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IN THIS THESIS, IT IS POSTULATED that a discrete body of health care law (HCL) can 
potentially offer more benefits to patients by providing protection for their rights and 
improving healthcare delivery as a result of making healthcare professionals and workers 
more aware of their legal duties towards patients than is the case where a field of HCL is 
absent. The emergence of a discrete body of HCL in England and Wales has not received a 
great deal of attention in the academic literature; there has not, as of yet, been any 
thorough study of the questions of how and why this relatively new field of law emerged 
three decades ago. This thesis addresses this gap in the literature and explores those 
attractive elements of HCL in the law of England and Wales that may be emulated by a 
jurisdiction like Ghana, which is seeking to develop this field of the law. A combination of 
legal history and empirical legal research methodologies are deployed to unpack the 
development of HCL in England and Wales as a response to the quest for patient 
empowerment in healthcare and the need to recognise the voice of society in mediating 
ethical dilemmas generated by rapid advances in medicine. The characteristics of HCL and 
rationale for its emergence in England and Wales are used as a basis of comparison within a 
functional comparative analytical framework in order to explore the need for the 
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INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE SCENE 
1.1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
Ghana and Great Britain (in particular England and Wales) are two countries in stark 
contrast to each other, whilst at the same time sharing some discernible similarities in the 
context of healthcare delivery. Ghana is a Republic which gained independence from Great 
Britain in 1957. Consequently, Ghana’s legal system is modelled upon the English common 
law tradition.1 Within World Bank classification, Ghana is a developing country with lower 
middle income status2 and as of 2012, had a population of 25.37 million.3 The healthcare 
system in Ghana has undergone many changes as a result of the various transformations in 
its political economy and now almost 70% of healthcare in Ghana is delivered by the public 
sector,4 which has been financed through a national health insurance scheme since 2004.5 
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), Ghana’s health expenditure in 2011 was 
only 4.8% of its GDP.6 Meanwhile, the total expenditure on health per capita was just USD 
90.7 Life expectancy at birth around the same period was 62 years for men and 65 for 
women.8 The physician to population ratio (per 10,000 population) was one doctor to 
10,000 patients.9 The nursing and midwifery personnel to population ratio (per 10,000 
                                                          
1 RF Oppong, Private International Law in Ghana (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2012), 15.  
2 World Bank Country Profile: Ghana, http://data.worldbank.org/country/Ghana (accessed: 7/4/2014) 
3 Ibid. 
4 J Akazili, B Garshong, M Aikins, J Gyapong and D McIntyre, ‘Progressivity of health care financing and 
incidence of service benefits in Ghana’ (2012) 27 Health Policy Planning (Suppl. 1), 113-122. 
5 Ibid. 
6 WHO African Region: Ghana, http://www.who.int/countries/gha/en/ (accessed: 10/9/2012).  
7 Ibid. 
8  Ibid. 
9 WHO: Ghana Publications, http://www.afro.who.int/en/ghana/ghana-publications.html (accessed: 
10/9/2012).   
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population) is one nurse to 6,705 persons.10 The HIV/AIDS mortality rate11 (per 100,000 
population) in Ghana as at 2007 was 89.12 Furthermore, there have been numerous 
complaints of patient abuses and scandalous practices in healthcare institutions reported in 
the media, but there have never been any formal or open public inquiries into the operation 
of healthcare or patients’ experiences in Ghana. 
 England and Wales, on the other hand, is a monarchical democracy with an unwritten 
constitution.13 Its legal system is the home of the common law tradition dating back to AD 
1066. With a population of approximately 63 million, it has a Gross National Income per 
capita of 37,340 USD and spends 9.3% of its GDP on healthcare.14 As part of the 
establishment of its welfare state, England and Wales (and the entire UK) have operated the 
National Health Service (NHS) since 1948, which is publically funded through taxation. For 
the purpose of the discussion in this section, I shall focus on the NHS in England, where the 
physician population per capita is 1:440.15 
There have been many scandals in healthcare delivery which have triggered the setting 
up of public inquiries.16 These public inquiries have served various purposes, including 
establishing facts; learning from events; catharsis or therapeutic exposure; public 
                                                          
 10 Ibid.   
11 Ibid. 
12 This is a significant improvement on the 500-plus of previous decades. This increased life span of HIV 
patients can be attributed to free antiretroviral drugs. 
13 Solely for the purposes of my outline of the country’s health profile, I propose to use ‘United Kingdom’ 
interchangeably with ‘England and Wales’, since the latter is subsumed under the UK. 
14 WHO Countries: United Kingdom, http://www.who.int/countries/gbr/en/ (accessed: 11/4/2014).  
15 Office of Health Statistics: http://ohe.org/page/index.cfm (accessed: 14/4/2014). 
16 Examples include:  Clothier Report Independent inquiry relating to deaths and injuries on the children's ward 
at Grantham and Kesteven General Hospital (London: HMSO, 1994) (Clothier inquiry); The report of the public 
inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995: learning from Bristol (Cm 5207, 
2001) (Kennedy inquiry); The Royal Liverpool Children's Inquiry Report (London: The Stationery Office, 2001) 
(Redfern inquiry); The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, HC 947 (London: The Stationery 
Office ) (Francis inquiry). See Chapter Six for a more nuanced discussion of public inquiries in healthcare.  
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reassurance; accountability, and blame and retribution.17 These inquiries, which are given 
significant media publicity, have also usually culminated in elaborate reports serving as a 
basis for reforms and the drafting of relevant bills, such as the Human Tissue Act, 2004, 
brought about as a consequence of, among things, the Alder Hey organs scandal,18 where 
the organs of deceased children had been retained by the Alder Hey Children's Hospital 
without consent, and the Kennedy inquiry into heart surgery on children at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary.19 Besides the new legislative intervention in these virtually uncharted waters, the 
courts have also increasingly become involved in the resolution of moral dilemmas in 
medical practice, in ways that were previously inconceivable, such as deciding when to 
withdraw or discontinue lifesaving nutrition and treatment, as in Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland.20 What will therefore become apparent in this thesis is that the question of whether 
the courts successfully rise to the occasion when it comes to determining these moral or 
ethical dilemmas, is contested among commentators.21 Nonetheless, for now, what is 
significant is that unlike many decades (and indeed centuries) before the significant period 
of the 1980s22, many cases that would have been previously not presented to the courts 
now come before them.23  The novelty of the cases emanating from medicine for judicial 
resolution in England and Wales has challenged the boundaries of common law and 
necessitated the rethinking of the applicability of conventional or settled doctrines to 
previously un-litigated aspects of medicine. As will be discussed, the tension between 
                                                          
17 N Black and N May, ‘Public inquiries into Health Care in the UK: A Sound basis for Policy-Making?’ (2013) 18 
Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 129. 
18 Redfern inquiry, n. 16 above. 
19 Kennedy inquiry, n. 16 above. 
20 [1993] 1 All ER 821 at 872 
21 See generally: J Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship (Oxford: Hart Publishing 
2007). 
22 See section 1.5.2 of the Thesis for a justification of choice of 1980 as a significant period of reference. 
23 See, for example, the court’s intervention in contraception therapy for girls under 16 in  Department of 
Health and Social Security v Gillick [1985] 3 All ER 402; discontinuation of artificial life-sustaining nutrition and 
hydration in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland  [1993] 1 All ER 821. 
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patient rights, professional discretion and the need for unimpeded progress in medicine has 
called into question the proper role of law vis-à-vis medicine in judicial, parliamentary and 
academic circles.  
Although Ghana is relatively underdeveloped compared to England and Wales, broadly 
speaking, it is still possible to study the changing response of law to medicine in both 
jurisdictions. This is particularly apposite since, as noted, both countries share the common 
law legal tradition (as a result of colonial legacy) and operate a national public sector-funded 
healthcare system.  
1.2. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS 
There has been increasing concern over patients’ clinical experiences and healthcare in 
general in Ghana. This concern (as will become apparent in Chapters Four and Six), is 
evidenced by frequent complaints brought against healthcare institutions and professionals 
in the media and recent cases brought before the courts, as well as before quasi-judicial 
bodies. The issues arising from healthcare and medical practice which make headlines in the 
media24 reveal multiple layers of complexity that transcend the micro-issues of doctor-
patient relations to macro-thematic areas, like access to healthcare and the regulation of 
ethically sensitive medical advances being imported into Ghana. These media headlines 
include ‘Doctors render woman barren ...after leaving towel in her abdomen’25; ‘Killed by a 
Doctor’26; ‘200 Children cry for help to undergo treatment’27; ‘Nsawam hospital has no 
                                                          
24 See: Chapter Six, particularly 6.1 and 6.2 for a more detailed discussion of these matters that make the 
headlines.  
25 The Mirror Reporter, ‘Doctors render woman barren ...after leaving towel in her abdomen’ (The Mirror, 
22/09/2012 edn) http://mobile.ghanaweb.com/wap/article.php?ID=251108 (accessed: 1/9/2014).  
26 The Insight Reporter (The Insight, 2014 edn) http://www.ghanamma.com/killed-by-a-doctor/ (accessed: 
12/3/2014). 
27 MY Jafaru, ‘200 Children cry for help to undergo treatment’ http://graphic.com.gh/news/general-
news/23023-200-children-cry-for-help-to-undergo-treatment.html (accessed: 17/5/2014). 
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incubators’28; and ‘MoH gives ultimatum to KATH [Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital] to 
produce five stillborn babies.’29 The reported media stories and the few available judicial 
decisions portray not only excessive medical paternalism but, more worryingly, the general 
exploitation of vulnerable patients by health professionals.30 Some examples suggest that 
health professionals are free to behave towards patients as if the law and even their 
professional ethics imposed no obligations on them towards patients. Symptomatic of this 
tendency was a public debate on a popular radio station in 2011 which took place between 
two medical practitioners over whether a doctor had a duty in law to explain the 
implications of a prescription to his or her patients.31 This conundrum is exacerbated by the 
fact that a significant segment of the patient population in Ghana is largely unaware of the 
rights provided for them in their clinical experience. There is also the cultural attitude of 
accepting statements or decisions from the elderly (including experts in this case) without 
challenge. Moreover, Ghana’s economic realities complicate the matter. The expectations of 
the citizenry, as regards healthcare from state-sponsored health facilities, are not pursued 
with sufficient vigour, as the obligations of the state in this regard are neither neatly 
calibrated nor adequately appreciated by the patients. The upshot of this is that even 
patients who use publicly funded healthcare institutions tend to see such institutions as 
doing them a favour and are thus reluctant to complain about any disregard for their rights 
during their clinical encounters. 
                                                          
28 The Reporter, ‘Nsawam hospital has no incubators’  
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/health/artikel.php?ID=304824 (accessed: 21/5/2014).  
29 R. Quaicoe-Duho, ‘MoH gives ultimatum to KATH to produce five stillborn babies’ - 
http://graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/18467-moh-gives-ultimatum-to-kath-to-produce-five-stillborn-
babies.html (accessed: 21/5/2014).  




A separate but not completely unrelated issue to the matters identified here involves 
the challenges attendant upon the absence of any legal regulation of the technological 
advances in reproductive and organ transplantation being imported into Ghana. While some 
of these advances are being lauded32 for the solution they promise to provide to the 
situation faced by many families, at the same time legitimate concerns are being registered 
by members of the public and organised groups against scandalous practices associated with 
them. For example, the increasing commercialisation of sperm for fertility treatment has 
been condemned by various sections of the Ghanaian public.33 Such difficult issues 
confronting patients and healthcare delivery in general in Ghana provoke a question about 
the role of law in all these developments. Is it the case that these matters are not 
adequately regulated by the law at all; or that the law addresses aspects of those matters in 
an incoherent manner; or is it that the legal community, and perhaps the healthcare 
profession, have not yet come to realise that healthcare is an area with unique 
characteristics that warrants special study or analysis, rather than merely being subsumed 
under more general law? In considering this, it is also helpful to take into account the 
historical context of law in Ghana. 
As noted above, Ghana gained independence from Great Britain on 6th March, 1957. 
Consequently, Ghana’s legal system was derived from English common law, and the 
traditional branches of law as conceptualised under common law also exist in Ghana. 
Similarly, the curriculum in legal education reflects those divisions of law.34 It has not 
generally been considered that healthcare necessitates a special approach in law. Indeed, 
                                                          
32 EE Abbey, ‘Infertility conference attracts over 1,500’ http://graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/19539-
infertility-conference-attracts-over-1-500.html (accessed: 21/5/2014).  
33 ‘Catholic Bishops conference condemns sale of sperms in Ghana’ 
http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201309/112759.php (accessed: 24/3/2014). 
34Copies of the Curriculum Handbook of Law Faculties of the University of Ghana and Kwame Nkrumah 
University of Science and Technology are available in my folder. 
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until 2013, when a statute was passed in Ghana to specifically deal with healthcare, no 
special normative standards were incorporated into it to demonstrate that legal issues in 
healthcare are significantly unique from all other areas. An apt description of the reality of 
Ghana’s legal system in relation to healthcare is that it has no discrete body of health care 
law (HCL),35 but rather a patchwork of texts from criminal, contract, tort and constitutional 
law. Thus, to understand the legal position on an issue arising from healthcare or medical 
advances in Ghana, one must look at all these branches of the law and the relevant case law 
under each of them. What aggravates the patchy legal situation is that there has not been 
any systematic effort to draw together all the relevant aspects of these different branches of 
the law into a coherent analytical study.   
In contrast, in England and Wales there has emerged a dedicated field of law, which 
deals with healthcare.36 Thus, there has been recognition among the legal community, 
politicians and healthcare professions in England and Wales that healthcare is a uniquely 
sensitive and risky area of human endeavour that necessitates a different way of thinking 
and analysis. Even where the conceptual tools for analysis have been borrowed from 
traditional areas of the law, they have been bent or adapted to suit the special 
circumstances of the healthcare. A typical example here is the standard of care in medical 
negligence, compared to the judicial approach towards other professional negligence in tort 
law. Brazier and Miola have aptly noted that the decision in Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee37 and its subsequent application in many cases created the 
impression that litigant in medical negligence cases only needed to get experts to testify 
                                                          
35 See: Section 1.5 below for an explanation of my choice of the term ‘HCL’. 
36 See: Chapter Three.  
37 [1957] 1 WLR 582 
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that they would have done virtually the same as the defendant did.38 In contrast, in other 
professional negligence litigation, the courts will ensure that ‘the expert evidence is 
demonstrably reasonable and responsible.’39 It is noteworthy that health care law (HCL) as a 
discipline was not part of English law until after 1980. It is my contention that understanding 
the circumstances concerning how and why a discrete body of HCL emerged in England and 
Wales can assist in exploring pathways that Ghana may follow towards the development of 
its own HCL.  
A fundamental assumption I make in this thesis is that a discrete body of HCL coupled 
with other liberalising factors can offer more benefits to patients by providing protection for 
their rights and improving healthcare delivery, as a result of making healthcare professionals 
and workers more significantly aware of their legal duties towards patients than is the case 
where a field of HCL is absent. It is pertinent to pinpoint at the outset that development of a 
distinct body of HCL by itself did not automatically bring about patient empowerment in 
England and Wales but so many other factors interacted to liberalise this area of the law.   
On the basis of this fundamental assumption, the research question being investigated 
in this thesis is two-fold, namely: how and why a discrete body of HCL emerged in England 
and Wales, and secondly, what lessons can Ghana draw from the English and Welsh 
experience? The first limb of the research question presupposes that a discrete body of HCL 
has not always been part of the recognised divisions of the law of England and Wales, but 
only emerged some time later, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Three of this thesis. It is 
also implicit in this aspect of the research question that there is an identifiable or discernible 
body of HCL in England and Wales. The other limb of the question suggests two possible 
                                                          





scenarios in relation to Ghana. One possibility is that there is an absence of a discrete body 
of HCL in Ghana, for which reason an effort is being made to draw lessons from a jurisdiction 
like England and Wales, which has a matured field of HCL. The other possible interpretation 
of the second limb of the research question could be that a discrete body of HCL is already 
extant in Ghana, but it is woefully inadequate or unsatisfactory, so there is the need to draw 
lessons from England and Wales in order to make improvements in Ghanaian HCL. In this 
thesis, I shall adopt the first interpretation of the second limb of the research question. 
Consequently, the thesis proceeds on the fundamental assumption, which I test and confirm 
in Chapter Four, that Ghana does not have a discrete legal field that may be called HCL, or 
which may go by any of the equivalent labels usually assigned in the field. 
In order to probe this two-limbed research question, it is necessary to reduce it to a 
hypothesis, which can be tested. In relation to the first limb, the hypothesis can be stated as: 
the quest for patient empowerment and the legal academic interest in medical advances 
accelerated the emergence of HCL as a distinct body of law in England and Wales. The 
import of the first hypothesis is that the field of HCL in England and Wales did not emerge in 
a vacuum, but was the product of a complex interaction between an increasing demand for 
respect for patient rights and the research interest which legal academics have developed in 
issues arising from medical advances. The second hypothesis of this thesis, which may be 
derived from the other limb of the research question, may be stated as: the need to protect 
patients’ rights and enhanced public awareness of the implications of medical advances 
should necessitate the development of a distinct body of HCL in Ghana. 
 





This thesis seeks to achieve four objectives, namely: 
a. to clarify the status of healthcare law as a legal field and academic discipline in 
England and Wales; 
b. to explore the  historical context of the development of HCL in England and Wales; 
c. to survey Ghanaian law for the existence or absence of a distinct body of HCL 
through the prism of English and Welsh HCL, and 
d. to explore potential lessons that can be drawn by Ghana from the development of 
HCL in England and Wales. 
Notwithstanding the existence of many other countries with a discernible field of HCL, 
my choice of England and Wales as a comparator jurisdiction is a well-considered one and 
can be justified on historical, doctrinal and practical grounds. As noted above, historically, 
Ghana was a British colony and its legal system is modelled upon the legal system and legal 
tradition of the former colonial ruler. Consequently, both Ghana and England and Wales 
(broadly speaking, Great Britain) share a common conceptualisation of law. Related to this 
historical nexus is a doctrinal compatibility. The judicial practice in Ghana reveals that 
Ghanaian courts continue to follow legal concepts and reasoning as embodied in English and 
Welsh decisions and rarely depart from them, except where absolutely necessary. The 
tendency to follow English and Welsh legal doctrines is also observable in the context of law-
making via Parliament. Some statutes adopted even after independence draw inspiration 
from English statutes.40 Thus, the historical and doctrinal links make it reasonable to use 
England and Wales as a basis for exploring the case for the development of a discrete body 
of HCL in Ghana. There are other common law jurisdictions, like Canada, Australia, and New 
                                                          
40 For example, see: Ghana’s Contract Act, 1960; the Data Protection Act, 2012, and the UK’s Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943 and Data Protection Act, 1998. 
 
41 K Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2007) 149. 
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Zealand that have a discrete body of HCL, but they do not have historical connections with 
Ghana.   
1.4. ORIGINALITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Undoubtedly, some commentators have earlier endeavoured to explore whether HCL 
has attained the status of a field of law (or a discrete body of law), they do so in rather 
perfunctory manner.  Nevertheless, Veitch’s monograph, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law, is 
the only work which is specifically dedicated to exploring the nature of HCL as a legal 
discipline in England and Wales. it seeks to test the rhetoric of academic medical law that 
‘ethical issues arising in the course of medical practice and from applications of 
technological developments in biomedical science should be determined outside of 
medicine, and that the most appropriate site for this ought to be the law.’41 Veitch 
concludes that the realities of the institutional framework of common law within which the 
courts operate tend to result in a situation whereby the real ethical or moral conundrum 
presented by HCL cases is side-stepped by the courts. Veitch’s work does not follow 
traditional approaches to the subject, as can be found in the textbooks42 which explore 
almost all the key themes43 of the discipline, and in the monographs44 that usually address 
one HCL theme, since the discussion and analysis do not revolve around a particular area of, 
or issue within HCL. In fact, cases from different spheres of HCL are used for the purpose of 
                                                          
41 K Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2007) 149. 
42 For textbooks, see:  J K Mason and GT Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (8th edn, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010); J Montgomery, Health Care Law (1st edn, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1997); M Davies, Textbook on Medical Law (2nd edn, London: Blackstone Press Ltd 1998).  
43 As established by an empirical survey reported in Chapter Three. 
44 For examples of just two of the many HCL monographs, see: S Fovargue, Xenotransplantation and Risk: 
Regulating a Developing Biotechnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012); A McLean, Autonomy, 
Informed Consent and Medical Law: A Relational Challenge (Cambridge Law: Medicine and Ethics 2009).  
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developing his arguments.45 This is one point of intersection between Veitch’s work and my 
thesis.  
Nevertheless, I do not merely repeat or rehearse his work since my thesis goes further 
than such boundaries. In the first place, as far as the first limb of my research question is 
concerned, unlike Veitch’s work, my thesis explores the existence of this field of law through 
an empirical investigation and doctrinal evaluation. Another aspect of originality within my 
thesis with respect to the first limb of the research question is that it does not limit its scope 
of investigation purely to common law but includes statutory and quasi-statutory sources in 
its investigations; at least to the extent of gauging the empirical foundation of HCL’s claim to 
a discrete status. Moreover, this thesis has systematically collected and analysed empirical 
data to verify the assertion in the literature that HCL is a distinct discipline because it has 
secured a place in the curriculum of law schools and research agenda of academics. 
Additionally, I have ascertained the views and reflections of pioneering scholars on the 
evolutionary trajectory of this field of law through empirical research; this aspect fills an 
important gap in the existing literature which has hitherto failed to provide such a detailed 
account of the contribution of the first generation of HCL academics in the development of 
the discipline.  
The significance of this study should not be overstated; its remit is evident from the 
focused statement of the double-barrelled research question. Nevertheless, two points are 
worth canvassing in relation to the two jurisdictions to be studied. It is certainly true that an 
enormous amount of academic research has been conducted in relation to English HCL, but, 
as pointed out above, there is a missing link in the literature concerning the historical 
evolution of this field of law as seen through the lens of pioneering scholars. This thesis 
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seeks, among other things, to fill this gap. With respect to Ghana, it is therefore both historic 
and significant, one central argument being that the development of a discrete body of HCL - 
currently lacking in Ghana – together with other social and cultural changes could assist in 
containing the existing excessive medical paternalism and would thereby facilitate patient 
empowerment. An important related aspect of this thesis is the plea being made to initiate 
the legal regulation of medical advances imported from abroad into healthcare in Ghana. It 
is significant to note that until this research was undertaken, there had never been a 
comprehensive, focused analysis of Ghanaian law and its relationship with healthcare. As a 
legacy of this thesis, its initial exploratory research46 culminated in the first ever entry on 
Ghana in the International Encyclopedia of Medical Law.47  This maiden entry further 
reinforces one of the central arguments in this thesis, that until my present research, there 
was no instance in the literature where all the relevant Ghanaian statutes and cases on 
healthcare were brought together into a single analytical work. However, it is important to 
clarify here that the contribution on Ghana to this international encyclopaedia does not 
suggest there is a discrete field of HCL in Ghana. Indeed, this contribution is just the first 
step in a long journey towards a matured field of HCL in Ghana which would be functionally 
equivalent to the role of HCL in England and Wales.  
1.5.0. SOME PRELIMINARY ISSUES  
In order to situate the thesis in a proper context it is necessary to address some preliminary 
issues including appropriate label or description of the field of law to which the thesis 
belongs as well as a justification for a watershed period or commencement of this field of 
law.  
                                                          
46 That is, research leading to a write-up of Chapters Four and Six. 
47 E Owusu-Dapaa, 'Ghana' in H Nys (ed), International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Medical Law (Alphen aan den 
Rijn, (NL: Kluwer Law International 2014) 131. 
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1.5.1 TERMINOLOGICAL CLARIFICATION 
The existing literature is replete with varying labels or designations for this field. 
Typically, one may come across terms such as ‘medical law’, ‘health care law’, ‘health law’, 
or ‘law and medicine’. Some of these designations may also quite rightly have ‘ethics’ 
attached to them. My overriding concern in this thesis is to chart the legal aspects of 
healthcare or medical practice within the remit of my research question.  Consequently, I 
exclude the ‘ethics’ component from my present analysis in this section, as regards 
designations for the field. It is indisputable that HCL goes hand in hand with ethics and so my 
decision to exclude ethics from the title of this thesis should not be taken to suggest I 
contend that ethics is irrelevant, but rather that law is my central concern. Nevertheless, the 
line between ethics and law in the context of healthcare is often difficult to draw. As Jackson 
has aptly noted, ‘it would be artificial to draw a sharp distinction between medical law and 
ethics.’48 Ethical discourse plays a role in legal analyses in this field of the law. Indeed, the 
number of textbooks written by pioneer scholars in this field, as presented in Table 2 in 
Chapter Three, which do not include ethics in their titles, substantially outnumber those that 
do, despite the fact they still include ethics in their treatment. The  extent of the usage of 
‘ethics’ in designations for this field of law in school curricula in England and Wales is 
addressed in Chapter Three.  
The name or title by which a field of law is identified is a signpost to its nature and 
scope. However, the challenge of finding an appropriate name for a discipline is not unique 
to this area of law. There are many examples of naming a subject based upon a key aspect of 
identity and, sometimes, of its very existence. These include Tort versus Torts; Conflict of 
                                                          
48 E Jackson, Medical Law –Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) 3. 
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Laws versus Private International Law, and Comparative Law versus Law of Comparison.49 In 
the evolution of HCL, different names have been adopted by scholars in referring to this new 
field. Montgomery, and McHale and Fox use the ‘health care law’ label for their works,50 
whereas ‘medical law’ is the preferred description put forward by Kennedy and Grubb,51 
Hope,52 and Brazier and Glover.53  
Each of the different titles adopted by scholars of this discipline has its underlying 
assumption regarding the subject matter or core themes of the discipline. Those who adopt 
the title ‘medical law’ or its variants, such as ‘medical law and ethics’, tend to perceive the 
core subject matter as the legal enforcement of the resolution of ethical dilemmas arising in 
the doctor-patient relationship. For example, Kennedy and Grubb have argued that medical 
law is ‘essentially concerned with the relationship between health care professionals 
(particularly doctors and to a lesser extent hospitals or other institutions) and patients.’54 
This approach to delineating the scope of this field begins with the work of doctors and 
proceeds outwards. The doctor–patient relationship is thus at the heart of the discipline, 
and this influences both the content of the subject and its underlying conceptual coherence. 
Montgomery has critiqued such an approach for individualising its focus in the application of 
ethical principles to the context of relationship.55 The problem inherent in the approach led 
by Kennedy and Grubb to the field is that by restricting the subject’s scope to issues raised in 
a clinical or medical context, a number of important areas are potentially excluded. Areas of 
                                                          
49 See generally: E Orucu, The Enigma of Comparative Law Variation on Themes for the Twenty-First Century 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 7-18; PD Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (London: 
Routledge-Cavendish 2007).   
50 J Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003); J McHale and M Fox, Health Care 
Law: Text and Materials (2nd edn, London: Sweet and Maxwell 2007).  
51 I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law: Text and Materials (3rd edn, London: Butterworths 2000). 
52 RA Hope, 'The Birth of Medical Law' (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 247, 253. 
53 M Brazier and N Glover, ‘Does Medical Law Have a Future?’ in D Hayton (ed), Law’s Future(s) (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2000) 371. 
54 I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical law (London: Butterworths 1989) 1. 
55 Montgomery, n 50 above, 1. 
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equal importance that risk exclusion under this paradigm include other health professionals, 
the health institutions that provide the platform for the delivery of health care, and public 
health and global health issues.56 It is thus not surprising that some scholars, including 
Sheldon and Thomson57, Hervey and McHale58 and Cruz59 have questioned the suitability of 
Kennedy and Grubb’s label and definition of the discipline. 
  In contrast, Montgomery, one of the leading proponents of the title ‘health care law’, 
rejects the doctor-patient paradigm. Rather, he contends that the subject ought to be 
defined in terms of the country’s ‘international obligation to tackle health problems and 
ensure that citizens have access to health care that they need.’60 His approach appears 
attractive, except in one significant respect. The attempt to define HCL in terms of the 
state’s obligation under international instruments to address health problems can 
potentially overstate the boundaries of the subject, due to the elastic nature of the concept 
of health, which could result in almost every aspect of law and policy being considered as 
falling within the scope of the subject. The objection to defining HCL as having illimitable 
scope is that it would risk a lack of coherence or conceptual unity and undermine its claim to 
a discrete status in the legal academy. 
Nevertheless, a broad conception of the subject as contemplated by Montgomery’s 
approach has ‘the advantage that it extends beyond those legal measures, to link health law 
and policy to other social policy fields, such as poverty or social exclusion’.61 Despite 
Montgomery’s personal preference for the label ‘health care law’, he concedes that what is 
                                                          
56 Ibid. 
57 S Sheldon and M Thomson (eds), ‘Health Care Law and Feminism: A Developing Relationship’ in S Sheldon 
and M Thomson, Feminist Perspectives On Health Care Law (London: Cavendish Publishing 1998) ch 1. 
58 TK Hervey and JV McHale, Health Law and European Union (Cambridge: CUP 2004) 17. 
59 PD Cruz, Comparative Healthcare Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd 2001) iv.  
60Montgomery,  Ibid n 50. 
61 J McHale and M Fox, Health Care Law: Text and Materials (London: Sweet and Maxwell 2006) 8. 
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in vogue since the emergence of the discipline is the ‘medical law’ label.62 For the purposes 
of this thesis, my preferred label for this field is HCL because it provides the discipline with a 
broader focus and encompasses other health care professionals, such as nurses. It offers a 
truer representation of the legal regulation of health care delivery than the narrower focus 
of the doctor-patient relationship that medical law suggests. In their contribution to 21st 
century reflections on British legal developments, Brazier and Glover comment on the 
different titles or labels used for the discipline: 
The difference between these two approaches [medical law and health care law] is 
more than just nomenclature. Medical law which focuses on a relationship between 
doctors and patients remains in essence a creature of private law. Albeit NHS 
patients have no contractual relationship with their doctors, echoes of contract still 
haunt their encounters. Health care law is located more firmly in public law. 
Doctors are shifted to the margins of debate. The needs, and even rights, of 
individual patients must be viewed within a wider context of protecting health and 
promoting public goods. A shift from medical law to health care law seems 
inevitable. We suggest that what we now call medical law will undergo much 
greater upheaval than simply a change of name. Society’s understanding of illness is 
in flux. 63 
 
These observations are an accurate assessment of the state of affairs with respect to this 
discipline, but the suggestion that medical law is a creature of private law and that HCL is 
located in the realm of public law is not a complete portrayal of the public/private law 
dimensions of this discipline. Brazier and Glover argue that medical law is a private law 
creation because it focuses on the doctor-patient relationship, but since the emergence of 
the discipline post-1980, and even before the more modern label of HCL, the focus has not 
only been on the doctor-patient relationship. In fact, issues such as the institutional 
arrangements of healthcare delivery, resource allocation and public health have also 
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engaged the attention of scholars and law makers.64 In my view, whether the discipline is 
labelled ‘medical law’ or HCL, it generates issues that transcend the private/public law 
dichotomy. As the subject matter of the discipline expands in leaps and bounds, it may be 
desirable to conceptualise medical law as a subset of HCL. For example, Brazier and Glover 
have predicted that since significant aspects of healthcare enjoyed by the young and aged 
are delivered by both ‘social care and healthcare providers’, it is indicative of the fact in the 
foreseeable future HCL may be integrated social welfare law.65 Nevertheless, as stated 
above, my preferred label throughout this thesis will be HCL. My preference for HCL is 
further reinforced by the view ‘that while the regulation of the doctor-patient relationship is 
important, such a restricted focus in determining a field of socio-legal enquiry has the effect 
of excluding a number of other key areas, and is thus in danger of providing an 
unrepresentative approach to the legal regulation of healthcare delivery.’66 
1.5.2 ATTEMPTING TO DATE THE COMMENCEMENT OF HEALTH CARE LAW AS DISTINCT 
BODY OF LAW. 
It is not an easy task to pinpoint time period within which HCL emerged with exactitude. In 
my view, identifying a precise commencement date for the discipline of HCL is rather 
difficult. This is especially so since, in a broad sense, it could be argued that there has always 
been some sort of medico-legal regulation from the very inception of law in society. Thus, 
there has always been some form of regulation of medicine even going ‘as far back from the 
Hammurabi Code of the ancient Babylonian empire, through the Hippocratic Code of Greek 
                                                          
64 JK Mason and GT Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2006) ch 1-3; E Jackson, Medical Law –Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) ch 2, 6 
and 7; I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law (3rd edn, London: Butterworths 2000) ch 2 and 3. 
65Ibid n 53.  
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Medicine which spread into the Roman Empire.’67 Nevertheless, a reasoned estimate of the 
temporal context will illuminate our appreciation of the historical trajectory of the discipline. 
As I have noted elsewhere it would be ‘helpful to identify an era in which the discipline 
became visible in academic circles and public discourse.’68 There are differing opinions as to 
when HCL was ‘born’ or ‘developed’ in England and Wales. One could date HCL in England 
and Wales back to 1858, ‘when, after 20 years of negotiation, the British Medical 
Association’s (BMA) Medical Reform Committee, successfully secured the passing of the 
Medical Act, 1858.’69 The Act established the General Medical Council (GMC) and the 
Medical Register, which distinguished, for the first time, between qualified and unqualified 
practitioners.70  Roberts has opined that the passage of the Act was ‘a distinctive version of 
medical reform’ since  ‘MPs were acting to mediate, not just between divergent strands of a 
still fluidly defined profession, but between professional and lay conceptions of the role of 
the medical practitioner as well.’71 Thus, if HCL is understood merely as the existence or 
creation of statutes to regulate the practice of medicine in order to safeguard the public 
from the hazards of quackery, then 1858 may be a viable proposition as the date HCL first 
appeared. On the other hand, if HCL as a distinct body is to be understood as having a well-
defined place in the legal academy and in particular having attained most of the defining 
characteristics identified in Chapter Three, then 1858 would not be the start date for the 
discipline. HCL was not then taught as a course in universities, nor did it have a significant 
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volume of dedicated legislation or case law in this jurisdiction.72 Scholarly writing in the area 
was virtually non-existent compared to the situation post-1980.73 
Another possible start date for HCL may be 1958, when Glanville Williams published 
the seminal HCL-related book entitled, ‘The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law.’ He 
presented controversial arguments relating to thought-provoking issues, such as euthanasia, 
abortion, contraception, sterilisation and artificial insemination. Undoubtedly, Williams’ 
work was remarkable for being a pioneering effort by an academic lawyer to engage in an 
analysis of these complex ethical issues arising in the delivery of healthcare. However, it did 
not have a dramatic impact on the evolution of HCL as a discrete subject. A plausible 
explanation for this is that the major medical advances which were to excite public interest 
in the legal regulation of bioethical dilemmas had not then crystallised. Therefore, while 
literature74 on the interface between law and healthcare has been published since the 
nineteenth century, I consider the period between 1980 and 2000 to be the defining years 
for HCL as a distinct branch of English law because it was during those two decades that the 
discipline became sufficiently visible and effectively met the criteria identified in Chapter 
Three as the hallmark of a distinct body of law. 
As it has been argued in Chapter Five there is no doubt that there has always been a 
relationship between law and medicine. Nevertheless, it is my submission that an 
exploration of the emergence of HCL as a distinct discipline needs a particular moment of 
commencement.  Thus, the use of ‘new’ as a qualifier to HCL is intended to avoid creating a 
misleading impression that healthcare or medical practice became subject of legal 
                                                          
72 See: Chapter Three of this thesis. 
73 Ibid. 
74 For example, AS Taylor, Elements of Medical Jurisprudence (London: Deacon 1836); JT Smith, The Laws of 
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regulation after 1980. On the contrary, the period 1980-2000 has been carefully selected in 
this thesis as the most plausible period during which HCL in England and Wales fully 
exhibited the working criteria or characteristics of a legal field. A more nuanced justification 
for the choice of the historical period is provided for in Chapter Five.75  
At this stage of the setting the scene for the substantive discussions few key points 
are worth underscoring. In the first place, in accordance with the overwhelming consensus 
of pioneering HCL scholars (as discussed in Chapter Five) that period 1980  to mid 1980 is a 
watershed moment in academic interest in HCL due largely to the huge public interest 
generated by Ian Kennedy’s Unmasking Medicine’s lecture and publication. Secondly, it 
might be contended that the period mid-1980 to early 1990s are the most conservative 
period in English HCL, with Bolam running rampant and patients’ rights totally ignored. 
Brazier and Miola76 as well as other commentators77 have rightly noted that the courts 
application of Bolam test suggested that they had abandoned their judicial duty to protect 
patient rights by failure to examine professional judgement of medical doctors. It was rather 
surprising that the courts were extremely deferential towards doctors (unlike other 
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76 M. Brazier, J. Miola, ‘Bye- Bye Bolam- A Medical Litigation Revolution?’ (2000) 8 Medical Law Review 85.  
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1.6. KENNETH VEITCH’S JURISIDICTION OF MEDICAL LAW IN EXPLORING THE NATURE OF 
HEALTH CARE LAW  
As earlier pointed out Kenneth Veitch is one author who has extensively engaged the issue 
of what HCL (or Medical Law) is. It is helpful that his work is used as a foundation for the 
discussion in this thesis relating to the relationship between development of a discrete 
discipline of HCL and its potential to contribute towards patient empowerment. The 
question concerning what is the nature of Health Care Law (HCL) is a proper one to ask as 
for many good reasons. Firstly, it ‘relates to the attempt to determine the scope of the 
subject’, that is, ‘identifying the nature of the actors and topics that ought to constitute the 
subject’s focus of study’.79 Secondly, it is necessary intellectual inquiry because of ‘its 
novelty as an academic subject’.80 Moreover, reflecting on the nature of HCL enables us to 
‘delineate its boundaries’81 and its relationship with other branches of law including tort, 
criminal law, property law, contract and public law. Engaging the question relationship 
between HCL and other branches of law is a worthy intellectual effort because of the 
argument by critics that HCL is just   ‘an amalgam of traditional categories of tort and 
criminal law’.82 
HCL is to be properly seen as ‘a responsibility’ rather than as ‘a prescriptive set of 
legal category’.83  Indeed, Veitch rightly contend that ‘[m]edical law is not simply about law; 
rather the questions and issues with which it is concerned have “philosophical, ethical 
sociological and political dimensions” too’.84  The question of defining ‘medical law’ is not 
                                                          
79 N 41 above,  14.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid 14. 
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really about ‘the need to delineate boundaries’ rather ‘it points to the need to acknowledge 
that medical law transcends the traditional legal requirement for a clear and settled 
framework’.85 According to Veitch, ‘if medical law has a definable feature at all it might be 
thought to reside in the nature of the problems it seeks to address (problems arising from 
developments in medicine and biomedical science that engage questions of human 
values)’.86  These problems studied in HCL are said to be ‘multifaceted’ and so ‘pressing’ that 
they defy ’clear boundaries’.87 
The academic study of HCL tends to challenge medical profession’s monopoly over 
resolution of ‘moral problems in medical practice’ that fall outside the technical knowledge 
properly so-called- ‘diagnosis, prognosis and treatment options available’.88 On the contrary 
academic HCL contend that ‘the ground rules of settling moral’ or ethical dilemmas in 
medicine ‘must be set by society’ through instrumentality of law.89   Indeed, Kennedy  and 
other HCL scholars  basically identify protection of rights of patients ( in the sense of 
negative and not-claim right) and the external determination of ethical standards in 
medicine as the ‘guiding features of medical law’.90 Veitch has argued that the ‘claim for 
jurisdiction’ for law in the resolution of moral/ethical dimensions of medicine has also got 
the other collateral benefit of ‘legitimating’ the sphere of HCL academics.91 
Veitch has expressed a well-founded concern that ‘the aspirational character of much of the 
legal academic commentary in this field- together with the need to stress the significance of 
ethical principles as a means by which to distinguish medical law as a subject in its own 
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right-‘has resulted in the neglect of the ‘fundamental business of inquiring into the actual 
working practices of the common law and the consequences of the manner in which these 
operate’.92  In this regard  there arises a  need to justify the status of a HCL as ‘a legitimate 
new  subject whose conceptual foundations and specific field of competence can clearly be 
distinguished from other more traditional , legal subjects as contract, tort and criminal 
law’.93 The ultimate outcome of developing legal jurisdiction through the development of a 
discrete body of HCL ‘is meant to convey to medicine and science that they can no longer 
expect to exercise exclusive control over the consequences of their practices’.94 That said, 
there still remains a question as to what relationship exist between the HCL and other  law 
subjects particularly the such traditional branches as tort, contract, criminal law, property 
and public law.  Exploring these relationship will invariably illuminate our appreciation of the 
boundaries between HCL and those other legal disciplines.  
1.7. HEALTH CARE LAW AND OTHER BRANCHES OF LAW 
The assertion that HCL is a discrete subject or field of law like others is likely to be greeted 
with the expectation as to whether it has got its own framework of substantive rules or 
principles like the others. It is thus crucial that one develops a better understanding of the 
status of HCL in order not to conflate it with settled doctrinal framework as in tort and 
others. Davies aptly sets the tone for exploring the relationship between HCL and ‘the 
general law’ when he remarks that:  
Criminal law, the law of torts, property, contract, family law and public law may at 
times apply in the medical context, but the traditional rules of those branches of 
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law have been strained and bent, if not at times broken, where medicine is in 
issue.95   
 
To start with HCL relies upon tort principles in some type of cases. Typically, grievances in 
the nature of medical injuries or malpractices may be pursued as either negligence or 
battery. Although the conventional requirements of tort must be satisfied, HCL presents 
additional dimension in the analysis as to whether certain elements are met or not. For 
example, in establishing the tort of battery it is critical to negative consent but what 
constitutes a valid consent may be given strained meaning in HCL. A consent which was not 
based upon adequate disclosure to the patient may, for example, not be considered as valid 
consent. Thus, tort principles are deployed but in a unique context and given a different 
emphasis.96 
Similarly, when claims from healthcare context are framed as tort of negligence all 
the usual ingredients of that tort need to be established but standard of care in relation to 
breach of duty as well as causation ( for determining resultant or consequent damage) will 
be bent or  modified to reflect peculiar consideration of HCL.97 Indeed, Miola has ably noted 
that the Bolam principle enunciated originally for medical negligence had been extended to 
shape many areas of HCL until recently.98 Furthermore, conventional principles for 
quantification of damages for breach of contract are modified in some respect when they 
are being applied to HCL cases. For example, due to inability to give absolute assurance 
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regarding treatment or procedures involving human health, it has been held that an action 
for breach of contract in the event of pregnancy after vasectomy will not lie.99   
What the foregoing examples suggest is that HCL still relies on other branches of law 
with some necessary modifications appropriate to the special circumstances of healthcare. It 
needs to be emphasized that this borrowing from other branches of law does not deprive 
HCL of its status as a discrete subject. Thus, the claim of HCL being a discrete body is to be 
properly understood as a distinct academic discipline. This has been discussed extensively in 
Chapters Three and Five. 
 
1.7. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Following on from the present introductory chapter, the thesis has six chapters, 
including the Conclusion. Chapter Two explains and justifies the methodology adopted for 
the research. It is indicated in Chapter Two that a blend of three legal research 
methodologies is utilised for investigating the research problem. These are: functional 
comparative methodology, legal history and empirical legal studies. Functional comparative 
methodology (FCM) proceeds from the premise that the transplantation of a panacea 
designed in one legal jurisdiction as an answer to a legal conundrum in another jurisdiction 
is conceptually flawed due to the unavoidable cultural and other factors underlying the legal 
institutions in each country. Nevertheless, FCM concedes that legal problems extant in one 
country may be equivalent or approximate to the legal problems encountered in other 
countries that have some similarities in the underlying characteristics of their legal systems. 
Consequently, as will be apparent in Chapter Two, FCM suggests that so long as some 
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common features can be identified as being shared by two jurisdictions, a legal problem can 
be conceptualised for the purpose of exploring legal solutions devised in one jurisdiction 
that serve the equivalent function of the answers provided in the other jurisdiction. Thus, 
the emphasis of FCM, as further elaborated upon in the chapter, is not to locate a similar or 
exact replica of a legal panacea for a problem adopted by a reference jurisdiction in the 
other jurisdiction being compared. Rather, it explores the degree of functional equivalence 
between solutions adopted by two jurisdictions in response to a common problem. In 
relation to HCL and in tandem with the emerging trend in the literature, I have adapted FCM 
slightly for the purpose of undertaking a sensible examination of the research problem. To 
this extent, I have borrowed the methodology of ‘lesson-drawing’ as a slight modification of 
the FCM. This means that for some areas of the legal problem being studied, where 
functional equivalence is not realistic due to the absence of effective incorporation of 
certain medical technologies into healthcare in Ghana (obviously due to economic 
constraints), I seek to explore useful lessons that Ghana may draw from England and Wales 
as it comes to regulate those aspects of healthcare in the foreseeable future. The actual 
application of FCM and its supplementary lesson-drawing are indicated in a more nuanced 
manner in the chapter. 
Moving on to Chapter Three, the thesis examines the assumption often taken for 
granted in the literature that HCL in England and Wales is a discrete body or distinct legal 
field. Four key issues will be addressed in the chapter. In the first place, I shall contextualise 
the issue of the discrete status of HCL by looking beyond HCL to a more fundamental 
question in legal theory of what constitutes a legal field (or discrete body of law). The 
chapter concedes that there is no formulaic prescription of what a legal field is, but draws 
upon reflections by some commentators on the issue of the legitimacy of certain new 
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disciplines of law as discrete fields. This yields a working framework that enables the chapter 
to construct what may be taken as indicia of a discrete body of law. Equipped with these 
indicators of a legal field, the chapter proceeds to evaluate HCL as constituted in England 
and Wales (between 1980 and 2000) in order to determine whether those requirements or 
characteristics of a legal field are satisfied. Chapter Three utilises empirical data from two 
surveys conducted to buttress some aspects of its claim that HCL emerged as a discrete field 
of law during the last four decades. Another issue explored in the chapter is the scholarship 
orientation that can be discerned so far from scholarly works in the field of HCL. Four 
strands of scholarship are identified, namely: the medical ethics-oriented approach; the 
human rights-based approach; the multi-method or pragmatic approach, and socio-legal 
approaches.     
 In Chapter Four, proceeding from the FCM framework and aided by the lesson-
drawing technique, the thesis explores the existence or absence of a discrete body of HCL in 
Ghana through the prism of proven characteristics of HCL in England and Wales. Consistent 
with the two limbs of the working hypothesis, the thesis identifies two cardinal problems in 
Ghana: the disempowerment of patients through longstanding, unchallenged and excessive 
medical paternalism and the regulatory vacuum in relation to legal and ethical dilemmas 
medical advances imported into the country. Having already contended in the previous 
chapter that a discrete body of HCL in England and Wales emerged largely in response to 
these two problems, Chapter Four explores first whether a discrete body of HCL exists in 
Ghana and secondly, whether the two major factors contributed to the development of a 
field of HCL in England and Wales are discernible in Ghanaian society.  
 The contributory factors for the emergence of a discrete body of HCL in England and 
Wales are considered in Chapter Five. First, the chapter explores the extent to which the 
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revival of liberalism and human rights thinking in the post-Second World War era impacted 
on the evolutionary trajectory of this field of law. The projection of individual liberty and its 
concomitant assertive citizenry are assessed in the chapter. Related to this is the distrust of 
the healthcare profession and biomedical science in general following the scandalous 
scientific behaviour reported during the Nuremberg Trials and questionable medical 
experiments undertaken on both sides of the Atlantic prior to 1970. The phenomenal role 
played by the media in stimulating public awareness and interest in various aspects of 
healthcare is explored in this chapter. In this regard, I contend that the media has assisted 
by unearthing scandalous medical practices and publicising formal inquiries into healthcare 
scandals. A related argument advanced in this chapter is that the media does not just 
convey disturbing news about healthcare, but also positive and exhilarating news regarding 
breakthroughs in medical advances. In particular, the spectacular effect of the BBC Reith 
Lecture series (1980-81) on the theme, “Unmasking Medicine” in providing a platform for a 
nationwide critical reflection on perceived excessive medical paternalism and medicalisation 
will be analysed in this chapter. Also, the chapter explores how popular culture contributed 
to liberalisation of the law.  Finally, the chapter fills an important gap in the literature on 
HCL by presenting for the first time the views and concerns of pioneer scholars in the field 
regarding HCL’s development and orientation.  
 In Chapter Six, I examine the issue of whether a case can be made for the conscious 
development of a discrete body of HCL in Ghana. Proceeding from the premise of the 
second hypothesis - that the need for protecting patients’ rights and enhanced public 
awareness of implications of medical advances could facilitate the development of a distinct 
body of HCL in Ghana - I shall first argue in this chapter that the reality reveals patient 
disempowerment in Ghana as a result of many factors. The multiple layers of this 
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phenomenon are concretised by documentary analysis of media reports and the factual 
matrices of decided cases. Secondly, the chapter engages in the lesson-drawing aspect of 
FCM by carefully adumbrating those aspects of the English and Welsh experience that can 
provide useful lessons for Ghana as it seeks to develop its HCL. Moreover, the chapter 
develops an argument for a human rights paradigm of HCL to take centre stage in the 
development of a discrete body of HCL in Ghana. Essentially I argue that the features of a 
human rights-based approach can fit easily in Ghana as it has nurtured a constitutionally-
based human rights culture since 1993. This will set the tone for the concluding chapter 
(Chapter Seven). 
 In Chapter Seven, I provide a closing argument to conclude the thesis. The chapter 
revolves around four themes. First,  I shall provide a summary of the salient arguments and 
findings advanced in each of the preceding chapters. Then I shall engage with the research 
question and hypotheses in the light of the research findings so far articulated, with a view 
to assessing the extent to which the research objectives have been achieved. Thirdly, I shall 
present considered recommendations to assist Ghana in its quest to develop HCL. Finally, I 













RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an articulation of the methodology underpinning the thesis.  
Explaining the methodology adopted in this thesis is not merely an example of pedantry or a 
luxury, but it is critical for the epistemological validity of the contribution this research adds 
to knowledge. The utility of demonstrating awareness of accepted conventions and norms is 
that it adds to the credibility of the research just as explicit methodology contributes to 
reliability of scientific research.100 Until recently, a reflection on a methodology that 
underpins  a research project in law would have been quite uncommon largely due to the 
fact that for so many centuries legal education has been organised and delivered in a 
manner which does not emphasises the necessity of clear articulation of one’s 
methodological choices. The status of law as discipline in which academic research can be 
undertaken like other disciplines for purely epistemological utility has vigorously been 
commented upon by many scholars.101 It is noteworthy that unlike the longstanding 
scholarly approach of other disciplines, law in many parts of the world for a long time has 
                                                          
100  See generally, CW Collier, ‘The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions 
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been taught through vocational training and apprenticeship.102 The concomitant effect of 
such an approach has aptly been stated by Chynoweth: 
Law, as an academic discipline within universities, has traditionally seen itself as the 
servant of the legal profession. This has tended to generate a scholarship that 
replicates the professional work, and the underlying assumptions, of its 
practitioners.103  
 
As a result of this reality, methodological awareness extant in academic research in other  
fields of knowledge until recently has not engaged attention of legal scholarship.104 
Nevertheless, the inevitability of confronting methodological issues thrown up by legal 
research has been highlighted by Salter and Mason: 
It is not possible to avoid questions of methodology because all researchers 
inevitably bring to their tasks a certain interpretation of the meaning and purpose 
of research. What one discovers through research will always be determined, to 
some extent, by how one initially sets up the project, the type of questions [one 
raises] and [the] choice of materials to be studied.105  
 
In the light of the foregoing the three tasks of this chapter are: first, an exposition of the 
aims and tenets of the chosen methodology and theories that underpin the research; 
second, the contextualisation of the selected methodology in relation to the research 
question, and finally, a justification of its suitability for the thesis. 
 
2.2. THE CHOICE OF A RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR MY THESIS AND THEORETICAL 
ORIENTATION 
                                                          
102 M Thornton, ‘The idea of the University and the Contemporary Legal Academy’, 28 Sydney Law Review, 487.  
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Undertaking research in law may broadly follow either the traditional black-letter law 
(doctrinal analysis) approach or socio-legal approaches (I am utilising the term ‘socio-legal’ 
here as an umbrella term for all approaches that recognise law as a social phenomenon, 
including feminism),106 or a blend of aspects of these approaches. The black-letter law 
approach looks at the law as a self-contained entity.107 This approach is anchored upon the 
thesis of legal positivism that ‘in any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and 
hence whether it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not its 
merits’.108 Thus, a black-letter law researcher would dwell on statutes, case law and 
academic commentaries on those sources of law as his data for any investigation. A 
doctrinal research tends to analyse the law ‘from an internal view point’.109 One major 
criticism of the doctrinal approach is its propensity ‘to exclude the context of the law’.110 The 
unduly narrow focus of this approach ‘insulates law from its social, economic, political and 
cultural contexts that explain how law operates in context.’111 In order to overcome this 
deficit of the black letter approach it may be necessary to adapt or borrow from social 
science or social theories. This is particularly relevant in HCL, where academic lawyers 
preoccupation with the interaction between ‘bioethical requirements and patients’ rights’ 
results in emphasis being placed on the law as it ought to be rather than as it is.112 In this 
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regard, the other methodologies subsumed under the term socio-legal, which are non-
doctrinal in orientation, are appropriate for the type of research my thesis is founded upon. 
          Much ink has already been spilt in enunciating the nuances of socio-legal 
methodology; it is therefore unnecessary to rehearse them.113 It suffices to succinctly 
remind the reader core essence of this methodology. Socio-legal approach basically requires 
the research not only look at the text of the law and judicial decisions but also all other 
relevant factors and circumstances that variously influence the law and people’s behaviour 
towards the law and its institutions., The research undertaken for my thesis employs a blend 
of socio-legal methodologies: functional comparative law approach, legal history and 
empirical legal studies. Having specified my choices of appropriate research methodologies, 
it is necessary to consider the nature and relevance of each. 
 
2.2.1. FUNCTIONAL COMPARATIVE LAW METHODOLOGY 
According to Reitz, ‘the comparative method consists in focusing careful attention on 
the similarities and differences among the legal systems being compared, but in assessing 
the significance of differences the comparatist needs to take account of the possibility of 
functional equivalence.’114 The core emphasis of functional comparative law is not really 
about ‘locating the strict formal components of the comparatist’s chosen legal system in the 
foreign law but more crucially the operation of the foreign law in the relevant areas of 
law’.115   
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Although I am a Ghanaian lawyer, for the purposes of this thesis I use England and Wales as 
the legal system to be compared with. This is due to the reasons adduced in Chapter One as 
informing my choice of research question in this thesis. Indeed, my focus in this thesis is not 
to identify an exact replica of a distinct discipline of HCL, as constituted in England and 
Wales, in the Ghanaian legal system. Thus, within the language of comparative law, Ghana 
becomes the foreign law for this matter. This thesis seeks to explore the extent to which 
there exist rules, institutions and arrangements in Ghana which perform equivalent 
functions to the body of HCL in England and Wales. Indeed, Zweigert and Kötz have rightly 
pointed out that the ‘functionality in comparative law should enable comparatists to study 
the facts behind the law.’116 Husa has also observed that ‘if we follow the thinking of 
Zweigert and Kötz’s way of thinking, the methodological skeleton-idea would roughly be as 
follows: 
A solution to legal problems can be provided by a custom or by some other social 
practice not necessarily in an identifiable legal form. The comparatist is thus, in the 
ideal case that is, trying to find in a foreign system the norms, which are 
functionally equivalent to those other rules or principles that have been taken into 
comparison from the other system. The paramount question is: what socio-legal 
function does the norm under study fulfil in its own societal context?117 
 
Ultimately, the usefulness of this methodology is contingent upon the level at which 
comparison is being made. At ‘macro’-level, this methodology suggests that ‘the comparison 
must extend to the same evolutionary stage of different legal systems under comparison 
and that they should be at the same stage of development, whether, economic, social or 
legal.’118 However, ‘at the level of micro-comparison’, it is ‘functional equivalence’ which 
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really matters..119 This requires that one explores ‘institutions which have the same role or 
which solve the same problem’.120  The rationale for such approach lies in the suggestion by 
Zweigert and Kötz that the ‘comparatist must assume that different societies face similar 
needs and that, in order to survive, any society must have (functionally equivalent) 
institutions that meet these needs.’121 Admittedly, England and Wales form part of a 
developed country and Ghana is a developing country. Nevertheless, the common law 
tradition underpinning the two legal systems, coupled with the predominantly public-funded 
healthcare system adopted in both countries, provide a legitimate basis for functional 
comparison. Following the suggestion by Zweigert and Kötz, noted above, it may be safely 
anticipated that a conscious effort to stimulate development of a body of HCL in Ghana 
could contribute towards solution to the conundrum of patient disempowerment in Ghana 
just as the quest for patient empowerment influenced the emergence of a distinct body of 
HCL. It is therefore apposite that the thesis explores potential parallels or functional 
equivalence in these two legal systems. 
           In undertaking the basic comparative task of identifying similarities and differences, 
the researcher has to consider the scope of comparison: what is going to be compared with 
what? Despite the controversy over the extent of ‘the problem of a lack of congruity’ Reitz 
has opined that  ‘there is a high degree of consensus that good comparative analysis should 
pay careful attention to the problem of equivalency by probing how similar and how 
different the aspects of each legal system under study are.’122 In this regard, it is imperative 
that to carefully explore whether ‘there are ...functional equivalents of the aspect under 
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study in one legal system inherent in the other.’123 According to Zweigert and Kötz, a 
convenient way to deal with the conundrum of what is going to be compared with what, is 
to ‘identify a common denominator called “tertium comparationis”’124 
           The term ‘tertium comparationis’ refers to the common point of departure for the 
comparison.125 Typically, it may be ‘either a real-life problem or an ideal’.126 For example, a 
comparative study of HCL might present the question of how and to what extent each 
country under study addresses the problem of patient disempowerment vis-à-vis excessive 
medical paternalism. The practical upshot of locating the ‘tertium comparationis’ is that 
‘either one legal system has the same legal rule or legal institution as another, or it has 
different rules or institutions as another, or it has different rules or institutions which 
perform the same function, or it provides different results for a particular problem, or it 
does not seem to address that problem at all.’127  This calls for ‘integrity,’ which makes the 
study amenable to the recognition of  ‘both similarity and difference’.128 Legal history, which 
is later discussed below, can provide illumination for a comparative lawyer in her task of 
explicating any differences or similarities which he or she may come across.129  
This open mindedness in functional comparative law is reinforced by its reliance on 
‘hermeneutical point of view,’ which preserves the classical scientific (i.e. objective) 
approach to the study of law.130 The hermeneutical point of view requires that the 
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researcher  ‘should try to explain the system as it appeared to the participants, even if their 
views are strange, such as the medieval lawyers who put rats on trial’.131 Thus, when a 
researcher makes statements about a foreign legal system, she tries ‘to describe those 
norms within the system which a law-abiding citizen or lawyer within that system ought to 
follow, based on the norms within that system’.132 In this regard the significance of the 
hermeneutic approach is that the researcher ought to appreciate the institutional context 
for the law that is being explored.   
           Another utility of  the comparative method is that it can deepen legal knowledge by  
‘inviting the comparatist to give reasons for the similarities and differences among the legal 
systems under study’.133  The necessity of accounting for the similarities and any differences 
would involve going beyond the black letter law to the socio-cultural and economic factors. 
This stage of comparison open the door for the rest of the humanities and social sciences to 
enter into picture. Reitz has noted that ‘this is where the various “law ands” become 
relevant: law and history, law and economics, law and society, even law and literature.’134 
He holds that ‘good comparative writing should be informed by at least some of these allied 
fields and will be to the extent it seeks to explain why there are given similarities or 
differences among legal systems or seeks to assess the significance of such similarities or 
differences.’135 Indeed, Markesinis has remarked that ‘[l]ooking at foreign law can bring a 
deeper understanding of problems...- perhaps even unexpected ideas for solving them - but 
that will only happen when [comparative lawyers] sharpen their focus by narrowing it.’136 As 
noted before, this thesis among other things seeks to explore the extent to which the 
                                                          
131 ibid,  159.  
132 Ibid. 
133 JC Reitz, ’How to Do Comparative Law’ (1998) 46 The American Journal of Comparative Law, 617,626. 
134 Ibid 627. 
135 Ibid .  
136 BS Markesinis, ‘Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of and Audience’ (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 1, 21.  
50 
 
emergence of a distinct body of HCL benefitted on the one hand from challenges presented 
by medical advances and on the other hand contributed towards the quest for patient 
empowerment against excessive medical paternalism. The functional comparative 
dimension could furnish useful lessons for addressing some of the similar challenges being 
faced, or yet to be faced in Ghana.  
          Furthermore, this methodology facilitates ‘the attainment of knowledge of another 
legal system in order to enhance the understanding of one's own system’.137  Becoming 
aware of how a particular legal system has resolved a problem could equip the comparative 
lawyer to solve ‘problems in one's own legal system’.138 As Cruz has aptly noted ‘knowledge 
of how other jurisdictions and/or cultures cope with similar health problems provides a 
broader and more informed basis for appraisal of one’s own system.’139 Thus, by using 
England and Wales as the comparator, this research should afford a better appreciation of 
what other factors  might be necessary to complement  a conscious effort to stimulate 
development of a distinct body of Ghanaian health care law which will contribute towards 
patient empowerment.   
           However, notwithstanding the attraction of functional comparative law methodology, 
it is prone to certain limitations. Bell has noted that there are peculiar challenges in 
comparative legal research: 
The first is to understand the full institutional setting out of which the legal issues 
and solutions arise: the organisation of the legal system, its legal concepts, 
presuppositions and mental map of the relationships between legal institutions, its 
legal procedures, and the broader social and cultural context and assumptions. In 
one’s own system, much of this is tacit knowledge. Second, the hermeneutic 
approach requires the comparatist to adopt the internal point of view of the 
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systems compared, but not necessarily to believe either of them is right, fair or 
just.140  
 
The criticisms echoed by Bell against the accessibility of functional comparative law as a 
research methodology may be valid in relation to comparative studies involving legal 
systems which do not share a uniform language and tradition. Nevertheless, the comparison 
being made in this thesis does not face such hurdles as the two legal systems involved 
belong to the same common law tradition and share a common official language by virtue of 
the colonial connection. Besides, the two legal systems each predominantly operate a 
publicly-funded universal healthcare system. 
           Additionally, functional comparative law has been ‘criticised for being legocentric.’141 
According to Acuña ‘”[l]egocentrism” denotes the perils of a field that inflates its own 
importance by suggesting that all political and social issues are solved through law.’142 Thus, 
the tendency to be  legocentric  may lead a situation where comparative law analysis may 
concern itself  with only the formal regime of law. However, diverse socio-economic and 
cultural conditions would necessarily make legal systems materially different from one 
another. For example, a developed economy like England and Wales may give greater 
emphasis to the ethical principles of autonomy and consent and probably relatively less 
attention to the issue of access to healthcare. The reverse is likely to be the case in a 
developing country like Ghana. Undoubtedly, this apparent difference in emphasis between 
these two jurisdictions is attributable largely to socio-economic and cultural disparity. In 
order to avoid some of the pitfalls alluded to above it would be helpful to adhere to 
admonition by Acuña that ‘the legal systems under comparative study must be viewed in the 
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socio-cultural context in which they thrive; this is the only way to develop a critical 
understanding of the law.’143  
2.2.1.1 THE APPLICATION OF FUNCTIONAL COMPARATIVE LAW WITHIN THIS THESIS 
For the sake of convenience, the research question needs to be repeated here: how 
and in what circumstances did ‘a distinct body of HCL’ emerge in England and Wales144; what 
lessons can be drawn in relation to Ghana? The functional comparative law methodology is 
employed in Chapters Three and Four (see below). This methodology requires that a legal 
problem for which legal solutions are being compared in a functionally equivalent sense 
needs to be identified. Thus, in Chapter One, as part of the general introduction to this 
thesis, I highlight the fact that a combination of social changes pre-1980, coupled with 
spectacular medical advances, created unprecedented legal and bioethical dilemmas which 
interplayed (as important triggers) to accelerate the emergence of a distinct body of HCL in 
England and Wales post-1980. Indeed, I argue that the interaction of various factors brought 
the issues of excessive medical paternalism and its attendant patient disempowerment into 
prominence. It will be helpful here to briefly reiterate these triggers. In the first place, the 
revelation from the Nuremberg trial of cases where doctors were accused of conducting 
experiments on prisoners in concentration camps, coupled with the popularisation of 
political liberalism, projected the bioethical values of consent and autonomy onto the centre 
stage of societal discourse. It has thus been noted that: 
... bioethics is about the inclusion of laypersons in the setting of ethical standards 
for medicine. In the 1970s there was a perceived imperative to do this, to move 
away from traditional medical ethics, because the medical experimentation 
documented in the 1945 Nuremberg trials was no longer a macabre Nazi 
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phenomenon of the past; the several-decades-long Tuskegee syphilis experiment, 
revealed to the [...] public in 1972, suggested that even outside the context of an 
extreme political ideology, physicians and scientists were failing to set adequate 
standards for themselves.145  
 
Another parallel development which has served as an equally important trigger 
consists of the rapid medical advances which occurred during the period between the 1950s 
and 1980s. These include haemodialysis, organ transplantation, assisted reproduction 
technologies (ARTs), life support machines (or respirators) and DNA cloning. Each of these 
has brought up significant questions for law and bioethics. With respect to organ 
transplantation technology, kidney transplants present a significant conundrum, including: 
the ‘(i) the allocation of scarce resources, where continuing treatment and supporting 
personnel are required; (ii) the allocation of organs for transplantation and (iii) the creation 
of resources by salvaging cadaver organs.’146 Related to these challenges, have been a 
myriad other critical dilemmas. Sanders and Dukeminier have noted seven issues in this 
regard: 
Who makes the decision, under what circumstances, applying what criteria? What 
institutional procedures or restraints are imposed upon the decision makers? What 
protection do the courts offer against arbitrary or irrational selection procedures 
regarding resource allocation? When can a patient who has been using dialysis be 
denied access to this life sustaining machine? Are the ethical problems so tough that 
they should be hidden in a medical judgment? Who bears the cost of treatment? What 
[financial] arrangements can [and should] be devised to shift the cost from the patient 
to the government?147   
 
Implicit in most of the foregoing questions is the vulnerability of patients and the need for 
their empowerment and protection through instruments of law. Moreover, organ 
transplantation has not been the only medical advance to generate dilemmas which have 
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accelerated the emergence of HCL in England and Wales. All the other medical advances 
enumerated above have generated equally complex and novel questions concerning law and 
bioethics in England and Wales, but consideration of their nuances is deferred to Chapter 
Five. Growing public discourse on these unprecedented bioethical legal challenges coupled 
with expansion of interest of legal academics into exploring solutions to them culminated in 
the emergence of a discrete body of HCL in England and Wales.  It is worthy of note that 
Brazier and Ost have made a similar observation in concurring with Jonsen’s remark that,  
The birth of bioethics [and HCL] was primarily to do with the public’s concern about 
dramatic scientific and medical progress, such as the occurrence of the first heart 
transplant in 1967: ‘bioethics [and HCL] did not begin with a Big Bang . . . it was a 
slow accumulation of concerns about the ambiguity of scientific progress that 
turned the old medical ethics into the new paths of bioethics.148     
 
 
           Within the framework of functional comparative law, Chapter Three explores the 
characteristics of the discrete body of HCL in England and Wales. In order to become aware 
of and comprehend these characteristics, it is necessary that I examine primary and 
secondary sources of law in the respective context from the perspective of the interface 
between law and health care.  The primary sources I rely on are common law or case law, 
specific statutes on healthcare, delegated legislation and quasi-laws. These primary sources 
are quite broad, reflecting the broad spectrum of healthcare itself. Consequently, the focus 
of my examination is predominantly on the specific intervention of various sources of law in 
medicine to empower patients through the overarching value of autonomy. Additionally, 
secondary sources will be relied upon to illuminate my understanding of the context in 
which the primary sources of law intervene through the mobilising capacity of HCL to 
empower patients. The secondary sources include journal articles, text books, and 
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monographs. Consistent with my hypothesis, that, the need for patient empowerment and 
medical advances the emergence of a discrete body of HCL, Chapter Three explores the 
extent to which in the post-1980 era, law was used as a tool for addressing the 
disequilibrium between doctors and patients, as well as regulating medical advances. 
           Having identified and analysed the key characteristics and overarching goal of a 
distinct body of HCL as it is constituted in England and Wales in Chapter Three, it then 
becomes necessary to compare the situation in Ghana. However, Chapter Four does not 
necessarily attempt to locate an exact replica of the characteristics identified in Chapter 
Three, in Ghana. Clearly, such an undertaking would be contrary to the paradigm of 
functional comparative law. More importantly, in Chapter Four I explore the presence or 
otherwise of functional equivalents of legal responses to the conundrum of patient 
vulnerability, autonomy and medical advances in Ghana. I highlight the main commonalities 
and/or differences that may be uncovered from the research. To achieve this, I survey 
primary and secondary sources in that context. Thus, I examine the Constitution of Ghana, 
the statutes, delegated legislation, common law, customary law and quasi-law to ascertain 
the responsiveness of such to the need to empower patients and regulate medical advances. 
Secondary sources, including academic commentaries on these laws, will also be considered 
with the same goal. As I consider these materials on Ghanaian law in Chapter Four, I also 
evaluate the law’s relative strength and weaknesses in the light of the characteristics of the 
distinct body of HCL in England and Wales highlighted in Chapter Five.  Similarly, where it is 
possible to assess English and Welsh HCL on the basis of functional equivalents from Ghana, 
the thesis does so. 
2.2.2. LEGAL HISTORY  
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The deployment of legal history as an approach to legal scholarship has increased during the 
past three decades.149 Nevertheless, there is no clear statement regarding its 
methodological aspects.150 Parrish has aptly, noted that ‘legal historical research 
methodology is learned on one's own, frequently after formal schooling has ended’.151 Legal 
history as research approach does not necessarily connote a single idea. Ibbetson has rightly 
observed that ‘legal history is by no means a unitary discipline’.152 In this regard a distinction 
is drawn ‘between “internal” and “external” legal history’.153 Ibbetson explains the 
distinction as: 
The former [internal], we might say, is the history of lawyers' law, of legal rules and 
principles. Its sources are predominantly those that are thrown up by the legal 
process: principally statutes and decided cases, supplemented where possible with 
lawyers' literature expounding the rules and occasionally reflecting on them. The 
latter [external] is the history of the law in practice, of legal institutions at work in 
society rather than legal rules existing in a social, economic, and political vacuum. 
The former, defined by its own terms, is bounded within its own field of reference; 
the latter, in its very nature, is necessarily unbounded.154    
           
 Internal legal history suffers from similar deficiency as the black-letter law approach for 
‘being too inward looking, too narrow, too technical and too self-referential.’155 This 
deficiency can be explained as emerging from its exclusive reliance on formal sources of law. 
However, such an approach will not fit into HCL research since the legal sources in this 
branch of law are broader than formal sources in the purely legal positivistic sense. Writing 
in relation to England and Wales, Montgomery included  quasi-law as one of the sources of 
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HCL.156 Quasi-law ‘describes rules which may be made without explicit legal authority and 
which are most important for the guidance they offer rather than sanctions which follow if 
they are regarded.’157 Examples of quasi-law in HCL are ‘circulars, guidelines and 
protocols’.158  Montgomery further notes that breach of quasi-laws may not necessarily 
trigger legal consequences, ‘but in most circumstances they will be followed and therefore, 
any survey of the norms which govern healthcare practice must take them into account.’159 
Indeed, internal legal history does not provide ‘the holistic and interdisciplinary 
perspective which is seen as increasingly desirable in the context of modern research’.160 
Pound is noted to have observed that ‘the historical search for fundamental legal principles 
entailed an internal approach to legal history, focusing on the history of legal thought while 
ignoring the interrelationship between law and society.’161 This way of proceeding by 
internal approach to legal history is fraught with a misleading presupposition that ‘legal 
change is caused exclusively by legal phenomena and that current legal issues could be 
decided by logical deductions from past law’.162 Since I am using legal history to supplement 
functional comparative law methodology in my research, it is apposite that I adopt the non-
doctrinal or external version of legal history which permits an inquiry extending beyond the 
traditional formal sources of law to contextual factors. Thus, external approach to legal 
history with its ‘inherent flexibility of sources can better assist in explaining why change and 
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continuity occurred’.163  I proceed now to demonstrate how and why the external approach 
to legal history has been utilised in the thesis.  
2.2.2.1. THE APPLICATION OF EXTERNAL APPROACH TO LEGAL HISTORY WITHIN THE 
THESIS 
In order to chart the path along which HCL evolved as a distinct body of law or 
discipline  in England and Wales, Chapter Five relies on the methodology of legal history. 
This requires that I examine parliamentary proceedings relevant to specific HCL statutes, 
Committees of Inquiries reports, and archives of academic legal literature to understand the 
context in which a corpus of statutes, quasi-law, case law and academic commentaries 
constituting a discrete field of HCL have evolved.  For example, the Hansard coverage of 
parliamentary proceedings preceding the passing of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act, 1990, as well as the related 1984 Warnock Report, are studied in this regard to obtain 
insights into the complex moral discussions which transpired before some of these novel 
areas of law could develop. Similarly, within the framework of the external legal history 
approach, I examine the crucial role played by Ian Kennedy’s Report, Learning from Bristol: 
the report of the public inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
1984 -1995,164 in stimulating academic and public discourse on patient safety in healthcare.  
Moreover, Chapter Five will survey the historical evolution of scholarship in this field of the 
law. This requires examination of law journals and other legal literature to trace when and 
how this field of law caught the interest and attention of legal academics. Furthermore, non-
legal literature, including the British Medical Journal, various newspapers and archives of 
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news websites, which reflect on matters pertaining to the historical context, within which 
the field has developed are explored as part of the external legal history underpinning the 
research. The comparative law dimension of the research requires that the research 
endeavours to uncover the constellation of factors in Ghana that account for lack of 
development of a distinct body of HCL. Thus, in examining the case for developing a distinct 
body of HCL in Ghana in Chapter Six, the thesis will draw on similar external legal historical 
sources, such as the Ghana Medical Journal, literature from medical sociology in Ghana and 
news archives. 
2.2.3. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
The term ‘empirical’ basically indicates something which is grounded in observation, 
experience, experiment or investigation. Empirical studies of how law works provide a 
contextual understanding and knowledge of law’s internal point of view.165 In the most 
recent authoritative work on this approach to legal research, Cane and Kritzer very helpfully 
illuminate our understanding of it as follows: 
For our purposes, ‘empirical’ research involves the systematic collection of 
information (‘data’) and its analysis according to some generally accepted method. 
This information can come from a wide range of sources including surveys, 
documents, reporting systems, observation, interviews, experiments, decisions and 
events. While the data can be retained as text or images, systematic analysis will 
often involve coding or tagging units of text or images using symbols that may or 
may not have numeric properties( in the sense that they can be manipulated 
algebraically, or compared in terms of absolute or relative size). The analysis can 
involve simple counting, sophisticated statistical manipulation...matching of 
patterns, or simple labelling of themes. Ultimately, the analyst engages in a process 
of interpreting the results of the analysis in order to link those results to the 
question motivating the research.166  
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Thus, empirical legal studies may be either qualitative, quantitative, or a blend of the 
two, known as the multi-method. Qualitative observation identifies the presence or absence 
of something, whereas quantitative observation involves measuring the degree to which 
some feature is present.167 However, both share four basic steps: project design, the 
collection and coding of data, analysis and the presentation of results.168 In view of the 
broad nature of this approach, I will not give a general explanation of it here, but will reserve 
explanation of those aspects of the methodology I use in explaining their application within 
the thesis.   
2.2.3.1. THE APPLICATION OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES WITHIN THIS THESIS 
Empirical legal studies, there are aspects of it which can only properly be studied and 
presented through such an approach. Chapters Three, Five and Six employ aspects of 
qualitative empirical legal studies. A section of Chapter 3 exploring the teaching of HCL as a 
distinct discipline in England and Wales employs survey data collection via e-mail. Therefore, 
an e-mail was sent to all law schools in England and Wales, seeking responses to the 
questions: ‘(1) Do you offer an undergraduate module in medical law/health care law? (2) If 
so, what year did the module commence? If you do offer such a module, I would be most 
grateful if I could have a copy of the module outline, syllabus or handbook.’169 In order to 
analyse the data generated from this e-mail survey and find meaning in its relationship to 
the research question, it was helpful to rely on a classical analysis of content (CCA). CCA 
reduces text or data to codes by categorising items in the text and then counting the 
occurrences of these items to allow inferences to be drawn from the document.170 In this 
                                                          
167 J Kirk and ML Miller, Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications 1986) 9. 
168 EM Jones, ‘Some Current Trends in Legal Research’ (1962) Journal of Legal Education, 131.  
169 From an e-mail sent to law schools. A Copy is attached as an appendix. 
170 L Webly, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in P Cane and HM Kritzer (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) ch 38, 941.  
61 
 
regard, the CCA of the data from the law schools enabled me to determine the extent of the 
reception of HCL into their curriculum, as well as the trends for topics or themes taught in 
this discipline. This aspect of the empirical studies serves as a frame for verifying the implicit 
claim made in this thesis, that the emergence of HCL as a distinct body of law is also 
accompanied by its academic discipline. 
           Furthermore, in order to complement the legal historiographical study of how HCL 
evolved in England and Wales as a distinct body of law, two methods of qualitative empirical 
legal studies are employed in part of Chapter Five. First, for the purposes of data collection, I 
undertook semi-structured interviews.171 This facilitated an explanation of how and why 
some legal academics in England and Wales have considered it necessary for categories of 
English and Welsh law to be opened up to encompass a new field, namely HCL. The target 
participants were pioneer HCL academics in England and Wales. In this regard, I employed 
the purposeful sampling technique to recruit my participants. Purposeful sampling entails 
seeking out key people or events likely to provide rich sources of information or data.172 The 
legal history employed in Chapter Five enabled me to identify key academics that pioneered 
HCL scholarship in England and Wales.173 In this way, there is a dialogue between the 
otherwise disparate methodological choices underpinning this thesis.  
Since the participants are human subjects, I sought ethical clearance from the 
Lancaster University’s Research Ethics Committee. The data generated from the interview 
was transcribed and analysed. To ensure a high degree of accuracy in preserving the actual 
words of the respondents, Express Scribe, a transcription software, was utilised. A technique 
for labelling simple themes was employed in analysing the transcript of the interview. This 
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entailed a careful reading of the transcript for each respondent in order to discern and draw 
out common and unique themes.  
Finally, Chapter Six examines the need to develop a distinct body of HCL in Ghana. Part 
of the discussion in this chapter explores the reality of patient vulnerability and the 
regulatory vacuum in relation to medical advances. It has proved helpful to use qualitative 
document analysis in order to determine these matters before drawing upon some lessons 
from the English and Welsh experience. Webly has pointed out that the ‘mode of analysis’ or 
manner of making sense of data to be derived depend on ‘the nature of the documents and 
the context within which they were written as well as the intended audience.’174 The 
documentary sources on Ghana that I analyse here include newspaper articles, internet 
materials, policy documents, the Ghana Medical Journal and other academic journals. My 
aim in this document analysis was two-fold: (1) to understand whether or not patients lack 
empowerment in Ghana, and (2) to explore the extent to which medical advances replicated 
in Ghana are unregulated by law. 
2.3. SUITABILITY AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE SELECTION OF COMBINED METHODOLOGY  
 
The research question in this thesis could have been addressed by various 
methodologies. Nevertheless, I consider a mix of functional comparative law, non-doctrinal 
legal history and qualitative empirical legal studies as the most suitable methodologies in 
meeting the objectives of the research stated in Chapter One. As noted, due to the colonial 
connection between England and Wales (in fact, Great Britain) and Ghana, their legal 
systems belong to the same common law tradition, which provides some conceptual basis 
for comparability. Thus, the emphasis on using functional comparative law here is not about 
the conventional contrast between common law and continental civil law traditions. Rather, 
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it is about how Ghana’s legal system has responded to, or is yet to respond to, the 
conundrum of patient vulnerability and the challenges presented by medical advances, the 
empowerment and regulation of which in England and Wales have respectively accelerated 
the emergence of a discrete body of HCL in the latter jurisdiction.  
           Secondly, the need to employ comparative law methodology in HCL has increasingly 
been emphasised as a means of addressing issues raised by medical advances that have 
already been dealt with in some other jurisdictions. For example, in reflecting on new 
legislation which Belgium passed to govern euthanasia in relation to the legal treatment of 
the phenomenon in the Netherlands, Adams and Nys employed functional comparative law 
and cited the political context underpinning the law in the two jurisdictions as being 
responsible for the differences between them.175 Related to this utility of comparative law, it 
was underscored in an editorial of the European Journal of Health Law:  
The comparative approach may also have an additional benefit. It will facilitate the 
identification of problems that have yet to be faced in some countries. All too often 
a society is 'taken by surprise' as technological developments in medicine are 
introduced without regulation and, often, without thought being given by the 
society to their implications. Some countries may already have had to address the 
issue and thus study of their policy solutions can help others to formulate policy 
responses for the future.176 
 
Since many aspects of medical advances have already been incorporated into healthcare 
practice in England and Wales, the legal system concerned has responded elaborately to the 
challenges presented by them. It is therefore apposite that those legal solutions are studied 
in juxtaposition to efforts made, or yet to be made in Ghana to respond to medical 
advances. Clearly, it is functional comparative law which allows this to be pursued.  
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       Moreover, the use of legal history as a complementary methodology is suitable for 
realising another aspect of the aims and objectives of the thesis. The fundamental 
assumption on which the thesis is built is that until the last three to four decades, there was 
no distinct body of HCL and, for that matter, a distinct academic discipline of HCL in England 
and Wales. Thus, in order to understand HCL as constituted at present, it is apposite that it is 
historically contextualised. This requires going beyond the primary sources of law located in 
the past to illuminate the complex factors which have acted in concert or along parallel lines 
to catalyse the evolution of this field of law. Non-doctrinal legal history facilitates this 
process, since it does not limit itself solely to primary sources of law.  
Finally the deployment of qualitative empirical legal studies in this may be deemed 
appropriate for many reasons. First, the need to ascertain the incorporation of HCL into the 
curricula at law schools can be met through surveys, interviews and content analysis. 
Although a survey may be quantitative, I consider the qualitative method to be a better 
research framework for my present purpose as I am more concerned with the trends 
emerging from views that can be distilled from the data to be collected, than with the mere 
numerical picture or calibration of certain occurrences in the data. Secondly, the use of the 
empirical approach serves a further purpose in validating some of the claims made in this 
thesis, using perspectives from functional comparative law. For example, the tertium 
comparationis, for which reason functional comparison is explored in Chapters Three and 
Four, is the conundrum of patient empowerment and the regulation of medical advances.  
The analysis of qualitative documents enables the thesis to confirm whether or not such a 




Articulating methodology that informs one’s research will enhance the intellectual 
validity of the research enterprise. The nature of the questions being explored in this thesis 
is not amenable to a single methodology. Therefore, I have argued that the research 
questions warrant a combination of functional comparative law, legal history and empirical 
legal studies approaches. Admittedly, there does not appear to be any grand theory which 
necessarily links these approaches together. However, I am more interested in the 
pragmatic purpose of facilitating an understanding and unpacking the research question. In 
this regard, the functional comparative law approach enables me to unpack how the law in 
England and Wales has addressed bioethical and legal dilemmas in healthcare and medical 
advances, on the one hand, and the approach which Ghanaian law has actually adopted, or 
could adopt, in dealing with medical advances, on the other. The historical context which 
has influenced how the law on healthcare and medical advances in England and Wales has 
developed was investigated using the non-doctrinal legal history approach. In the case of 
Ghana, various literature of a legal and non-legal character spanning over five decades was 
studied in order to understand the necessity for developing a discrete body of HCL. In order 
to verify an often unexamined assumption that HCL is widely taught and studied as an 
academic discipline, an empirical survey was conducted. Another application of qualitative 
empirical studies in the research consisted of the extraction and analysis of views offered by 
pioneer scholars in the field in England and Wales, concerning the trajectory and projection 






THE DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF A DISTINCT BODY OF HEALTH CARE LAW IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES 
3.0. INTRODUCTION 
The central argument of the thesis (that the quest for patient empowerment and the 
increasing interest of legal academics in the regulatory issues in medical advances has 
served as an impetus for the emergence of HCL) presupposes that HCL has matured into a 
distinct body of law. Thus, in this chapter, I explore the extent to which this is true of 
England and Wales. In order to properly accomplish this purpose, the chapter constructs a 
test for identifying a distinct body of law or legal field and proceeds to examine the available 
evidence, in consideration of whether the test has been satisfied by HCL in England and 
Wales.   
3.1. WHAT MAKES AN AREA OF LAW A FIELD OF LAW OR DISTINCT BODY OF LAW? 
As a prelude to exploring the defining features of a legal field, it is worth asking 
whether anybody should care at all whether HCL is a distinct legal field or discrete body of 
law (as opposed to simply exploring laws related to a particular subject). Attempting to 
determine what constitutes a field of law in relation to HCL is not an empty academic 
exercise with insubstantial practical application but, as this chapter should demonstrate, will 
evidence the transformation of the doctor-patient relationship in the healthcare context 
from being excessively paternalistic to one involving a partnership in which the empowered 
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patient enjoys rights. The patient, whose right to autonomy and self-determination are 
increasingly protected by HCL, now takes responsibility for treatment decisions in this new 
paradigm.  
Additionally, such an exploration offers many benefits for legal practice and 
scholarship. Law is usually organised into ‘distinct fields as a form of legal taxonomy in the 
premise that the classification will facilitate an improved understanding of the law.’177 A 
field of law is basically a convenient framework that ‘assists the legal community in drawing 
boundaries between situations that fall within and those that fall outside the field.’178 Thus, 
a legal field is simply ‘one of the important categories through which the law functions.’179  
Indeed, it has been noted that ‘the designation of a situation as falling within, or outside of, 
a particular legal field often carries powerful associations about how the situation should be 
understood and what legal rule should apply to it.’180 In addition, Berman has noted that 
‘self-definition as a discrete legal field appears to be a precondition for academic 
legitimacy.’181 Moreover, ‘defining a subject as a distinct academic field may also motivate 
legal practitioners to organize and self-identify along similar lines.’182 In this way, 
practitioners can specialise and students can find employment.183   
Notwithstanding the widespread reference to the concept of a ‘field’ in legal 
discourse, it does not have a clear-cut definition. It has been noted that the existing 
literature does not provide ‘an epistemology or meta-theory for positively defining the 
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essential characteristics of a field of law.’184 However, in the wake of the emergence of new 
fields of law outside the traditional ones (i.e. contract, tort, criminal law, property, 
constitutional and administrative law), some commentators have attempted to explore the 
discrete status of their areas of law and in the process have afforded us some sense of what 
constitutes a field of law. For example, in his contribution to a symposium on the status of 
sports law, Carter states: 
But what makes a ‘field’ a field? The answer is that a field becomes a field not 
because it is inherently so but because in our public legal dealings we shape it as 
such, defining the concepts and legal norms that will prevail uniquely in that 
context. It becomes a field because enough people with power on all sides are so 
affected by it to require some special treatment of it in the law. For many years, 
sports law has been somewhat removed from the things that make a field a field - 
the litigation that establishes a common law specific to the concerns of the 
participants, the scholarship that provides conceptual and theoretical guidance 
(and sometimes misguidance), and the legislative and administrative action that 
creates a statutory and regulatory base.185 
 
Thus, according to Carter, a field of law must have sufficient case law, dedicated legislation 
and regulations, as well as scholarship that provide theoretical direction. Moreover, 
discussing whether health law meets the traditional characteristics of legal disciplines, 
Theodore Ruger186 states four key characteristics of a coherent legal field. First, it must have 
‘a reductionist focus on logic.’187 This means that the field must provide ‘one or a few core 
conceptual building blocks’ for explicating various legal materials.188 Second, it must have ‘a 
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focus on essential legal form.’189 Third, it must have ‘a linear historical development.’190 
Finally, it must exhibit ‘a high level of institutional specification and centralization.’191   
 Other criteria for identifying the characteristics of a field of law have been presented 
by Aagaard in relation to environmental law:192   
[a]t a minimum, a legal field must exhibit two characteristics: commonality and 
distinctiveness. An organizational framework for a legal field therefore must focus on 
identifying a combination of features that, as a group, are common and distinctive to 
the field.193 
  
Commonality in this context refers to ‘a characteristic or set of characteristics shared in 
common by the situations that arise within the area of law that the field encompasses.’194  
Aagaard has noted that the distinctiveness of a field may occur in one of two ways – ‘it may 
have unique legal rules that apply exclusively within the field, or yield unique outcomes 
when general rules are applied to it.’195 A related hallmark of a distinct body of law is 
whether it has attracted practice specialisation. In this regard Aagaard has noted that ‘If, on 
the other hand, lawyers organize their practice by reference to a category, they highlight the 
category as a potential field and also create a demand for other correlates of a legal field, 
such as practice materials, conferences, academic research, and law school courses.’196 
Similarly, Mariner has identified three approaches to defining a field of law, namely: 
‘(1) subject-matter- taking the history and tradition of rules and customs associated with a 
particular subject; (2) statutes or sets of related documents, such as constitutional law, 
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public international law, and (3) the overall purpose of the laws associated with the field.’197 
Like other authors considered earlier, Mariner does not appeal to any higher authority for 
the legitimacy of his proposed criteria for a field. Indeed, he concedes that ‘no ultimate 
authority exists for defining a field of law.’198 He maintains that practitioners identify an area 
as a field of law for their own purposes and ‘ts validity depends upon its acceptability to 
others.’199  
 From the foregoing, it appears that there is no universally accepted criteria or test for 
the recognition of a distinct field of law. However, I find the indicators of a field stated by 
Carter and Aagaard above to coincide with most of the views of other authors that have 
explored the issue. Thus, in this thesis four indicators drawing upon Carter and Aagaard are 
utilised in exploring emergence of HCL as a legal field. First, a field of law should have 
sufficient case law evidencing factual peculiarities that require specialised analysis. This will 
result in a unique judicial application of law from other fields to a specific context. Secondly, 
the field being considered should see a significant development of interventionist or 
dedicated legislation to regulate specific relationships. Thirdly, it should have core principles 
or values which give it commonality and, at the same time, distinctiveness. This is crucially 
important as Tarlock has aptly emphasised that ‘one of the primary characteristics of a 
distinct area of law is that it contains a relatively unique set of core principles distinguishing 
it from other areas of the law.’200 Fourthly, a field of law should be able to sustain its 
existence and relevance by finding a place in legal education and scholarly works. The need 
for a place in the academy in order to avert the marginalisation and extinction of the field is 
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aptly underscored by Tarlock when exploring the discrete status of environmental law. He 
states that: 
[w]ithout a distinctive core and the self-study that the academy provides, an area of 
law will lose power in the judicial and political arena. It becomes a factor or screen 
to be considered from time to time rather than a consistent decision driver.201 
 
3.2. DOES HEALTH CARE LAW IN ENGLAND AND WALES CONSTITUTE A DISTINCT 
FIELD OF LAW? 
 
Having identified the key characteristics which a discipline should possess before it 
may be considered as a distinct body or field of law, I will proceed to demonstrate the 
extent to which HCL in England and Wales satisfies these requirements. While relying on the 
four indicators enumerated above, with regard to my understanding of how a field of law is 
constituted, I submit that HCL in England and Wales became sufficiently developed as a field 
of law in the post-1980 era.202 Admittedly, literature on the interface between law and 
healthcare has been published intermittently since 1858,203 but it was during the post-1980 
era that HCL began to manifest the characteristics of a field of law and have a discernible 
objective.204 I turn now to explore whether the test for a field of law has been sufficiently 
satisfied by HCL while interrogating my first hypothesis that the quest for patient 
empowerment and the legal academic interest in medical advances has accelerated the 
emergence of health care law as a distinct body of law in England and Wales.   
3.2.1. THE PROLIFERATION OF CASE LAW IN HEALTHCARE 
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Three aspects of the proliferation of case law in this field are worth considering in this 
section. These are: (a) a quantitative increase in litigation, (b) factual peculiarities discernible 
from the burgeoning case law, and (c) core principles running through the field as a thread 
which gives it commonality and distinctiveness.  Each of these will be considered in turn. 
A.  THE QUANTITATIVE INCREASE IN LITIGATION 
One of the important indicia of a field of law identified above is that it must generate 
significant quantum of litigation, so that over time, the mediation or resolution of the 
tensions presented by the litigation will generate some core principles which pervade that 
field of law and imbue it with some distinctiveness. Montgomery has noted that ‘litigation 
can be seen as one of the ways in which the nature and values of the law can be established 
and shaped.’205 Morgan and Lee underscore the significance of litigation to this field of law 
by propounding the concept of a 'stigmata case'. Such cases manifest five cardinal features:  
they are relatively novel and ethically controversial; raise the balance of personal 
interests and public interest; force us to consider the goals of medical practice; they 
offer an opportunity to take stock of the boundaries between the anomalous and 
routine, the normal and the pathological; and they require the courts to develop a 
social, even moral, vision to respond to the social and cultural revolution of 
contemporary medicine.206 
 
The post-1980 period saw an exponential growth in litigation involving such stigmata cases 
in this field in England and Wales. In 1985, Kennedy noted the sudden increase in cases, 
writing:  
[s]suddenly, in the last few years, the courts have got into the act. Cases have come 
rattling along. Medical law is beginning to get a corpus of law.207  
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Brazier and Cave have similarly acknowledged the dramatic increase in the number of 
judicial decisions since the 1980s.208 Indeed, a survey of cases discussed by leading 
textbooks on the subject reveal that between 1980 and 2000, more than 200 cases209 were 
decided by the courts.210 This frequency of litigation bodes well for the maturation of the 
field as it gives scholars sufficient material with which to critique and shape the law. The 
increasing volume of litigation in HCL during the past three decades can partly be attributed 
to significant medical advances and the coverage of high profile medical cases by the media. 
This has made the public more aware that it is possible to sue when things go wrong in the 
NHS. This increasing trend of litigation in the field of HCL was succinctly noted by Lord Bridge 
in the context of medical negligence: 
[L]itigation in the field of medical negligence continues regrettably to grow in 
volume. The growth is probably attributable to two principal causes: first, the 
greater awareness of patients of their legal rights and a greater willingness to 
enforce them; secondly, the ever increasing sophistication of medical procedures. It 
is ironic but perhaps inevitable that the further advances medical science makes in 
being able to offer potential cures for conditions previously incurable or fatal, the 
more the medical profession lays itself open to attack in respect of the mistakes 
which can occur in the highly complex and delicate procedures necessary to make 
the cures effective...211 
 
B.  FACTUAL PECULIARITIES  
It is not only the quantitative increase in the number of cases which is remarkable; but 
equally important has been the expansion in the subject matter of litigation. This expansion 
has also witnessed a number of cases that are factually and procedurally peculiar. Unlike the 
time before 1980, when the limited number of cases was predominantly concerned with 
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medical negligence or (potentially) criminal behaviour,212 some of the litigation post-1980 
concerned other equally important issues of HCL. For example, Gillick was concerned with 
challenging a policy which sought to empower doctors to offer treatment relating to 
abortion or contraception to girls under the age of 16 without the need for parental 
consent.213 Furthermore, the burgeoning litigation at that time not only featured patients as 
claimants, but sometimes health institutions would approach the court for a declaration on 
the legality of a proposed treatment or the withdrawal of life-saving treatment, where this 
was considered to be morally contentious.    
Many cases decided during the period provide examples of this.214 In one leading case, 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, a health authority responsible for the treatment of a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS) patient brought an application to the court for a declaration that it 
and the physicians responsible could lawfully discontinue all life-sustaining treatment and 
medical support measures designed to keep the patient alive in his existing PVS, including 
ventilation, nutrition and hydration by artificial means.215 The House of Lords granted the 
declaration but reiterated the need for doctors to seek the guidance of the courts before 
withholding treatment in such cases.216 The trial judge in Bland, Sir Stephen Brown P, noted 
that the term ‘persistent vegetative state’ (PVS) was first coined in 1972 to ‘describe a 
syndrome that was being increasingly encountered as the life-saving and life-sustaining 
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technologies of intensive care were securing the survival of some patients with brain 
damage of a severity that would previously have proved fatal.’217  
           Also in Re T(adult: refusal of medical treatment),218 the court was presented with a 
request for a declaration that doctors could lawfully transfuse blood to a patient who 
appeared to have ambiguously evinced an intention to refuse blood transfusion, long before 
she became incapable to consent, in a life-threatening emergency situation. The Court of 
Appeal granted the declaration, holding that where a genuine decision could not be 
expressed by an otherwise mentally sound adult patient, treatment could be administered 
in defiance of any previous vaguely expressed contra-instruction, on the ground of 
necessity. Lord Donaldson, with whom the rest of the court concurred, noted the tension 
that can arise between an individual’s right to self-determination and the public interest in 
the sanctity of life. Accordingly, he held that the right of the individual is paramount, but  
‘[i]n case of doubt, that doubt falls to be resolved in favour of the preservation of life, for if 
the individual is to override the public interest he must do so in clear terms.’219 
             These new areas of medical litigation reinforce the earlier argument that, since 1980, 
there has been sufficient litigation in HCL to result in an expansion of the common law. This 
has reflected at least some of the unique concerns of stakeholders in the field. For example, 
patients’ rights to self-determination and autonomy, which often clash with medical 
paternalism, have contributed to the increasing resort to the courts for declarations 
regarding the legality of intended treatment.  Indeed, the mere fact that since 1980, doctors 
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increasingly seek prior judicial validation for their proposed treatments suggests that 
patients are progressively becoming empowered. Admittedly, emergence of a distinct 
discipline of HCL per se could not have brought this about but as I contend in Chapter Five so 
many other factors contributed towards patient empowerment.220 The rapid increase in 
litigation also tends to necessitate adapation of the common law to reflect peculiarities of 
issues that confront the field. 
As a prime example here, since 1980, the courts have increasingly recognised patient 
autonomy as an overarching ethical principle in HCL.221 In this regard, autonomy refers to 
the ‘bodily integrity and opportunity for individuals to decide when it is appropriate to allow 
healthcare professionals to have access to their bodies.’222 The case of Sidaway is quite 
instructive here.223 In Sidaway, a female patient had an operation to relieve persistent pain 
in her neck, right shoulder and arms. Regardless of how properly it was done, there were 
inherent risks in the treatment. These consisted of damage to the spinal column and 
damage to the nerve roots. She became severely disabled after the operation and sued the 
hospital for negligence as the doctor failed to disclose those inherent risks. In his dissenting 
judgment in Sidaway, Lord Scarman noted that in order to determine whether there had 
been a breach of the surgeon’s duty of care to his patient, mere compliance with the current 
state of responsible and competent professional opinion at the time was not sufficient.224 In 
his view, an equally important requirement was an adequate level of disclosure of 
information to the patient prior to her giving consent, because there may be ‘other non-
medical circumstances, objectives and values that affect her decision on a proposed medical 
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treatment.’225 Whilst he was the only judge who attached such significance to patient 
autonomy in Sidaway, his focus upon this matter became a dominant approach in HCL cases, 
which subsequently came before the courts. The 1992, the case of In Re T is quite poignant 
on this.226 Here, T - a 34 year old pregnant woman - had informally evinced an intention to 
refuse blood transfusion due to the undue influence of her mother, who was a Jehovah’s 
Witness. After being treated for accident injuries, her condition deteriorated, as an 
emergency caesarean operation had to be performed. She needed a blood transfusion but 
was put on ventilator and could not express consent. In an application to the court for a 
declaration as to the lawfulness of a forcible blood transfusion, the Court of Appeal agreed 
that the doctors could lawfully administer the blood transfusion as a matter of necessity.  
Lord Donaldson affirmed the primacy of autonomy when he observed: 
[t]he patient’s interest consists of his right to self-determination- his right to live his 
own life how he wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to his premature 
death. Society’s interest is in upholding the concept that all human life is sacred and 
that it should be preserved if at all possible. It is well established that in the 
ultimate the right of the individual is paramount.227  
 
Moreover, an examination of some of the leading HCL cases decided post-1980 will reveal 
that not only were novel legal and bioethical dilemmas presented, but they also had peculiar 
factual characteristics attributable to advancements in medicine. Medical advances had 
increased the capacity to keep patients alive in situations which previously would have made 
this impossible, but they had also created the phenomenon of medical futility, which means 
that ‘the proposed therapy should not be performed because available data show that it will 
not improve the patient's medical condition.’228 The resolution of these issues by the courts 
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projected tensions which could arise between sanctity of life and quality of life on one hand, 
and the best interests of the patient on the other.  Thus, to return again to the Bland case, a 
court in England and Wales was presented for the first time with a question relating to the 
discontinuation of treatment of a PVS patient who could be kept alive so long as he 
continued to receive artificial hydration and nutrition by means of a nasogastric tube.  The 
advancement of medical technology had changed the traditional test of death, but this did 
not help the Law Lords in Bland. Lord Keith of Kinkel stressed that the principle of sanctity of 
life was not an absolute one.229 The House of Lords confirmed that despite Anthony Bland 
being, in reality, in a state of living death, in law he was still alive because his brain stem 
continued to function,230 but that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment was lawful because 
treatment was futile. Doctors were thus under no duty to continue to treat him. In view of 
the obvious peculiarities of this kind of case, the court directed that in similar future cases, 
the doctors and health authority concerned must seek the prior approval of the court before 
terminating treatment which would result in death for a PVS patient. Bland further 
underscores the real challenge which medical advances posed, namely whether to keep a 
patient in PVS alive.  Reflecting on the Bland case, Singer instructively remarked that ‘with 
this decision the law has ended its unthinking commitment to the preservation of human life 
that is a mere biological existence.’231 Thus, Bland recognised that ‘at a minimum, 
consciousness is essential if continued life is to be worth having.’232  
A number of cases involving PVS patients subsequently came before court. In Re H 
(adult: medical treatment), the court applied Bland and held that life-sustaining treatment 
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could be discontinued for an insentient patient who was unable to communicate or to 
acknowledge anything taking place and who was completely dependent on artificial feeding 
by tube, on a tracheostomy for breathing, and on round the clock nursing for all physical 
needs.233 Also in Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S,234 the doctor responsible for treating a 
patient who was in PVS, in his and the other experts’ view, applied to the courts for a 
declaration authorising discontinuance of life-prolonging therapy (replacement of the 
gastrostomy tube in the patient’s stomach). The Court of Appeal upheld the declaration 
granted and held that an application of that nature required determination of what was in 
the best interests of the patient. The court indicated it would accept the decision of the 
doctor of the PVS patient concerning the best interests of the patient, unless ‘the court had 
real doubt about the reliability, bona fides or correctness of the medical opinion.’235 It is 
worth noting here that the best interest in the case of mentally incapacitated patients is 
now assessed via the Mental Capacity Act, 2005. Again, in Re D (adult: medical 
treatment),236 where the doctor in charge of a PVS patient could not definitively conclude 
that all the criteria contained in the 1996 Guidelines of the British Medical Association (BMA) 
had been met, the court examined the evidence and granted the declaration for the 
discontinuation of treatment following Bland. What is significant about the foregoing cases 
in terms of factual peculiarities is the fact that although healthcare treatment might have 
been discontinued many times previously, the doctors and primary care trusts began to seek 
the prior approval of the courts in the wake of medical advancements which had made the 
prolongation of life possible, even when a patient is persistently, and to put it crudely (but 
nonetheless realistically), a vegetable. In my view, the resort to the courts for declarations of 
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the legality of proposed medical procedures, as in Bland and subsequent cases, could be 
explicated by the issue of futility of treatment which had become part of the reality of 
healthcare as a result of medical advances. These cases also suggest that the medical 
profession was testing the boundaries regarding how definitive the PVS diagnosis needed to 
be. Indeed, the advancement of medical technology has increased the capacity to keep 
bodies alive, even when the patient cannot appreciate any quality of life.   
From the foregoing case law analysis, one key conclusion is worth drawing here. The 
possibilities created by medical advances have meant that certain clinical decisions ought 
not to be unilaterally made by healthcare professionals without seeking the endorsement of 
the courts in order to avert future liabilities. This obviously demonstrates the deficit of the 
law as it existed before those cases were presented to the courts. The gap or lacuna in 
English and Welsh law in the wake of medical advances, coupled with the increasing 
popularity of liberalism237 (particularly individual autonomy) partly explains the emergence 
of this field of law.  
C. COMMONALITY AND DISTINCTIVENESS: ARE THERE CORE PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH 
CARE LAW IN ENGLAND AND WALES? 
 
As noted above, in order for an area of law to stand out as a field of law, it must have 
commonality of legal doctrine. Indeed, Mariner has opined that: health [care] law should be 
described in a manner that gathers all the disparate legal doctrines into a comprehensible 
whole with observable commonalities, but without necessarily forcing it to adopt any 
normative goal.238  
Thus, if it is a field of law, HCL should have the capacity to exhibit some sort of core 
principles or values which will provide an explanatory framework for the majority or all of 
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the disparate areas of the field. Undoubtedly, locating core principles which could imbue the 
field of HCL with some degree of coherence or conceptual unity is an uphill task. According 
to Grubb, the obligations imposed on doctors in the context of doctor-patient relationship 
must be put on some theoretical footing.239 Thus, he points out that ‘the ethical principles of 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, promise-keeping and truth-telling are all 
reflected somewhere in the law and the inevitable conflicts and tensions that arise between 
them have to be resolved in the law.’240 Although the first four of these principles were 
popularised by Beauchamp and Childress241 as the conceptual tools for ethical evaluation in 
medicine, they have become a crucial analytical framework in HCL in England and Wales for 
addressing complex and novel cases, as I discuss below. Indeed, Kennedy, a pioneering HCL 
scholar, has stressed the need for adopting ethical analysis in order to imbue the field with 
coherence.242 Despite the claim by Kennedy and Grubb that the ethical precepts stated 
above have the power to organise and give unitary coherence to this field, it appears that in 
litigation before the English and Welsh courts, the tensions posed by autonomy and its allied 
ethical precepts are often subtly or surreptitiously evaded when the cases are decided. I 
demonstrate this further in the discussion below. Indeed, Veitch has argued that there is a 
gap between what academic HCL scholars prescribe as the underlying ethical principles of 
HCL and what the courts actually do when deciding HCL disputes.243  
Notwithstanding the description by some commentators,244 that HCL is an amalgam of 
different branches of the law without any overarching principles, I submit that it is possible 
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to discern certain core principles which commonly emerge from litigation in this field. As the 
quest for recognition of patient rights in healthcare propelled the development of HCL, 
many cases decided during the period under study have demonstrated the prominence of 
the principles of autonomy, sanctity of life and quality of life. Nevertheless, some of the 
decided cases reveal not only tension between these principles, but also their legal 
pervasiveness. 
 Autonomy is considered by some of the pioneering literature on HCL as ‘the most 
significant value to have influenced the evolution of contemporary medical law.’245 
Traditionally, autonomy in the HCL field concerns ‘controlling access to one’s body and what 
can be done to it.’246 The bodily integrity, which is protected by the ethical value of 
autonomy, was underscored by Cardozo J in the USA long before the emergence of HCL as a 
field of law in England and Wales. He remarked: 
[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without 
the patients consent commits an assault.247  
 
From the above quotation, it is clear that there is an important link between bodily integrity 
and consent. Thus, autonomy can be conveniently considered as ‘the representation of the 
ethical value underlying consent to and refusal of medical treatment.’248 Litigation in the 
field of HCL between 1980 and 2000 demonstrates that autonomy is also viewed as the right 
to self-determination. In his powerful dissenting opinion in the afore-mentioned Sidaway 
case, Lord Scarman stated that: 
...the question whether or not the omission to warn constitutes a breach of the 
doctor's duty of care towards his patient is to be determined not exclusively by 
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reference to the current state of responsible and competent professional opinion 
and practice at the time, though both are, of course, relevant considerations, but by 
the court's view whether the doctor in advising his patient gave the consideration 
which the law requires him to give to the right of the patient to make up her own 
mind in the light of the relevant information whether or not she will accept the 
treatment which he proposes.249  
 
In the course of the judgement, Lord Scarman adopted the phrase ‘right to self-
determination’ to describe the right of a patient to determine for herself whether she would 
or would not accept the doctor's advice.250 The other case where similar views were 
espoused is the aforementioned case of Re T.251 Lord Donaldson, reflecting on the conflict 
between the interest of the patient and the interests of the society pertaining to the 
situation stated:  
The patient’s interest consists of his right to self-determination - his right to live his 
own life how he wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to his premature 
death. Society’s interest is in upholding the concept that all human life is sacred and 
it should preserved if at all possible. It is well established that in the ultimate the 
right of the individual is paramount. In the case of doubt, that doubt falls to be 
resolved in favour of the preservation of life, for if the individual is to override the 
public interest he must do so in clear terms.252   
 
In Bland, Lord Goff underscored in similar language the right to self-determination as a 
dimension of autonomy when he said: 
 [I]t is established that the principle of self-determination requires that respect 
must be given to the wishes of the patient, so that if an adult patient of sound mind 
refuses, however unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by which his life 
would or might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give effect 
to his wishes, even though they do not consider it to be in his best interests to do 
so.253 
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The dicta, from the above and other cases,254 emphasises autonomy in terms of the nexus 
between the right to self-determination and consent to treatment.255 It has therefore been 
rightly contended that the linking of autonomy with this right has rendered autonomy 
synonymous in HCL with ‘the generic idea of patients’ rights itself, such that the term 
patient autonomy is often just another way of referring to patient’s rights.’256 The 
prominence of autonomy in this field of law post-Sidaway was not only unassailable but 
became what Veitch calls ‘an ideological tool deployed as a means by which judges [could] 
justify the court’s contemporary relevance in resolving disputes arising in the course of 
medical practice.’257   
 Despite the presence of autonomy in HCL’s discourse and litigation, there exists a 
tension between the ethical value of autonomy reflected in consent to treatment and the 
doctrine of sanctity of life.  Admittedly, whilst sanctity of life gained prominent coverage in 
the 1950s in Glanville William’s seminal book258 and still remains an important principle of 
HCL, it is submitted that autonomy appears to be increasingly pervasive in HCL discourse  .259 
However, the judicial approach to the refusal of consent to life-prolonging treatment in 
some of the cases decided between 1980 and 2000 seems to create impression of leaning 
towards sanctity of life.260 Such cases reveal that the courts tend to mediate the tension 
between autonomy (as the right to self-determination) and sanctity of life by setting a high 
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against contraception, sterilisation, artificial insemination, abortion, suicide and euthanasia.  
259 Although not in every instance, for example, in assisted dying. 
260 For example, see: Airdale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821; Re G (Persistent Vegetative State) [1995] 
2FCR 46; Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 782 
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threshold of capacity as a prerequisite for recognising a decision by a patient to refuse 
treatment. Harrington, bemoaning the fact that tests of valid consent have proved so 
‘malleable as to be of little use in advancing patient’s interests’, notes that: 
Patients seeking compensation on the basis of non-disclosure of risks which have 
occurred are faced with [a] minimalist test of consent, which predicates validity, 
more or less on the amount which a reasonable doctor would disclose. On the 
other hand patients refusing treatment who have or seek to deviate from medical 
and social norms in favour of treatment are faced with maximalist tests of valid 
consent in the form of capacity requirements.261 
 
Thus, in Re T, Lord Donaldson emphasised the absolute right of a patient to choose or refuse 
medical treatment provided he or she has no mental incapacity.262 Therefore, it appears 
from the jurisprudence of the courts relating to the refusal of treatment that autonomy is 
characterised as the goal and (provided one has mental capacity) exercising one’s right to 
refuse is viewed as the process of arriving at the goal.263 
 In fact, it may not be inaccurate to assert that the judicial approach to cases of the 
refusal of treatment suggests a lack of interest in the exercise of autonomy or self-
determination to refuse life-prolonging treatment. On the contrary, Veitch contends that 
the courts are being pretentious, since, in reality, ‘the regulation of continued existence of 
human life is at the root of law’s function.’264 The logical upshot is that the courts are rather 
over-zealous to uphold the sanctity of life at the expense of autonomy by masquerading 
under stringent tests of mental capacity to bring into question the validity of refusals of 
medical treatment.265 Whether one is satisfied with the protection of life, which, according 
                                                          
261 JA Harrington, ‘Privileging the Medical Norm: Liberalism, Self-determination and Refusal of Treatment 
(1996) 16 Legal Studies, 348, 363.   
262 Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] All ER 64, at 652-653.  
263 JA Harrington, ‘Privileging the Medical Norm: Liberalism, Self-determination and Refusal of Treatment 
(1996) 16 Legal Studies, 348. 
264  Veitch, n 41 above, 84. 
265 For example, see:  Bolton Hospitals NHS Trust v O [2003] 1 FLR 824 
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to Veitch, lies at the heart of judicial reasoning, is largely contingent upon the side that one 
takes in the philosophical debate over the nature and role of law in society.266 
 The prominence of autonomy in HCL cases decided during the period under study may 
be rationalised by the need to empower patients against medical paternalism, which came 
under severe criticism in the 1970s and 1980s.267 Arguments based on individual autonomy 
are used to urge the courts ‘to maximise the transfer of information and decision-making 
from doctor to patient.’268 As Veitch aptly notes, ‘one obvious reason would be the need to 
ensure that patients’ voices are heard and respected.’269 Another reason he advances for 
the prominence of autonomy is that it allows the judiciary to present the law as ‘a social 
institution that assists in the process of redressing the traditional imbalance of power 
between doctor and patient.’270 In this way, it presents an opportunity for the courts to 
‘claim to meet the expectations of individuals today - their desire for choice, self-
determination and the exercise of rights.’271   
The traditional academic presentation of HCL as being organically linked to ethics has 
been noted as inadequate for understanding the role of autonomy in this field of the law.272 
Consequently, an explanation that goes beyond a priori reasoning in ethics is needed here. 
To achieve this alternative explanation, Veitch draws upon inter-professional politics, as 
used by Montgomery.273 Veitch argues that the insistence of the courts that mental capacity 
                                                          
266 For example, natural law proponents, like Finnis, support the view that the preservation of life is the 
ultimate goal of law. See:  J Finnis, ‘Natural Law and Natural Rights’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980).  
267 See: I Illich, Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis, the Expropriation of Health (London: Penguin 1977); M 
Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (London: Tavistock Publications Ltd. 
1973); I Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine (London: George Allen & Unwin I98I).  
268 JA Harrington, ‘Privileging the Medical Norm: Liberalism, Self-determination and Refusal of Treatment 
(1996) 16 Legal Studies, 348-367. 
269  Veitch, n. 41 above, 99. 
270 Ibid.  
271 Ibid, n.269 . 
272 Ibid 101-103. 
273 Ibid and citing J Montgomery, ‘Law and Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26 Legal Studies, 185-210. 
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should be satisfied as a precondition of the genuine and valid exercise of a right to refuse 
treatment is a strategy employed ‘to reduce the power of the medical profession vis-à-vis 
the patient.’ Thus, Veitch has noted:  
The split constructed within the courts between the nature of patients’ decisions 
(something which cannot be questioned) and tests for mental capacity (which, 
because they are designed to assess understanding and use of treatment, are 
supposed to be neutral) is meant to subvert the possibility of medical paternalism 
by confining the medical professional’s role to that of judging the state of the 
patient’s mind, while allowing the courts to assert the importance of individual 
autonomy.274     
 
Despite the optimism that Veitch’s analysis of the courts’ approach holds for safeguarding 
patient autonomy, Harrington has advocated a shift from ‘contract models of medical 
relationship’ to a fiduciary approach, if the law is to have a ‘prospect of redressing medical 
paternalism and the disempowerment of patients.’275 Harrington draws upon two leading 
Canadian cases276 and rightly contends that unlike contract or tort, the fiduciary approach 
explicitly recognises the power imbalance inherent in the doctor-patient relationship, and 
imposes obligations on that basis.277 While the cases from this era which I have discussed 
present moral dilemmas in their particular factual matrix, the courts often subtly or 
surreptitiously gloss over the moral undertones of the dispute.278 This is evident in, for 
example, the cases involving the refusal of life-saving treatment which are considered 
above. It has been seen that the courts evade the hard question of the primacy of autonomy 
over sanctity of life by taking refuge behind technical barriers, such as erecting the hurdle of 
mental capacity to ascertain autonomy or self-determination. Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
274 K Veitch, n. 248 above, 101-102. 
275 n.268 above, 366. 
276 Norbeg v Wynrib [1992] 93 DLR (4th) 415; Mclnery v MacDonald [1992] 92 DLR (4th) 449. 
277 Ibid. 
278 J Montgomery, ‘Law and Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26(2) Legal Studies, 185, 190. 
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jurisprudential conundrum concerning whether it is the province of the court of law to 
decide on matters of ethics lingers on. 
  Although the substantial quantitative increase in case law on healthcare matters in 
this jurisdiction is largely beyond the realm of contestation, it is not enough for this area of 
the law to be recognised as a field unless the other indicia of a legal field identified above 
are met. One such important indicator of the maturation of HCL in England and Wales as a 
distinct body of law is the enactment of specific statutes to address emerging issues in the 
field. In the next segment, I explore the existence of dedicated statutes and other soft law 
on healthcare and in particular, those which portray patient empowerment and the 
regulation of medical advances. 
3.2.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERVENTIONIST LEGISLATION AND QUASI-LAW TO 
REGULATE HEALTHCARE PRACTICES AND MEDICAL ADVANCES 
 
A. DEDICATED HCL LEGISLATION 
The moral and legal complexities associated with medical advances and the public debate 
such advances trigger engaged the attention of lawmakers and culminated in the passage of 
numerous specific HCL statutes during the period under discussion.279 Reproductive 
technologies, organ transplantation, life support machines and genetic research are 
important achievements of modern medicine. These developments have raised novel 
questions that transcend legal norms and generate major bioethical debate. As will be 
discussed further in Chapter Five, they have precipitated the enactment of the statutes in 
Table 1 below: Dedicated HCL Statutes 1980-2000. 
 
 
                                                          
279 M Brazier and E Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law (5th edn, England: Penguin Books 2011) xxiii-xlv.    
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SHORT TITLE OF  THE STATUTE KEY SIGNIFICANCE TO HCL  
Human Organ Transplant Act 1989 (now repealed) 1. Prevented commercial dealings in human 
organs for transplantation. 
2. Responded to reported instances of the 
purchase of kidneys from live donors 
overseas by prohibiting the traffic in 
organs.280 
3. Regulated transplantation through live 
donation. 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE) 1. Endorsed the primacy of the ethical principle 
of autonomy by requiring the consent of 
donors before their gametes or embryos 
could be used for treatment. It established a 
regulatory body comprising a majority of lay 
members to keep medical practice and 
scientific research relating to IVF and other 
assisted reproduction technologies (ARTs) 
within acceptable legal and bioethical limits 
through a licensing scheme and to produce 
periodic guidelines and consultation 
documents on new areas of ARTs. 
2. Regulated the creation, use and storage of 
human embryos and human admixed 
embryos ex utero for treatment or research 
purposes.  
Access to Health Records Act 1990 Unlike the (now repealed) Data Protection 
Act 1984, which allowed access only to 
computer-held information, this Act protects 
patients’ right of access to their own 
manually-held records within defined 
parameters. 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 Does not prohibit surrogacy but outlaws 
commercial surrogacy agencies.  
Abortion Act 1967 amended by s 37 of HFE Act 1990 Since passed and amended, the Act has 
provided four key conditions under which 
pregnancy can be terminated. First, s. 1(1)(a) 
permits abortion up to 24 weeks if the 
pregnancy would pose a greater risk to the 
physical or mental health of the pregnant 
woman or children than a termination. 
Second, s. 1(1)(b) permits abortion to 
prevent grave permanent injury to the 
woman’s physical or mental health. Third, s. 
1(1)(c) allows abortion if continuing the 
pregnancy would carry risk to the life of the 
pregnant woman and finally, s. 1(1)(d) 
legalises abortion if there is substantial  risk 
that if the baby was born it would be 
seriously handicapped. 
The amendments brought about by the HFE 
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Act 1990 meant that apart from s. 1(1)(a), 
where there is a time limit281 for undertaking 
abortion for what are regarded by some as 
‘social’ reasons, all the other instances 
(relating to medical and disability) do not 
provide any time limit. Thus, there has been 
substantial liberalisation of abortion.     
 Table 1:  Dedicated HCL Statutes 1980-2000. 
Notably, the statutes enumerated above were purposefully enacted to regulate certain, 
often inherently sensitive, aspects of healthcare, due to the moral dilemmas they provoke. 
B. QUASI-LAW: THE RAPID INCREASE IN PROFESSIONAL GUIDELINES, DIRECTIVES 
AND CIRCULARS AS A PROACTIVE RESPONSE TO ETHICAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS IN 
HEALTHCARE 
 
It has been suggested that HCL cannot be fully understood without appreciating that it is a 
combination of hard law and collegiate norms.282 Indeed, Montgomery has contended that 
quasi-law also constitutes a significant segment of the body of HCL. Quasi-law ‘describes 
rules which may be made without explicit legal authority and which are most important for 
the guidance they offer rather than sanctions which follow if they are disregarded.’283 The 
post-1980 period saw a marked increase in the drawing-up of clinical guidelines and codes 
of practice to deal with potentially controversial clinical situations, in order to help instil 
public confidence in healthcare and also to protect healthcare professionals.284 For example, 
the Shipman Inquiry and ensuing government response emphasised the need for explicit 
standards to describe the quality of care which patients can expect to receive.285 Some of 
                                                          
281 The time limit was reduced from 28 to 24 weeks so the first subsection was made more restrictive. 
282 J Montgomery, ‘Time for a Paradigm Shift? Medical Law in Transition’ in M. Freeman (ed), 
Current Legal Problems (Oxford: OUP 2000) 363.   
283 J Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997) 5. 
284 A Samanta, MM Mello, C Foster, J Tingle and J Samanta, ‘The Role of Clinical Guidelines in Medical 
Negligence Litigation: A shift from Bolam Standard?’ (2006) Medical Law Review, 321-366. 
285 ‘Safeguarding Patients: Lessons Learned From the Past—Proposals for the Future’ (Fifth Report, Cmnd. 6394 
2004) http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20050202182438/the-shipmaninquiry.org.uk/fifthreport.asp 
(accessed: 15/4/2013); ‘Safeguarding Patients (The Government’s response to the recommendations of the 
Shipman Inquiry’s fifth report and to the recommendations of the Ayling, Neale and Kerr/Haslam Inquiries) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20050202182438/http://the-shipman 
inquiry.org.uk/images/fifthreport/SHIP05_COMPLETE_NO_APPS.pdf (accessed: 15/4/2013).  
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these guidelines emanate from non-statutory health professional associations like the 
British Medical Association (BMA) or statutory bodies, such as the General Medical Council 
(GMC), the Royal Medical Colleges, the Department of Health, and the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence.286 It is pertinent to consider a few examples to demonstrate 
how the emergence of HCL has necessitated a modification of our traditional understanding 
of law-making or legislation.287 Firstly, the Department of Health has issued several circulars, 
including the circular on contraceptive services for young people, which precipitated the 
Gillick case.288 Similarly, NICE has published guidelines in three thematic areas: ‘the use of 
health technologies within the NHS (such as the use of new and existing medicines, 
treatments and procedures), clinical practice (guidance on the appropriate treatment and 
care of people with specific diseases and conditions), and guidance for public sector workers 
on Health promotion and ill-health avoidance.’289 As a further example, the Medical Ethics 
Committee of the BMA has issued more than thirty clinical and ethical guidelines since 
1980.290 Moreover, in 1983, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry produced 
a code for dealing with problems relating to the compensation of volunteers injured during 
drug trials.291  
                                                          
286 NICE set up in 1999 and re-organised in 2005 with a new name, has published many guidelines. See National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence, ’NICE Guidelines’ http://guidance.nice.org.uk/CG/Published (accessed: 
15/4/2013).  
287 See generally: J Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), 5. 
288 Gillick v W. Norfolk & Wisbech AHA [1985] 3 All ER 402 
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The legal effect of guidelines has been the subject of intense debate292 in the legal and 
medical literature and there is an emerging consensus affirmed by the dicta of the courts 
that a doctor who complies with directions in guidelines could have a good defence if 
subsequently challenged in court.293 Two leading cases are instructive on the place of quasi-
law in this field of law. These are W v Egdell294 and Bland. First, in W v Egdell, a convicted 
serial killer being detained in a mental health institution contracted an independent 
psychiatrist to examine him and produce a report. Due to the adverse content of the report, 
its intended application (to indicate that the patient could be released) was abandoned, but 
the psychiatrist disclosed the content of the report to the hospital where the patient was 
being cared for and also to the Home Office. In the appeal regarding the patient’s action for 
breach of confidentiality, the Court of Appeal needed to determine the balance to be struck 
between the public interest in the preservation of professional confidence and the public 
interest in disclosure of confidential information for public safety. Despite having stated that 
the 'Advice on Standards of Professional Conduct and of Medical Ethics' contained in the 
General Medical Council's 'Blue Book' on professional conduct and discipline, ‘do not 
themselves have statutory authority,’ the Court of Appeal, like the court below, relied 
extensively on the guidelines in its reasoning, upholding the displacement of confidentiality 
by public safety concerns.295 The copious reference to these guidelines in the Court’s 
decision reinforces the view espoused by Montgomery that in this field of the law, one 
                                                          
292 See generally: J Tingle and C Foster (eds), Guidelines: Law, Policy and Practice (Cavendish 2002); D Black, 
‘Guidelines or Gumption? The Role of Medical Responsibility: A View from the Profession’ in SR Hirsch and J 
Harris (eds), Consent and the Incompetent Patient: Ethics, Law and Medicine (London: Royal College of 
Psychiatrists 1998). 
293 H Teff, ‘Clinical Guidelines, Negligence and Medical Practice’ in M Freeman and A Lewis (eds), Law and 
Medicine Current Legal Issues Volume 3 (Oxford University Press 2000) 67–80; A Samanta, MM Mello, C Foster, 
J Tingle and J Samanta (2006) ‘The Role of Clinical Guidelines in Medical Negligence Litigation: A shift from 
Bolam Standard?’ Medical Law Review, 321-366.  
294 [1990] 1 All ER 835 
295 W v Egdell, [1990] 1 All ER 835, at 843, 845-846. 
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cannot know the full scope of the relevant principles or rules without also having recourse 
to quasi-law. Similarly, in Bland, the House of Lords considered guidelines296 produced by 
the BMA regarding the discontinuation of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH).297 Lord 
Goff  noted that if a doctor ‘acts in accordance with the medical practice now being evolved 
by the Medical Ethics Committee of the BMA, he will be acting with the benefit of guidance 
from a responsible and competent body of relevant professional opinion, as required by the 
Bolam test.’298 Thus, it would seem that what constitutes ‘proper’ medical treatment (and 
thus treatment that is more likely to be lawful) is largely ascertained by considering whether 
it is in accordance with professional guidance. 
 In addition to the above, the GMC has issued numerous guidelines in the wake of high 
profile medical scandals, including the Bristol Inquiry and the Harold Shipman Inquiry.299 In 
terms of standards of medical practice regarding consent to treatment and disclosure, it has 
been argued that the GMC’s guidelines300 set a higher threshold than what the courts have 
determined since the celebrated Bolam case.301 However, in 2008, when the GMC revised its 
guidelines on consent,302 it was pointed out by commentators that it was taking a retrograde 
                                                          
296 Medical Ethics Committee of British Medical Association, Discussion Paper on the Treatment of Patients in 
Persistent Vegetative State (London: BMA, 1992); British Medical Association, Withholding or Withdrawing 
Life-prolonging Medical Treatment: Guidance for Decision Making (London: BMJ Books, 1999). Note that these 
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see: British Medical Association Access to health records – Guidance for health professionals in the United 
Kingdom (London: BMA 2008) www.bma.org.uk/ethics 
297 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1990] 1 All ER 835, especially 843, 845-846, 872.  
298 Ibid.   
299 For example: Good Medical Practice 2013 (effective from April, 2013) sets out the high level principles of 
good practice expected of all doctors http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/news_consultation/20477.asp (last 
accessed 16/4/2013). 
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301 S Fovargue and J Miola, ‘One step forward, two steps back? The GMC, the common law and ‘informed’ 
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step in applying a lowered standard of care than the one set by the courts.303 This was 
because previous versions of the GMC guidelines imposed a higher standard for doctors 
than was prescribed by the prevailing common law. It is submitted that the standards set by 
GMC ought to be higher than those set by courts or law makers, since self-regulation in the 
healthcare context should observe higher ethical standards. 
 The recognition of HCL as an important subject worthy of discrete status is further 
evidenced by increasing reliance on these guidelines by lawyers in their litigation strategy. 
An empirical survey to determine practising lawyers’ perceptions of the use of guidelines in 
medical negligence litigation in England and Wales, undertaken by Samantha et al, revealed 
that a high proportion of respondent barristers and solicitors were familiar with the 
guidelines, had used them as part of a trial strategy, and also expected guidelines to play a 
greater role in medical litigation in the future.304 That said, the normative standards of 
healthcare embodied in professional guidance and other forms of quasi-law are sometimes 
challenged. Two examples will be discussed here to illustrate this point. First, as noted 
earlier in Gillick, the Department of Health issued a circular on contraceptive services for 
young people. Mrs Gillick305 challenged the circular in court because it envisaged that in 
exceptional circumstances, a doctor might offer contraceptive advice and treatment to a 
child below 16 years without parental consent. However, the majority of the House of Lords 
held the circular to be consistent with the law. Secondly, in Burke,306 the applicant was 
suffering from a cerebral ataxia, a terminal degenerative condition that at some point would 
require him to receive artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) to prolong his life; at that 
                                                          
303 S Fovargue and J Miola, ‘One step forward, two steps back? The GMC, the common law and ‘informed’ 
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Negligence Litigation: A shift from Bolam Standard?’ (2006) Medical Law Review, 324.  
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stage he would remain conscious and competent for a considerable time until the disease 
reached its final stages. He was concerned by the tenor of the GMC’s guidance to doctors in 
Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Treatment: Good Practice and Decision 
Making.307 This Guidance implied that unless the patient was actively refusing ANH, its 
continuation was contingent upon the discretion of a doctor in charge of his care. Mr Burke 
accordingly challenged the Guidance’s legality in relation to both common law and human 
rights. The Court of Appeal held that contrary to strenuous effort by the judge in the first 
instance to demonstrate the incompatibility of the Guidance with the patient’s right to life-
prolonging ANH, there was nothing wrong with the advice contained in the Guidance. It is 
thus significant to note that, in both the above examples, the courts were prepared to 
uphold the legality of quasi-law.  
3.2.3. SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FIELD: TEACHING AND SCHOLARSHIP 
A. THE TEACHING OF HEALTHCARE LAW IN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES 
 
Brazier and Cave have noted that, until the 1980s, ‘university courses on medical law were 
virtually unknown.’308 Thus, in ascertaining whether HCL is taught at universities, the course 
titles used and the content of courses will provide useful evidence of the existence of HCL as 
a discrete subject in England and Wales. I, therefore, undertook an e-mail-based survey in 
law schools to elicit responses to three questions, namely: ‘(1) Do you offer an 
undergraduate module in medical law/healthcare law? (2) If so, which year did the module 
commence?’ Finally, I asked whether the school did offer such a module and whether they 
could provide me with a copy of the module outline, syllabus, or handbook. 
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I. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
Table A: POPULATION: UNIVERSITIES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 2012 
Categorisation of University 
Programme 
Number of Universities Percentage 
Law Degrees Offered 89 77.4 
No Law Degrees Offered 26 22.6 
Total 115 100 
 
TABLE B: UNIVERSITIES OFFERING UNDERGRADUATE LAW DEGREES WITH HEALTHCARE LAW 
AS A MODULE IN ENGLAND AND WALES, AS AT SEPTEMBER, 2012 
 
Categorisation of University 
Programme 
Number of Universities Percentage 
Health Care Law Offered 59 66 
No Health Care Law Offered 30 34 
Total No. of Universities Offering 
Law 
89 100 
TABLE C:  UNIVERSITIES OFFERING LAW DURING STATED PERIODS WHICH SUPPLIED THEIR 
COURSE HANDBOOK TO THE RESEARCHER 
 
Approximate Period of 
Commencement 
Number of Universities Offering 
Health Care Law 
Percentage 
1980-1990 3 3 
1990-2000 14 15 
2000-2010 8 9 
2010-2012 3 3 
Unspecified/Unknown* 57 64 
Total 89 100 
*Universities that could not specify the approximate period of commencement due to the unavailability of 
tutors who first taught HCL, or the absence of records. 
 
TABLE D: TOPICS /THEMES TAUGHT UNDER HEALTHCARE LAW IN ENGLISH AND WELSH LAW 
SCHOOLS 
 
SN Key Topics/ Themes Taught on HCL Courses Number of Universities Offering 
Health Care Law/ Medical Law 
1 The Doctor-Patient Relationship 6 
2 Autonomy & Consent to Treatment  12 
3 Informed Consent and Capacity 17 
4 Refusal of Treatment  4 
5 Access to Medical Records/Confidentiality & Privacy 12 
6 Medical Malpractice/Medical Negligence 14 
7 Resource Allocation 9 
8 Human Rights & Health Care 8 
9 Regulating Medical and Genetic Research 7 
10 Issues at the End of Life/Death, Dying & Assisted Dying/ 
Euthanasia 
29 
11 Organ Donation, Transplantation and Human Tissue 15 
12 Public Health 2 
13 Pharmaceuticals, Regulation and Research 2 
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14 Wrongful Conception & Prenatal Injury 4 
15 Abortion 8 
16 Assisted Reproduction 13 
17 Law and Mental Illness/Mental Health 3 
18 Complementary/Alternative Therapies 1 
19 Structure of the UK Healthcare System 3 
20 The Role of Law and Morality in Developing Bioethics 2 
 
TABLE E:  DESCRIPTIVE TITLES GIVEN TO ‘HEALTH CARE LAW’ COURSES IN LAW SCHOOLS IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES 
Description of the Course Number of Universities Offering Health Care Law/ 
Medical Law 
Medicine, Ethics and Law 5 
Medical Law 41 
Medical Law and Ethics 20 
Health Care Law/Health Care Law and Ethics 14 
Health law 5 
Law and Medicine/Medicine and Law 4 
 
II. ANALYSIS  
Table B indicates that 66 per cent of a total of 89 universities with law schools offer an 
undergraduate course or module in HCL. Thus, as at 30th September, 2012, when data was 
collected, well over 60 per cent of law schools in England and Wales were already offering 
HCL as a course, at least at undergraduate (LLB) level. Since the study sought, among other 
purposes, to inquire into the period when HCL was taught in the universities, the various 
time periods embodied in the responses elicited by the questionnaire were critical. 
Unfortunately, from Table C, 57 of the schools offering HCL - representing 64 per cent of the 
general population in the survey - could not even ‘guesstimate’ when their school had 
started offering the course. The dominant justification provided by those law schools was 
that the first lecturer to have taught the course was no longer available, coupled with 
records being untraceable. Nevertheless, the responses from the remaining schools revealed 
that whereas only 3 schools had commenced offering HCL courses between 1980 and 1990, 
between 1990 and 2000, another 14 law schools had also introduced the course at LLB level. 
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Thus, during the first two decades of the emergence of academic HCL in England and Wales, 
judging by these responses, only 17 law schools offered the course. This conclusion is a 
cautious one, due to the inability of 57 law schools to specify or speculate as to when the 
courses were initially offered in their respective schools. This caution is largely impelled by 
findings from a survey of law schools undertaken in 1996 by Harris and Jones.309  
The 1996 survey found that as at the 1994/95 academic year, there were 26 law 
schools in the United Kingdom offering HCL as an option at LLB level. This earlier finding 
obviously does not include the period after 1995. It is interesting that the survey I undertook 
in 2012 found that, between 1980 and 2000, only 17 law schools offered the course in 
England and Wales. The contrast between 26 law schools (up to 1995 as per the 1996 
survey) and 17 law schools (up to 2000 as per the current survey) is quite striking. Two 
reasons can be advanced to explain the divergence in the findings. First, it is worthy of note 
that whereas the present survey only targeted law schools in England and Wales, the 1996 
survey used the entire United Kingdom as its target population. This inevitably causes the 
two surveys to differ in their results. The other reason is that it is highly likely that some of 
the 57 law schools which could not specify when their HCL commenced might have started 
offering HCL courses before 2000. The probable inference that most of the 57 law schools 
might have commenced offering such courses before 2000 is reinforced by Brazier’s and 
Glover’s observation  in 2000, that HCL had matured as a distinct discipline in the way it was 
being taught in many universities.310  
Apart from the visibility of HCL in the curricula of law schools, Table D presents 
interesting findings concerning the topics or content of the course in various law schools. 20 
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topics or thematic areas were found to be covered in HCL courses in England and Wales. 
Before proceeding further with this analysis it is pertinent to note a caveat that the figure of 
20 might look large at first glance, but upon closer observation, some of the topics are 
similar or may overlap. Nevertheless, it was considered prudent to present them in their 
existing form because the research relates purely to what is stated in course handbooks and 
not necessarily in lecture notes. Consequently, it was not possible to assume that similarly 
couched topics might necessarily cover the same breadth of relevant subject matter. Beyond 
this unavoidable limitation, the frequency of topics distributed among the research 
population offers interesting revelations. The most popular topic taught in HCL comprises 
‘Issues at the End of Life/Death, Dying and Assisted Dying/Euthanasia’, which is taught in 29 
law schools. The next most popular topic taught in as many as 17 law schools is ‘Informed 
Consent and Capacity.’ This particular topic could also have ranked first if the 12 law schools 
offering ‘Autonomy and Consent to Treatment’ had been added to the former. Significantly, 
autonomy and self-determination are, of course, important aspects of these two topics. 
Thus, the popularity of these topics lends some credence to the earlier argument made that 
autonomy stands out as a core principle of HCL. ‘Organ Donation, Transplantation and 
Human Tissue’ ranks as third most popular, being taught in as many as 15 law schools. The 
least popular topics taught in less than three law schools include Public Health, 
Complementary/Alternative Therapies and Pharmaceuticals Regulation and Research. It is 
submitted that the topics taught in eight or more schools can largely be taken as 
constituting the basic syllabus for HCL. Using these criteria, the popular HCL topics taught in 
law schools are:   
 Issues at the End of Life/Death, Dying and Assisted Dying/Euthanasia; 
 Informed Consent and Capacity;  
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 Autonomy and Consent to treatment; 
 Organ Donation, Transplantation and Human Tissue;  
 Medical Malpractice/Medical Negligence;  
 Assisted Reproduction;  
 Access to Medical Records/Confidentiality and Privacy;  
 Resource Allocation;  
 Human Rights and Healthcare, and  
 Abortion.  
Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for HCL entering the teaching curriculum in universities 
was that it was (and is) an attractive field of research for legal academics. Indeed, HCL has 
stimulated vibrant scholarship, culminating in an abundance of HCL journals, monographs, 
textbooks and research centres.  
B. BURGEONING HEALTHCARE LAW SCHOLARSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON SHAPING 
LEGAL DOCTRINE 
 
As Carter notes above, it is important for a field of law to have scholarship that provides 
conceptual and theoretical guidance or sometimes misguidance. Despite its seeming oddity, 
misguidance may inspire a plurality of ideas in the field. This finds support in Tarlock’s311 
remarks noted earlier above312 and is a criterion which has been sufficiently met by HCL in 
England and Wales, as I will demonstrate in this section. The evolution of HCL as a discrete 
body of law has also stimulated the development of its academic discipline. Apart from the 
widespread teaching of HCL, its coming of age as an academic discipline can also be 
measured through the rapid increase in the volume of literature produced in the field, and 
                                                          





the establishment of many HCL-oriented academic research centres. Undoubtedly, a 
textbook or treatise on an area of law constitutes a compelling indicator of its emergence as 
a discrete subject. Since 1980, there has been phenomenal growth in the publication of 
literature exploring and critiquing HCL topics, as shown in Table 2 below. I have only 
selected textbooks published between 1980 and 2000 and compared their first and last 
edition as at 2012, since this was necessary to establish the quantitative increment of those 
texts to infer the degree of expansion in the field. 
TABLE F: HEALTHCARE LAW TEXTBOOKS PUBLISHED 
AUTHOR(S) TITLE YEAR EDITION NO. OF 
PAGES 
S McLean and G 
Maher 
Medicine, Morals and the Law 1983 1st 214 
JK Mason and RA 
McCall Smith 
Law and Medical Ethics 1983 1st 275 
PDG Skegg Law, Ethics and Medicine 1984 1st 278 
M Brazier Medicine, Patients and the Law 1987 1st 337 
I Kennedy Treat Me Right - Essays in Medical 
Law and Ethics 
1988 1st 428 
I Kennedy and A 
Grubb 
Medical Law: Cases and Materials 1989 1st 1210 
J Montgomery Health Care Law 1997 1st 476 
J McHale, M Fox 
and J Murphy 
Health Care Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials 
1997 1st 963 
I Kennedy, A Grubb 
and J Laing 
Principles of Medical Law 1998 1st 1191 
I Kennedy and A 
Grubb 
Medical Law: Cases and Materials 2000 3rd 2303 
J Montgomery Health Care Law 2002 2nd 515 
J McHale, M Fox 
and J Murphy 
Health Care Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials 
2007 2nd 1204 
JK Mason and RA 
.McCall Smith 
Law and Medical Ethics 2010 8th 824 
M Brazier and E 
Cave 




According to the preface to some of these textbooks, the growth in the length of each new 
edition may be explained by the increasing resort to the courts for the resolution of HCL 
cases, as well as the increasing intervention by law-makers in this field.313 
Apart from the textbooks, there has also been a considerable increase in journal 
articles on HCL between 1980 and 2000. I conducted an electronic search of all law journals 
in England and Wales held on the Lexis and Westlaw databases in order to survey the trend 
of articles on HCL themes during the temporal remit of my research. This revealed that 16 
articles were published in the Modern Law Review; Legal Studies published 8 articles during 
the same period and the Cambridge Law Journal also published 2 articles. 2 specialist 
journals on HCL established during the period were the Medical Law Review and Medical 
Law International.314 In the inaugural issue of the Medical Law Review, published in 1993, 
the editorial note by Kennedy and Grubb stated that ‘the appearance of the Review 
represents part of the process of the coming of age of medical law as a subject.’315   
          Besides these dedicated journals, university research centres were established during 
the period with a focus on cutting-edge issues in HCL. As early as 1976, the Centre for 
Medical law and Ethics was established by Ian Kennedy at King’s College, London.316 Its 
founder became the first Professor of HCL in 1983.317 Ten years later, the Centre for Social 
Ethics and Policy was established in the University of Manchester with a mandate to 
undertake ‘research and teaching courses in bioethics and biolaw.’318   
                                                          
313 M Brazier and E Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law (5th edn, England: Penguin Books 2011) v.  
314 But I did not find it necessary to report the number of published articles in these journals since their stated 
editorial policy is towards the publication of HCL-related themes only. 
315 The Editors, ‘Introduction’ (1993)1 Medical Law Review, [i]. 
316 Centre for Medical Law and Ethics, Kings College London, 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/research/centres/medlawethics/index.aspx (accessed: 6/3/2012).  
317 LO Gostin, ‘Honouring Ian McColl Kennedy’ (1997)14 Journal of  Contemporary  Health Law & Policy,  v. xi  
318 Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, University of Manchester, 
http://www.law.manchester.ac.uk/research/centres/csep/ (accessed: 6/3/2012).  
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           A research body, unaffiliated to any particular university, is the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics. It was established in 1991 to examine bioethical issues.319 It is independent of 
government in its origin and funding and seeks to provide advice to assist in the formation 
of public policy and to foster public understanding.320 Its methodology involves public 
consultation and publication of its reports. Between 1991 and 1999, the Council produced 
reports dealing with genetic screening,321 uses of human tissue,322 xenotransplantation,323 
genetics324 and mental disorders.325 These reports can be accessed by the general public and 
policy-makers and have been very influential in shaping discourse on the subject, policy and 
law-making. For instance, the report on Genetics and Human Behaviour326 was extensively 
quoted by the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Science and Technology in its 
Fifth Report on the review of the Human Fertilisation Embryology Act, 1990, particularly in 
exploring the ethical basis for pre-implantation genetic diagnosis.327 Since the Council’s 
report is expected to reflect consensus from its public consultation, the use of its report in 
Parliamentary debates helps ensure that carefully studied public views are reflected or 
considered in those debates. It is instructive that in 1994, after the Council328 released its 
report, the Secretary for Health was questioned in the House of Lords as to when the 
                                                          
319 Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1992-99 (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2000).  
320 Ibid 5. 
321 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetic Screening: Ethical Issues (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1993).  
322 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Tissue: Legal and Ethical Issues (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
1993). 
323 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Animal-to-Human Transplants the ethics of xenotransplantation (London: 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1996).  
324 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetics and Human Behaviour: The Ethical Context (London: Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics 2002). 
325 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Mental Disorders and Genetics (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1998). 
326 ‘The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology’, Cmnd. 9314, para 1.2.  
327 ‘HC Standing Committee on Science and Technology’, 14 March 2005, para 109.  
328National Health Service, Blood and Transplant 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/about_transplants/transplantation_milestones/transplantation_milest
ones.asp (accessed: 02/4/2012).  
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government was going to respond to the issues raised in it.329 The report recommended that 
‘the Department of Health in consultation with the appropriate professional bodies 
formulate detailed criteria for introducing genetic screening programmes, and establish a 
central coordinating body to review genetic screening programmes and monitor their 
implementation and outcome.’330 It can be argued that this report substantially informed 
the government’s decision to set up two new advisory committees. These were ‘an Advisory 
Committee on Genetic Testing [which] would oversee aspects of the manufacture and sale 
of genetic tests by commercial companies, and the Human Genetics Advisory Commission 
[which] would provide early assessment of the broader issues arising from the development 
of genetic science.’331 
It has been stated above that another important indicia of the existence of a field of 
law is that its scholarship should influence judicial approaches to disputes in that field. The 
teeming interest in HCL among academic lawyers since 1980 not only resulted in numerous 
articles, monographs and textbooks, but also inspired the thinking of judges in adjudicating 
medico-legal cases. There are many instances of the use of opinions of HCL commentators in 
court judgments between 1980 and the 2000. For example, in 1984, Kennedy wrote an 
article entitled ‘The Patient on the Clapham Omnibus’332 in which he reviewed the trial court 
and Court of Appeal’s decision in the Sidaway333 case that a doctor's obligation in law was to 
give the patient that information which a reasonable and responsible member of the 
medical profession would think it proper to give. Kennedy contended that the ruling was 
                                                          
329 House of Commons, ‘Genetic Screening’, House of Commons Debates, 22 February 1994, Vol. 238, c205W.  
330 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetics and Human Behaviour: The Ethical Context (London: Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics 2002) 85. 
331 R Jacobs, ‘Genetic screening — uses, potential abuses and ethical issues’ (1997) 47 Occupational Medicine, 
387, 388. 
332 (1984) 47 The Modern Law Review, 454. 
333 I Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988) 175-212. 
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unhelpful as it failed to recognise that the emerging trend of medical practice was a shared 
partnership, which required the patient to be given all the information necessary to enable 
them to properly consent to treatment.334 When a further appeal was made in the Sidaway 
case to the House of Lords in 1985, Lord Scarman acknowledged the assistance he had 
gained from the Kennedy article.335 Indeed, I have pointed out in section 3.2, above that 
Lord Scarman recommended the adoption of the transatlantic doctrine of informed consent 
into English law.  
Secondly, an article by Robertson,336 entitled ‘Informed Consent to Medical Treatment’ 
was extensively relied upon by Lord Scarman in the Sidaway case.337 Having reviewed a long 
line of English cases from 1950 to 1981, Robertson bemoaned the fact that it was judicial 
policy not to expand the liability of the medical profession, since this was an obstacle to the 
recognition of the informed consent doctrine that could meaningfully safeguard the 
patient’s right to self-determination.338  
Thirdly, during the House of Lord’s consideration of an appeal against the declaration 
that it was lawful to withdraw lifesaving treatment and allow the PVS patient to die, Lord 
Goff repeatedly cited Kennedy’s article ‘Switching off Life Support Machines: the legal 
Implications’, to support his vote against the appeal.339 Furthermore, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, in analysing whether the removal of the nasogastric tube from a PVS patient 
                                                          
334 (1984) 47 The Modern Law Review, 454, 459. 
335 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643, 
652. 
336 G Robertson, ‘Informed Consent to Medical Treatment’ (1981) 97 Law Quarterly Review, 102. 
337 n 335 above, 652-653. 
338 G Robertson, ‘Informed Consent to Medical Treatment’ (1981) 97 Law Quarterly Review, 124. 
339n 336 above, 
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would constitute a positive act of commission for the purposes of the offence of homicide, 
cited Skegg’s340 discussion of switching off a ventilator in his textbook.341  
 Again, the influence of writings by HCL academics on judicial decision-making was 
clearly manifested in the seminal case of Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Separation), 
where the Court of Appeal had to decide whether it was appropriate to separate conjoined 
twins in order to save the stronger twin’s life, despite the parents’ refusal to consent to the 
operation.342 This was significant for the emergence of HCL as a discrete subject because the 
acknowledgement of the work of these scholars suggested that academic HCL was making 
an impact on medico-legal litigation. Indeed, in his analysis of the ethical and legal dilemma 
inherent in the question of whether to save the life of the stronger baby, while causing the 
death of the weaker twin through the separation, Ward LJ extensively drew upon John 
Keown’s343 analysis, that the sanctity of life doctrine rejects quality of life because ‘it denies 
the ineliminable value of each patient and engages in discriminatory judgments, posited on 
fundamentally arbitrary criteria such as physical or mental disability, about whose lives are 
“worthwhile” and whose are not.’ The learned judge noted that: 
When considering the worthwhileness of the treatment, it is legitimate to have 
regard to the actual condition of each twin and hence the actual balance sheet of 
advantage and disadvantage which flows from the performance or the non-
performance of the proposed treatment. Here it is legitimate, as John Keown 
demonstrates, and as the cases show, to bear in mind the actual quality of life each 
child enjoys and may be able to enjoy.344 
 
                                                          
340 PDK Skegg, Law, Ethics and Medicine: Studies in Medical Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1985) 169.  
341 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821, 881 
342 [2000] 4 All ER 961. In considering the legal position on where a proposed course of action would terminate 
life, Ward LJ cited the Bland case but pointed out that the case had been the ‘subject of much academic 
scrutiny by Kennedy and Grubb’. 'Withdrawal of Artificial Hydration and Nutrition: Incompetent Adult' [1993] 2 
Med L Rev, 359; I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law (2nd edn, London: Butterworths 1994) ch 16; J Finnis, 
'Bland, Crossing the Rubicon?' (1993) 109 LQR 329; J Keown, 'Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law 
after Bland' (1997) 113 LQR, 481. 
343 J Keown, 'Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland' (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review, 
481. 
344 [2000] 4 All ER 961 at 1010.  
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Notably, this dictum seems to contradict what Keown says above and this is a point that 
Huxtable has made - that sometimes, judges misinterpret the academic literature.345 
There is, therefore, no doubt that the field of HCL has its own academic discipline which has 
come of age. However, as I will now discuss, the boundaries of the subject matter of HCL are 
still unsettled. 
C. DELINEATING THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE DOCTRINAL ORIENTATIONS OF 
HEALTH CARE LAW 
 
The general view on the status of HCL as a field of law does not necessarily translate into 
unanimity among scholars in the field regarding its subject matter and methodology.  As I 
have pointed out, the topics treated in the pioneering textbooks increased with each 
successive edition and the number of pages also grew significantly. It was therefore not 
surprising that in 2000, Kennedy and Grubb noted that the corpus of medical law was almost 
unrecognisable from its form at the time of their first edition in 1989 because it had 
metamorphosed from being exclusively concerned with medical negligence to encompassing 
family law and public law cases of real legal significance.346 The significance of these 
observations is that HCL has now gained a large territory, making it sufficiently mature to 
give birth to sub-disciplines, such as mental health law and public health law.347 However, it 
is clear that delineating the subject matter of HCL and its conceptual basis is not 
straightforward. In this regard, I recall Cane’s observation that the boundaries of a legal 
subject are not set by divine prescript but by the customs of lawyers.348 He noted that the 
emergence of a separate legal subject is largely a product of the systematising activities of 
                                                          
345 See: R Huxtable, ‘Separation of conjoined twins: Where next for English law?’ (2002) Criminal Law Review, 
459-70. 
346 I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical law: Text and Materials (3rd edn, London: Butterworths 2000) v.  
347 J Coggon, What Makes Health Public? A Critical Evaluation of Moral, Legal, and Political Claims in Public 
Health (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012) ch 5.     




academic lawyers.349 In order to understand the boundaries of the subject, I will now 
consider the doctrinal orientation and research approaches that explicitly or implicitly 
inform the works of some of the leading scholars in the field.  
I submit that four different approaches concerning HCL scholarship can be discerned 
from the literature. These are medical ethics, human rights, and multi-disciplinary and 
philosophical approaches. Each of them is underpinned by a different conceptualisation of 
medicine.  
I. THE MEDICAL ETHICS APPROACH 
The medical ethics approach conceptualises modern medicine as a ‘social sphere’ with 
competing ethical claims.350 Accordingly, it defines HCL as the law’s interaction with medical 
ethics.351 Similarly, Davies has stated that the link between medical ethics and its practical 
expression in law is the essence of defining medical law.352 In 1987, Grubb underscored the 
medical ethics approach when he suggested that in many of the areas of HCL, it is an 
understanding of ethical principles which may help to map out much of the uncharted 
waters in the field.353 It should be noted, however, that this may not be so uncharted today. 
Medical ethics ‘looks at distinct case constellations from biomedical practice and seeks to 
make a normative statement about how one should behave in such cases.’354 Thus, Hoppe 
and Miola note that ‘while both law and morals [ethics], are frameworks of norms of 
                                                          
349 Ibid. 
350 See generally: HM Evans, ‘Philosophy and the Medical Humanities’ in HM Evans and I Finlay (eds), Medical 
Humanities (London: BMJ Books 2001) 250-256.  
351 Ibid. 
352 M Davies, Textbook on Medical Law (2nd edn, London: Blackstone Press Ltd 1998) 3. 
353 A Grubb, ‘The Emergence and Rise of Medical Law and Ethics (1987) 50 Modern Law Review, 241-267.  
354 N Hoppe and J Miola, Medical Law and Medical Ethics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2014) 1.  
109 
 
differing binding quality and pedigree, ‘ethics’ can be the process which is used to reflect 
what course of action is appropriate in terms of moral obligations.’355  
            The medical ethics approach has inspired the work of many academics, including 
Kennedy and Grubb,356 Morgan,357 McLean,358 Herring,359 Davies,360 Hoppe and Miola.361 
These scholars have a two-prong argument informing their methodologies or theories of 
HCL. First, they contend that there is a power imbalance between doctors and patients due 
to a multiplicity of factors, including information asymmetry and the basic vulnerability of 
patients.362 Secondly, they maintain that the ethical dilemmas in healthcare, generated by 
medical advances, ought to be externally regulated through the instrumentality of law.363It 
needs to be empahsised that the medical ethics approach to HCL appears to take the 
relationship between ethics (or morality generally) and law as self-evident but that is not 
necessarily the case in legal theory.364 
Medical ethics manifests in HCL in two ways: first, it operates as a regulatory 
framework through guidance by the General Medical Council and such non-statutory 
professional bodies as the British Medical Association and the Royal Colleges; second, there 
is ‘the overwhelming variety of opinion and debate contributed by philosophers, lawyers, 
sociologists and others, which seek not to regulate, but rather to discuss.’365 Hoppe and 
                                                          
355 Ibid 3. 
356 I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical law: Text and Materials (3rd edn, London: Butterworths 2000) v.; I. 
Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988) 175-212. 
357 D Morgan, Issues in Medical law and Ethics (London: Cavendish 2001). 
358 S McLean Old Law: New Medicine: Medical Ethics and Human Rights (London: Pandora, 1999). 
359 J Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
360 n 352 above, 3. 
361  N Hoppe and J Miola, n. 354 above, 1.  
362 I Kennedy and A Grubb, n. 356 above, 679.  
363 I Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine (2nd rev edn, St Albans: Granada, 1983), 78, where Kennedy sought 
to “de-medicalise” medical ethics. I have borrowed the term “de-medicalise” from J Miola, Medical Ethics and 
Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2007) 41. 
364 J Montgomery, ‘The Legitimacy of Medical Law’ in S McLean (ed), First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and 
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Miola have noted that the latter statement (‘unofficial sector of ethical discourse’)366 is of 
limited utility as it does not seek to provide answers, given that it has no way of choosing 
between competing answers to questions.367 Thus, its utility in situations requiring 
normative statement is limited.368 However, it may be used by judges to justify decisions 
that they have already come to - most notably if there is no settled law in the area or the 
judges wish to reshape the existing legal rules. In Chester v  Afshar,369 the House of Lords 
sought to change the law so as to prioritise patient autonomy (and thus make the decision 
‘legal’ in nature). They cited a philosophical piece by Ronald Dworkin370 to justify this.  
There are many approaches to reasoning deployed in the unofficial sector concerning 
how to resolve complex ethical dilemmas. The popular approaches in the literature include 
deontology, consequentialism, principlism and feminism. A detailed exposition of these 
approaches is avoided here due to its adequate elaboration in the textbooks and 
monographs alluded to earlier in this section. For my present purpose, it suffices to briefly 
explain them. Consequentialism (also known as utilitarianism)371 judges whether an action is 
ethically right or wrong by its outcomes or consequences. It is based upon the maximisation 
of the wellbeing (human welfare) or happiness of human beings. The difficulty with the 
consequentialist approach is how to determine what is good or predict372 the consequences 
of all conceivable situations in healthcare. 
A deontological theory, on the other hand, ‘holds that certain kinds of actions are 
good, not because of the consequences they produce, but because they are good and right 
                                                          
366 J  Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2007) 6. 
367 n354 above,8. 
368 Ibid.  
369 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHCL 41, para 18. 
370 R Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and individual Freedom (New York: 
Vintage Books 1993).  
371 E Jackson, Medical law (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 11.  
372 J Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 13.  
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in themselves.’373 A central tenet of deontological theory is that a person cannot justify the 
breach of a basic moral principle merely by referring to the consequences. The difficulty 
with the deontological approach is ‘how we decide what the principles are.’ This is 
exacerbated by the fact that we live in a diverse society and there is rarely any shared 
morality on all things. Indeed, as society increasingly becomes multi-faith and multi-cultural, 
it becomes harder to identify what constitutes a moral consensus before translating it into 
positive law. Another problem with this approach is that it follows a priori reasoning as it 
proceeds on ‘pre-existing abstract conceptual positions rather than illuminate[ing] the social 
practices that the law is regulating.’374  
Consequentialist and deontological theories may be exciting to ethicists but their relevance 
to finding rapid solutions to concrete ethical dilemmas in healthcare delivery are limited. In 
order to obviate this limitation of the medical ethics approach, Beauchamp and Childress 
propound a more practical approach known as principlism.375 Principlism refers to the four 
principles of respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice, which, 
according to Beauchamp and Childress represent a common morality for societies in general 
around the world.376 Proponents of principlism contend that the best way to approach 
ethical problems is to test the problem against each of these principles so that possible 
options of solution will emerge. Brazier and Ost note that ‘whilst there may be congruity 
between liberal values and the four principles, Beauchamp and Childress’ approach is not 
accepted by all as illuminating the correct principles that inform bioethics and/or as the 
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method by which moral dilemmas in health care can be resolved.’377There may not be a 
definite consensus on the ethical approach to adopt but ethical issues remain important 
consideration in judicial deliberations in controversial cases. Thus  in Bland, Hoffman LJ 
stated: 
[t]his is not an area in which any difference can be allowed to exist between what is 
legal and what is morally right. The decision of the court should be able to carry 
conviction with the ordinary person as being based not merely on legal precedent 
but also upon acceptable ethical values.378  
 
II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH 
The human rights approach conceptualises medicine as a ‘field of intense imbalance or 
disequilibrium that opens up possibilities for the abuse of patients.’379 For example, the 
doctor has the information and skill needed by the patient, but which the patient lacks. The 
doctor by virtue of his privileged position is able to interfere with the body of the patient. 
This necessitates special protection for the weak and vulnerable. Accordingly, for the 
proponents of this approach, the subject-matter of HCL comprises the protection of patients 
through the mobilisation of a shielding mechanism: human rights.380 Although Kennedy and 
Grubb do not develop their human rights perspective of HCL in detail, they have declared 
that HCL is, essentially, ‘a sub-set of human rights law.’381 In a similar vein, Brazier and Cave 
contend that the fundamental nature of the relationship between doctors and patients 
amply justifies the human rights approach.382 Their view is persuasive since human rights 
emerged as a more formidable mechanism for safeguarding the individual against the 
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sweeping powers of the state than the general protection afforded under private law..383 As 
seen in Bolam, section 2.1.1, and notwithstanding the prominence of individual autonomy in 
bioethics and the increased recognition of self-determination in HCL, common law still tends 
to give power back to the medical profession to sit in judgment over the bioethical and legal 
issues raised in healthcare. The human rights approach, on the other hand, would enable 
the court to assume direct responsibility for determining the contested bioethical and legal 
controversies in healthcare. The human rights prism for delimiting the subject matter of HCL 
enables all aspects of medical practice to be recast as the loci of potential infringement of 
the human rights of the patient.384  
A different reflection on the Human Rights Act, 1998 (HRA), which incorporated the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms385 into 
UK law, was undertaken in 2007 by Wicks. She explores what happens when, rather than 
drawing on ethical principles, the familiar range of HCL issues is unpacked and repackaged 
from a human rights perspective.386 In this regard, she argues in favour of the prioritisation 
of individual autonomy and rights as an underlying value in English HCL.387 In some 
instances, Wicks demonstrates that the conceptual unity of HCL could be explained through 
the prism of human rights. Wicks has successfully demonstrated that ‘the end-of-life 
decision-making, reproduction, rights in the body, consent to treatment and medical 
confidentiality are indeed topics best understood within a human rights framework.’388 
Noteworthy in this regard is the fundamental distinction between human rights based 
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analysis and analytical perspective of traditional medical ethics or bioethics.Human rights 
law  has the advantage of relying on  hard law to determine the norms that it considers 
more important than others but traditional bioethics rely simply on “structured analytical 
framework”.389 For example, the Four Principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence 
and justice, originally devised by Beauchamp and Childress,390 are considered by some as the 
standard theoretical framework from which to analyse ethical situations in medicine. A 
notable caveat here is the acknowledgement by Brazier and Ost that ‘principlism is not by 
any means the theoretical approach adopted by all bioethicists, although it is a dominant 
approach in the United States and the UK.’391 
            The critical distinction between the work of Garwood-Gowers et al and Wicks is that 
the former sought to gauge the probable effect of the HRA on aspects of HCL, whereas the 
latter undertook a more fundamental enterprise of trying to translate HCL as being 
constituted into a complete human rights analysis. In my view, in a jurisdiction like England 
and Wales, where common law was employed in the service of HCL disputes long before the 
passing of the HRA, human rights thinking has gradually entered into HCL discourse either in 
the courts or academic circles. Thus, it is true to say that human rights have played a role in 
developing and shaping aspects of the law in the field. For example, human rights were 
important in the Evans392 case on consent to the use of stored embryos and reliance on 
Article 8 in the Purdy393 case, leading to the DPP’s policy on assisted suicide.    
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The human rights approach is, however, prone to some limitations. Traditionally, 
patients’ grievances were redressed through the mechanism of private law. In this regard, 
tort law in the form of battery and negligence is of primary significance. In contrast, an 
action can only be brought under the HRA against the state. However, it has been argued 
that the HRA ‘allows the courts a unique opportunity to improve the consistency and 
coherence of the common law without being unduly fettered by precedent’.394 The courts 
are also public bodies, so they must act compatibly with the HRA. Some of the early rulings 
of the courts indicate that they would rather interpret the provisions of the HRA as being 
compatible with common law than allow the HRA to completely replace the former.395   
For the human rights prism to be useful in illuminating HCL, it is submitted that rights 
need to be reconceptualised from the positive sense of a right to make a claim, to a negative 
right, so that patients can assert a right not be harmed. A negative right is a right not to be 
subjected to an action of another person. Thus, negative rights permit or oblige inaction on 
the part of a duty bearer under the Hofeldian theory of right.396 On the other hand, a 
positive right imposes an active duty on the duty bearer; it permits or obliges an action. If 
HCL is to be ‘patient friendly’, seeking to empower patients, then patients must, amongst 
other things, have a negative right in relation to safe clinical interaction. In this way, a 
patient can directly enforce his or her negative right not be harmed, through the HRA, rather 
than using the route of torts of battery and negligence.  
III. THE PRAGMATIST APPROACH  
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The third doctrinal approach is the pragmatist or multi-disciplinary approach. It 
focuses on practical issues and avoid abstraction or general theorisation.397 Thus, it is an 
evidence-based approach to the application of the discipline of law to healthcare practice 
for the benefit of all stakeholders. The pragmatist approach develops its ‘analysis around the 
practices of health care rather than principles of law or ethical theory abstracted from this 
context.’398 Brazier, Teff399 and Montgomery are notable examples of scholars whose 
writings in this field of law manifest this approach. This approach consists in ‘building 
analysis around the practices of healthcare, rather than principles of law or ethical theory 
abstracted from this context.’400  
Contributing to the 20th Anniversary Special Issue of the Medical Law Review in honour 
of Brazier, Montgomery401 explored her approach to the role and nature of HCL in an 
important academic paper she wrote on informed consent.402 He identified four key 
characteristics of the multi-disciplinary approach as epitomised in Brazier’s academic and 
public work: (1) the role of law is seen as facilitating effective healthcare as well as 
protecting patients’ rights; (2) it is empirical as it shows an interest in the realities of clinical 
practice; (3) it engages in healthy cynicism about the consequences of legal intervention in 
medical practice, and (4) it is conscious of the need to develop tailored responses required 
to ‘break the shackles of the traditional forms of action (negligence and battery) and also 
look more broadly to soft law to ‘supplement the stark legal rules’.403 In seeking to 
propound a solution to a problem in the field of HCL, the multi-disciplinary approach ‘begins 
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from what life is like from the patient’s perspective, and is open to the contributions from a 
wide range of disciplines to make sense of the law’s role in their experiences.’404 This 
approach always keeps in focus the notion that ‘If the purpose of the law is, in part, to 
facilitate effective health care, then it is important to understand what might happen as a 
consequence of the legal rules being discussed.’405 In this way, the social and institutional 
context of the doctor-patient relationship becomes important in analysing issues in HCL.406 
The principal audience to be considered in evaluating the legal rules is the doctor rather 
than the judge, or the realities of the clinic rather than the norms of litigation in the court 
room.407 For example, Brazier, in suggesting the setting up of a commission to start afresh 
and a study to fine tune the principles of informed consent and medical practice, advocated 
the establishment of norms in healthcare practice in such a way that ‘would make recourse 
to the law largely unnecessary.’408  
The pragmatic approach is intrinsically appealing for two reasons. To begin with, by 
emphasising empiricism in developing an understanding of the relationship between law 
and medicine, the approach has the capacity to produce a body of rules in HCL which 
substantially mirror the realities in the healthcare field. The resultant law will not appear to 
have been imposed from above on some kind of ad hoc basis as in judge-made law or 
rushed legislation. Moreover, the approach ensures that the body of rules in HCL is 
accessible to the intended audience, who are predominantly doctors and patients. As 
Montgomery notes in his tribute:   
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For Brazier, the law needs to be comprehensible to doctors. It is the way in which 
they interpret it which will make the biggest difference to patients.409 
 
Indeed, in view of the importance of making HCL comprehensible to doctors, Teff, for 
example argues that ‘it seems unlikely that the introduction of informed consent into 
English law would have much effect on medical practice without effective strategies to alter 
attitudes among practitioners.’410 
  The challenge which the pragmatist approach presents to legal scholarship is that it 
creates the impression that a well-grounded knowledge of the nuances of healthcare is 
required before legal scholars can critique the interface between law and medicine. 
Although this is not necessarily bad, it dislodges traditional HCL scholars from the comfort 
zone of black-letter or doctrinal scholarship towards socio-legal approaches, which often 
require multi-disciplinary efforts. Indeed, this approach envisages a broadening of the 
researcher’s jurisprudential horizon beyond strict, positive or hard rules to embrace the 
regulatory efficacy of other types of regulation. In this regard, it is apposite to recall 
Montgomery’s admonition that ‘a full range of legal tools needs to be brought to bear; 
processes and soft law as well as strict rules.’411               
IV. SOCIO-LEGAL  APPROACHES 
Socio-legal approaches consist in the use of, for example, post-modernist theories, 
rhetorical analysis, literary criticism and the feminist perspective to critique the legal 
regulation of medical practice and the organisation of healthcare delivery. In his discussion 
of HCL, Harrington, for example, often adopts some of the ‘postmodernist postulates of 
consumerism and anti-utopian idealism from Harvey and Bauman’ as his theoretical 
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premise.412 Similarly, Veitch often draws upon social critiques of medicine, such as those of 
Bauman, Foucault and Illich as the prism for his exploration of HCL themes.413 The feminist 
aspect of socio-legal approaches is more pervasive in the literature and consequently 
warrants a nuanced elaboration here. 
           In order to be able to explore feminism in relation to healthcare, it is apposite to 
explain briefly what feminist approaches to law entail. The contention of the various 
feminist approaches to law, reduced to their barest core is that ‘throughout history and 
even today, public discourse has been almost exclusively conducted by men from the 
perspective of men.’414 Thus, the nature of women, their interests, lived experiences and 
perspectives in law and other spheres have been constructed by men from men’s own 
perspective and interpretation of the world. To counter this state of affairs, feminists 
analyse and criticise law as a patriarchal institution which subjugates women to men.415   
It may be an overstatement to assert that the feminist critique of law significantly 
accelerated the emergence of HCL in this jurisdiction. The feminist movement extended 
their crusading zeal into the sphere of HCL and later medical ethics in the evolution of HCL in 
England and Wales (more prominently post-1990s). However, in the North Americas, the 
deployment of a feminist critique of medicine had been going for some time until this 
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period. Sheldon and Thomson lament the apparent neglect of feminism in mainstream HCL, 
noting that: 
a review of the existing medical law textbooks gives the impression that feminist 
perspectives have had no serious impact on this part of the legal academy. A brief 
perusal of how these books deal with abortion might serve to illustrate this point. 
Only in McHale and Fox’s own book is any serious attempt made to draw upon the 
substantial feminist literature in this area. Mason and McCall Smith’s Medical Ethics 
and Law is more typical of the norm. Their chapter on abortion is broken down into 
the following sections: the evolution of the law, the Abortion Act 1967, the rights of 
the fetus and other people’s rights, abortion and the incompetent, reduction of 
multiple pregnancies and selective reduction. The only mention of the significance 
of abortion services to women is in the introduction to the chapter, where the 
authors note in passing that attitude to abortion depend on one’s views on the fetal 
right to life versus the woman’s right to control her own body.416 
 
There are various strands of feminism as an ideological construct.417 Consequently, the 
approaches of feminist critiques of HCL and ethics are not necessarily uniform. Nevertheless, 
it can reasonably be surmised from the literature that certain basic tenets run through the 
aims which the seemingly disparate feminist approaches seek to achieve in the context of 
HCL and ethics. In the first place, they contend that the dominant analytical frameworks of 
‘utilitarianism/consequentialism’ and ‘deontology/Kantianism’ are traditionally masculine 
ethical models which never challenge the patriarchal context in which medicine is 
practised.418 Feminist healthcare ethics criticise ‘the institution of medicine for contributing 
to the oppression and continuing disempowerment of women.’419 In England and Wales, the 
mantra of feminism in HCL discourse was manifested to a degree when HCL was still in its 
nascent form as a discipline and continues to shape scholarship and policy discourse in the 
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field. For example, reflecting on the competing rights of women and foetuses, McLean 
remarks that: 
Showing respect for the embryo/fetuses at the expense of women’s rights is a 
monumental misunderstanding of the concept of respect and a perverse 
interpretation of the value of human rights. It is to the law’s shame that it has in the 
past colluded in this to the detriment of women.420 
 
It may be useful in illuminating our appreciation of the entry of feminism into HCL discourse 
to explore some of the sites in which feminist critique has been most persuasive.  
 
One typical site of contestation between feminist approaches and the traditional non-
feminist paradigms of HCL has been the criminalisation of abortion. The Abortion Act, 1967 
and its subsequent amendments in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990 have 
attracted rigorous and scholarly illuminating critique from feminist perspectives.421 The 
critical issues concern the moral status of the foetus and the right rights of the pregnant 
woman. Feminist commentators tend to argue that a woman’s right to choose whether she 
intends to carry the foetus to full term is what is most important because ‘it reflects the self-
determination of the woman.’422 Commenting on the debate which preceded the 
introduction of the Abortion Act, Sheldon decried the perceived task of the law as 
‘responsibilisation’ which reduces to this: ‘if the woman seeks to evade the consequences of 
her carelessness, the law should stand as a barrier.’423 Similarly, Jackson has added that the 
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legalisation of abortion in 1967 was not intended to enhance women’s reproductive 
autonomy, but rather to ‘enable doctors [to] act lawfully in assisting women who were 
driven to distraction by the prospect of yet another mouth to feed.’424 The significance of 
the implications of abortion law for the disempowerment of women has made the topic of 
abortion assume prominence, not only in purely feminist scholarship, but even in the HCL 
curriculum in many law schools in England and Wales. As was seen from the empirical data 
in Table D above, eight law schools, which offer HCL modules, treat ‘abortion’ as a whole 
topic. 
 
Another issue, which has attracted feminist critique, albeit subtle, relates to 
compulsory caesarean operations.425 The agonising conundrum which once again arises here 
is whether the bodily integrity of a pregnant woman can be sidestepped in favour of 
protecting the foetus by a compulsory caesarean operation. Hewson has observed that the 
trend towards caesarean cases suggest that the courts were unfairly pushing women to save 
themselves, whereas men in comparable healthcare situations are not similarly treated. She 
notes that: 
 [T]he assumption in the most recent cases seems to be that pregnant women are 
not really autonomous individuals entitled to equal protection, but merely a 
subdivision of what courts once called infants and lunatics, incapable of making 
decisions for themselves, for whom doctors and courts should be surrogate 
decision-makers.426 
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Clearly, the patriarchy accusation made by feminists against HCL is substantiated by 
Hewson’s foregoing remarks. Apart from abortion and forced caesarean sections, other 
aspects of human reproduction have also attracted the attention of the feminist movement. 
 Furthermore, feminist discourse has identified the privileged status of medicine over 
nursing and midwifery as another fertile site of patriarchy in which women are 
subordinated.427 The premise of this argument is that historically, and in fact until recently, 
the medical profession is virtually monopolised by men. Consequently, when it comes to the 
working out the standard of care in negligence cases, the Bolam test facilitates the 
perpetuations of domination and oppression of women. 
These diverse doctrinal orientations reinforce the maturation of HCL as a distinct 
academic discipline since, as noted in section 3.1 above, scholarship provides crucial 
evidence of the emergence of a field of law. There does not appear to be an immediately 
discernible coherence in these doctrinal approaches that could imbue HCL with a conceptual 
unity. But Morgan has rightly noted that HCL transcends the traditional legal requirement 
for a clear and settled framework because he considers HCL as ‘not just a subject but a 
responsibility.’428 The responsibility which Morgan alludes to entails four elements, namely a 
process of naming, blaming, claiming and declaiming. Each of these elements has important 
philosophical dimensions which Morgan explains:  
Naming - is this person ill, unwell, chronic, acute etc.; blaming - exploring the role of 
caring for oneself and one’s responsibilities for health care, particularly whether we 
are responsible for our own health, but also the State’s responsibility for provision 
of health care; claiming - what are our entitlements to health care, of access to 
services?; and declaiming - about saying who we are and who we want to become, 
giving a moral and symbolic emphasis to law.429 
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Clearly, these elements distribute responsibilities for various stakeholders in healthcare. 
Nevertheless, HCL scholars and practitioners bear the initial responsibility for developing a 
body of law that will fairly apportion these responsibilities. To accomplish this does not 
really depend upon the niceties of disciplinary categorisation in the strict sense, but being 
attuned to the dynamic dimension of this field of law and responding appropriately. Thus, I 
agree with Veitch that:  
[i]f medical law has any definable feature at all, it might be thought to reside in the 
nature of the problems it seeks to address (problems arising from developments in 
medicine and biomedical science that engage questions of human values), rather 





Defining a legal field has functional importance and a legitimising usefulness for the 
field. There is no doubt that HCL has emerged as a field of law and a discrete academic 
discipline in England and Wales with indicators that gradually became identifiable post-
1980. Increasingly, patients aggrieved by their clinical experiences have sought redress in 
the courts. Doctors have also resorted to the courts for declarations as to the legality of 
proposed procedures that are ethically sensitive. The burgeoning litigation in healthcare has 
not only generated an avalanche of case law for academic study, but has also exposed the 
inadequacy of the common law in resolving the specific bioethical and legal challenges 
raised by healthcare. Specific legislation was enacted for the first time to address issues 
raised by medical advances. Even in areas where no direct solution could be provided for in 
                                                          
430 n 41 above, 16. 
125 
 
the statutory law due to a lack of compromise in a morally pluralistic society, bodies such as 
the HEFA have been established by the law to provide a forum for debating contentious 
ethical issues and providing guidance for medical professionals.431 
 Also, concomitant with the evolution of this field of law was the emergence of its 
academic discipline. It entered the curriculum of legal education as many universities began 
to teach HCL. This eventually triggered a proliferation of textbooks and journals. The 
proliferation of literature was accompanied by the creation of academic research centres. 
Active scholarship in this field has manifested itself in four different doctrinal orientations, 
namely medical ethics, human rights, and multidisciplinary and socio-legal approaches. 
Despite the diversity in these theoretical approaches, the conceptual unity of the field lies in 
the commonality of the problems of healthcare practice that are addressed by HCL. The 
trajectory of HCL can be illuminated by an appreciation of its historical development. 
         That said, the ultimate validity of HCL as a discrete field depends largely on its 
acceptability by scholars, the legal community and, more importantly, its utility. It must 
empower patients and provide guidance in resolving novel challenges attendant upon ever-
increasing medical advances. In the next Chapter, I shall explore the existence of a 
functionally equivalent field of HCL in Ghana through the lens of the characteristics of a 
discrete body of HCL identified in the present Chapter and pertaining to England and Wales. 
As already noted in Chapter Two the focus of functional comparative law is not exploring the 
presence of exact replica of legal arrangements or frameworks in the jurisdictions being 
compared. Consequently, the exploration in the next chapter is simply to identify the extent 
to which Ghana’s legal system can be said to be responding to the conundrum of patient 
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EXPLORING WHETHER A DISTINCT BODY OF HEALTH CARE LAW EXISTS IN GHANA 
4.0. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the need to empower patients against long-standing 
excessive medical power, as well as to regulate medical advances within acceptable margins, 
contributed to the emergence of a distinct body of HCL in England and Wales. In this 
chapter, I shall explore the extent to which a distinct body of HCL exists in Ghana. The 
exploration here is largely driven by a functional comparative law compass. Thus, my 
objective is not to locate an exact replica of the body of HCL identified earlier in relation to 
England and Wales in Ghana’s legal system. On the contrary, the chapter explores the 
existence or absence of a functional equivalent of the English and Welsh body of HCL in 
Ghana and the extent to which a distinct body of HCL could interact with other factors to 
promote patient empowerment. In order to achieve the goals of this chapter, I shall first 
explore the existence of each of the defining characteristics in relation to Ghana; then find 
out whether the other factors that interacted with evolution of HCL to advance patient 
empowerment are present or absent in Ghana and finally, I shall critically compare and 
contrast the legal approach in England and Wales with the Ghanaian approach to patient 
empowerment and the regulation of advances in medicine. 
4.1. EXAMINING THE EXISTENCE OF HEALTH CARE LAW IN GHANA THROUGH THE PRISM 
OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A DISTINCT FIELD OF HEALTH CARE LAW IDENTIFIED IN 




The quest for the empowerment of patients and the increasing interest of academics 
in the regulation of medical advances were noted in the previous chapter to have been 
pivotal to the emergence of HCL in England and Wales. In examining how these issues are 
addressed in Ghana, it will be helpful to adopt the defining characteristics of a distinct field 
of HCL in England and Wales as the framework for assessing the legal situation in Ghana. The 
defining characteristics of a field of HCL, as discussed in Chapter Three, may be succinctly 
restated here, as follows: the existence of a significant volume of case law and dedicated 
legislation, the teaching of courses relating to the field, and the verifiable interest in the field 
of legal academics. It is necessary to find out whether these features are present or absent 
in Ghana.  
4.1.1. HEALTHCARE-RELATED LITIGATION IN GHANA  
Generally, the relationship between the increasing volume of litigation in healthcare 
matters and patient empowerment is significant. Indeed, it has been rightly noted that 
‘increasing litigation will ensure a notional shift in the balance of power within the doctor-
patient relationship and in particular, the coercive paternalism of medical practice may be 
replaced with the patients’ assertion of rights.’432 Significantly, there was not a great deal of 
reported litigation in Ghana from the colonial era to post-independence.433 Indeed, there is 
a dearth of litigation in this area of the law in Ghana. A search I conducted in the law 
reports434 in Ghana revealed only six reported cases concerning healthcare.435 The very few 
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decided cases relate mainly to medical negligence and access to medical records. Unlike 
England and Wales, where there are over two hundred reported cases436 relevant to HCL, 
the few cases in Ghana to be explored were not all decided by the courts; some were 
decided by quasi-judicial bodies.437  
Beginning with the court decisions, it is worth noting that the first reported case of 
relevance is the leading case of Asantekramo alias Kumah v. Attorney-General438 in 1975. In 
this case, a patient’s hand became swollen and gangrenous following the wrongful 
administration of a blood transfusion after an operation induced by a ruptured ectopic 
pregnancy.439 The doctor later amputated the patient’s hand to save her life. In a negligence 
suit, the court accepted the expert medical evidence that, ‘in all the contingencies, the 
bacteria which caused the gangrene could only have entered the plaintiff’s body if the 
defendant’s servants, namely, the nurses or those in charge of the infusion apparatus, the 
needle and the drip stand, were prima facie negligent.’440 Contrary to the accusation that is 
often levelled against English courts in handling medical negligence cases (that they defer 
excessively to the medical profession), the judge in this case weighed the evidence fully and 
even rejected a portion of the evidence provided by the defendant’s witness (a doctor) and 
entered a judgement for the patient.441   
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It took almost four decades before the Bolam test,442 which has largely dictated the 
direction of HCL in England and Wales,443 was fully discussed and applied by the Ghanaian 
Court of Appeal in Gyan v Ashanti Goldfields Corporation.444 Here, a senior nurse working in 
the defendant’s hospital mistook polio fever for malarial fever in a one year old child patient 
and rushed to administer a chloroquin injection without carrying out tests or referring to the 
doctor on duty. This was established by the court during the trial as being in tandem with 
the general practice at the time.445 The injection caused paralysis in the right leg of the 
infant and a claim was vicariously brought against the defendant for negligence. The court 
upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim by the trial judge. The holding of the court was 
founded upon two main reasons grounds: first, the evidence on record showed that the 
nurse did what most, if not all, healthcare professionals would have done in the 
circumstances on that occasion.446 Secondly, the plaintiff failed to prove that the paralysis 
was attributable to any omission or negligent act of the defendants as he failed to lead any 
evidence to substantiate his allegation that the nurse had failed to follow the medical 
regulations in place.447 It is instructive to note that the court appeared willing to consider 
clinical guidelines in determining the standard of care expected of the nurse if the claimant 
had been able to adduce evidence to prove the existence of the relevant clinical guidelines 
or medical regulations.  
However, Justice Ofori-Boateng dissented from the majority and contended that a 
defendant in a medical negligence suit could still be held liable, despite acting in accordance 
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with common practice.448 Indeed, the dissenting judge was prepared to think through the 
medical procedures when an emergency case was presented without confining himself to 
the testimony of what other doctors thought they would have done. He posed profound 
probing questions, remarking: 
To my mind, however, the charge by the first plaintiff witness that the first 
defendant witness did not follow the laid down routine of the hospital to give the 
injection need not be confined to what happened in the treatment room where the 
injection was administered because the injection alone cannot be taken in isolation 
in a case like this. It includes all the accepted procedures and practice of treating 
people suffering from fever, like the plaintiff, culminating in the giving of an 
injection. For example, when a child is suffering from fever, what kinds of illness 
should be suspected? Should such illnesses be identified after diagnosis before 
treatment can start? When can a nurse decide to treat, on his own, an unidentified 
illness without any reference to a doctor? Under what circumstances can the most 
risky method of treating suspected malaria by injection without any test be 
adopted for speeding up results, as opposed to other methods of administering 
drugs orally which are not so risky?449 
 
The dissenting view gives a better assurance for the protection of patients’ interests in 
healthcare because it recognises that the scope of duty of care owed to patients goes 
beyond actual treatment or therapy to encapsulate all procedures undertaken on the 
patient, right from the moment that he or she enters the healthcare facility. It therefore 
questions what should constitute good medical practice. On the contrary, the majority view, 
based upon Bolam, implicitly assumes that medical paternalism will safeguard the welfare of 
patients. In my view, such an assumption is quite risky for patient safety and empowerment, 
even as the experience from England and Wales, where there is arguably a more effective 
regulatory healthcare regime, suggests that it is unsafe for the law to simply trust medical 
paternalism without external accountability.450 Indeed, the dissenting judge qualified the 
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principle in Bolam to the effect that ‘if a hospital practice is negligent and breaches the duty 
hospitals owe to patients, the extensiveness of that negligence, because it is committed by 
many hospitals in general, cannot cure the practice of its negligent nature.’451 Since the 
Supreme Court of Ghana has not so far decided any other medical negligence or HCL cases, 
the majority decision in Gyan remains the current law in Ghana. 
In 2008 the Bolam approach to medical negligence resurfaced in the unreported case 
of Darko v Korle-bu Teaching Hospital.452 The brief facts were that a fourteen year old boy 
hoping to become a professional footballer complained of pain in the right knee at the 
defendant’s hospital for treatment.453 Although clinical investigations revealed that ‘the left 
knee was also lax, it was the right knee which was diagnosed as having a torn patella 
ligament.’454 He was requested to sign a consent form for surgery to repair the torn patella 
tendon in the right knee. The consent form indicated as follows: 
 I ….hereby consent to undergo the operation of the repair of right patella tendon 
the effect and nature of which has been explained to me. I also consent to such 
further or alternative operative measures as may be found to be necessary during 
the course of such operation and to the administration of a local or other 
anaesthetic for the purpose of the same. I understand an assurance has not been 
given that the operation will be performed by a particular surgeon.455  
 
However, instead of the right knee being operated on, the team of surgeons operated on 
the left knee. The plaintiff sued for medical negligence and whilst the suit was pending, ‘the 
hospital refused to further attend to him during his review and physiotherapy appointments 
as a protest against his suit.’456 The court did not find the doctors or hospital liable for 
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negligence in operating on the left knee instead of the right, but did find that the hospital 
was liable for refusing the claimant further treatment after the legal action had been 
initiated. In dismissing the negligence claim against the doctors, the court based its decision 
on two pillars. First, the court relied on Bolam and contended that insofar as the consultant 
surgeon ‘acted in accordance with the practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of 
medical men in that particular art, although a body of adverse opinion also existed among 
medical men,’ they could not be guilty of  negligence.457 Secondly, the court justified its 
decision by arguing that the patient had signed ‘a broad consent form’ which empowered 
the surgical team ‘to undertake any necessary measures for the purpose of the 
operation.’458 Indeed, Ayebi JA remarked:  
From Exhibit 6, plaintiff’s mother gave consent for operation on the right patella 
tendon. But then the consent further gave the surgeon the discretion to carry out 
other operative measures which may be found to be necessary during the course of 
the operation. Unfortunately, neither counsel for the parties addressed the import 
of this consent form.459  
 
In finding the defendant hospital liable for negligence in refusing to further treat the 
claimant after the legal action had been initiated, the court generally relied on the 
Hippocratic Oath and maintained that ‘since it was implicit in the Hippocratic Oath to save 
life, it was incumbent upon the defendant not to refuse further treatment,’ despite their 
discomfort with the suit.460 
            Although, the decision in Darko demonstrates some degree of sensitivity to patient 
autonomy, it does not adequately advance patient empowerment. To begin with, the court 
applied the Bolam test without evaluating its adequacy in the light of the exigencies of the 
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case before it. This is an important omission given that the issues at stake were not about 
the actual surgical operation, but concerned the carrying out of the operation on the left, 
instead of the right knee. It was not sufficient to rely on the concurring opinion of other 
doctors to justify the position that the operation on the left knee did not amount to 
negligence. Thus, it can be inferred that the judge was labouring under the illusion that 
medical paternalism always ensured beneficial outcomes for the patient. The judge’s 
obsession with medical paternalism manifested itself clearly when he alluded to the 
Hippocratic Oath, as noted above. It would have been better had the court directed its 
inquiry towards the extent of the information disclosed to the patient regarding the planned 
surgery on the right knee and any potential risk that could have necessitated an emergency 
operation on the left knee. It is submitted that the court failed to attach weight to the 
patient’s autonomy in determining the breach of duty of care by the surgical team in 
operating on the left knee. The lawyer for the claimant also deserves a share in the blame 
since he did not make an issue out of the inadequate disclosure of information to the 
patient. Thus, the court could not have substituted a new case for the claimant.  As the 
judge pointed out,461 the lawyers who conducted the case never bothered to comment on 
the wording of the consent form which the patient had signed prior to the operation.  
The most recent case of considerable significance to HCL in Ghana relates to access to 
medical records. The Human Rights Division of the Ghana High Court has affirmed a patient’s 
right of access to her medical records in Elizabeth Vaah v Lister Hospital and Fertility 
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Centre.462 In 2010, Vaah, brought an application to the court on the basis of Article 21(1)(f) 
of the 1992 Constitution, which guarantees freedom of information, for two main sources of 
relief.463 First, the applicant sought a declaration that ‘a patient is entitled as a matter of 
right to her medical records within the custody of a health care institution subject only to 
the payment of reasonable fees for the production of copies of the record and any other 
limitations as recognized by law.’464 Secondly, the applicant also requested ‘an order 
compelling the respondent, Lister Hospital, to furnish her with her medical records in its 
custody.’465 The factual matrix that precipitated this suit was that the applicant, who was an 
expectant mother, began receiving antenatal services from the respondent with a view to 
delivery at the respondent hospital. Several tests and scans were run on the applicant and 
baby and proved that she was carrying a normal healthy foetus. In the course of time, the 
applicant’s membranes ruptured and she was rushed to the respondent hospital without 
delay. The next day, the applicant delivered a still-born baby. A post mortem examination 
revealed that ‘the baby died of “multiple organ haemorrhages” most probably due to a 
bleeding diathesis/coagulation defect with bleeding precipitated by the ‘trauma’ of 
labour.’466 The applicant deposed in the affidavit accompanying the application that she 
needed access to her medical records so that she could put them at the disposal of any 
doctor who  would subsequently attend to her (whether within or outside Ghana). The 
respondent refused the written request of the applicant’s solicitors for the medical records. 
The applicant thus invoked the assistance of the court, complaining that her fundamental 
right to information, as guaranteed under the Constitution, had been and was still being 
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violated by the respondent. The respondent argued that it was justified in refusing the 
applicant’s request for medical records because by speaking to the press about the 
circumstances in which she gave birth at the respondent hospital, she had evinced an 
intention to abuse the records. The court analysed the constitutional provision on freedom 
of information and held that the excuse provided by the respondent in denying access to the 
applicant was not covered by the qualifications contemplated by the Constitution for 
limiting freedom of information.467 Due to the lack of Ghanaian precedent, the judge cited 
and discussed the American cases of Emmet v Eastern Dispensary and Casualty Hospital468 
and Julian Cannel v The Medical and Surgical Clinic.469 Although Vaah is a High Court 
decision, until a higher court issues another precedent or specific legislation is passed to 
govern access to medical records in Ghana, Vaah is likely to be followed in future litigation.  
Vaah raises issues of urgent concern. First, the resort to the general legal provision on 
freedom of information in seeking redress for access to medical records exposes a gap in 
Ghanaian law. There is a need for a dedicated enactment which provides a clear framework 
for accessing health records. Statutory intervention in this area may help address specific 
and distinctive issues relating to ownership of health records, access to information in 
health records and so on. Secondly, the case has also revealed a lack of awareness on the 
part of the legal community about healthcare practice and delivery in Ghana. This 
observation is justified by the lack of any attempt made by the court or the lawyers in the 
case to derive any assistance from soft law in the field. In this regard, the Medical and 
Dental Council’s Guiding Rules on Disclosure, or the Ghana Health Service’s Patient Charter 
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of 2010,470 or the Professional Ethics of medical doctors within Ghana could have been 
considered since they have some relevance to the subject before the court.471  
Apart from court decisions, other quasi-judicial bodies in Ghana sometimes render 
decisions that have some relevance for patient empowerment.  The most important quasi-
bodies for this purpose are the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice 
(CHRAJ) and the Disciplinary Committee of the Medical and Dental Council (MDC). The 
CHRAJ has a mandate to serve as a forum for the protection and enforcement of human 
rights in general. It is able to apply the human rights provisions of the Constitution in an 
expansive way that accommodates grievances from patients against healthcare 
professionals.472 For example, in Somi v Tema General Hospital, the CHRAJ held that the 
failure of a public hospital to ensure that an emergency caesarean section operation was 
carried out on a patient, thus leading to her death, constituted a violation of her human 
right to life.473 The fact that in 2000, CHRAJ could invoke the constitutional right to life in 
finding a health institution liable for the negligent handling of an emergency case leading to 
death suggests that CHRAJ has the potential to serve as an effective forum for the 
ventilation of patients’ grievances against healthcare professionals and institutions. Indeed, 
in the CHRAJ annual reports, the Commission has consistently reported a growing awareness 
of the public about their rights as patients.474 In Section 4.1.3 below, I elaborate on the 
extent of public awareness of the Patient Charter in a more nuanced way. 
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Furthermore, the MDC serves as a platform for aggrieved patients to petition against 
the conduct of doctors and dentists.475 A brief report obtained476 from their secretariat in 
2012 indicates that between 2002 and 2011, six cases relating to patient empowerment had 
been concluded.477 The most recent decision of the MDC is MDC v Dr Sandys Abraham 
Arthur (Complainant: Amarkai Amarteifio).478 On 1st January, 2007, the complainant, Miss 
Amartefio, accompanied her fiancé Johnson (deceased patient) to a private health facility 
where Dr Arthur was employed.479 The patient reported pain in the upper calf, which was 
diagnosed by the respondent as a torn ligament.480 The complainant informed the 
practitioner that the patient had rested in bed for some days as a result of a chest infection 
and so could not have torn a ligament, but possibly had a deep vein thrombosis (DVT).481 
The respondent ignored the complainant’s suggestion and prescribed aspirin tablets for the 
patient. The respondent advised the patient to see him the following day, but he did. The 
pain in the calf worsened, yet the respondent insisted the deceased had a torn ligament.482 
Even though the complainant repeated her suspicion of DVT, the respondent stood his 
ground and repeated the treatment for a torn ligament. The patient died the following 
morning (the 3rd day) in his own home.483 A post mortem examination result indicated that 
‘the patient died of a pulmonary embolism resulting from DVT.’484 A complaint was 
therefore lodged with the MDC, which found negligence in the treatment of the patient, 
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resulting in his death and pronounced the respondent guilty of infamous conduct in a 
professional respect. The MDC ordered removal of the respondent’s name from the register 
of medical practitioners in Ghana.485  
Although the MDC found the doctor liable, it is difficult to suggest that the MDC’s 
handling of disciplinary cases is mainly geared towards patient empowerment. On the 
contrary, it appears that the MDC is primarily interested in upholding the reputation of the 
healthcare profession. This can be inferred from the interpretation which the MDC in this 
case gave to what constitutes infamous conduct. The MDC  interpreted infamous conduct to 
mean ‘any conduct which detracts from the duty imposed by regulation 1 or simply put any 
conduct which tends to bring the medical profession into disrepute or disgrace or 
dishonour.’486 Regulation 1 stipulates that: ‘A medical practitioner must be a man of 
integrity and good faith. It is his duty at all times to uphold the dignity and high standard of 
his profession and his own dignity and high standing as a member of it.’487 The MDC sought 
to test the correctness of its interpretation by drawing inspiration from the way in which the 
same phrase ‘infamous conduct’ used in equivalent English legislation in the nineteenth 
century, had been construed in the Allinson’s case in which the English Court of Appeal held 
that:  
if it is shown that a medical man, in the pursuit of his profession, has done 
something with regard to it which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful and 
dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency, it is 
open to the Council to find that he has been guilty of infamous conduct in a 
professional respect.488  
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The MDC has fully endorsed the definition of ‘infamous conduct’ given above. Despite the 
clarification of the meaning of ‘infamous conduct’ by the MDC in Dr Arthur’s case, there still 
remains a pertinent question for future cases and law reform. It is uncertain whether the 
same interpretation of ‘infamous conduct’ will be adopted in future disciplinary cases, since 
the MDC is not a court of law in the strict sense but a quasi-judicial body. Consequently, the 
doctrine of judicial precedent as it is utilised in Ghanaian courts does not necessarily apply 
to operations of the MDC. Due to the absence of a full compilation of the disciplinary cases 
decided by the MDC since its inception over 30 years ago, I could not gain access to all the 
disciplinary cases decided during the period. This would have enabled me to ascertain 
whether in previous cases, different interpretations of ‘infamous conduct’ were provided by 
the DC. This absence poses a problem when one endeavours to discern the thinking of the 
MDC concerning ‘infamous conduct’ from its previous decisions. My research did not find 
any case in the law reports in Ghana concerning an appeal before the Court of Appeal in 
which a challenge was made to the MDC’s interpretation of infamous conduct in disciplinary 
proceedings, or where judicial review was sought before the High Court in relation to such 
proceedings. Thus, there is no guide as to whether or not the MDC has been consistent in its 
interpretation of infamous conduct. The only reported case concerning the MDC is Republic 
v. The Registrar, Medical and Dental Board; Ex parte Christian.489 But this case concerned 
the service of a disciplinary decision by the MDC on an affected doctor who had left the 
shores of Ghana immediately following the full proceedings of the MDC, but before the final 
decision had been issued and this offers no assistance.  
Furthermore, it is not likely that there will be a clarification of the provision by 
Parliament in the foreseeable future, because the  MDC, which could possibly recommend 
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an amendment of the law, has openly declared its approval of the law in the Dr Arthur case. 
It is therefore not surprising that in the newly passed Health Professions Regulatory Bodies 
Act, 2013 (Act 857), the part of the present legislation (i.e. NRCD 91) concerning disciplinary 
provisions, including infamous conduct, has been left intact with no hope for amendment 
that could have clarified the law. I submit that there is an urgent necessity for an 
amendment to provide for a clear interpretation of ‘infamous conduct,’ particularly when 
Article 19(11) of the 1992 Constitution is critically assessed. According to this constitutional 
provision, ‘no person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is defined 
and the penalty for it is prescribed in a written law.’ The procedure for trying the allegation 
of infamous conduct in a professional respect is materially the same as for an ordinary 
criminal trial in a court of law. It is therefore crucial for a clear statement of the offence in 
the law so that the determination of the commission, or otherwise, of infamous conduct 
does not lie largely in the realm of the MDC’s subjective consideration.  
In my view, the lack of certainty in some aspects of the MDC Act (now replaced 
substantially by Act 857), particularly infamous conduct, coupled with the absence of clear 
legislative attempts or judicial decisions to clarify the law, could possibly be explicated by 
the absence of a distinct body of HCL in Ghana. Indeed, if a field of HCL succoured by legal 
scholarship were in existence, the infelicities associated with the provision relating to 
infamous conduct would surely have been explored and necessary recommendations made 
for law and policy makers. 
4.1.2. HEALTHCARE-RELATED LEGISLATION IN GHANA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
As noted in Chapter 3, a critical component of the field of HCL is the existence of 
dedicated legislation that seeks to empower patients or mediate the ethical dilemmas 
generated by advances in medicine. In this section, I proceed to explore the extent to which 
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this feature of a distinct field of HCL exists in Ghana. To some extent, there are many 
statutes that have been enacted in Ghana to govern various aspects of health in general and 
healthcare in particular. In Table 3 below, I outline these statutes and note their implications 
for healthcare in terms of patient empowerment.  
TABLE 2:  Healthcare-Related Legislation in Ghana  
SHORT TITLE OF STATUTE/DELEGATED 
LEGISLATION/ GUIDELINES 
RELEVANCE TO THE EMPOWERMENT OF THE  
PATIENT AND  THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL 
ADVANCES 
Health Professions Regulatory Bodies Act 
2013 (Act 857) 
 Consolidates the existing statutes on 
the Medical and Dental Council, 
Pharmacy Council, and Nursing and 
Midwifery Council into one statute 
 Creates two new regulatory bodies- the 
Allied Health Professions Council and 
the Psychology Council. 
Public Health Act 2012 (Act 851)  Provides for a comprehensive legal 
framework for public health 
 Incorporates the GHS Patient’s Charter 
as a compendium of patient rights 
 Repeals the old disparate statutes on 
public health – the Infectious Diseases 
Act, 1908 (Cap 78); the Mosquitoes Act, 
1911 (Cap 75); (c) the Quarantine Act, 
1915 (Cap 77); (d) the Food and Drugs 
Act, 1992 (PNDCL 305B). and (2) 
Sections 285-288 of the Criminal 
Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). 
Mental Health Act 2012 (Act 846)  Provides an elaborate statement of 
patients’ rights in the context of mental 
health.   
Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 843)   Provides that a person shall not process 
personal data which relates to the 
health of an individual unless stated 
exceptions apply.490 
National Health  Insurance Act 2003 (Act 
650) 
 Establishes the National Health 
Insurance Authority (NHIA) with the 
mandate to ‘secure the implementation 
of a national health insurance policy 
that ensures access to basic healthcare 
services to all residents’ (s. 2(1)). 
 The NHIA ‘ensures that healthcare 
services rendered to beneficiaries of 
schemes by accredited healthcare 
providers are of good quality’ (s. 2(2)). 
 the NHIA is required to ‘devise a 
mechanism for ensuring that the basic 
healthcare needs of indigents are 
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adequately provided for’ (s. 2(2)). 
 The NHIA has the additional 
responsibility towards quality assurance 
and in particular: 
‘(a) the quality of healthcare services delivered 
are of reasonably good quality and high 
standard; (b) the basic healthcare services are of 
standards that are uniform, throughout the 
country; 
(c) the use of medical technology and equipment 
are consistent with the actual needs and 
standards of medical practice; 
(d) medical procedures and the administration of 
drugs are appropriate, necessary and comply 
with accepted medical practice and ethics, and 
(e) drugs and medication used for the provision 
of healthcare in the country are those included in 
the National Health Insurance Drug List of the 
Ministry of Health’ (s. 68). 
Ghana AIDS Commission Act 2002 (Act 613)  Is not directly relevant to patient 
empowerment, but creates a broad-
based commission to co-ordinate the 
national fight against HIV/AIDs.  
Traditional Medicine Practice Act 2000 (Act 
572) 
 Regulates traditional medical practice 
for the first time and provides a 
monitoring scheme, which can protect 
patients against exploitation by 
unscrupulous herbalists. 
Ghana Health Service and Teaching 
Hospitals Act 1996 (Act 525) 
 Mainly sets up the institutional 
framework for the delivery of 
healthcare through state-owned health 
institutions. 
 Remotely touches on patient safety by 
providing that the monitoring of the 
quality of care provided in health 
institutions is part of the responsibilities 
of the Boards established by the Act (s. 
35(2)). 
The  Fourth Republic Constitution of Ghana, 
1992 
 Guarantees various human rights which 
can be adapted to the healthcare 
context. 
Medical and Dental Council Act 1972 (NRCD 
72) 
 Deals exclusively with the regulation of 
the medical profession. 
 Establishes a council which ‘is 
concerned with medical and dental 
practitioners and is responsible for 
securing, in the public interest, the 
highest standards in the practice of 
medicine and dentistry’ (s. 4). 
World Health Organisation (Protection) Act 
1958 (No. 41) 
 Makes it unlawful to misuse or abuse 
the name and emblem of the WHO. 
 
Vaccinations Act 1919 (Cap. 76) [recently 
repealed by Act 851] 
 Provides for free and compulsory 
vaccination against certain diseases. 
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Infectious Diseases Act 1908 (Cap. 78) [ 
recently repealed by Act 851] 
 Deals with how to contain the spread of 
infectious diseases. 
 
From the above table, it is clear that there is no specific or dedicated legislation dealing with 
the various issues arising from medical advances, such as IVF-assisted reproduction, organ 
transplantation, etc. which have gradually been imported into healthcare in Ghana. Apart 
from this obvious gap in Ghanaian law, neither has the theme of patient empowerment 
been featured prominently in healthcare legislation enacted in Ghana from the colonial era 
to the post-independence era. Having said that, this situation which has existed since the 
inception of this research in 2011, has now improved with the recent enactment of the 
Mental Health Act, 2012 (‘MHA’) and the Public Health Act, 2012 (‘PHA’). Admittedly, the 
MHA has made a significant shift in putting the issue of patient empowerment or patients’ 
rights at the centre of the legal and policy framework for mental health. Specifically, the Act 
provides a compendium of rights for mental patients. To begin with, it affirms the 
importance of the self-determination of voluntary mental patients: ‘(2) [t]he consent of a 
voluntary patient shall be obtained before treatment is given. (3) [a] voluntary patient 
reserves the right to refuse treatment.’491 These provisions are important indicators of the 
modest progress being made in Ghana towards the empowerment of patients. There is no 
reported case concerning these provisions of section 41 (consent and refusal of treatment), 
so their true effects are yet to be realised. 
Looking at the MHA, apart from general mental healthcare, a higher level of consent is 
required where special treatments are to be administered to mental health patients. In this 
regard, four aspects of the MHA are worth considering. First, ‘a person with mental disorder 
shall not undergo sterilization, a major medical or surgical procedure without informed 
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consent or the informed consent of a personal representative if that person is incapable of 
giving the consent.’492 The MHA expressly mentions electro-convulsive therapy as one 
procedure which cannot be administered without informed consent.493 It is interesting to 
note how the Ghanaian lawmakers have reserved informed consent for these high risk 
invasive procedures. Unlike England and Wales, where no statute has specifically 
incorporated the doctrine of informed consent, for the first time this has been expressly 
incorporated in Ghanaian law. The MHA did not merely incorporate informed consent and 
leave the courts to work out its interpretation but went a step further to unequivocally spell 
out its meaning. Thus, according to s. 97 of the MHA, informed consent means ‘an 
agreement or consent for a procedure given freely without coercion by a person with 
capacity when the person has been made fully aware of the nature of the procedure, its 
implications and available alternatives.’ A person has capacity where he or she possesses 
‘the functional ability to understand or form an intention with regard to an act.’494 A striking 
feature of this statutory definition of informed consent is the requirement for full disclosure 
to the patient or their representative. However, the benefits of this provision are limited as 
informed consent is stipulated here only in relation to mental, rather than general 
healthcare. Secondly, a healthcare facility can ignore the absence of informed consent and 
proceed with the requisite procedure where the life of the patient with a mental disorder is 
endangered as a result of the delay caused while obtaining consent.495 Thirdly, in all cases of 
serious medical procedures for a mentally ill person, where informed consent cannot be 
given or is delayed, the relevant healthcare facility is required to apply to the Mental Health 
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Review Tribunal for consent.496 Finally, the MHA has made the breach of the rights of a 
patient with a mental disorder a criminal offence, punishable with a fine and 
imprisonment.497 Thus, a doctor or any healthcare professional that treats such patients 
without obtaining appropriate consent risks facing criminal prosecution. It appears from 
these provisions that as far as mental healthcare is concerned, the issue of patient 
empowerment is addressed in Ghanaian law. Nevertheless, it is difficult to meaningfully 
assess whether there are rough edges in the law which need to be reviewed since the 
provisions of the MHA are yet to be tested in the courts or the tribunal. It also needs to be 
emphasised that merely passing a legislation with elaborate provisions on patient rights will 
not by itself be an effective solution to the conundrum of patient disempowerment. There 
would have to be socio-cultural changes as well (as discussed in Chapter Six).  
Another way in which the MHA potentially advances patient empowerment is the 
guaranteeing of ‘free and full access to information about mental disorder and the 
treatment plan of [the mental] patient.’498 This is a remarkable improvement in Ghanaian 
law, especially when one considers the situation in Vaah where the court had to invoke 
generic provisions on freedom of information as grounds for holding that the claimant was 
entitled access to medical records. Since there is no specific legislation on access to medical 
records in Ghana, except the general Data Protection Act, 2012 (Act 843) (hereafter, DPA), it 
is  my submission that a court may now draw inspiration from the MHA when interpreting 
freedom of information under the 1992 Constitution in relation to medical or health records 
in a similar situation to Vaah. In a country where there has been excessive medical 
paternalism and patients tend to lack the confidence to ask doctors questions concerning 
                                                          
496 Ibid, s. 71(2) and (3). 
497 Mental Health Act 2012 (Act 846), s. 94. 
498 Ibid, s. 62(1). 
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their clinical experience, the MHA has ushered in an era of a brave new world. The 
conundrum inherent in the MHA’s approach towards access to medical records is that it 
permits the health facility to deny access to information about the patient’s medical 
disorder and treatment plan ‘if the information is harmful to the well-being of the 
patient.’499 The question which immediately comes to the fore is how we determine what 
constitutes ‘harmful information’? This provision is yet to be tested in litigation, so not much 
can be said beyond this observation.  
Similarly, the DPA as a general rule exempts the processing of personal data relating to 
the health of an individual.500 However, this presumption may be rebutted by necessity of 
medical purpose where the ‘processing is undertaken by a health professional; and pursuant 
to a duty of confidentiality between patient and health professional.’501 Furthermore, there 
is a general prohibition of the disclosure of personal data relating ‘to the physical, mental 
health or mental condition of the data subject.’502 This prohibition is relaxed where there is 
another law that requires disclosure. Unlike the MHA, which has already entered into force, 
the operation of the DPA is yet to commence from a date to be specified in a statutory 
instrument.503 Consequently, the real effect of the DPA in relation to health data or records 
cannot be assessed at present. 
The PHA has also introduced new initiatives that can potentially advance the 
empowerment of patient. For the first time, the GHS Patient’s Charter has been given 
statutory basis through its incorporation into section 167 of the PHA. The Charter embodies 
the rights and responsibilities of patients. The PHA has also established a maiden framework 
                                                          
499 Ibid 62(3). 
500 Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 843), s. 37(1)(b). 
501 Ibid s. 37(6)(e). 
502 Ibid  62(a). 
503 Ibid  s.99. 
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for conducting clinical trials.504 The explicit endorsement of the doctrine of informed 
consent is noticeable in this framework.505  
In addition to the new statutory provisions described above in relation to patient 
empowerment, Chapter Five of  the Constitution of Ghana  embodies a bill of rights which 
can be relied upon to draw inspiration for patient empowerment in Ghana. Article 12(2) 
unambiguously stipulates that ‘[e]very person in Ghana, whatever his race, place of origin, 
political opinion, colour, religion, creed or gender shall be entitled to the fundamental 
human rights and freedoms of the individual contained in this Chapter but subject to respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest.’506 Article 34(2) of the 1992 
Constitution of Ghana imposes an obligation on a sitting President to ensure ‘the realization 
of basic human rights; the right to good health care of every citizen.’507 However, Article 34 
forms part of Chapter Six (Directive Principles of State Policy) of the Constitution and the 
rights contained therein are of an aspirational character. Consequently, the status of the 
right to healthcare under Ghana’s Constitution appears to be somewhat doubtful when 
juxtaposed with other rights. For example, the right to education, which follows the right to 
health in the enumeration of rights contained in Article 34(2), noted above, is elaborately 
repeated in Article 25. Since Article 25 is located in Chapter Five of the Constitution 
(Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms) it can be considered as having more 
prominence than the right to healthcare. This is particularly worrying when account is taken 
of the fact that, until recently, the directive principles of state policy under which the right 
                                                          
504 See: Part 8 of the Public Health Act, 2012 (Act 851); see:  further details re informed consent in Ghana in 
Section 6.3.2 of the thesis. 
505 Public Health Act 2012 (Act 851), 158-159. 
506 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana. 
507 Article 34(2) stipulates: ‘The President shall report to Parliament at least once a year all the steps taken to 
ensure the realization of the policy objectives contained in this Chapter and, in particular, the realization of 




to healthcare is subsumed, were all held to be non-justiciable508 (‘An issue is justiciable if it is 
capable of being settled by a court’).509 In the Lotto case, the Supreme Court emphatically 
declared that there is a rebuttable presumption for the justiciability of rights and other 
provisions contained in the Directive Principles.510 Thus, it can be contended that ‘the right 
to health care’ mentioned in Article 34(2) forms part of the enforceable rights under the 
Constitution. A survey of law reports in Ghana which I undertook did not reveal any 
reported cases concerning the direct or implicit enforcement of the right to healthcare. The 
paucity of case law could be explained by the obscurity which the right to health is accorded 
in the Constitution. Unlike other rights, which have prominently been enshrined in a 
dedicated chapter on fundamental human rights and freedoms in the Constitution, the right 
to healthcare is just briefly mentioned in a chapter on directive principles of state policy.  
Perhaps if there had been an adequate appreciation of the right to healthcare among 
the citizenry and within the legal community in Ghana, Ghana’s obligations under 
international law could have been relied upon in litigation. Ghana ratified the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 2000,511 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),512 the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) in 1990,513 the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) in 1989,514 and 
many other international instruments which either directly or indirectly protect the right to 
                                                          
508 New Patriotic Party v Attorney- General (31st December Case) [1993-94] 2GLR 35 
509 Ghana Lotto Operators Association v National Lottery Authority [2007-2008] SCGLR 1088, 1099 (hereinafter 
‘the Lotto case’). 
510 ibid 1106. 
511 Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&lang=en   (accessed: 6/5/2014). 
512 Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed: 6/5/2014). 
513 Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CRC&Lang=en 
(accessed: 6/5/2014). 
514 Available at: http://www.achpr.org/states/ (accessed: 6/5/2014) 
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health.515 In terms of Article 40 of the Constitution, Ghana is obligated to fulfil her 
commitments to international organisations. However, being a dualist country, Article 75 
requires the domestication of international instruments before their content can have any 
effect within its legal system. It follows that if a suit seeking to enforce the right to health, 
however defined, were to be pegged onto Ghana’s general obligations under international 
law, it may be an uphill task, taking into account the unambiguous provisions of Article 75. 
Nevertheless, the dualist status of Ghana should not, in principle, be a challenge to the 
protection of rights since those who framed the Constitution purposefully made the Bill of 
Human Rights expandable. In this regard, Article 33(5)516 of the Constitution stipulates that 
the human rights and freedoms spelt out in Chapter 5 of the Constitution are not exhaustive 
but, more importantly, all rights considered to be inherent in a democracy and intended to 
secure the freedom and dignity of man are also guaranteed. This constitutional provision 
has an important implication for HCL in Ghana. It is submitted that by virtue of this, any right 
relating to healthcare and recognised in other democratic countries as necessary for 
ensuring the dignity of man may be enforced in a Ghanaian court, despite the absence of 
explicit domestic legislation.  
It is apposite at this stage to survey the relevant provisions and explore the extent to 
which they can be utilised to advance the empowerment of patients. As noted earlier, there 
is no explicit recognition of the right to healthcare in the Constitution;517 it only stipulates 
that a person acting on behalf of a sick person cannot deny that person the right to medical 
                                                          
515 J.C. Mubangizi, ‘The Constitutional Protection of Socio-Economic Rights in Selected African Countries: A 
Comparative Evaluation’ (2006) 2 African Journal of Legal Studies, 1, 15. 
516 The full text of Article 33(5) states: ‘The rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter shall not be regarded as 
excluding others not specifically mentioned which are considered to be inherent in a democracy and intended 
to secure the freedom and dignity of man’. 
517 See: Chapter Six for further discussion of this point. 
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treatment, education or any other social or economic benefit on the grounds of religion or 
other beliefs.518 The provision tacitly requires consent to be given in all other cases prior to 
medical procedures. However, the Constitution does not give an indication of the nature of 
consent required of a patient. There is no decided case based upon this provision, so there is 
no guidance from the courts concerning the nature of consent that satisfies this 
constitutional provision. Therefore, neither is it clear as to whether the informed consent 
principle, as recently incorporated in the MHA, may be extended to an interpretation of this 
constitutional provision.  
Furthermore, patients’ rights to access medical records, which is an aspect of the right 
to health, can be enforced through the combined effect of freedom of information and the 
right to privacy. Article 21(1)(f) of the Constitution guarantees ‘the right to information, 
subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic society.’ The right to 
privacy guaranteed under the Constitution could arguably be interpreted to encapsulate the 
privacy of health records and protection from the arbitrary disclosure of medical records of 
patients by healthcare workers.519 The viability of utilising some of these generic human 
rights provisions to aid patient empowerment was seen earlier in the Vaah case. 
It has been demonstrated in this section that although Ghana has legislative provisions 
of relevance to healthcare, it was not until post-2012 that it enacted statutes to directly 
address patient rights in a clinical and research setting. Since these statutes are relatively 
new and there are no cases based upon them, it is not realistic to gauge their true impact on 
patient empowerment. This reinforces the earlier point made in this thesis that having 
                                                          
518 The 1992 Constitution, Art. 30. 
519 See: Article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution which stipulates: ‘No person shall be subjected to interference 
with the privacy of his home, property, correspondence or communication except in accordance with law and 
as may be necessary in a free and democratic society for public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of 
the rights or freedoms of others.’ 
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statutory provisions on patient rights are not automatic guarantee of patient 
empowerment. Moreover, it is significant to note that despite the increasing use of IVF and 




4.1.3. HEALTHCARE-RELATED QUASI-LAW IN GHANA (SOFT LAW) 
There are other forms of quasi-law or ‘soft law’520 in Ghana which have significance for 
patient empowerment. The prominent example of quasi-law that I will explore first is the 
Ghana Health Service Patients Charter and the Code of Ethics.521 The Patient’s Charter and 
Code of Ethics were introduced in 2002 ‘with the main aim of promoting an open and 
positive relationship between and amongst health workers and patients.’522 The Code of 
Ethics particularly defines the general moral principles and rules of behaviour for all service 
personnel in the GHS.523 The Patient’s Charter addresses three thematic areas: 
(i) respect for the patient as an individual with a right of choice in the decision of 
his/her health care plans; (ii) the right to protection from discrimination based on 
culture, ethnicity, language, religion, gender, age and type of illness or disability; 
(iii) the responsibility of patients/clients and health personnel towards the full 
enjoyment of the right to health.524 
 
                                                          
520 As indicated in Chapter Three above, the term ‘soft’ or ‘quasi-law’ was first introduced into the discussion of 
sources of HCL by J Montgomery. 
521 Other examples of quasi-law are guidelines, including the Ministry of Health, ‘Ghana Health Service 
Guidelines for Case Management of Malaria in Ghana’ (Accra 2004); Ministry of Health; ‘Ghana Health Service, 
National Guidelines for Laboratory Diagnosis of Malaria’ (Accra 2009). 
522 GHS, ‘Patient Charter’ http://www.ghanahealthservice.org/aboutus.php?inf=Patients%20Charter (accessed:  
8/12/2011). 
523 GHS, ‘Code of Ethics’ http://www.ghanahealthservice.org/aboutus.php?inf=Code%20of%20Ethics 
(accessed: 10/5/2013). 




The thematic areas addressed by the Patient’s Charter are in line with General Comment 
number 14525 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
The Patients’ Charter embodies fourteen rights and nine responsibilities for patients which 
all healthcare providers and patients are enjoined to observe. Examples of rights in the 
Patients’ Charter are: ‘the right to be informed about alternative treatment, the right to 
privacy during consultation; the right to consent or decline to participate in a proposed 
research study involving him or her after a full explanation has been given; the right to full 
information on his/her condition and management and the possible risks involved, except in 
emergency situations when the patient is unable to make a decision and the need for 
treatment is urgent.’526 The Patient’s Charter not only recognises rights but also imposes 
responsibilities on the patient. Thus, according to the Charter, a patient is responsible for 
many things, including ‘(I) providing full and accurate medical history for his/her diagnosis, 
treatment, counselling and rehabilitation purposes; (ii) Requesting additional information 
and or clarification regarding his/her health or treatment, which may not have been well 
understood; (iii) complying with prescribed treatment, reporting adverse effects and 
adhering, to follow up requests.’527 This has parallels with the NHS Constitution in England, 
as the former envisages similar responsibilities within the context of the partnership 
contemplated between patients and the NHS.528 It can be discerned from the approach used 
in the Charter that the Ghana Health Service (GHS) envisages the building of a partnership 
between healthcare professionals and patients in the healthcare process. Clearly, such an 
                                                          
525 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment 14, The right to the highest 
attainable standard of health’ (twenty-second session, 2000), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), paras 12(d) and 
36 
526 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment 14, the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health’ (twenty-second session, 2000), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), paras 12(d) and 
36. 
527 Ibid. 
528 See: NHS, ‘NHS Constitution’ https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-nhs-constitution-for-
england (accessed: 5/5/2014). 
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initiative is a positive step towards patient empowerment, since the rights-based approach 
to healthcare, depending upon the manner of its implementation and general effectiveness, 
could diminish the disequilibrium of power in the patient-doctor relationship in Ghana.   
           However, until 2012 when the PHA was enacted, the legal status of the Patient’s 
Charter was doubtful, since it was neither created as an Act of Parliament, nor delegated as 
legislation. It is important to note that the PHA does not create any new right as far as 
patients’ interests in healthcare are concerned; it basically invests the extant Patient’s 
Charter with unequivocal legal status by repeating the content of the Patient’s Charter 
verbatim as the Sixth Schedule to the PHA.529 The Charter constitutes an operational 
guideline for health providers which the GHS is mandated to regulate. It is important to 
point out that the teaching hospitals are not subject to the regulation of the GHS and so may 
not follow the prescriptions of the Charter.530 Despite not being an Act or a formal delegated 
legislation, the Patients’ Charter has become a de facto framework for patients’ rights 
discourse in Ghana’s health sector.531 Indeed, empirical research seeking to determine the 
extent of public awareness of the Charter and individuals’ readiness to assert their rights as 
patients was conducted by Abekah-Nkrumah, Manu and Atinga in 2010.532 Their findings 
show that ‘the majority of patients (53.4 per cent) are not aware of the existence of the 
Charter; of those that know about it, a sizeable minority (33.7 per cent) are not 
knowledgeable about its contents.533 Unlike the patients, the providers of healthcare exhibit 
better awareness (61.8 per cent) and content knowledge (61.8 per cent) of the Patients' 
                                                          
529 Public Health Act 2012 (Act 851), s. 167. 
530 Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Act 1996 (Act 525).  
531 For example see: G Abekah-Nkrumah, A Manu and RA Atinga, ‘Assessing the implementation of Ghana's 
Patient Charter’ (2010) 110 Health Education, 169 – 185. 
532 Ibid. 
533 Ibid 182. 
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Charter, but on the whole are not yet carrying out their responsibilities under it.’534 From the 
empirical findings, it emerges that patients who are supposed to be beneficiaries of rights in 
the Charter are not sufficiently aware of its existence or its content.535 It is even more 
worrying when one considers the socio-demographic matrix of the research. The paper 
indicates that ‘this is an initial exploratory research with a limited sample, which was biased 
towards the educated.’536 It is thus likely that the degree of awareness among the illiterate 
population would be shockingly low. According to statistics from the 2000 Census, only 
57.9% of Ghana’s population is literate.537 The lack of awareness of the Patients’ Charter will 
impede litigation for the ventilation of these rights. Careful research involving a search 
through all the available law reports from Ghana indicate that there is no reported case 
relating to the Patients’ Charter.538 It is therefore fair to conclude that most Ghanaians 
continue to be ignorant of the Charter and the rights stipulated in it.  
The empirical findings above are also corroborated by the annual report on the state 
of human rights in Ghana published by the CHRAJ.  Field work undertaken by the CHRAJ and 
reflected in its 2010 annual report confirms this massive lack of awareness among the 
population.539 The report further revealed that there were no clear governmental or 
                                                          
534 Ibid. 
535 A similar survey in respect of the NHS Constitution has been conducted by the Patients Association in the 
UK: The Patients Association, ‘NHS Constitution- Fact or Fiction’ (London 2012) 
http://www.patientsassociation.com/Portals/0/Public/Files/Research%20Publications/NHS%20Constitution%2
0Report_Fact%20or%20Fiction.pdf (accessed: 5/5/2014).  
536 The Patients Association, ‘NHS Constitution - Fact or Fiction’ (London 2012)  
http://www.patientsassociation.com/Portals/0/Public/Files/Research%20Publications/NHS%20Constitution%2
0Report_Fact%20or%20Fiction.pdf (accessed: 5/5/2014), 169. 
537 CIA World Factbook,  ‘Ghana Demographics Profile 2013’ 
http://www.indexmundi.com/ghana/demographics_profile.html (accessed: 10/1/2013). 
538 The law reports in Ghana are ‘Ghana Law Report’, ‘Supreme Court of Ghana Law Report’, ‘Ghana Bar Law 
Report’ and  ‘Ghana Monthly Law Report’.  
539 CHRAJ, ‘The 2010 State of Human Rights Report’ (Accra 2010) 
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session14/GH/JS1_UPR_GHA_S14_2012_JointSubmission%20
1_Annex2_E.pdf (accessed: 18/5/2013). 
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institutional plans towards creating awareness or enforcing the Patients’ Charter.540 The 
only significant mode of accessing information on the Charter is through posters and fliers in 
health institutions.541 However, these are not even to be present in every health institution, 
or in a language542 that can be read nor understood by the masses.543 In most cases, health 
personnel who are supposed to inform patients on their admission to hospital of their rights 
under the Charter do not do so. In sum, ‘Inadequate staff strength in view of increasing 
workload (hospital attendance), inadequate funds to carry out education programmes, and 
insufficient rooms for clients’ privacy and confidentiality are the major challenges in 
achieving the objectives of the Charter.’544  It is instructive to note that the need to actively 
create awareness of the existence and content of the Charter in Ghana is imperative, since 
even in England,545 with a high literacy rate and easily accessible information, a large 
segment of the patient population remains ignorant of the NHS Constitution, which serves 
the equivalent function as the Charter in Ghana. 
4.1.4. WHAT IS THE PLACE OF LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING HEALTHCARE IN GHANA’S 
LEGAL EDUCATION? 
 
To date, there is no University or other tertiary education institution in Ghana that 
offers a course in HCL. There are five major public universities and over twenty private 
universities in Ghana. Only the University of Ghana and Kwame Nkrumah University of 
Science and Technology have law faculties.546 Since the inception of the University of Ghana 
over half a century ago, HCL has never been offered as a discrete academic discipline to 
                                                          
540 Ibid. 
541 Ibid.  
542 That is English. 
543 CHRAJ, n. 539 above.  
544 Ibid, 539..  
545 The Patients Association, ‘NHS Constitution- Fact or Fiction’ (London 2012) 
http://www.patientsassociation.com/Portals/0/Public/Files/Research%20Publications/NHS%20Constitution%2
0Report_Fact%20or%20Fiction.pdf (accessed: 6/5/2014). 
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undergraduates, or even to postgraduate students.547 It is surprising that such academic 
disciplines as Environmental Law, Comparative Law, International Human Rights Law and 
Criminology, which are relatively new to Ghana - like HCL - are offered, but HCL is not.548 
Indeed the fact that the subject has never been introduced in this university is quite 
inexplicable because in the 1970s it had one lecturer who had been a former staff member 
of the legal unit of the WHO and was also actively researching in HCL.549 The Law Faculty at 
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), on the other hand, was 
established a decade ago. Although HCL is not offered to students yet, the KNUST law faculty 
has mentioned HCL in the list of its courses available on its website.550 ‘Medical Law and 
Ethics 1 & 2’ are the names of the modules listed there. It is positive that a law faculty 
established a decade ago has evinced an intention to offer HCL as an academic discipline. 
This move is indicative of the increasing relevance of issues of HCL in Ghanaian society. The 
repercussions of the failure to offer HCL as an academic discipline in any of the Ghanaian 
universities has recently been noted by Doku et al: 
The law faculties of the University of Ghana and Kwame Nkrumah University of 
Science and Technology, do not offer elective courses of study in health law hence 
lawyers trained in Ghana qualify without exposure to health law training, let alone 
mental health law. Without lawyers who are trained in health law to help interpret, 
advocate and enforce the Mental Health Act, to protect patients' rights and 
implementation of the Act the risk of non-fulfilment or breach of patients' rights 
will be real.551 
 
                                                          
547 Faculty of Law, ‘Course Handbook’ http://www.ug.edu.gh/index1.php?linkid=876 (last accessed: 
20/8/2012).  
548 Ibid. 
549 He was called R Simmonds and he wrote the article ‘The Law and Human Experimentation’ (see: n. 528 
below). 
550 http://knust.edu.gh/pages/sections.php?siteid=law&mid=258&sid=846 (accessed: 20/8/2012). I personally 
interviewed the Dean of this Faculty on 10/8/2012 and he confirmed that it is not yet being offered, but they 
are waiting until they get experts in to teach it.  
551 VCK Doku, A Wusu-Takyi and J Awakame, ‘Implementing the Mental Health Act in Ghana: Any Challenges 
Ahead?’ (2012) 34 Ghana Medical Journal, 241, 244. 
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From the foregoing it is increasingly clear that there is a real and urgent need for the 
teaching and learning of HCL in Ghana. Again, the teaching of HCL as a discipline per se will 
not immediately empower patient, it rather has the prospect of building capacity of 
personnel that may  play important role in helping patients to ventilate their grievances 
once the necessary awareness has been created. Some commentators who are not 
necessarily HCL lawyers or academics occasionally explore HCL themes in their writings, as 
will be seen in the subsection below. 
4.1.5. COVERAGE OF HEALTHCARE LAW IN ACADEMIC WRITING ON GHANA  
Despite the fact that HCL is not taught in any of the Ghanaian universities, Ghanaian 
scholars are not completely uninterested in the subject. There has been some academic 
writing relevant to HCL in Ghana. The leading law journals in which these writings might be 
found are the Review of Ghana Law (RGL) published by the Council for Law Reporting, the 
University of Ghana Law Journal (UGLJ), the KNUST Law Journal, the Journal of African Law, 
and the African Journal of International and Comparative Law. I did a manual and electronic 
review of all the editions of RGL from its maiden edition in 1969 to 2005 (the most recent 
edition). For the electronic search, I entered the search words ‘Health Care Law,’ ‘Medical 
law,’ ‘Health Law,’ ‘Medical Negligence,’ and ‘Patient Autonomy,’ but none of these yielded 
any relevant articles. Using the same methodology for the UGLJ, two articles exploring 
certain HCL topics were identified. These were ‘The Law and Human Experimentation’ by 
Simmonds,552 and ‘The law of Abortion in Ghana’ by Poole-Griffiths.553 Simmonds (who, as 
previously mentioned, was formerly a member of the legal staff of the WHO before joining 
the University of Ghana Law Faculty), discussed the necessity for human experimentation 
                                                          
552 R Simmonds, ‘The Law and Human Experimentation’ (1973) 10 University of Ghana Law Journal, 81.  
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and the overriding obligation to comply with the acceptable ethical standards embodied in 
the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical Principles for Medical 
Research Involving Human Subjects.554 He suggested the incorporation of these ethical 
standards into the international declaration within domestic legislation in order to avert the 
repetition of the Nazi experimentation scandal.555 Simmonds’ recommendation advances 
the cause of patient empowerment, at least in the context of medical research and clinical 
trials for new drugs.556 Poole-Griffiths, on the other hand, contended in his paper that the 
vast number of illegal abortions undertaken by patients did not call for a scaling up of 
punishment for the offence; rather, it warranted expansion in the country’s medical 
facilities.557 
Apart from the mainstream law journals, it is apposite to look at the Ghana Medical 
Journal (GMJ) by virtue of its strategic focus, in order to identify HCL-related articles that 
might have been published in it since its inception in 1962 by the Ghana Medical 
Association. However, within the first two decades of the founding of the GMJ, none of the 
articles published in it could be considered as directly relevant to HCL. Although during the 
late 1970s scholars from fields other than medicine began to contribute articles to the 
journal, no lawyer or legal academic contributed any article relevant to HCL until 2006. For 
example, Twumasi, the medical sociologist, contributed an article entitled ‘Social Aspects of 
Health and Illness with Particular Reference to Ghana.’558 Strangely, for over three decades 
                                                          
554 World Medical Association, ‘WMA Declaration of Helsinki – Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving 
Human Subjects’ http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/index.html.pdf?print-media-
type&footer-right=[page]/[toPage] (last accessed: 6/9/2012).  
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556 This is now reflected in the regulatory framework under the PHA. 
557 FL Poole-Griffiths, ‘The Law of Abortion in Ghana’ (1973) 10 University of Ghana Law Journal, 110. 
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Journal, 63.  
160 
 
following the inception of the GMJ, not one single article by a scholar from the field of law 
exploring any legal issue relevant to health and healthcare has appeared in it.559  
It was only three decades after the journal’s inception that articles of significant 
relevance to HCL appeared. In 1996, Appiah-Poku, an ethicist, contributed an article on 
justice in healthcare.560 The author discussed the problem of resource allocation in 
healthcare delivery in the context of the ‘cash and carry’ health-funding policy, which was 
then in operation in Ghana’s health sector. He drew upon Rawls’ Theory of Justice and 
Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Bioethics and advocated ‘access to healthcare which 
was not dictated by market principles,’ but by ‘the communal responsibility to be fair to 
patients who lacked the financial ability to pay.’561 The same author wrote another article on 
informed consent in 1999.562 In this paper, he used his empirical findings to reinforce the 
point that informed consent not only enhances patient autonomy, but also advances clinical 
goals, as there was a positive correlation between a patient with full disclosure of their 
condition and their attendance and participation in treatment programmes. A similar point 
was made in 2005 by Clegg-Lamptey and Hodasi in their article which audits aspects of 
informed consent.563 They concluded that: 
Patient information with regard to their diagnosis and operation at the Korle Bu 
Teaching Hospital is very unsatisfactory. Informed consent is poorly administered. 
There is the need for surgeons to train doctors to administer informed consent or 
administer the consent themselves. The consent form in use currently needs 
modification.564 
 
                                                          
559 I examined the content of all the editions of the Journal from the maiden issue in 1962, to 2011. 
560 J Appiah-Poku, ‘Justice in Health Care - A Study at Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital, Kumasi’ (1996) 33 
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562 Ibid 62. 
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Four decades after the founding of the Journal, the first article co-authored by a legal 
academic was published in 2005 on abortion services in Ghana.565 The authors noted that 
the law in Ghana appears to allow therapeutic abortion and therefore sets no limit to the 
gestational age at which pregnancy may be lawfully terminated. They therefore recommend 
law reform to set a limit of gestational age at which safe abortion may be permitted. This 
article is one of the academic papers published in the GMJ in which a thorough analysis of a 
statute (i.e. the Criminal Code) relating to HCL is undertaken. The justification for this 
approach may well be that one of the co-authors is a legal academic. This article is quite 
significant as it has been cited in 24 papers, according to Google. 
Another article of relevance to the field of HCL published in 2008 is Edwin’s paper on 
therapeutic privilege.566 The author advocates for full disclosure to be made to competent 
patients since this upholds the ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence and non-
maleficence. In 2009, the same author discussed the necessity for the disclosure of medical 
errors within the context of the doctor-patient relationship.567 Two years later, Norman et al 
contributed another article to the GMJ, in which they discussed the legal framework for 
dealing with public health emergencies in Ghanaian hospitals.568 This paper provides 
suggestions for hospital administrators and medical personnel on how to develop 
administrative templates in compliance with the law while managing public health 
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emergencies. It also provides examples of such templates for possible adoption by hospitals 
and other health administrators.  
 There are a few other academic writings published outside Ghana that explore some 
aspects of HCL there. In order to identify these, I undertook an internet search using major 
search engines, including Google, Ixquick, Heinonline, the Social Science Research Network, 
Lexis and Westlaw. The search phrases I entered included ‘medical law (Ghana),’ ‘health 
care law (Ghana),’ ‘medical ethics (Ghana),’ ‘right to health care (Ghana),’ and ‘patient 
empowerment (Ghana).’ These general and directed online searches yielded only two 
refereed articles other than those from the GMJ mentioned above. Again, one of the two 
academic papers of some relevance to this field was written by non-legal scholars. Newton 
and Appiah-Poku, collaborators from the Kintampo Health Research Centre in Ghana, have 
authored a number of papers of some relevance to questions of patient empowerment. In 
2007, their article entitled ‘Opinions of Researchers Based in the UK on Recruiting Subjects 
from Developing Countries into Randomized Controlled Trials’ was published.569 The paper 
emerged from an empirical investigation undertaken by the authors to explore the 
challenges of effectively explaining the content of consent forms administered to research 
subjects before their informed consent could be said to have been properly elicited. The 
paper dwelt on the Declaration of Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects as the legal basis for obtaining informed consent prior to 
biomedical research. However, the authors failed to demonstrate the extent to which the 
Declaration has a legal effect in developing countries, including Ghana. Clearly, such an 
omission in the paper could reasonably be attributed to the fact that the authors were not 
lawyers or did not have the requisite legal background. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
                                                          
569 SK Newton and J Appiah-Poku ‘Opinions of Researchers Based in the UK on Recruiting Subjects from 
Developing Countries into Randomized Controlled Trials’ 2007) 7 Developing World Bioethics, 149-156.  
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authors explored this topical issue of informed consent suggests that patient 
disempowerment is not fanciful but real phenomenon. 
Similarly, in 2010, an international journal called Health Education published the result 
of empirical research carried out by Abekah-Nkrumah et al seeking to gauge public 
awareness of the Ghana’s Patients’ Charter and individuals’ readiness to assert their rights 
as patients.570 The study findings of Abeka-Nkrumah et al have already been discussed 
above so no further comment needs to be made, except that it is one of the few available 
academic writings on HCL in Ghana. The other paper relevant to Ghana HCL which was 
revealed through the web search was jointly authored and related to the Vaah case.571 In 
exploring the decision in the case, the paper examined the issues of the physician-patient 
relationship, the ownership of health records and the duties of the physician to the patient. 
The authors concluded that the court ought not to have grounded its decision to grant 
access to medical records on the basis of a provision of Ghana’s Constitution, which 
provided generally for the right to information. Unlike the previous papers, one of the four 
joint authors is a medical doctor and lawyer. Thus, a legal analysis of medico-legal cases 
needed for academic HCL was pursued. However, although the paper engaged in extensive 
legal analysis, it is submitted that the authors ought to have explored the prospects of a 
human rights-based approach to resolve the conundrum of lack of access to medical 
records, rather than criticising the Judge for choosing the human rights route to resolve the 
dispute. Moreover, rather than seeking to superimpose medico-legal analysis extant in US 
and Canadian jurisdictions on the situation in Ghana, the paper could have been more 
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571 ID Norman, MSK Aikins, FN Binka, DN Banyubala and AK Edwin, ‘The Constitutional Mandate for Judge-
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original by seizing the opportunity presented by the Judge to explore and advance a human 
rights-based approach to HCL that would better fit the particular situation in Ghana, as I  will 
clarify further in Chapter Six. 
4.2. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN THE FEATURES OF A DISTINCT 
BODY OF HEALTH CARE LAW IN  ENGLAND AND WALES, AND GHANA  
 
The two jurisdictions being studied do not uniformly manifest the characteristics of a distinct 
body of HCL identified earlier in Chapter 3. I will outline the key points of convergence and 
divergence between the two jurisidictions and analyse the potential rationale. This will later 
serve as a launch pad for discussing the way forward for Ghana in Chapter Six. 
 In the first place, England and Wales has a higher frequency of HCL litigation compared 
to Ghana. Such a great volume of HCL litigation provides indication of a certain degree of 
patient empowerment. The disparity between the two jurisdictions can be accounted for. It 
is clear that there is a highly informed population in England and Wales who are more 
disposed to assert their rights. Also, it is plausible to attribute the inflation of HCL litigation 
in England and Wales to the frequent media prominence given to HCL issues, particularly 
medical scandals and medical advances, coupled with vibrant scholarship amongst legal 
academics. By contrast, in Ghana, there is no active scholarship in HCL topics, probably due 
to there being too few legal scholars researching the area. Perhaps the significant 
quantitative increase in HCL cases in England and Wales, as compared with Ghana, may be 
also partially explained by the frequent public inquiries into healthcare quality and scandals, 
which are given sufficient prominence in the media. The public who watch or observe these 
proceedings are likely to become more emboldened to assert their rights as patients. Thus, 
the fact that the well-publicised findings of these inquiries in England and Wales are made 
freely available online so that the public have easy access to them, as well as the extensive 
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media coverage of HCL cases in the areas concerned, enhance the public demand for 
accountability from healthcare professionals. However, there is no record of a public inquiry 
in Ghana ever being held over the operation of any health facility or in the healthcare 
system in general. Surprisingly, there have been a number of public inquiries commissioned 
in respect of various political issues.572 
 Moreover, it is easier to identify certain core principles or threads which run through 
the majority of cases decided in England and Wales. Thus, the principles of patient 
autonomy, self-determination and the sanctity of life can be discerned as being engaged in 
most HCL cases in England and Wales. The same cannot be said for Ghana, due to the 
paucity of cases litigated in relation to healthcare. Indeed, the few Ghanaian cases available 
mainly relate to medical negligence and do not manifest any consistent principle. It is only 
Vaah which has considered the issue of patient autonomy directly in relation to access to 
medical records. Nevertheless, it is pretty tenuous to rely on a single case to generalise or 
hypothesise about HCL in Ghana. The smaller number of HCL cases in Ghana compared to England 
and Wales is not necessarily indicative of poor attitude of Ghanaian doctors but more importantly, 
for purposes of the present thesis, it demonstrates that the test for existence of a distinct discipline 
of law alluded to in Chapter Three that I used to locate a distinct discipline of HCL in England and 
Wales could not be fully satisfied in the case of Ghana.  The reason is that some of the ingredients of 
the test (such as quantitative increase in case law with peculiar factual characteristics) could not be 
satisfied by evidence assembled through my research. 
 Moreover, there are many more dedicated HCL statutes in England and Wales than 
there are in Ghana. Whereas the HCL statutes in Ghana until 2012 mainly created an 
institutional framework and remain completely silent on substantive norms that should 
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guide healthcare delivery, most of the HCL statutes in England and Wales accomplish both 
purposes. The relative insensitivity of the pre-2012 Ghanaian healthcare-related statutes to 




The discussion in this chapter has underscored some significant points which I propose 
to recapitulate. Firstly, there has not been much litigation in relation to healthcare in Ghana. 
The few cases decided by the courts and quasi-judicial bodies predominantly concern 
medical negligence, with only a tangential connection to patient autonomy or self-
determination. Secondly, until 2012, there was no legislation or delegated legislation which 
provisions that could potentially be utilised to advance patient empowerment in healthcare. 
Until dedicated legislation is enacted on patients’ rights, it will take a court which is 
determined to advance patient empowerment to exploit and manipulate principles of 
statutory interpretation in order to apply the extensive patients’ rights provided in the MHA 
to other, more general healthcare matters. The conspicuous vacuum which existed in 
Ghanaian law in relation to patient rights has been  evidenced by the increasing popularity 
of the Patients’ Charter in healthcare discourse.. Thirdly, specific or general treatment of 
legal aspects of healthcare and its relationship with patient empowerment and medical 
advances has not been given any place in Ghana’s legal education. The absence of HCL 
modules in the curricula of law schools has led some non-legal scholars who write on HCL 
matters in Ghana to raise concerns about lawyers’ lack of appropriate technical capacity to 
attend to legal tasks created by the MHA as a means of advancing patients’ 
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empowerment.573 Fourthly, the exploration in this chapter has demonstrated that while 
there is a paucity of proper legal academic writing on HCL topics in Ghana, there has been a 
gradual increase in publications on some aspects of HCL in Ghana by scholars who do not 
have the requisite legal background to properly undertake a rigorous and critical analysis of 
the relevant issues which could potentially advance patient empowerment. Thus, there has 
been a discernible disconnect between the healthcare-related statutes and themes 
addressed in academic writing on HCL in Ghana by non-legal scholars. Finally, the discussion 
here has illuminated an understanding of differences in how patient empowerment and the 
mediation of dilemmas generated by medical advances are addressed by the law in the two 
jurisdictions under study. 
In the next chapter, I shall proceed to chart the historical trajectory along which a 
distinct body of HCL emerged in England and Wales. This may yield powerful lessons for 
Ghana when I embark upon an exploration of the question of whether there is a need for a 
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 WHAT FACTORS HAVE ACCELERATED THE EMERGENCE OF A DISTINCT BODY OF HEALTH 
CARE LAW IN ENGLAND AND WALES? 
 
5.0. INTRODUCTION 
The exploration undertaken in Chapter Three not only unpacked the defining 
characteristics of a distinct body of healthcare law (HCL), but also crucially demonstrated 
that HCL in England and Wales is a distinct field of law as it satisfies those defining criteria. 
Thus, the above chapter essentially explored HCL as it is currently constituted in England and 
Wales as a legal field. However, the explanation of how and why HCL has acquired those 
characteristics, rendering it a distinct body was not proffered. In this chapter, I seek to fill 
this gap by charting the historical trajectories and contours along which the distinct body of 
HCL in England and Wales came to be what it is; and in particular how evolution of this 
distinct body of law interacted with other factors to contribute towards patient 
empowerment  
5.1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS 
 While it is generally incontestable in the first part of the 21st century that HCL has 
emerged as a field of law that can potentially promote patient empowerment and  assist in 
resolution of ethical dilemmas associated with medical advances, the circumstances which 
precipitated its development have received little attention in the literature. In order to fully 
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map out the field of HCL in England and Wales and explore the potential lessons that can be 
drawn in relation to Ghana, it is apposite to consider the factors that have assisted or 
accelerated this development. Five key factors are worth exploring here. These are (1) the 
revival of autonomy-oriented liberalism and human rights thinking, (2) the popularisation of 
bioethical discourse; (3) the feminist movement; (4) the role of the media, and (5) the 
advocacy role played by pioneering scholars. It must be emphasised that none of these 
factors can be considered as the most important trigger or accelerator in the emergence of 
HCL. Rather, it is more plausible to contend that the five key factors worked in concert in 
various ways to influence the development of this field of law. 
5.1.1. THE REVIVAL OF LIBERALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS THINKING: THE INCREASING 
POPULARITY OF AUTONOMY 
 
The projection of patient empowerment, particularly through the advancement of 
autonomy as an important ethical value in regulating healthcare via law, has benefitted from 
the reawakening of society’s interest574 in the notions of liberalism and human rights. As 
Brazier and Ost have noted that the influence of ‘liberalism on bioethics and criminal law’ 
(and for that matter HCL) cannot be whittled down because it ‘remains the predominant 
system of political normativity in Anglo-American and other Western societies.’575 The 
notions of liberty were embedded in social thought long before the war. However the 
universal adoption of human rights as basis of new world order that would guarantee peace 
gave new impetus to political liberalism.  
 Liberalism is increasingly less amenable to straightforward definition. This is 
particularly so since ‘the concept has changed significantly over time... and is riddled with 
                                                          
574 J Coggon, What Makes Health Public? A Critical Evaluation of Moral, Legal, and Political Claims in Public 
Health (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012) ch 5.      
575 M Brazier and S Ost, ‘Bioethics, Medicine and the Criminal Law Volume III: Medicine and Bioethics in the 
Theatre of the Criminal Process’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) ch 7, 182. 
170 
 
contradictions and ambiguities because of historical, social and political singularities and 
interactions.’576 Nevertheless, for the purposes of the present discussion I use the term 
“liberalism” to denote ‘an ideological construct which perceives the promotion and 
enhancement of the freedom or liberty of the individual as the most cherished goal of 
political and social arrangements.’577  Autonomy, which is often expressed as self-
determination, lies at the heart of the concept of liberalism.578 The influence of liberalism in 
the development of HCL can be assessed from two perspectives: general norms of human 
rights under international law, and autonomy via Mill’s harm principle. The only justification 
for circumscribing the liberty of a person, according to Mill’s harm principle, is necessity to 
prevent injury or pain to another autonomous person.579 In the context of healthcare, 
patients ought to have their autonomy respected, including their self-determination 
regarding what should happen to their body, unless in certain cases this causes harm to 
others. For example, public health considerations may be a legitimate ground to interfere 
with a patient’s autonomy. A typical illustration may be the Rampton Smokers’ case in which 
the court upheld a prison regulation banning inmates from going out to smoke as leglitimate 
as it sought to safeguard the health others.580 
           Turning to the general norms of human rights under international law, the formal 
recognition of ‘human rights’ for individuals was left unspecified until the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights following revelation of atrocities during the Numerberg trial.  
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The significance of human rights in the context of the evolution of a field of HCL can 
readily be appreciated. To begin with, since health and healthcare are components of the 
well-being of human beings, it is contended that any efforts to protect the rights or 
entitlement of individuals to issues relating to their well-being should similarly apply to 
healthcare. Accordingly, human rights norms which relate to well-being in general and 
healthcare in particular under international conventions and declarations can be said to 
have impacted the quest for the empowerment of patients, however remotely or 
tangentially. In the United Kingdom, international instruments must be incorporated into 
domestic law by Parliament before they can have direct effect. Nevertheless at the time581 
when the UK had not yet incorporated some of these international instruments relevant to 
HCL, their provisions to some extent indirectly influenced the writings of some pioneer HCL 
academics582 and judicial deliberations in HCL cases.583 McLean, for example, points out that 
there was a dearth of national case law in this field which necessitated that an analysis of 
developments in the field be approached from the perspective of norms embodied in the 
plethora of international instruments extant at the time.584 In one of her maiden co-
authored monographs in the field published in 1983, she cited provisions from the European 
Convention on Human Rights585 to bolster her explanation of the right to reproduction and 
also cited the Proceedings of the 5th World Congress on Medical Law, 1979 to reinforce her 
remark that ‘sterilisation had become one of the most popular ways of controlling 
                                                          
581 It is important to note that the United Kingdom has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and indeed the European 
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582 M Brazier, ‘Rights and Health Care’ in R Blackburn, Rights of Citizenship (London: Mansell 1994) 56-74. 
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643, 649, wherein Lord Scarman used rights-based argument. 
584 Extracted from the ‘Transcript of Personal Interview with Professor Sheila McLean on 16/10/2013’. A copy is   
available on file with the author. 
585 The UK incorporated ECHR into its domestic law via the Human Rights Act 1998. 
172 
 
reproduction because of its relative certainty.’586 Moving forward to today, the UK still has 
not incorporated most of these instruments, notably the ICESCR and more specialised 
relevant treaties, such as the CRC. Only the ECHR has been incorporated. Articles under the 
ECHR have increasingly appeared and been applied in HCL case law.   
With the rapid adoption of various international human rights instruments, some 
scholars have actively explored the degree to which human rights may be seen serving as 
the fulcrum upon which to hinge patients’ rights in HCL.587 This is perhaps unsurprising as 
one commentator has noted that patients' rights more likely to be breached in healthcare 
not necessarily ‘because health care providers are more inclined than others to do so, but 
because the individual in health care is easily reduced to a case and the patient’s position is 
weak because of the illness and the insecurity and fear it produces.’588 In such a situation, 
the individual needs to be protected. This has always been the role of law. Thus, Kennedy 
has postulated that human rights can appropriately be the basis for protection of patients’ 
interest in healthcare because that is in keeping with how society has had to adopt ‘some 
sort of social system’ for safeguarding vulnerable persons against privileged ones.589  
As far as human rights norms derived from international human rights are concerned, 
a patient’s right to bodily integrity and autonomy in relation to medical procedures is 
reflected not only in customary international law (as established by the Nuremburg Trials), 
but also in various treaties or conventions. Examples of relevant International human rights 
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instruments are those already mentioned: ICCPR, ICESCR, and ECHR. As I have noted in 
Chapter Three,  the incorporation of the ECHR into UK law via the Human Rights Act, 1998 
(HRA) has expanded the scope of protection that patients can enjoy in their clinical 
experience. Indeed soon after the passing of HRA, it was noted by Lord Irvine, the Lord 
Chancellor at the time, that the number of Convention rights which are relevant in the 
medical field is ‘more than you might guess.’590 He further remarked that the principles of 
the ECHR ‘will gradually reshape the climate in which the courts view any case concerned 
with human rights.’591 Wicks has interpreted Lord Irvine’s remarks to mean that the scope of 
influence of the HRA could not be gauged at the time, largely because ‘the medical field is 
itself so diverse – from issues of duties of care to doctor-patient confidentiality; from 
assisted conception to end of life decisions – that the nature of rights which apply varies 
accordingly.’592 
The potential impact of the HRA on HCL has been explored in monographs specifically 
dedicated to the subject.593 The anticipated impact of human rights on the development of 
HCL is a reflection of the views of some the pioneers of HCL in England and Wales. Indeed, 
as noted in Chapter Three,  Kennedy and Grubb in the  late 1980s went as far as to 
categorically define HCL (what they prefer to call medical law) as ‘a subset of human 
rights.’594 It is apposite at this juncture to explore some of the specific instances in which the 
liberal agenda of human rights has been relevant in the evolution of HCL.  As a prelude to 
this exploration, it is important to underscore here that it is not only the usual formulaic 
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right to health or right to healthcare that marks the point of intercession between liberalism 
and human rights on the one hand and HCL on the other, although the right to healthcare 
may feature prominently in considering the thorny issue of allocating scarce healthcare 
resources, or whether there should be a right to demand medical treatment.595 To use 
Shue’s lexicon of human rights, the right to healthcare relates to subsistence rights and is 
therefore a positive right.596 A positive right is one that requires that something is done for 
the realisation of the subject-matter of that right. Thus, the right to healthcare per se has 
not been the fulcrum around which human rights has advanced patient empowerment in 
HCL. It is those rights usually classified as civil and political rights which have proven to be 
most influential in the course of the evolution of HCL. Some of these categories of human 
rights are worth exploring for their relevance in the quest to empower patients in their 
clinical experience. 
First, the right to life is enshrined in Article 2 of the ECHR under the following terms: 
‘everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.’ It is a fundamental right in the sense that 
it provides the basis for enjoyment of all other rights. Consequently, the right to life has 
important implications for HCL, particularly having regard to the sensitive and delicate 
decisions made at both the beginning and end of life.597 Indeed, both law598 and bioethics 
are yet to provide definitive answer to the enduring question of ‘when the right to life 
begins at conception; implantation; viability; birth, or at some other stage in the process of 
life’s commencement?’599 The resolution of these puzzles would profoundly assist in 
                                                          
595 Burke v GMC [2005] EWCA Civ 1003  
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separate existence from the mother. 
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determining ‘the treatment which is available to a pregnant woman, both in terms of the 
legality of a termination of pregnancy and in terms of the woman’s right to refuse necessary 
medical treatment during pregnancy and labour.’600 For example, in the case of Paton v 
UK,601 the European Commission categorically refuse to recognise the foetus having 
absolute right to life but left open whether  the foetus did have some right to life. Moreover, 
it is still not clear whether the right to life necessarily encapsulates the sanctity of life as an 
overarching value to be upheld at all times, or whether the quality602 of a person’s life 
releases the state from its obligations to sustain that life.603 In this regard, the question 
arises whether a ‘right to life not only protects the value of life but also incorporates an 
element of self-determination about issues of life and death.’604 In the landmark Pretty605 
case, the applicant, a motor neurone disease patient, sought to rely on the right to life under 
Article 2 ECHR to derive a right to die, but the UK and European Courts rejected her 
submission. The court held, inter alia, that such an interpretation would be contrary to the 
very right to life the provision was crafted to protect. Commenting on the Pretty case, Ost 
contended that deriving a right to die from the right to life and other rights on the basis of 
an individual’s perception of a lack of quality of life was discouraged by the UK courts due to 
‘fears that vulnerable members of society would be at risk.’606 The UK Supreme Court has 
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given indications in a recent decision that a blanket ban on assisted dying is a violation of the 
right to life in Article 8 of the ECHR.607 
Wicks has noted that ‘one other aspect of the right to life which has huge significance 
in the healthcare context is the issue of a positive obligation upon the state to preserve life 
and the possibility that this may be the basis for a right to treatment.’608  Thus, in England 
and Wales, where there is a publicly-funded healthcare system, it is the possibility of a 
recognition of a right to receive necessary or beneficial medical treatment which may appeal 
to the general public,609 although the UK courts are reluctant to recognise any right to 
demand medical treatment.610 The illustrations and examples of relationship of specific 
human rights to healthcare cannot be exhausted, but how do all these bring about patient 
empowerment. 
   It has been demonstrated that the culture of political liberalism that gathered 
momentum in the post-World War II era facilitated adoption of a plethora of human rights 
instruments. The aftermath of the war increasingly revealed that a strong state under the 
control of over powerful politicians could not be trusted to safeguard liberty of the 
individual; this set the scene for political and legal order that should gravitate more towards 
autonomy of the individual. Undoubtedly, this did not happen overnight, and did not also 
automatically translate into empowerment of patient in the context of healthcare. 
Nevertheless, political liberalism and the increasing adoption of various human rights 
frameworks sowed seeds that would gradually develop into projecting the need for 
empowering patient against excessive medical paternalism. Indeed, some of findings from 
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the Pioneering HCL Scholars considered below lend credence to the fact HCL discourse in the 
early stages benefitted from the concept of political liberalism and human rights as they 
added to the repertoire of criteria available at the time for commenting on the then evolving 
body of HCL. Much as it is conceded that an emergence of a distinct body of HCL per se 
could not be an instant solution to patient disempowerment, it is my submission that the 
crystallisation of liberalism through human rights certainly gave some hope to patients. 
Indeed, public conversation and academic discourse on matters affecting patient 
empowerment would have been most likely not forthcoming in a situation where liberalism 
was not valued or the field of HCL was virtually none existent.   
5.1.2 THE POPULARISATION OF BIOETHICAL DISCOURSE 
The upsurge in bioethical discourse in the 1970s crucially set the scene for academic 
interest to extend to a relatively new area of law known, inter alia, as HCL in the post-
1980.611. ‘Before exploring those particular aspects of the development of bioethics which 
impacted on the then evolving HCL, it will be illuminating to unpack the meaning of 
bioethics. In seeking to explicate bioethics, it is important to note that although bioethics 
and medical ethics are sometimes used interchangeably, the two are not necessarily 
uniform in meaning.’612 ‘The term bioethics was first used in print in 1970 in an article’613614 
by Potter, an oncologist from the University of Wisconsin.615 The Encyclopaedia of Bioethics 
explains the origins of bioethics as follows: 
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The word bioethics was coined in the early 1970s by biologists in order to 
encourage public and professional reflection on two topics of urgency: (1) the 
responsibility to maintain the generative ecology of the planet, upon which life and 
human life depends; and (2) the future implications of rapid advances in the life 
sciences with regard to potential modifications of a malleable human nature. 
Bioethics, then, emerged from biologists who felt obliged to address the moral 
meaning of the biosphere, and to reflect on the remarkable implications of their 
discoveries and technological innovations.616 
 
Bioethics mark a ‘critical departure’ from the prior tradition of medical ethics, where doctors 
governed their own conduct through professional codes.617 Medical ethics, in a technical 
sense, connects to the medical (i.e. physician’s) profession; it ‘governs how a physician as a 
professional should practice - and has traditionally been seen as within the province of 
physicians only.’618 On the other hand, whilst bioethics encompasses medical ethics within 
its orbit, it also ‘expands the scope of ethical inquiry to include not only clinical issues but 
also many more beyond the ‘bedside619 concerns’; for example what happens at 
institutional, research, public health and policy levels.’620 Despite the two fields having some 
kind of distinct identity as a field of inquiry, it is obvious that medical ethics preceded 
bioethics. Thus, Jonsen remarks that: 
 [e]ven though medical ethics, bioethics’ predecessor was shaken by notable and 
notorious events, it was a slow accumulation of concerns about the ambiguity of 
scientific progress that turned the old medical ethics into the new paths [known as 
bioethics].621 
 
In this regard, it has also been noted that ‘following the emergence of bioethics... many non-
physicians played a critical role in developing regulatory standards for medicine and the life 
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sciences, and took the lead in publicly defining the ethical issues raised by clinical practice 
and research.’622 In fact, bioethics can be taken to incorporate interdisciplinary perspectives, 
including philosophy, sociology, law and theology in debating or addressing not only 
traditional issues of medical ethics, but also the ethical dilemmas generated by advances in 
medicine, science and biotechnologies.623 Within the context of the present historical 
discussion, my focus shall then be on the extent to which the upsurge in interdisciplinary 
perspectives of ethical dilemmas in healthcare have influenced the emergence of a distinct 
body of HCL. In this regard, it also becomes important to explore the viability of the 
hypothesis that patient empowerment and academic interest in medical advances have 
accelerated the development of HCL as a field of law. 
 At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the origins of bioethics in England and Wales 
and any influence these might have had on HCL are inextricably linked to the history of 
bioethics across the Atlantic. The exact origins of bioethics in the USA remain a contested 
issue, but for the purposes of charting a symbolic commencement of bioethics as a 
discipline, a useful insight may be drawn from Rothstein’s narrative.624 According to 
Rothstein, five events in the USA during the 1970s directly affected the emergence of 
bioethics there:  
(1) development of safer and more successful solid organ transplantation 
techniques, thereby raising the issue of how to allocate the supply of scarce organs; 
(2) establishment of hospital ethics committees to deal with organ transplant 
allocation, end-of-life issues, and other matters; (3) the deinstitutionalization of 
many individuals with mental illness, often as a result of litigation; (4) debates 
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about the safety of new recombinant DNA technology, including the Asilomar 
Conference in 1975625; and (5) the beginning of medical ethics classes at American 
medical schools.626   
 
These events had been preceded by some scandals involving healthcare and biomedical 
science, which aroused public interest and generated calls for the public to have a voice in 
deliberations relating to healthcare and biomedical research. For example, as a result of 
controversies over the withholding of syphilis drugs from African Americans in Alabama, and 
non-consented experiments on institutionalised children in New York, Katz argued that 
fundamental questions needed to be asked about the nature of the authority assigned to 
physicians.627 He argued for the more active involvement of lay people in research decisions, 
since doctors were not better placed than the rest of society to be commissioned as the sole 
arbiters of medical ethics. In 1974, President Nixon responded to these controversies by 
setting up a National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and 
Behavioural Research, which was required to have at least six lay people amongst its eleven 
members, drawn from philosophy, sociology, or the general public.628 The growing influence 
of bioethics in the USA was confirmed in 1978 when President Carter formed a permanent 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research.629 
These developments in the USA had a snowball effect in England and Wales, which 
was going through social and political change that emphasised accountability and 
                                                          
625 The main goal of the conference was to address the biohazards presented by recombinant DNA technology. 
According to Paul Berg and Maxine Singer  in 1995, the conference marked the beginning of an exceptional era 
for both science and the public discussion of science policy. See: http://www.biotech-
info.net/asilomar_revisited.html (accessed: 18/6/ 2013).  
626 MA Rothstein, n. 615 (above), 74; see also: D Wilson, ‘Who Guards the Guardians? Ian Kennedy, Bioethics 
and the ‘Ideology of Accountability’ in British Medicine’ (2012) 25 Social History of Medicine, 193. 
627 J Katz, ‘Who is to Keep Guard Over the Guardians Themselves?’ (1972) 23 Fertility and Sterility, 604. 
628 D Wilson, ‘Who Guards the Guardians? Ian Kennedy, Bioethics and the ‘Ideology of Accountability’ in British 
Medicine’ (2012) 25 Social History of Medicine, 199. 
629 Ibid 200. 
181 
 
transparency. Politically speaking, Margret Thatcher’s government in the late 1970s had 
argued that professions should be exposed to outside scrutiny in order to render them 
accountable to their end-users.630 It was against the backdrop of this crusade for an ‘audit 
society’ that Ian Kennedy, who had been trained in the USA and had followed all the 
developments in medical ethics and later, bioethics, called for the external oversight of 
medicine during his series of lectures and publications between 1973 and 1981.631 Indeed, 
there was a general crusade for an audit society in the UK at various levels.632 In the social 
realm, there was a combination of factors that had generated a growing discussion of 
medical ethics. These included uncertainty over death and transplants, the exposure of birth 
defects caused by the ‘miracle’ morning sickness drug, Thalidomide, and the publication of 
Maurice Pappworth’s Human Guinea Pigs.633 In this publication, Pappworth sought to 
expose unethical medical and scientific research which was being performed contrary to the 
Nuremberg Code. He cited experiments on children and on inmates of mental and penal 
institutions, and included actual examples of research that had been conducted on patients 
who were at NHS hospitals for routine surgery. ‘One notable example was cardiac 
catheterization, performed on patients who had been admitted for routine surgery and had 
given permission for blood specimens to be taken while they were under the anaesthetic.’634 
Pappworth believed the reasons for the experiments to be purely for the advancement of 
the careers of those involved rather than for the therapeutic benefit of the patients.635 
Pappworth was advised by the medical establishment to keep quiet on the issue, but he 
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refused.636 According to Pappworth’s biographer, the publication of the book spontaneously 
provoked a huge storm in British society; its debate attracted massive newspaper and 
television coverage, as well as questions in Parliament.637 It has been noted that eventually, 
Pappworth’s work ultimately accelerated the introduction of stricter codes of practice for 
human experimentation and the establishment of research ethics committees, which would 
have come much later, had it not been for his whistleblowing.638 In the wake of these 
developments, the London Medical Group (LMG) was formed by medical students in 1963 as 
a forum for discussing the ethical implications of medical advances and scientific research. 
The LMG sponsored ‘the extracurricular study of issues raised by the practice of medicine 
which concern other disciplines, such as the law, moral philosophy, moral theology and the 
social sciences, in programmes of lectures and symposia on topics identified by students of 
medicine, nursing and allied disciplines.’639  
Also, in the 1970s, a small group of academics from law and other disciplines began to 
discuss the ethical implications of new technologies and clinical practices.640 These included 
the academic lawyer, Ian Kennedy; the theologians, Alastair Campbell and Gordon Dunstan, 
and the philosopher, Robin Downie.  The growth of those ethical discourses around the 
1970s culminated in the publication of the Journal of Medical Ethics in 1975. This journal 
served as a platform for readers and authors who were interested in the rich debates on 
bioethics taking place in the late 1960s and 1970s and enabled lawyers to contribute legal 
perspectives. 
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5.1.3. MEDICAL ADVANCES 
The history of improvements in medicine can be seen as a sort of ‘continuum so that 
at every point in time a new approach or technology in medicine may be discovered.’641 
However, the medical advances witnessed during the past four decades have radically 
altered the nature of medical practice by making doctors assume more power over life and 
death than ever before. Medical technology has allowed doctors to prolong life. This in turn 
has ‘signalled that there is no longer any general consensus on the sanctity of life, when it 
begins, or when it ends, or should end.’642 Similarly, medical advances in the field of human 
reproduction have significantly ameliorated the conundrum of infertility. These medical 
advances have provoked public anxiety about the acceptable boundaries for scientific 
progress in human health. I explore these further now with a closer scrutiny of some of the 
prominent medical advances of the time. 
5.1.2.1. ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 
The breakthrough643 made in the transplantation of human organs during the 1960s 
had become well consolidated by the 1970s, with organ transplantation being seen as a 
medical therapy and with consequent excess demand for organs over supply.644 In 1968, the 
legal, bioethical and social uncertainties that attended these novel medical procedures were 
succinctly captured by Donald Longmore:  
This is a new area of medical endeavour; its consequences are still so speculative 
that nobody can claim an Olympian detachment from them. Those who work 
outside the field do not yet know enough about it to form rational and objective 
conclusions. Paradoxically, those who work in the thick of it […] know too much and 
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are too committed to their own projects to offer impartial counsel to the public, 
who are the ultimate judges of the value of spare-part surgery.645 
 
Two important bioethical challenges were raised by the recognition of organ transplantation 
as a regular part of medical practice. First, how could patients in need of organs obtain them 
when needed?  For example, a patient could benefit from a donation from a live donor if 
available. This raised the issue of whether a human organ could and should be treated as a 
commercial commodity.646 Furthermore, organs from cadavers raised an issue as to consent, 
which also depended on ‘the property status of the organ.’647 This prompted academic legal 
debate. For instance, in order to address the problem of shortage of kidneys for 
transplantation, coupled with ‘the dangers inherent in the commercialisation’648 of kidneys, 
Kennedy argued in various articles for ‘an amendment of the Human Tissue Act, 1961 to 
allow an opt-out scheme for harvesting kidneys from dying patients.’649 As discussed later in 
this section, a particular scandal associated with the sale of kidneys in 1985 attracted public 
attention due to its coverage in the media.  
The second significant bioethical issue regarding organ transplantation is the definition 
of death. This is crucial for determining the best time to harvest organs. For a long time it 
was thought that the vital functions of a human body were respiration, pulse and the 
capacity for consciousness or sentience; thus, death was understood as the absence of these 
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vital functions.650 In 1976, the Royal Colleges of Medicine in England and Wales adopted 
‘brain-stem death’ as the new ‘medical definition of death’.651 R v Malcherek652 endorsed 
the definition of ‘brain-stem death’, which was subsequently included in the Department of 
Health’s Code of Practice.653 This criterion for declaring a person dead meant that it was 
possible for high quality organs to be harvested for transplantation.654 Despite the apparent 
judicial approval of the brain-stem death test for confirmation of death, it has no statutory 
foundation in England and Wales. Mason and McCall Smith have rightly opined that 
legislative intervention in prescribing a definitive test for death is unnecessary. According to 
these commentators, ‘medical facilities and expertise alter and do so faster than can the 
law; it is therefore essential that the evaluation of diagnostic techniques remains in the 
hands of the medical profession.’655 Indeed, the new challenge presented to the law by 
organ transplantation and the determination of an exact point in time at which death can be 
considered to have taken place has engaged the attention of certain pioneers in HCL for a 
good period of time.656 Therefore, it reinforces one of the hypotheses of this thesis that the 
legal academic interest in medical advances has accelerated the emergence of HCL as a 
distinct body of law in England and Wales.  
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5.1.2.2. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (ART) 
Developments in human reproduction have also presented unprecedented legal and 
ethical dilemmas. The ‘delivery of Louise Brown, the first ‘test tube’ baby, through in vitro 
fertilisation at Oldham Hospital, Manchester in 1978’657 gave rise to public concerns over the 
apparently uncontrolled advance of science, bringing with it new possibilities for 
manipulating the early stages of human development.658 Fertility treatment also depended 
upon gametes and embryos provided by third parties. This raised sensitive bioethical and 
legal issues concerning how to regulate the involvement of such third parties. First, should 
they be entitled to payment for making their gametes/embryos available to others? 
Secondly, should there be screening of those third parties and should the prospective 
parents be allowed to choose whose gametes and embryos to accept? Thirdly, what legal 
relationship should exist between the resultant child and the third party? Related to this, 
should the law prohibit disclosure of information about the donor? Fourthly, must the 
consent of the donor be obtained before any further medical procedures or scientific 
research could be carried out on the embryos? There was also the issue over the destruction 
of embryos after their use. This impinged upon the question of when human life actually 
‘began’ in the reproduction process. Lastly, the potential of IVF technology to develop 
further was another source of concern, as it was uncertain whether scientists should be 
prohibited from further research on human reproduction or whether the potentially 
beneficial outcome was sufficient justification for giving unfettered research freedom to 
doctors and scientists. Against this backdrop of cautious public excitement and concern, the 
Warnock Committee was established in July 1982 ‘to consider what policies and safeguards 
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should be applied, including consideration of the social, ethical and legal implications of 
ARTs, and to make recommendations.’659 The Committee’s Report was influential in the 
development of HCL, at least in the context of the regulation of ART.  
First and foremost, despite some of its controversial recommendations (as discussed 
below) on highly ethically sensitive matters, the Report informed the enactment of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990. It recommended the establishment of an 
independent statutory body to monitor, regulate and license infertility services and embryo 
experiments. This was a critical outcome of the deliberations of the Committee as a balance 
needed to be struck between public anxiety about the moral dimensions of reproductive 
technologies and the need to facilitate advancement in treatment and medical knowledge 
by continuing research on embryos. The issue of researching on embryos was particularly 
contentious as it defied the usual harm-benefit calibration of the ethical dimension of 
medical advances. Indeed, Warnock herself later noted that:  
The question is not whether individuals should be allowed to do what they like, as 
long as it does not harm people, but whether the experiments at present carried 
out, which undoubtedly do harm to the embryo, should be permitted at all. If they 
are not permitted, it will be because of this harm. If they are permitted, it must be 
because the embryo, at a certain early stage of its development, is not yet morally 
significant; and because, on the other side, the benefits to other humans in society 
which will flow from such research are so great as to outweigh the insignificant 
damage.660    
 
Thus, a licensing authority consisting not only of scientists and medical professionals but 
also ‘lay’ people without any financial interest in the proposed research, was recommended 
by the Report. These prescriptions were substantially enacted into law through the creation 
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of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority.661 The phenomenon of in vitro 
fertilisation and the Warnock Report generated public discourse and stimulated much 
academic interest. Various aspects of the ethical and legal dimensions of the technology 
were explored in the academic literature. The Journal of Medical Ethics published many 
articles touching on the matter. A few examples here will enhance our appreciation of the 
pervasiveness of those discussions in the literature. In 1983, Singer and Wells explored the 
ramifications of the new reproductive technology, including the unnaturalness of the 
procedure, restrictions on access and the ethico-legal concerns it entailed.662 Kirby sought to 
reflect legal and bioethical concerns that scholars and legal practitioners from Britain had 
expressed on IVF at a symposium held on the subject in 1983.663 In addition, Jansen 
critiqued the Warnock Committee’s Report recommendations on the need for legislation to 
outlaw ownership in human embryos. He contended that although the presumption behind 
such a recommendation may be the prohibition of the commercial trade in embryos, the 
Report underestimated the stake that donors may have in the fate of their sperm, ova or 
embryos.664 The issue of allowing research on embryos, which had received partial approval 
from the Warnock Committee, was discussed by Brown in 1986.665 Brown sought to respond 
to an earlier paper by Kennedy,666 which called for a complete ban on human embryo 
research, except on embryos generated fortuitously (i.e. by chance or accident and not 
deliberately) and aged fourteen days or less, by contending that since ‘human embryo 
experimentation affords future generations the likelihood of considerable medical benefits,’ 
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any prohibition or restriction on its research must be preceded by a full public debate.667 
Moreover, Montgomery waded into the post-Warnock Committee debate and the ensuing 
legislation by offering some approval, noting that: 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 represents a milestone in 
biomedical regulation. Not only does it finally bring to fruition the long running 
government discussions about the proper limits of reproductive science, it also 
provides the first attempt in English law to provide a comprehensive framework for 
making medical science democratically accountable.668  
 
Additionally, the Warnock Committee recommended a more restricted regime on surrogacy. 
The Committee was aware that some sections of society did not see anything wrong with 
commercial surrogacy so long as there was no compulsive element and yet still took the 
view that commercialisation was inherently wrong due to the inevitability of exploitation 
associated with it. In her post-Committee reflection, Warnock aptly captured the position of 
the Committee: 
Whatever our views about the rightness or wrongness of surrogacy, most of the 
Committee agreed that it was not something that, in itself, should be criminalized. 
Our recommendations were not designed to turn a surrogate mother herself into a 
criminal [...] we recognized that a law against surrogacy would, in any case, be an 
intolerably intrusive, and ultimately an unenforceable, law. On the other hand, we 
were unanimous in holding it to be offensive for anyone to act as a commercial 
agent, offering surrogate mothers for payment to infertile couples or single men. 
This was, we thought, an area where the criminal law could and should be involved; 
and so we recommended.669 
 
Thus the ensuing legislation, the Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985 (now amended by the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008) had the primary aim of preventing any 
commercial involvement in the negotiation and setting up of surrogacy arrangements. This 
anti-autonomy stance of the Warnock Report and the 1985 Act on surrogacy attracted 
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criticism from commentators. The alleged sale of Kim Cotton’s baby670 to a childless couple 
in 1985 and the media coverage it attracted is often cited by commentators as the trigger 
for the hasty criminalisation of commercial surrogacy in 1985.671 Freeman criticised the 
Warnock Report as being increasingly incoherent and philosophically muddled and the 1985 
Act as an ill-considered and largely irrelevant panic-measure.’672 Subsequently, reflecting on 
reforms of surrogacy law recommended by the Brazier Commission, Freeman  again 
attacked the 1985 Act and its subsequent amendment in 1990 as not having been  
‘rationally constructed or properly thought through’, as it was a  ‘response to a moral panic 
with the surrogate the classic “folk devil.”’673  
The deliberations of the Warnock Committee, the ensuing report and the related 
legislation, stimulated debate in both academic literature and the media. The growing 
academic interest in the legal and bioethical concerns regarding advances in reproductive 
technologies culminated in the emergence of assisted reproduction as an active research 
area for HCL scholars, as well as its presence in the HCL syllabus in universities.674 This area 
has generated a multitude of articles and monographs675 and as noted in Chapter 3, all law 
schools in England and Wales that offer a course in HCL teach ART as part of the syllabus.  
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5.1.2.3. RESPIRATORS/LIFE SUPPORT MACHINES 
The victim died on October 8, 1979, when, in view of the fact that he was 
virtually already dead, the breathing machine on which he had been placed on 
October 5 was finally switched off.676    
    
The introduction and incorporation of respirators or life support machines into routine 
medical practice in some crucial respects has accelerated the evolution of the field of HCL. 
The machines have challenged the conventional perceived goal of medicine. Traditionally, 
medical practice was geared towards the treatment of diseases and not the prolongation of 
life beyond what the human system unaided by these new machines could endure. This led 
to the question of whether switching off a life support machine constituted the killing of the 
person, or whether the patient would be considered to have died from other (pre-existing) 
causes. In Re A, for example, a two year old boy had suffered a serious head injury and was 
put on a ventilator, but a subsequent test established that he was brain-stem dead. The 
court held that it was lawful for the doctors to switch off the ventilator.677 Was it a doctor or 
a court that should have decided when the life support machine ought to be switched off? 
Indeed, in Bland, where the issue arose as to whether artificial feeding and antibiotic drugs 
may be lawfully withheld from an insensate patient with no hope of recovery, when it was 
known that if that were to be done, the patient would shortly die, the court observed that 
until relatively recently, the question could scarcely have arisen, since the medical 
technology to prolong life in such cases did not exist.678 These innovations in medical 
technology brought to the fore the relationship between law and medicine, particularly in 
the context of criminal law. Most of the practical issues considered above in relation to 
respirators necessarily impinge on criminal law, even if not overtly so, as in the direct 
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criminal prosecution of a doctor who switches off a life support machine implicitly engaging 
criminal law, such as in  Bland.679 In this regard, Brazier and Ost contend that close scrutiny 
of the relationship between law and medicine will confirm that the criminal stands on centre 
stage.680  
 The practical challenges inherent in the use of respirators in relation to the causation 
of death at law have exercised the minds of some pioneering scholars in HCL in England and 
Wales. The typical conundrum presented is whether a doctor who switches off a respirator 
could be regarded as the proximate cause of the patient’s death. Writing in 1984, Skegg 
opined that in the ‘overwhelmingly unlikely event of a doctor being prosecuted for 
terminating the artificial ventilation’ of  a patient dependent on a respirator, ‘judges would 
be likely to develop, modify, refine, or even fudge, legal concepts rather than direct the jury 
that the doctor was guilty of murder.’681 Thus, the introduction of life support machines, like 
other medical advances, has increasingly necessitated the bending of otherwise settled 
principles of criminal law in order to make the law sensitive to ethical dilemmas associated 
with these medical advances. Indeed, in explaining her choice of HCL as a career option, 
McLean, one of the pioneers of HCL in this England and Wales has stressed the need for a 
discrete field of law to govern healthcare and medical advances: 
When I started it was difficult to decide on what topic to include in medical law 
because it had not been taught anywhere before. So it was difficult to decide on 
topics to include. But with advances in medicine like genetics, I think there is a 
distinct jurisprudence which non-medical lawyers will not know or understand; so 
the kind of question we are asking in medical law is quite distinct. Also we adapt 
topics to healthcare. There are other areas like genetics where there are no 
common law principles which will apply so you have to create. Certainly within the 
                                                          
679 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789  
680 M Brazier and S Ost, Bioethics, Medicine and the Criminal Law III: Medicine and Bioethics in the Theatre of 
the Criminal Process (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2013) 2. 
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legal system; there are discrete questions which require considerable innovation on 
part of those who started teaching the area for the first time.682 
 
The significance of these medical advances in the context of the evolution of HCL is that they 
generate moral and legal dilemmas, which cause lawyers, philosophers, theologians and the 
general public to partake in the debate and its resolution, rather than leaving them to the 
exclusive deliberation of members of the medical profession.  
5.1.3. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA  
‘Medicine and medical science attract a degree of media coverage much greater than 
other professions or other branches of science.’683 The breakthroughs and advances in 
medical science and the practice of medicine have become a subject of public discourse as a 
result of media reporting.684 The spectacular advances that have brought about modern 
medicine made headlines in various parts of the media. For instance, IVF made headlines in 
leading newspapers in the late 1960s. The Times carried a report discussing the implications 
of the then developing ‘test tube’ baby technology.685 It posed the following question: 
‘looking even further into the future, the growing of a baby in a test tube, should it prove 
both possible and ethically justifiable, is not at all the same thing as ‘growing life in a test 
tube.’’686 The uncertainty regarding the success rate of this technology must have made it an 
uneasy decision for putative mothers to undergo the test tube trials. According to The 
Times, in 1970, a 34 year old Lancashire woman who had agreed to participate in a trial was 
interviewed by her consultant gynaecologist on the BBC television programme, Horizon, a 
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day before the initial step was to be performed.687 The consultant made it clear during the 
programme that he had no moral qualms about any advancement in the technology that 
would make it possible to ‘manufacture’ babies in the biological engineering industry, 
provided that public opinion was in support of it.688 Similarly, organ transplantation, which 
had become part of regular medical practice, also came under the spotlight of the media. 
For example, in 1969, the Daily Mirror carried a headline ‘Heart-Swap Doctor Accused of 
Murder’ in its coverage of a case where the heart of a man who died in an accident through 
the crushing of his skull was removed and implanted in another patient. This caused a 
theologian to initiate a suit against the doctor.689  
It was not only the scientific breakthroughs that made headlines but errors and 
scandals were also, and continue to be, given equal prominence by the media. I have 
discerned a pattern in the newspapers which I have examined from available digital 
archives: until the last four decades, medical errors were not reported with the passion 
evident in reporting these days. Two examples illustrate this observation. The Daily Mirror 
reported that nearly 2000 cases of mistaken diagnosis were admitted to hospitals under the 
Metropolitan Asylums Board during 1904.690 An examination of the way the newspaper 
reported this matter shows that it did not, or was not expected to generate public anger, as 
it was covered in a small corner of the page. However, in contrast, in 2006 the Daily Mirror 
carried the headlines ‘As my wife lay dying of cancer at 33 she handed me a devastating final 
letter, I’ve been killed by a medical blunder.’691 The story in the paper was about a 
                                                          
687 P Wright, ‘Progress towards 'test tube' baby’, (London: The Times, 24 February 1970, accessed at: The Times 
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689 Daily Mirror Reporter, ‘Heart-Swap Doctor Accused of Murder’ Daily Mirror (London, England 5 June 1969) 
22-23.  
690 Daily Mirror, The Reporter (London, 7 August 1905) 4. 
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successful outcome in a medical negligence suit by the husband of the deceased, which 
resulted in a six-digit compensation award. The story was given full page coverage in the 
newspaper. This prominent coverage by the Daily Mirror reveals that society is no longer 
sympathetic to the perception that doctors belong to a noble profession and therefore 
cannot make mistakes (or should not be blamed for making mistakes) in the genuine quest 
to restore health.  
Additionally, the media has played an influential role in stimulating public debates 
about ethical dilemmas which these developments generate. In 1980, under the headline 
‘Doctor’s Secrets for Sale’, the Daily Mirror reported that the British Medical Association was 
about to release its ‘Handbook of Medical Ethics’ for sale to enable the public to understand  
the problems that doctors face in their practice and how to tackle them. The paper stated 
that ‘It also tells how to deal with drink–drive patients; with those in police custody with 
pressure from the Press, radio and TV about medical matters and with child abuse 
patients.’692 What is quite telling about the Daily Mirror’s report in 1980 is that the medical 
profession was already feeling the pressure of the public voice concerning ethical matters 
and general clinical conduct. This was facilitated by the new bioethics movement which, in 
1970, started engaging with the ethical dimensions of medical practice in England and 
Wales, as discussed earlier. However, the difficulty with the media in all these examples is 
the degree to which they can be objective in presenting these scientific matters, without 
skewing their reportage towards sensationalism (in the case of the tabloid press), and their 
preferred side of the ethical pendulum. It was in connection with this that Brazier posed the 
following question: ‘Is it better for issues relating to medicine and science to attract public 
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debate in which case they need to be presented with a degree of drama? Or are we arguing 
that such matters should be reserved for the intellectual elite?’693 
 I would suggest that the publicity generated by the media has actually accelerated the 
emergence of HCL in different ways. First, it has made the public aware of the extraordinary 
heights which medicine has attained for the first time in recorded civilisation, thereby 
stimulating the public’s enthusiasm for medical advances and anxieties about their 
regulation and inherent ethical challenges. Second, the media coverage of inquiries into 
medical scandals and malpractices has also contributed towards the development of HCL. In 
this regard, mention could be made of the Public Inquiry into children’s heart surgery at 
Bristol Royal Infirmary (1998-2001), chaired by Ian Kennedy. The Bristol Inquiry unfolded 
shocking revelations concerning the disempowerment of patient at the hands of doctors, 
particularly how organs of children were removed without the knowledge or consent of 
their parents after unsuccessful cardiac surgery. The general public could follow the 
revelations due to extensive media coverage of the proceedings and the ensuing report.694 
The report recommended that the delivery of healthcare should be approached from the 
perspective of the patient.695  
5.1.4.  THE CONTRIBUTION OF PIONEERING HEALTHCARE LAW SCHOLARS  
Academic lawyers, rather than legal practitioners were at the forefront of the 
development of HCL as a field of law and, concomitantly, as a discipline. To begin with, novel 
issues presented in HCL cases provided impetus for the courts to seek assistance from 
academic writings founded on research into thorny ethical or moral issues involving 
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694 Daily Mail Reporter, ‘NHS must change after inquiry into Bristol heart baby deaths’ 
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197 
 
medicine. An example of this can be found in Re A, which saw the court dealing with 
numerous amicus curia submissions from ethicists and other moral constituencies in British 
society.696 Secondly, the complexity of issues presented in HCL cases required judges to 
mould the law to fit or reflect contemporary societal norms. For example as Lord Scarman 
remarked  in Gillick, that novel factual features of the case namely ‘contraception as a 
subject for medical advice and treatment’;  ‘the increasing independence of young people’; 
and ‘the altered status of women’ warranted an interpretation that would make the law 
accommodate the new social and medical technological changes.697 Thus in Bland, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson highlighted the need for Parliament to address dilemmas posed by 
medical advances when he opined that ‘the broader issues raised by a withdrawal of 
artificial feeding to allow a PVS patient to die would be better dealt with by Parliament.’698  
           The pioneering scholars in the field have endeavoured to extend the frontiers of legal 
thinking to the specific bioethical and legal issues raised by healthcare in some cases to 
consider how to regulate and who should regulate medical advances. Consequently, any 
historical account of this field would not be complete without exploring their contribution. 
In terms of the authorship of early textbooks and leading articles on HCL, nine pioneering 
scholars can be identified, namely Glanville Williams, Peter Skegg, Ian Kennedy, John Kenyon 
Mason, Alexander McCall Smith, Sheila McLean, Margaret Brazier, Jonathan Montgomery 
and Graeme Laurie. I shall proceed to explore the specific contribution made by these 
scholars to the maturation of HCL as a field of law. The selection of these scholars for 
nuanced consideration here is neither arbitrary nor an underestimation of the contribution 
of others; they have been selected on the basis of their involvement in the evolution of the 
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field from a chronological perspective, in terms of authoring leading textbooks, monographs 
and articles in the field during the period under consideration.  
A. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 
Notwithstanding Williams’ fame as a criminal lawyer, his monograph, The Sanctity of Life 
and the Criminal Law,699 can be viewed as the foundation stone of HCL. His monograph 
considered how far human life is or ought to be protected under criminal law. He also 
discussed moral issues, such as abortion, infanticide and suicide. It is thus notable for 
tackling thorny ethical issues that continue to vex the law and bioethics. His important role 
in being a precursor of HCL scholarship was acknowledged by Grubb when he commented in 
1998 that ‘if the fathers of HCL in England and Wales were Kennedy and Skegg, then 
Williams was its grandfather.’700 This was why Kennedy and Grubb, as founding editors of 
the Medical Law Review, invited him to contribute the Journal’s first article.701 More 
recently, Keown and Jones have lauded William’s book as ‘a bold and original attempt at an 
interdisciplinary analysis of profoundly important questions of law and ethics’, despite 
containing - in their view – ‘some flawed theological and legal arguments’.702 The proud 
position occupied by Williams in the history of HCL in England and Wales has recently been 
affirmed by some of the living pioneers of this field of law.703 Thus, when asked whether, as 
an academic, he had an interest in HCL prior to 1980, Skegg responded as follows: 
In the 1970s Ian Kennedy and I were the two English academic lawyers whose main 
focus was on ‘the law and health care’ [...] There were, however, other academic 
lawyers who wrote in that field in the later 1970s and the early 1980s: from 
                                                          
699 (London: Faber & Faber 1958). 
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701  G Williams, ‘Controlling the Repetitive Dangerous Offender’ (1993) 1 Medical Law Review, 1. 
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memory, Glanville Williams, John Finnis, Graham Zellick, Joseph Jacob, John Finch, 
Gerald Robertson, and before long John Keown.704 
 
Responding to the same question, Grubb remarked that:  
Before the 1980s, it won’t be easy to describe a development of law that 
systematically dealt with the relationship between doctors and patients or 
healthcare generally. The law came out of criminal law and it was analysed like that. 
The initial scholars who dealt with medical law were really criminal lawyers looking 
at issues like death and dying, transplantation. Probably the greatest legal academic 
of all times in England and Wales, Glanville Williams, wrote about those kinds of 
issues; and he was actually a criminal lawyer even though he was a legal polemic 
since he knew most of the law. He wrote on abortion, transplantation, with [a] focus 
for lawyers.705 
 
The other respondents as captured in the Transcript of the Interview (Appendix 1 ) did not 
allude to Glanville Williams in their responses to this particular question; so it is unnecessary 
to state their answers at this stage.  From the accounts of Skegg and Grubb, it can 
reasonably been maintained that although HCL did not exist in the shape of a discrete legal 
field as in the post-1980 era, Williams’ writings foreshadowed some of the issues that later 
took centre stage in HCL.  
B. PETER SKEGG 
Skegg’s book, Law, Ethics and Medicine, enabled him to influence the development of HCL 
with the author’s black-letter law approach.706 His objective was to produce studies on legal 
aspects of some of the issues that arise in medical practice.707 Skegg made the effort to 
synthesise common law and how it affected healthcare practice. However, it is arguable 
whether he gave sufficient direction to HCL, which was then emerging as a body. As Grubb 
aptly noted Skegg ought to have expressed his personal views on what the new evolving 
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discipline was or, better still, ‘the underlying notions which supply the framework of what, 
at least in part, entails medical law in the 1980s.’708 Besides Skegg’s book, his numerous 
articles709 are worthy of commendation because they were seminal in synthesising the 
common law. Thus, Keown appropriately notes ‘the new kid on the legal block was suckled 
academically by Peter Skegg's excellent Law, Ethics and Medicine (1984).’710 These 
comments are corroborated from the empirical findings in Section 5.1.7 below. 
C. IAN KENNEDY 
The high profile advocacy role played by Ian Kennedy is arguably the watershed phase in the 
evolution of HCL as a discrete body of law. Kennedy’s basic thesis was that the excessive 
medicalisation of non-medical matters had made doctors extremely powerful and the only 
way to overcome that was to subject medicine to external accountability through the 
instrumentality of the law.711 Kennedy’s contribution was unique because he purposefully 
advocated a variety of platforms through his writing for the recognition of a discrete body of 
HCL to facilitate patient empowerment.   
First, he delivered the prestigious 1980 BBC Reith lectures, which were then published 
in his seminal monograph, The Unmasking of Medicine.712 Brazier has described this 
publication as ‘a key moment in the birth of modern medical law’ because the case law and 
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the literature on the field exponentially increased thereafter.713 The 1980 BBC Reith lectures 
were a broad platform which enabled Kennedy to reach a larger audience, at least if we are 
to gauge this by the usual popular patronage of BBC programmes. It is not surprising that 
the resultant publication became a popular point of reference in the community of HCL 
scholars and lawyers in England and Wales.714  
Inspired by the ideas of Illich715 and Foucault,716 Kennedy presented an unprecedented 
tirade - at least as regards an academic lawyer in England and Wales - against the 
dominance and paternalism of the medical profession.717 The core of his message was that 
medical practice was oriented towards supporting the socio-economic system; it was 
concerned with cure rather than prevention; it placed too little emphasis on achieving 
health through environmental improvements; its decisions were hardly ever value-free, and 
doctors generally failed to understand all the foregoing.718 He bemoaned the fact that 
citizens failed to realise the political aspect of medicine and instead, kept concentrating 
excessive power in the hands of doctors to decide matters which were not purely technical, 
but also ethical or policy-oriented.719  
Besides Kennedy’s Reith lectures and his numerous works, Veitch has noted that 
Kennedy’s dual status ‘as professor of medical law’ and ‘Chairman of the Bristol Royal 
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Infirmary Inquiry’ gave him the opportunity to further influence the development of HCL in 
this jurisdiction, since he used both positions as platforms to reiterate his original concerns 
over the seeming monopoly of the medical profession over matters which were not strictly 
technical.720 The huge impact of Kennedy’s seminal book in laying the foundation of modern 
HCL was evident from the reactions it provoked from the medical profession. Indeed, the 
vigour and rigour of Kennedy’s critique of medicine was unfavourably commented upon by 
some writers associated with the medical profession. In 1981, the Journal of Medical Ethics 
published twelve articles reacting to Kennedy’s radical challenge to medical practice.721 
Unsurprisingly, Montgomery has recently acknowledged the unique pioneering role of 
Kennedy, remarking that:  
...Professor Sir Ian Kennedy, then at the Law School of King’s College London 
virtually invented the field in the United Kingdom. Certainly, his Reith Lectures in 
1980, later published as The Unmasking of Medicine (1983), mark the beginning of 
highly visible public discussions of the issues which became increasingly matters for 




It is a tribute to Kennedy’s contribution to development of HCL that after over three decades 
leading and respected modern scholars in the field have convincingly maintained that ‘ 
Kennedy was correct about the law being overly paternalistic in the 1980s, and the fact that 
doctors were claiming responsibility for making decisions that were outside of their field of 
expertise.’723  
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Indeed, the towering stature of Kennedy in the evolution of the discipline is abundantly 
bolstered by unanimous independent views expressed by some of the pioneering scholars, 
as discussed in the findings of the empirical survey below. 
    D. MARGARET BRAZIER 
Margaret Brazier is another key scholar who played a role in developing HCL into its status 
as a distinct discipline. Beginning her academic career as a tort law scholar,724 Brazier, like 
Kennedy, acknowledged the inadequacy of traditional common law and statutory law which 
existed in the 1980s. She used various platforms and publications to advance the case for 
medical ethics and HCL. In 1986, she collaborated with the philosopher John Harris and 
founded the Centre for Social Ethics and Policy at the University of Manchester.725 This 
collaboration bears testimony to Brazier’s multi-disciplinary approach to HCL and ethics, 
which I discussed earlier in Chapter Three. Her achievements were recently celebrated in a 
special issue of the Medical Law Review726 and in a Foreword to that publication; Gostin 
noted that Brazier had been a leading exponent of respect for persons, which finds 
expression in the concept of personal autonomy: the first principle of modern HCL.727 
Indeed, this ethical principle of personal autonomy has been used by scholars in HCL to 
analyse many pertinent issues in different contexts, including judicial decisions, proposed 
statutory law and professional guidelines. I argue in Chapter Three that it is the use of 
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ethical principles, including personal autonomy as an analytical framework, which, among 
other things, renders HCL a discrete subject.  
E. SHEILA MCLEAN 
The construction of the history of HCL in becoming a discrete discipline or legal field in 
England and Wales cannot be completed without consideration of the scholarship of Sheila 
Mclean in this area of the law. Mclean has contributed towards the emergence of the 
discipline in two major ways which are worthy of exploration. In the first place, Mclean 
produced many important scholarly works in the form of articles and monographs from the 
early 1980s. In 1983, McLean co-authored a book entitled Medicine, Morals and the Law 
with a medical doctor, Gerry Maher.728 The objective of this book, as captured in its Preface, 
was to reinforce the external critique of medical practice which Kennedy729 and Illich730 had 
earlier embarked upon. The medical profession could no longer be allowed to debate ethical 
dilemmas of medical practice via medical ethics. Lay people needed to participate in the 
resolution of these through the instrumentality of law and moral evaluation.731 The authors 
discussed contemporary issues, such as the sanctity of life, abortion, euthanasia, withdrawal 
of treatment, and decision-making in medicine, and offered their opinions as to how they 
should be resolved. At the end of the millennium, McLean authored a monograph entitled, 
Old Law, New Medicine: Medical Ethics and Human Rights732 in which she bemoaned the 
excessive medicalisation of problems faced by patients and their families, which she opined, 
were not most of the time essentially of a medical nature.733.  
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729 I Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine (2nd rev edn, St Albans: Granada, 1983)  ch 1. 
730 I Illich, Limits to medicine: medical nemesis, the expropriation of health (London: Boyars 1976). 
731  McLean,   Maher n 729 above, vii-viii. 
732 S McLean, Old law, New Medicine: Medical Ethics and Human Rights (London: Pandora 1999). 
733 Ibid xi. 
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Since 1983, McLean has authored over one hundred publications on almost every aspect of 
HCL.734  
 Apart from her extensive writing on almost all the major themes often explored in 
HCL, McLean has played many important public service roles, including serving on various 
statutory and non-statutory bodies that deal with legal and ethical issues relating to medical 
practice and biomedical research. For example, she is UK Adviser to WHO Europe on the 
revision of the Health for All Policy; Specialist Adviser to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Science and Technology; a member of the BMA Ethics Committee, and a 
member of the Wellcome Trust, Biomedical Ethics Panel.735 
F. ANDREW GRUBB 
Grubb is a pioneer scholar who, like others, showed original interest in HCL at the beginning 
of his academic career. Grubb’s contribution to the field can be explored in three main ways, 
namely: teaching, research and his public service role in relation to the field of HCL. It must 
be noted as historic fact that Grubb was the very first person to create a course in HCL at the 
University of Cambridge, where he graduated in the late 1970s.736 He has stated that as a 
student in the 1970s, medical law was completely unknown; it simply did not exist.737 Grubb 
recollects his experience with the introduction of the discipline of HCL into the curriculum 
for LLB students, as follows:  
When I first started teaching in the University of Cambridge in the early 1980s in 
the law school, there had been for a long time an elective course for medical 
students started by Glanville Williams. It was popular for medical students. Because 
it had been started by Williams, it was run by the law faculty; so when I got there I 
was asked to take it on by running it. I was a criminal lawyer, a tort lawyer and an 
administrative law lawyer[… ]So I had three main interests that might have worked. 
                                                          
734 Staff Profile, http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/law/staff/sheilamclean/#tabs=1 (last accessed: 13/09/2013).    
735 Ibid. 
736 Information based upon a ‘Personal Interview with Professor Grubb, 22/10/2013’. 
737 Ibid.  
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Gradually I got interested in it. The courses consisted of a few lectures from me and 
guest lectures by people from a medical background and lawyers including Ian 
Kennedy. One evening in a bar, I said to him [Kennedy] I was trying to write a book 
on medical law and he accepted that we should write together and so the first 
edition came out in 1989. The reality was that the more I got into it the more I 
became a medical lawyer.738  
 
Apart from the development of the discipline through teaching, Grubb has also generated 
high quality scholarship in the field. He has co-authored a leading textbook and 
practitioner’s book on the subject with his long-time collaborator, Ian Kennedy.739 Grubb 
alone authored the expanded volume of their book in its third edition.740 Moreover, since 
the early 1980s, he has authored more than fifty articles.741 Grubb’s scholarship covers 
much of the scope of the field.742 He is one of the pioneers to focus on the purposeful 
development of HCL as an academic discipline. This assessment is bolstered by his rigorous 
review of Skegg’s maiden monograph on the field, cited earlier above.743 As already noted, 
having lauded the pioneering efforts Skegg made in his Law, Ethics and Medicine to 
synthesise English common law at the time of his writing and how it affects healthcare 
delivery in this jurisdiction, Grubb criticised Skegg’s monograph as having failed to give 
sufficient direction to HCL, which was then emerging as a discrete subject.744  
Another dimension of Grubb’s HCL scholarship is that he sees great potential in 
comparative law methodology in unravelling certain problems of HCL in one jurisdiction that 
                                                          
738 Information based upon a ‘Personal Interview with Professor Grubb, 22/10/2013’. 
739 I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law: Text With Materials, (London: Butterworths 1989; 2nd edn, London: 
Butterworths 1993).  
740 A Grubb, Medical Law: Text With Materials, (London: Butterworths 2000). 
741 Such as: A Grubb ‘The Emergence and Rise of Medical Law and Ethics - A review of PDG Skegg, Law, Ethics 
and Medicine: Studies in Medical Law, Oxford University Press (1985)’ (1985) 50 Modern Law Review, 241; A 
Grubb, ‘Breach of Confidence: Anonymised Information’ (2000) 8(1) Medical Law Review, 115-120;  A Grubb, 
‘Human Rights: Right to Treatment and Article 2’ (2000) 8 Medical Law Review, 358-359; A Grubb, 
‘Incompetent Patient (Adult): Bland and the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2000) 8(3) Medical Law Review, 342-349; 
A Grubb ‘Incompetent Patient (Child): HIV Testing and Best Interests’ (2000) 8(1) Medical Law Review, 120-125.  
742 Ibid. 
743 A Grubb, ‘The Emergence and Rise of Medical Law and Ethics (1987) 50 Modern Law Review, 241. 
744 Ibid 243. 
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might have been solved in another. Thus, when he was invited to write the inaugural 
editorial of the European Journal of Health Law, he underscored the utility of comparative 
law and advocated its use in HCL research:  
The comparative approach may also have an additional benefit. It will facilitate the 
identification of problems that have yet to be faced in some countries. All too often 
a society is 'taken by surprise' as technological developments in medicine are 
introduced without regulation and, often, without thought being given by the 
society to their implications. Some countries may already have had to address the 
issue and thus study of their policy solutions can help others to formulate policy 
responses for the future.745 
 
His academic interest in the systematic development of the discipline of HCL saw him 
become one of the founding editors of the leading and highly reputed journal in the field, 
the Medical Law Review. Between 1992 and 2004 he was editor of that Journal.746 As far as 
his public service contribution toward HCL is concerned, Grubb has been a member of a 
number of bioethics bodies, including the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
and the Ethics Committee of the Royal College of Physicians.747 The wealth of experience 
Grubb has accumulated in the field has given him pertinent insights into the antecedents 
and direction of HCL in England and Wales. I shall explore this further in the section on 
findings from my empirical survey below. 
G. JONATHAN MONTGOMERY 
Another academic who has made a distinct contribution to the evolution of HCL as a discrete 
field of law is Jonathan Montgomery, having contributed numerous articles and a textbook 
on the subject. In 1997, Montgomery wrote his maiden HCL textbook, departing from the 
traditional description of works of that nature, he chose748 to entitle his work Health Care 
                                                          
745 A. Grubb, ‘Comparative European Health Law’ (1995) 11 European Journal of Health Law, 292. 
746 Staff Profile, http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/contactsandpeople/GrubbA (accessed: 4/1/2012) 
747 Ibid. 
748 See: Section 1.5 of Chapter One for explanation of Montgomery’s title preference. 
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Law.749 In addition to this textbook, which was revised in 2002, Montgomery has authored 
several dozen articles and book chapters which critically engage with major HCL issues, 
including the orientation of HCL as a discrete legal field.750 It will be helpful to attempt to 
outline some of the key crusading arguments often deployed by Montgomery, especially in 
relation to the proper direction of HCL as a discrete subject.  
 Montgomery has consistently argued that a proper HCL methodology ought to be one 
which is not a priori, but steeped in the ‘concrete realities of healthcare delivery’, including 
an appreciation of the ‘historical traditions of medical practice’.751 In this regard, he criticises 
Kennedy and his ‘Centre of Medical Law and Ethics at King's College, London - which more or 
less represents the orthodox position on the subject’ - for approaching HCL from the 
perspective of ‘rationalist consumerism’, which indulges ‘applied moral philosophy’ in 
exploring controversial issues, at the expense of the ‘concrete realities of medical 
practice’.752 The ‘orthodox approach’, according to Montgomery, sees medical law as ‘a 
species of applied ethics, implying a staged process of applying ethical principles to a 
problem and deriving the necessary legal rules from that application.’753 In a later work 
Montgomery notes the flaw inherent in the orthodox approach:  
Few commentators have tried to understand the concrete situations in which 
health care is delivered. Yet without such an appreciation, criticism seems 
uninformed, abstract and superficial.754 
 
To overcome this defect in the orthodox approach to HCL, Montgomery advocates a 
paradigm shift when he remarks: 
                                                          
749  J Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997) 1. 
750 See the list of his publications via the University of College of London website: 
https://iris.ucl.ac.uk/iris/browse/profile?upi=JRMON09   (accessed: 1/7/2013). 
751 J Montgomery, ‘The Compleat Lawyer - Medical Law as Practical Reasoning: Doctrine, Empiricism, and 
Engagement’ (2012) 20 Medical Law Review, 8-28.  
752 J Montgomery, ‘Medical Law in the Shadow of Hippocrates’ (1989) 52 Modern Law Review, 566. 
753 J Montgomery, 'Time for a paradigm shift? Medical law in transition' (2000) 53 Current Legal Problems, 363 
754  Montgomery, ibid n753.  
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an examination of the way in which the courts, the health professions, and the NHS 
have regulated standards of practice shows how the idea of externally driven 
scrutiny has been less effective than had been hoped by many commentators. 
Instead, a paradigm based on the development of values within the health care 
communities provides a more illuminating model for explaining the subject. 755  
In this regard, it has been suggested that HCL should adjust its conceptualisation of law and 
lawmakers. Thus, legal norms for the governance of medical practice are to be derived not 
only from statutes but also from guidance issued in the healthcare community. To that 
extent, Montgomery has opined that ‘the traditional paradigm that sees the health 
professions and the institution of the NHS as the principal problem, forces to be constrained, 
needs to be replaced by a broader paradigm that sees them as part of the solution.’756  
 In addition to his writing on shaping the subject, Montgomery, like other pioneers, 
plays an important public role in reviewing and implementing law and policy in various 
aspects of the healthcare system. For example, in 2012, he became ‘the Chair of the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, an independent body that examines and reports on ethical issues in 
biology and medicine’.757 In that same year, he also became the Chair of the Health 
Research Authority, established to protect and promote the interests of patients and the 
public in health research.758 Prior to 2012, he performed several other public service roles in 
relation to HCL. These include ‘Chair of the Human Genetics Commission, which advised the 
UK Governments on ethical and legal issues relating to that field; Chair of the Steering 
Committee for the UK Brain Banks Network, having chaired the Strategy Committee, which 
recommended to the UK Clinical Research Collaboration that it should be established’, and a 
                                                          
755 Montgomery, 'Time for a paradigm shift? Medical law in transition' (2000) 53 Current Legal Problems, 363, 
364. 
756 Ibid 407. 





member of the Organ Donation Taskforce, ‘which considered the case for introducing an 
opt-out system for donation in 2008’.759 
H. KEN MASON, ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH AND GRAEME LAURIE  
For the sake of better appreciation of the role of Mason, McCall Smith and Laurie in the 
development of the field of HCL, I deem it appropriate to discuss them together. The 
justification for grouping them together lies in their leading textbook, which epitomises a 
huge component of their influence on the development of the subject. Mason and McCall-
Smith collaborated together in authoring major monographs and textbooks in the field. 
When McCall Smith retired from active research in HCL, Laurie replaced him in the academic 
collaborative venture with Mason.760   
 Mason is arguably the first medical doctor and lawyer to have started working in this 
field during its nascent stages in the early 1980s. As Smith stated in a Foreword to a 
collection celebrating the contribution of Mason to HCL:   
Ken Mason is one of those rare scholars who have mastered a number of quite 
different disciplines – in his case, medicine, law and bioethics.761 
 
Mason has authored several monographs, articles762 and a textbook in this field and it was 
thus no surprise that his achievements in HCL were celebrated, as noted earlier. The 
philosophical underpinning of Mason’s scholarship was relatively different from other 
pioneer scholars. Laurie noted that Mason’s scholarship in HCL did not ‘doggedly adhere to 
                                                          
759 Ibid. 
760 Information based upon a ‘Personal Interview with Professors Ken Mason and Graeme Laurie’ in October, 
2013. Extract of Transcript of Interview in Appendix 4.  
761 Sandy McCall Smith, ‘Ken Mason - An Appreciation’ in S McLean (ed), First Do No Harm - Law, Ethics and 
Healthcare (Aldershot: Ashgate 2006) xv.  
762 Professor Ken Mason, http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/people/jkenyonmason (accessed: 16/1/2014).  
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the mantra of ‘patient autonomy’ but advocated a balance between private interest and 
community interests.’763 
Sandy McCall Smith, on the other hand, was a criminal lawyer who developed an 
interest in HCL and co-authored the first six editions of Law and Medical Ethics with Ken 
Mason.764 The latter was former ‘Chairman of the British Medical Journal Ethics Committee 
until 2002, the former Vice-Chairman of the Human Genetics Commission of the United 
Kingdom, and a former member of the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee’.765 
Lastly, Graeme Laurie766 serves as a ‘member of the BMA Ethics Committee’ and most 
recently, as a ‘member of the Royal Society Working Group on Science as an Open 
Enterprise’.767 He is a ‘member of the editorial teams of the European Journal of Health Law, 
and Medical Law International’.768 Laurie was ‘the Chair of the permanent UK Biobank Ethics 
and Governance Council from 2006-2010’.769 
The foregoing brief profiles of the pioneering scholars in the development of HCL in 
England and Wales sets a context that will contribute towards our comprehension of their 
thoughts on the developmental trajectory of the subject, as gathered through an empirical 
survey, which I now turn to.      
    
5.1.6. FINDINGS FROM AN EMPIRICAL SURVEY OF THE VIEWS OF PIONEERING 
HEALTHCARE LAW SCHOLARS ON THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIELD  
 
                                                          
763 G Laurie, ‘The Autonomy of Others: Reflections on the Rise and Rise of Patient Choice in Contemporary 
Medical Law’ in S McLean (ed), First Do No Harm- Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Aldershot: Ashgate 2006) ch 9, 
132. 
764 Alexander McCall-Smith, http://www.alexandermccallsmith.co.uk/about-the-author/full-bibliography/ 
(accessed: 16/1/2014). 
765 Ibid. 
766 Professor Graeme Laurie, http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/people/graemelaurie (accessed: 16/1/2014).  
767 Ibid. 
768 Ibid. 
769 Ibid.  
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As discussed in Chapter Two, I interviewed seven pioneering HCL scholars as part of 
the empirical legal research aspects of the thesis. The findings770 that I present for analysis 
and discussion here were derived from responses to questions from four thematic areas, 
namely:  
 the relationship between law and medicine before 1980;  
 the surge in academic interest in law and medical ethics post-1980;  
 the role of the courts and the legal profession in the emergence of a distinct 
body of healthcare law;  
 potential attractiveness of healthcare law in England and Wales as a 
potential export to other jurisdictions.  
Within the context of these broad themes, other sub-themes also emerged during the 
interviews, including the question of the discrete status of HCL in the light of its substantial 
borrowings from other branches of the law and also the nature of the relationship between 
HCL and ethics/bioethics. Many revealing findings emerged which I proceed to present and 
analyse. For each sub theme I present the relevant responses of respondents and their 
analyses before concluding on that particular sub-theme.  
5.1.6. .  VIEWS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND MEDICINE BEFORE 1980 
Proceeding on the basis of the assumption made in this thesis and justified earlier ( in  
Section 1.5.2 ) that it was not until after 1980 that a distinct body of HCL gradually became 
visible, I sought to ascertain what the respondents771 considered to have been the 
relationship between law and healthcare or medicine long before 1980. To begin with, all 
                                                          
770 See: Section 2.2.3.1. of Chapter Two (above) for how I processed and analysed the data to arrive at these 
findings.  
771 I succeeded in getting opportunity to interview seven (7) out of the nine Pioneer Scholars that constitute my 
sample. The other two were not available. 
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the seven respondents were unanimous about the fact that there has always been some 
form of engagement between law and medicine. Noteworthy here is that the respondents 
had different opinions concerning the specific focus of law in its interaction with medicine or 
health care in that long period before 1980.  It is apposite at this juncture to quote each of 
them before any further analysis is done.  
Skegg:  
The law has related to issues arising in health care for centuries, e.g. the licensing of 
various professionals, the law relating to asylums and lunatics, abortion, 
negligence/manslaughter. There have long been books about the law for medical 
practitioners, in addition to those on ‘medical jurisprudence’ (which might now be 
described as forensic medicine). A search of the index volumes to Holdsworth’s 
multi-volume History of English Law would lead you to the statutory regulations 
relating to the UK medical professions, etc.772 
McLean: 
 
 Most of the cases that arose before 1980 were more about criminal issues; for 
example about abortion and that sort of thing. Very few issues that we now regard 
as mainstream medical law - for example cases on negligence – arose, so there 
wasn't a national jurisprudence as such except for a very limited body of law. 
Arguably the majority of activity before 1980 was at the international level, so there 
were a number of international declarations about using human beings in research 
and so on, particularly following the Nuremberg Trials; and some of the medical 
professional associations had a fair amount to say but basically what existed in the 
way of case law was relatively scarce.773  
 
Grubb:  
Before the 1980s, it won’t be easy to describe a development of law that 
systematically dealt with the relationship between doctors and patients or 
healthcare generally. The law came out of criminal law and it was analysed like 
that... Actually, what is interesting is primarily, criminal law was how the academic 
analysed [it], as far as there was any medical law [Sic, if I may say]. In fact, criminal 
law was rarely used to prosecute anybody in a medical case. There are some 
famous prosecutions of doctors for unlawful abortion (the Bourne case), and the 
famous case of the paediatrician in 1981 (R v Arthur) and also the only thing you 
heard about them was the trial, because very often, the criminal trial of a doctor 
ended up in a verdict of acquittal and the summing up by the judge but never got to 
the appellate court. By contrast, there were medical negligence cases; there were 
not many though, that went to the court regularly before the 1980s and even 
                                                          
772 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Peter Skegg, See Appendix 4 
773 Extract form ‘ Transcript of Interview with Professor Sheila McLean, See Appendix 4 
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before the 1970s, it was just a handful of cases. There was in fact no medical law 
going on in the court apart from the odd prosecution and a smattering of medical 
negligence cases; it was completely undeveloped in the courts. 
Brazier: 
I think that we have neglected the fact that there is a long history of the law’s 
involvement in medicine, if you look back in 16 and 17th centuries, a number of 
cases went to court between patients and physicians and surgeons; there were also 
cases where college of surgeons fighting college of physicians. There was quite a lot 
of discussion in the media about what we call medical law, quite critical of quacks. 
Once the different medical professions came together in 1858 with Medical Act 
1858. And even more as the state took over funding of medicine; there came period 
when litigation more or less disappeared and there was a period of extreme 
deference to medics. Although there were cases towards 1950s and beyond; it was 
the medical gentlemen who must be right. In England lots of people were hesitant 
to challenge medics with the inception of NHS: most people were so grateful to be 
able to get medical care free; go to the doctor for free. That gratitude inhibited 
criticism for a very long time. It seems about 30 years or so; it took a generation to 
grow up who took NHS for granted. I think medical law went into abeyance for 
about 100 years and then began to rise in early 1980s…  
Mason: 
  There has always been medical law in so far medicine has always been subject to 
the law. ..It should be negligence .If people asked you what you mean about 
medical law, the answer would be the law of medical negligence. The way that 
medical law was being taught in the universities was by Department of forensic 
medicine. Forensic medicine was a matter of pathology; I chose to follow it as 
medical practice. We call medical law here by the title, medical jurisprudence. I 
started teaching it around 1980s. I taught it with Alexander McCall Smith.  Before 
1980, you expected your doctor to behave in correct proper way and the effect of 
Kennedy was to question our original belief in doctors. 
Montgomery: 
I think the main thing is that the early writing covered quite a lot of things around. 
The early writing covered lot of things around clinical negligence. On my shelf I do 
have a 19th century book given by my father years ago. I will start with Nathan on 
Medical Negligence in 1957. I have works from 1970s by Skegg and Kennedy. The 
works in the 1970s picked issues mainly around the interface between criminal law 
and medicine. I am not sure if before 1980, it really felt like anything like law 
relating to medicine. What Nathan's book was about (taking negligence and 
applying it in a particular context) was not seen as being enormously different; so if 
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you look at it, it does not cite or discuss the Bolam case although it had been 
decided, so it does not look at an application of tort law in an area.774 
 
Laurie:  
There are two books which Sheila McLean edited in the 1970s- Legal Issues in 
Medicine and Medicine, Morals and the Law. Legal Issues in Medicine is interesting 
book because it is a collection of essays: a lot of them talked about criminal law 
issues. Before 1980s the law engaged with doctors either in criminal context or 
negligence law. Indeed, McCall Smith came into medical law as a criminal lawyer 
and not tort of law. What we have seen is that in the post 1980s we have had less 
of criminal law as other areas of the law have grown up in broadening their 
perspectives on the law and medicine relationship. Britain and other European 
countries were taking a lot of lead from America so lot of it was around litigation 
but because UK was no very litigious we didn’t have a body of law as such.it was 
something on the radar in UK until Kennedy and Mclean began to question 
authority of medical profession. I could not have had interested in medical law 
before 1980s as I was a child. I studied medical law from 1987 to 89. It was 
immediately after the Sidaway case; same time as the Gillick case; so I think it was 
very good time to study medical law because they landmark decision was laid down 
at the time I was interested in the subject; so lots of discussion we had in class was 




 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: 
The responses of the respondents bring to fore important perspectives that illuminate our 
appreciation of the situation that was extant before emergence of a discrete body of HCL in 
the post-1980. In the first place, the relationship between law and medicine was arguably 
two way traffic so speak. Medical doctors needed to have their profession safeguarded 
against quackery; thus law aided medicine by introducing a licensing regime.775 Similarly, 
forensic medicine was also needed in adjudication of complicated cases in which the facts 
contained significant dose of medical issues. Thus, any scholarly reflection on any aspect of 
                                                          
774 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Jonathan Montgomery, 22/10/2013’.  
775 See Views of Skegg and Brazier , above. 
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law and medicine relationship during the early period did not really critique medicine on 
basis of external standards of acceptable or proper practice as a future discrete body of HCL 
might seek to do. 
 Indeed, Skegg, who started writing on topics concerning law and medicine  in the 
early 1970s, was quite emphatic that the existing works at the time did not reflect his vision 
of what HCL (although he prefers the term ‘medical law’) was supposed to be addressing. 
Indeed, he clearly sounded frustrated with the situation in those days since the works at the 
time, including those of ‘medical jurisprudence’, only sought to facilitate an understanding 
of how medicine could benefit legal knowledge and its application rather than how law 
could be utilised as a vehicle to direct medicine to serve our needs. Skegg’s assessment of 
type of scholarship dealing with law and medicine in the pre-1980 finds corroboration in 
Brazier’s view that the courts as well as authors at the time deferred to ‘the medical 
gentleman’.776The views of Skegg and Brazier can be taken to represent the picture of the 
era of excessive deference in HCL. 
Moreover, legal academic exploration of issues pertaining to law and medicine during 
the period under consideration was done predominantly as part of criminal law scholarship. 
This finding is evident from views of McLean, Grubb, Montgomery, Laurie and inferentially 
from views of Skegg and Brazier. Obviously lacking in such an academic approach to law and 
medicine in the pre-1980 is scrutiny of medical power vis-a-vis patient empowerment.  Thus, 
it is reasonably plausible that courts, lawyers and even academics writing in the area 
engaged with healthcare issues without necessarily appreciating that the matters at stake 
deserved to be approached differently from other problems dealt with by the law. As Foster 
and Miola note ‘medical law is complex...since it should reflect the complexity of its 
                                                          
776 See Views of Brazier quoted above  
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astonishing subjects, human beings.’777 It is not only criminal law that was employed in the 
law and medicine relationship during the period.  As Montgomery, Brazier and Grubb 
pointed out there were also some civil cases but were dealt with by courts and academic 
commentators through routine analytical framework of traditional law particularly tort.  The 
treatment of civil cases in the context of healthcare like any other civil matter demonstrated 
that the law was insensitive to peculiar challenges in this area such as the disequilibrium of 
power in the doctor-patient relationship, excessive medicalisation of otherwise non-
technical medical matters. 
 
For example, Bolam was decided in 1957 and established an important principle which 
remained in abeyance until 1980 when the House of Lords gave imprimatur to it in 
Whitehouse v Jordan.778  It is instructive to note that once HCL became visible as a discrete 
body of law, Bolam became a touchstone for any discourse on the doctor-patient 
relationship and many other areas of the field. Indeed, many areas of HCL are said to have 
been victims of ‘Bolamisation’ or ‘Overt Bolamisation’.779 Thus, as Montgomery has noted 
above, for a dedicated book on medical negligence to have been published in 1957 without 
any discussion of a principle within a case that would later principle pervasive principle in 
HCL discourse, reinforces the observation that the law and any scholarship around prior to 
1980 confined issues from the interface between law and medicine to the doctrinal 
frameworks of the traditional areas of the law. 
 The nature of the law and medicine relationship prior to 1980 warrants some 
explanation as to why the situation was the way it was. When respondents were invited to 
                                                          
777 Foster, Miola, n 723 above, 517. 
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attempt to provide justification for the state of the law-medicine relationship one of them ( 
Skegg) decline and rather stated that such a question necessitates a ‘whole PhD thesis’.780 
Several rationales were given by the other respondents who addressed this aspect of the 
interview. Brazier argued that : 
...  People were much less likely to litigate generally; so we moved gradually 
towards much more litigious society. Social attitudes began to change; between 
1950s in England, vast majority of people had very conservative values; vast 
majority attended some sort of church so views on things like sexual conduct; 
family life were very much uniform and the other factor was gradually development 
of medicine created all sorts of new dilemmas which did not exist before.781 
It is worth pointing out that Brazier remarked that beyond 1950 social attitude began to 
change. Brazier’s rationalisation of the nature of the law-medicine relationship during the 
period finds support in an account given by McLean that: 
 Patients in those days were much less likely to challenge clinical decisions and the 
culture of medical paternalism was still very powerful in those days; so patients, I 
think, in a sense colluded with that and simply didn't challenge when things went 
wrong; there wasn't a culture of openness among healthcare professionals. And so 
there was no obvious reason for the law to become engaged because there wasn't 
a big volume of people actually registering complaints about the way that they have 
been treated in the healthcare system.782 
The conservative social attitude that made people unlikely to often challenge wrong 
treatment in their clinical experience as Brazier and McLean cited was further reinforced in 
Grubb’s account when he stated that:  
There was much less interest by the general public in how doctors behaved. 
Doctors were seen as central figuring in medicine with patients; much less public 
interest in questioning what they did; doctors were the kings of their castle; 
masters of their real; kings of the realm, therefore the courts and lawyers through 
litigation rarely became involved. If something went wrong it was rarely challenged 
in the legal way.783 
 
Thus, while three respondents were generally in agreement that conservative social attitude 
of not challenging noble profession of medicine accounted for the state of law and medicine 
                                                          
780 See Skegg’s Interview responses in Appendix 4 
781 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Margot Brazier,  See Appendix 4 
782 Extract from Transcript of Interview with Professor Sheila McLean, See Appendix 4 
783 Extract from Transcript of Interview with Professor Andrew Grubb, See Appendix 4. 
219 
 
relationship pre-1980,  Skegg found it impossible to provide reasons without a major 
research but the  remaining three respondents ( Montgomery, Mason and Laurie) 
postulated that there had not been any critical societal awakening concerning a demand for 
accountability over medicine until Kennedy’s BBC Reith Lectures, ‘The Unmasking of 
Medicine’.784 Grubb had similar conviction when he remarked that ‘Kennedy’s The 
Unmasking of the Medicine started to cause society to think about doctors and whether 
their decisions should be challenged and if so how should it be questioned.’785 This 
consensus reinforces my earlier argument in Chapter 1 that the publication of ‘The 
Unmasking Medicine’ was crucially catalytic in stimulating scholarly reflections on themes 
that eventually crystallised to become subject matter of the discipline of HCL. 
 It has been demonstrated from the views of the seven respondents that there were 
some interactions between law and medicine.  Cases presented from medical practice to law 
were not differentiated in any significant way from how the law dealt with all other cases. 
Academic reflections on law and medicine prior to 1980 were not concerned about proper 
boundaries of medical power and issues of patient empowerment. Indeed, writing in the 
area of law and medicine relationship was often done by members of the medical profession 
so much so that works by non-medical scholars were the exception rather than the norm. 
There is a consensus among pioneering HCL Scholars that the posture of law as well as 
scholarship regarding law and medicine relationship were very deferential towards 
medicine. A very important inference worth drawing from the views of the respondents, 
especially Brazier, McLean and Grubb suggest that social change is relevant for law to be in 
proper disposition to hold medicine to greater accountability which advances patient 
empowerment against excessive medical paternalism. Having clarified the situation during 
                                                          
784 See Transcript of Interview, Appendix 4. 
785 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Andrew Grubb, Appendix 4. 
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the long period pre-1980, it has set the scene for us to appreciate the thoughts of the 
pioneering scholars regarding the law-medicine relationship post 1980. 
 
5.1.6. B. VIEWS ON THE SURGE IN ACADEMIC INTEREST IN LAW AND MEDICAL ETHICS 
POST-1980 
 
A number of strands are embedded in this broad theme pertaining to surge in 
academic interest in the field post 1980. First, the pioneering HCL expressed their views on 
whether there had really been an appreciable increase in academic interest in HCL and 
medical ethics post 1980 Skegg, who presented written responses via email, stated:  
The interest was developing in the 1970s: e.g. Ian Kennedy’s BBC radio programmes 
and his being invited, though a mere Lecturer at that stage, to deliver the Reith 
Lectures. The invitation, and the lectures themselves, can be seen both as a 
symptom and as a cause. Ian’s Reith Lectures were very significant in the UK, but I 
suspect less so in the USA, where Bioethics was born in the 1970s (if I understand it 
aright). 
There are many reasons for the surge, but in terms of the law they include the 
growth of UK law schools and in numbers of academic lawyers and graduate study; 
the fashion for taking on subjects that were not already dominated by major 
academics; and the much greater recourse to the courts to deal with medico-ethical 
dilemmas, which was linked to the increased willingness of the courts to deal with 
matters prospectively. (The introduction of RAE/REF may also have added to the 
incentive to move into new fields.)Incidentally, one way of measuring the increased 
academic interest in medical / health care law would be to look at the “Special 
Interests” listed by UK members of the SPTL/SOLS in the Annual Directory at (say) 5 
year intervals.786 
 
McLean also agreed that the post 1980 period really marked a surge in academic interest 
and explained that:  
 It is difficult to work out why. I think in part it was probably because other 
academics knew it was happening, a couple of courses were running and students 
interest was enormous with over subscription by students, and there was increased 
coverage of medico-legal issues on the television and the news. I think there was 
perhaps also a bit of student pressure; once people were aware that the subject 
was being taught; it persuaded other academics that the subject was worth 
pursuing. I did not have problem in trying to get publishers but I had problem trying 
                                                          
786 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Skegg, See Appendix 4 
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to convince colleague to embrace the discipline. It was not accepted very 
comfortably by lots of academics in the early days.787 
 
Like Skegg, Mason remarked that: 
There has always been medical law in so far as medicine has always been subject to 
the law. What you are referring to here is medical law as an organized discipline or 
subject on its own. If you’re talking about medical law as a discipline then I have no 
doubt that it was the series of lectures given by Ian Kennedy which aroused 
peoples’ minds and marked the start of the subject.  The lectures aroused peoples’ 
minds as to different views of medical law rather than just as a matter of medical 
negligence… If you like, the lectures made people see medical law not just as 
negligence but rather a matter of medical ethics. At the same time and quite 
fortuitously, the subject was being developed in Scotland by Sheila McLean in 
Glasgow. She had also started writing on medical law in the early 1980s. 
Nonetheless if you look back those writings were important. Kennedy published the 
Unmasking of Medicine in 1981. Kennedy is still the one who started the discipline of 
medical law.788 ...the effect of Kennedy was to question our original belief in 
doctors.789 
 
For Brazier the new field was bound to excite academic interest because:  
 
There is so much to do. All things you have talked about before changes. Changes in 
medicine, technology and society. So it needs lots of people to address all those 
questions. More and more academic lawyers and professional practitioners became 
much more socially aware, much more interested in the kind of law not much more 
akin to property law, contract etc. The influx of women into academia made quite a 
lot of difference. Of the younger generation of medical lawyers I will say two thirds 
are women and I think they are the very successful ones. For what I am going to say 
I have to be cautious because of my feminist colleagues but I think just as in 
medicine you see women becoming pediatricians so in medical law lots of women 
came in; although there are women who are wonderful commercial lawyers and 
similarly male colleagues who are wonderful medical lawyers. The subject matter 
attracted women. One of the things medical law does for academics in a way not all 
other areas of law does; it offers opportunity for you to do things outside the 
university system. You get opportunity with Department of Health, medical 
profession, Ministry of Justice. 
 
Grubb in his response stated that: 
 There was demystifying of the role of professionals in society and so challenging 
professional judgment was suddenly not a taboo; doctor and nurses making 
profound decisions, which have profound effect on people. I think it was par to the 
                                                          
787 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Sheila McLean, Appendix 4 
788 Emphasis added. 
789 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Ken Mason and Graeme Laurie, Appendix 4  
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demystifying professional in general. Academic interest in medial law grew slightly 
ahead of people litigating over it. It was just lawyers here. There was stream of 
academic interest by others medical ethics, philosophy. A very distinguished moral 
philosopher Jonathan Glover was interested ling before that. His book causing Life 
And Death is a classic. It was equivalent of Skegg's book on Law and Medicine. Peter 
Skegg was a very distinguished academic and how work was both authoritative and 
settled. He contributed enormously to development of medical law in the common 
law world. He taught in in UK at Oxford substantial part of his career. 
My concern was simply that Skegg was fundamentally a criminal lawyer and viewed 
at medical law from criminal law perspective and there was nothing wrong with 
that; but when I was starting I was trying to do that through the eyes of other areas 
in medical law. So Skegg's book is absolutely definitive on criminal law perspective. 
But I am interested in broadening our understanding of medical law from A to Z 
whereas Skegg’s work comes with much nuanced authoritative analysis from point 
of view of criminal law.  
 
Similarly, Montgomery says: 
I think what changed in the 1980s is because of Ian Kennedy’s Reith lectures. He 
argued that there was a common theme. I will say the Unmasking of Medicine is the 
starting point. The Unmasking of Medicine is interesting because it was not 
particularly well received by doctors or medical sociologists who didn’t think it 
would be helpful or it was something new, but it had massive impact on legal 
scholarship so it suddenly became a subject in its own right on that basis. Kennedy's 
book is really important because it opened up the subject to lawyers. When I 
reviewed Kennedy and Grubb Text and Materials, I did say that it did not really live 
up to the promise of The Unmasking of Medicine as it did not address public health 
issues which were largely scratched over. I was strongly influenced by The 
Unmasking of Medicine and what I did was a reaction to what I didn’t like about it 
so I will put that down as the lynch point. The Unmasking made it clear that the 
subject was neither for lawyers alone nor doctors alone. The lectures were a public 
forum.I think a second publication which is crucial is Mason and McCall Smith, 
1980/81 because what did was to make it possible to teach medical students 
because you had a textbook. I was not doing that because I only came in the mid-
1980s and teaching. But I think you see an interest in medical schools in trying to 
work out how to respond to medical teaching so there was Pond Report towards 
the end of 1980s which consider what syllabus might be in teaching medical law in 
the medical schools. I think one of the key people was a priest from Edinburgh. So I 
think on the legal side Ian was actually crucial because he gave an identity. I think 
Mason and McCall Smith developed something which medical schools to develop a 
syllabus and so it will be wrong to say that the medical people did not respond; I 
also think the BMA was really important so they had their hand book which began 
to grow in to something which would help people work out what to do. So at that 
stage you had the GNC which had its blue book which told you what will get you 
into trouble .These were all handy in the 1980s so people began to have interest 
and so they became literature in the 1980 in way that wasn't previously. If you look 
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at the journals you had medicine, science and the law-- a lot of it was about medical 
aspect of criminal law cases but it was not about legal aspect of medical practice 
and in the 1980s what you get is the legal aspect of medical practice and training. 
so  I will tract it through  the hand book of medical ethics and you will see how that 
expands and later on in the 1990s what the GMC did - emergence of good medical 
practice was quite significant. But I think in the 1980s it was led from the BMA and I 
think they had a key role to play in their medical ethics department did that. 790 
 
Laurie, who is relatively new compared to the other six Pioneering Scholars observed that:  
In the 1980s there were not that many medical lawyers that you know about - 
Kennedy, Brazier, Grubb, McCall, Mason, Sheila. The real explosion was in the 
1990s and after 2000. I think the passing of the HRA 1998 is an important date 
because that was the year in which HL decided the Bolitho case- the first time that 
court began to say we need to control standard of care for medical profession. 
Historically, medical law has been a marginal aspect of family law; human rights etc. 
There are still few chambers that specialize in medical law but that is changing. If 
you look at the court particularly the HC in E & W; over the last 50 years they have 
taken interest I particularly in certain core concepts but I am not sure that in itself is 
a good thing; I think the courts are becoming more paternalistic particularly if you 
look at the Judge Munby, now Lord President; He has a particular view of medical 
law which has been influential in shaping medical law in England and Wales. His 
contribution is open to critique; I think he has a very particular view on dignity, 
autonomy. I f you expose those views to other disciplinary perspectives especially 
bioethicists and philosophers' they will have very much to say. I think he has very 
much driven the court's intervention in medical law. Media has been actively 
reporting on medical law; there has been number of parliamentary intervention. So 
the profile of medical law has been raised for bad reasons: so that medical law has 
to come in a very reactive way. There are also number of scandals - organs; tissues 
etc. In a positive sense I think law schools have come to realise that actually human 
health is such a fundamental part of the human condition that we have  got to 
engage with the role of law in protecting and promoting human health and 
wellbeing; and actually medical has been seen as a very marginal area but if you 
look at the discipline you have to involve almost all areas of the law- private law; 
judicial review; public law; international law- thus medical law is incredibly rich and 
multi-dimensional.so medical law has progressed from being marginal area at the 
edges to the centre of law's role in society and teaching.791 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
                                                          
790 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Jonathan Montgomery’ 25/10/2013.  
791 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Laurie’ 15/10/2015. 
224 
 
Mason’s remarks are quite significant in seeking to situate the beginning of the discipline in 
time and space. This is particularly true since Mason and McCall Smith had published the 
first edition of their book in 1983. Furthermore, it is evident from the above quotation that 
in terms of the scope of HCL in the period before 1980 it was no more than medical 
negligence and some criminal law implications of certain aspects of medical practice. 
Another significant finding is that, according to the pioneering scholars in the field, the 
development of HCL as a discrete body of law can be traced to just after 1980 when 
Kennedy gave his 1980 BBC Reith lectures, which, as already noted, were subsequently 
published as The Unmasking of Medicine in 1981. Although the respondents were 
unanimous that HCL as a legal field developed post 1980, it needs to emphasised that none 
of them can be taken to have meant that HCL as at 1980 or even a year or two later had 
attained all the defining characteristics as considered earlier in Chapter 3. On the contrary, a 
proper interpretation of their responses regarding the commencement date of a distinct 
body of HCL is a period necessarily beyond 1980.  Apart from McLean and Brazier,792 all the 
other five respondents mentioned that the Reith lectures and ensuing publication constitute 
a watershed in the emergence of what some prefer to call ‘modern medical law.’ 
From Montgomery’s response, two pertinent inferences may be drawn. One is that he 
considered Kennedy’s the Unmasking of Medicine as not only opening up the field of HCL to 
lawyers but also serving as a blueprint (or ‘manifesto’) of what academics and legal 
policymakers ought to be reflecting in their works in the field. The other inference is 
Montgomery’s disappointment at what might appear to be Kennedy’s lack of commitment 
                                                          
792 It does not necessarily mean that these other two object to suggestions made by the five since there was no 
direct question on that.  
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in not sticking to the ideals of the Unmasking of Medicine in his later major work with 
Grubb, Medical Law: Text and Materials.793  
Since it was accepted by all the respondents that the discipline became sufficiently 
visible after the 1980s, I was curious to comprehend a possible explanation for the apparent 
lack of challenge to medical dominance and its allied paternalism, which had prevailed 
during the long period prior to 1980. This line of inquiry generated interesting responses, 
mainly from McLean, Grubb and Brazier, as the rest did not address this aspect of the 
question directly.  
 
 
Brazier responded elaborately that:  
As the state took over the funding of medicine, there came a period when litigation 
more or less disappeared and there was a period of extreme deference to medics. 
Although there were cases towards the 1950s and beyond, it was the medical 
gentlemen who ‘must be right’. In England lots of people were hesitant to challenge 
medics with the inception of NHS: most people were so grateful to be able to get 
medical care free; to go to the doctor for free. That gratitude inhibited criticism for 
a very long time. It seems it took about 30 years or so before a generation grew up 
who took the NHS for granted. I think medical law went into abeyance for about 
100 years and then began to rise in the early 1980s. There are several different 
reasons. People were much less likely to litigate generally, so we moved gradually 
towards a much more litigious society. Social attitudes began to change; between 
the 1950s in England, the vast majority of people had very conservative values. The 
vast majority attended some sort of church so views on things like sexual conduct 
and family life were very much uniform and the other factor was that gradually the 
development of medicine created all sorts of new dilemmas which did not exist 
before... As social cohesion lessened, people began to possess different views on 
morals. Thus you begin to get case like Gillick - challenging contraceptives to an 
unmarried young daughter- If the case had been heard in 1950s, it would have been 
laughed at; the idea that an unmarried 16 year old can get access to contraceptives 
in 1951 would have been just too awful to go into the newspapers. And the 
development of different forms of medical technologies and procedures likes 
transplantation. It is not one thing but different things happening almost at the 
same time - changes in social attitudes and changes in medicine.794 
 
                                                          
793 (London: Butterworths 1989). 
794 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Margot Brazier, 22/10/2013’. 
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Pulling all these responses together, one key finding that can be established is the 
perception amongst pioneering scholars that the reluctance or failure of patients to 
challenge their dissatisfaction with healthcare in the period 1948 – 80 could be attributed to 
their gratitude for free healthcare via the NHS, creating a culture of solidarity as well as a 
more conservative social attitude during the period. 
 Additionally, the survey also revealed a variety of reasons to explain why the 
pioneering scholars developed an interest in this field. The majority of those interviewed 
attribute it partly to accident and others due to their passion for human life, which is the site 
of interaction between law and medicine in this subject. This finding is buttressed by their 
diverse responses. First, Skegg states that:  
I first started researching in this area in 1966, as a law student in New Zealand. In 
1969 I published an article arguing for what came to be called Gillick competence... 
I commenced doctoral research in this field at Oxford in October 1969, and 
continued with this full-time until I became a Fellow of New College Oxford in 
October 1971. English health care law (though we didn’t use that term then) 
remained my main research and publishing activity until 1984 when I returned to 
New Zealand to become a Professor of Law at the University of Otago... My interest 
in the subject dates from 1966... 1966 was the year when my teenage girlfriend 
(since late in 1963, and now wife for most of the 50 years following) started her 
nursing training. So one element... was hearing about the issues she was faced with 
on the ward and seeking, as a law student, to work out their legal ramifications. But 
there was more to it than that. I was puzzled by the attitude to abortion in the 
circles in which I moved, so [I] made use of the opportunity, to write a research 
paper on that topic. This contributed to my interest in this area of the law. My 
interest was also fostered by reading...) Glanville Williams’ Sanctity of Life and the 
Criminal Law... Had I agreed with all of it, and an article on consent issues published 
the previous year in Med Sci Law, I doubt if I would have been stimulated to 
continue in the field.  I soon found other fascinating publications, most importantly 
the proceedings of a CIBA Foundation seminar edited by GEW Wolstenholme and M 
O’Connor Ethics in Medical Progress (1966)... 795 
 
According to McLean: 
It was some sort of accident. I was working at the time in the Forensic Medicine 
Department and for my then professor, the department always did a little bit of 
                                                          
795 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Peter Skegg, 29/10/2013’.  
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teaching to law students and he suggested that we should expand the amount of 
teaching that we did and basically told me to go and venture a course and so it was 
very much an accident that brought me into it. I suppose that I have always see 
medical law as a kind of human rights issues and so I think I wanted to explore from 
the kind of angle that I was particularly interested in.796 
 
Grubb recounted his entry into the field as:  
 
When I first started teaching in the Cambridge in the early 1980s in the law school; 
there had been long time an elective course for medical students started by 
Glanville Williams' it was popular for medical students. Because it I had been 
started by Glanville; it was run by the law faculty so when I got there I was asked to 
take it on by running. Because I was teaching criminal law. I was criminal lawyer and 
a tort lawyer; administrative law lawyer because we have the NHS by the 
government. So I had three main interests that might have worked. There was no 
medical lawyer so I took it on. Gradually I got interested in it. The courses consisted 
of few lectures from me and guest lecturers by people from medical background 
and lawyers including Ian Kennedy. On evening in a bar I said to him I was trying to 
write a book on medical law and he accepted that we should write to ether and first 
edition came out in 1989. The reality it the more I got into it the more I became a 
medical lawyer. Within 6 years I really got into it and did lots because the materials 
were accumulating so there were lots to grapple with. After 5 or 6 years I called 
myself medical lawyer because I wanted to do. I started a course with colleague in 
Family; which was becoming popular children's interest etc. We started an elective 
in 3rd year for law students in Cambridge in 1986 or 7 thereabout.797 
 
Brazier explained how she ended eventually in this field:  
 
I got interested in late 1970s; my work was in professional negligence generally. So I 
wrote a paper on solicitors and surveyors; I got to doctors and I found that it is so 
much more  interesting and I started to read Canadian cases on informed consent 
and that gradually urged me into medical law. I think I wrote my first article on 
“Informed Consent to Medical Care" I wrote it during my maternity leave in 1979 
(but it might have been published in 1980). It was based largely in Canadian cases 
because there was very little English law so gradually I became interested in it. One 
thing about medical law is I met and worked with people who are not lawyers. So I 
met John Harris, Tony Dyson, and Dr Mary Lobjoit who was fantastic pioneer 
insisting that we should teach medical ethics to medical students. So combination 
of these things got me interested in medical law.798 
 
Montgomery also explained that: 
A lot of my career has been about being at the right place at the right time. And the 
reasons why I am interested in it were a mixture. One was that by then my 
                                                          
796 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Sheila McLean, 16/10/2013’.  
797 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Andrew Grubb, Appendix 1 
798 Extract from ‘ Transcript of Interview with Professor Margot Brazier, Appendix 1 
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girlfriend (now my wife) was training as a nurse while I was a student so I did my 
undergraduate course in 1980-83. I did a one year LLM… that was about the time 
that the Unmasking of Medicine was coming out as a book. I was also interested in 
the issues around ethics because at that stage I was expecting not to stay in legal 
academia for very long, I had a place in theological college to study theology in 
order to be ordained in the Church of England. So I had an interest in life and death 
issues and these sorts of big ethical questions about how we value life. So I started 
being interested in a combination of the teaching needs and a little bit of personal 
need. My academic research interests at that stage were around children rights so 
another aspect of accident was that at the time the Gillick litigation was going 
through, I was mainly teaching family law with an interest in children's rights. So I 
started working on Gillick from the point of view of there is a case about children's 
rights and I realised that raised issues about children rights and parental rights and 
how they merge together. And of course I started teaching what was then a medical 




 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: 
It stands out clearly from Montgomery’s response that he came into this field of law for two 
main reasons. One was his remote interest fuelled gradually by HCL-related questions that 
he had to answer from his partner who was training as a nurse at the time. The other major 
reason was his dissatisfaction with how the leading light on the academic status of HCL, Ian 
Kennedy, had presented the subject to the public and legal academy in the 1980s. This 
particular motivation has been consistently evident in the way Montgomery has developed 
his vision for the field of HCL through his scholarship and public service roles. For example, 
he has on various occasions and in different contexts criticised Kennedy’s type of HCL, which 
proceeds from a prior postulation about the doctor-patient relationship and rather contends 
that the proper emphasis of the subject ought to be on ascertaining and shaping the actual 
norms of the healthcare system that dictate the realities of HCL.800    
                                                          
799 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Jonathan Montgomery, Appendix 4.  
800 For example, see:  J Montgomery, ‘The Legitimacy of Medical Law’ in S McLean (ed), First Do No Harm: Law, 
Ethics and Healthcare (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 2006) 4; J Montgomery, J Montgomery, J Montgomery, 
'Time for a paradigm shift? Medical law in transition' (2000) 53 Current Legal Problems, 363; J Montgomery, 
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Grubb, on the other hand, has pursued an academic career in HCL largely as a result of 
his fascination with the interface between law and science (in particular medicine). He states 
that: 
I happened to come into [medical law] because of the course I was asked to run so I 
got a kind of eclectic interest in law. I have never been interested in just tort, 
criminal law, etc. I like to mix and match if I can. So, medical law was relatively 
untouched in terms of systematic analysis and I had to borrow from different areas 
of the law; this suited my academic personality.  I read science in secondary school. 
I was generally interested in the scientific area. So I became quite interested to the 
extent that I could do it to master what was going in the medical field as well 
especially reproduction genetics which was quite technical; so I liked the 
background factual areas which were coming up rather than being interested in 
bridge building or planning. [I was] not really interested in that.801 
  
5.1.6. C.  VIEWS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HCL AND MEDICAL ETHICS 
Additionally, empirical research has explored the views of pioneering scholars on the 
perceived relationship between HCL and medical ethics in England and Wales. Apart from 
Skegg all the respondents had something to say that was relevant to  this issue.  
Respondents that I encountered face to face were able to provide relatively detail responses 
due to interactive conversation. For instance, Grubb points out that: 
One area that judges have been dutiful in is in the area of moral issues, which is 
conventionally for moral philosophers and this is purely coincidental. Lawyers don't 
have any expertise in moral philosophy; some do but it is not because they are 
lawyers, but because they were interested in it. That is equally true for judges and 
so when issues are debated in the two professional realms - law and philosophy, 
the interaction between them is quite difficult for judges and you can see that in 
cases like the persistent vegetative case of Tony Bland or the conjoined twins case. 
When they are presented with pure argument based upon philosophy it is difficult 
for the judges to adjudicate because that is not what they do or where they came 
from; and perhaps it is not what the court is about but it is almost impossible to 
think about the problem of what you do in the conjoined twin case (one will die or 
one will survive in the operation) or the withdrawal of artificial hydration and 
nutrition from a PVS patient. It is difficult to see without looking at both sides, so 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Health Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997); J Montgomery, ‘The Compleat Lawyer - Medical Law 
as Practical Reasoning: Doctrine, Empiricism, and Engagement’ (2012) 20 Medical Law Review, 8. 
801 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Andrew Grubb, 22/10/2013’ (emphasis added). 
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you get some judges looking across from both disciplines to help them with their 
legal arguments.  
 
Montgomery remarks that: 
I think one question we have not adequately answered yet which HCL is now increasingly 
vexed by is the law and moral problem. When I wrote a piece entitled ‘The Legitimacy of 
Medical Law’ in 2006, I began to realise that the whole enterprise revolved around Ian 
Kennedy… The impression was that we must first guess what should happen in healthcare 
and then use the law to ensure that the doctors did that. So there was a debate about 
whether the question of what is the right thing to do was separate from the question of 
what doctors should do; and further, whether there was no such link between the two. I 
described that as some kind of hierarchy, the applied philosophy deals purely with what is 
the right thing to do and law is a tool you used to make sure that practice operates like that. 
And if you think a bit like that then the law and moral problem - when can we enforce 
morality? - should be answered because we don't generally believe that you can move 
straight from taking a moral view to imposing this on people who think differently. So that is 
how I began to think: that if that is how I understand Ian Kennedy's version of the subject, to 
make it work I need to solve this… So when you look at how the law really operates it doesn't 
simply translate our views on the right thing to do, and it isn't to make doctors do it. And one 
of the reasons it does not do that is it assumes that doctors are already engaged in that 
enterprise of trying to do the right thing. One of the problems that needs to be solved is 
when can we justify using the coercive power of law in areas that in a plural society we don’t 
agree on. I don’t really have an answer to that yet… What I have found myself doing is 
actually being involved in public engagement. In… ‘Law and Demoralisation of medicine,’ I 
noted that people like Ian Kennedy, Margot Brazier, and Sheila McLean had all done similar 
things. McLean had been involved in the post Diane Blood debate, Margot has been involved 
in the Retained Organ commission after the Alder Hey Scandal; Ian had done Bioethics on 
Xenotransplantation. So I thought this is something academic lawyers have been doing and 
it is not the same as working out in abstract what the law should be. It is not quite the same 
as telling doctors what to do; it is about engaging in a deliberative process to try and work as 
a society in improving our understanding of things so that it connects law and ethics in a 
different way.802 
 
According to Brazier:  
 
There could be tension at the moment within judicial system… on the issue where 
medical law interact with social values or morals again there is tension; between 
very conservative judgement and hands off judgement like Mr Justice Munby on 
the morning after pill saying that the law has no business here. The increasing 
difficulty in bringing claims; abolition of legal aid so ordinary medical negligence 
case is going to become very difficult. Government wants to make it much more 
difficult to bring claim to judicial review so cases in which people challenge 
allocation for health care resources are going to be much more difficult… And there 
                                                          
802 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Jonathan Montgomery, 25/10/2013’ (emphasis added).  
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is a tension in relationship between religion and medical law; that seems to me a 
fact that states have to account of religion 803 
 
Mason briefly stated that: 
 
I think medical law is interesting because it makes us [sic: ask] deep questions 
about how much law can be an effective social tool… There may be some assistance 
from legal analysis …to the health professionals [sic: when they have to] take very 
difficult decisions. That might be good area but I resist in being too dogmatic about 
the role of law in the development of medical jurisprudence.804 
 
McLean also endorsed involvement of the law court in matters relating to medical ethical 
disputes when she stated:  
The engagement of law in this area is extremely important and I cannot think of 
another forum when you can obtain disinterested decisions I think the role of 
lawyers is important in this area; it is not always interested in the way I would like 
but at least it provides an independence forum for addressing these questions so I 
am in favor of the law continuing to be involved in resolving these disputes.805 
 
Laurie remarked that: 
If you want to develop deep medical jurisprudence you need different discipline to 
work together; you need to ask when law should intervene in medicine and when is 
it appropriate to leave matters to medical discretion. So what I have been 
interested in is that question of limits of law in medicine.806 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Significantly, there was unanimity among the respondents that HCL is inextricably linked 
with bioethics/medical ethics, despite the truism that the courts are not experts in dealing 
with moral issues. Thus, Grubb reinforces the inevitable intercourse between HCL and 
medical ethics in grappling with cases that straddle law and morality. Even where judges 
clearly point out that it is law that they have to apply in such controversial cases, it is still 
possible to see moral deliberations lurking in the backdrop of their reasoning.807  
                                                          
803 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Margot Brazier  
804 Extract from ‘Transcript of interview with Professor Ken Mason. 
805 Extract from Transcript of interview with Professor Sheila McLean. 
806 Extract from Transcript of Interview with Professor Graeme Laurie. 
807 Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961 is a prime example of this.  
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This interconnected legal and moral thesis in HCL was further acknowledged by 
Montgomery, but in the form of thinking from lawyers and medical professionals, as well as 
the wider society through the combined realities of medical practice and medical advances, 
in order to yield regulatory policy outcomes that mediate any contested ethical positions on 
a matter. Thus, Montgomery rationalises the link between HCL and ethics in a unique way. 
He concedes that HCL cannot avoid the issue of medical ethics or contested moral positions 
in healthcare. Neither should these conundrums be avoided until they rear their heads in 
litigation, nor should it be left to HCL scholars and bioethicists to merely speculate and find 
some sort of a priori panacea which may not necessarily coincide with the realities of 
medicine. A preferable approach, according to Montgomery, is a pragmatic one which 
involves all stakeholders reflecting on the actual experiences of medical practice vis-à-vis 
medical advances through the prism of various moral positions in a morally pluralistic 
society.  
It appears from the various responses that there are two schools of thought 
regarding what the relationship between HCL and medical ethics (and perhaps morality 
generally as Respondents use the two words without precise definition) ought to be. 
Montgomery, Laurie and  Mason appear to suggest that medical ethics ought to be dealt 
with largely out of direct involvement by the law.  In other words, these three Pioneering 
scholars seem to prefer minimalist approach for law as far as ethical issues in healthcare are 
concerned. Such an approach tend to assume that the law and for that matter law courts are 
not better than health care professionals in resolving ethical dilemmas in medical practice 
and medical advances.  However, these Respondents did not draw clear boundaries 
between three HCL ‘( medical law), medical ethics and medical morality’ as Foster and Miola 
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have helpful done in their recent profound analytical article.808 On the other hand, McLean, 
Grubb and Brazier belong to school thought which holds that law ( and for that matter the 
law courts)  are better suited to be final say in cases or situations of medical ethics 
contestation. Their preference for leadership role of the law in medical ethics controversy 
seem to be premised upon their recognition that the law court can be a more neutral 
‘umpire’. This approach coincides happily with the strong case made by Foster and Miola in 
their article aforementioned. Nevertheless, McLean, Brazier and Grubb have also not clarify 
the senses in which they use the concepts- ‘medical ethics’ and ‘morality’- as Foster and 
Miola have done in their article.  
5.1.6. D. VIEWS ON THE STATUS OF HCL AS A DISCRETE FIELD OF LAW 
 As a follow-up to the issue of the connection between HCL and medical ethics, I asked 
the respondents whether HCL can actually be considered as a discrete field of law at all since 
it borrows almost all its rules from other branches of law. This yielded interesting responses 
from respondents. According to Brazier: 
Medical law cannot claim strictly any particular principles of law as exclusively its 
own but we have got the foundational laws which create the building blocks of the 
legal system; tort, contract, equity, land law. Then we have got next part of lawyers 
training which is to apply the law to a crucial area of human life which may be 
family law, medical law, and employment law. So we have got a kind of the 
founding blocks and law and so medical law is law.809 
 
A similar response was given by Grubb. As far as he is concerned:  
Like many subjects, Property law [for example], is probably not breakable down to 
its own constituents. It is a bit like fundamental Particles in Physics: most particles 
are made up of the particles yet they look different. Proton neutrons are made up 
of quarts. Likewise there are quarts in law; and most law is either of neutron or 
proton particle size, so to speak. Medical Law is really a blend of other things but it 
                                                          
808 C. Foster, J. Miola, ‘Who’s in Charge? The Relationship Between Medical Law, Medical Ethics and Medical 
Morality?’ (2015) 23 Medical Law Revew 505, 529. 
809 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Margot Brazier, 18/10/2013’ (emphasis added). 
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is its own unique blend of other things and that is why it is medical law. You have to 
know more about other things before you can know medical law.810  
 
Laurie on the other hand opines that: 
In a positive sense I think law schools have come to realise that actually human 
health is such a fundamental part of the human condition that we have got to 
engage with the role of law in protecting and promoting human health and 
wellbeing; and actually medical law has been seen as a very marginal area but if you 
look at the discipline you have to involve almost all areas of the law- private law; 
judicial review; public law; international law. Thus medical law is incredibly rich and 
multi-dimensional. So medical law has progressed from being a marginal area at the 
edges to the centre of law's role in society and teaching.811 
 
Mason also responded in similar terms:  
Although we have always had criminal law but civil law engagement of medicine 
has increased during the last 30 years. There are core concepts and values that hold 
the different aspects of medical law together: the notion of autonomy; human 
health' dignity ' wellbeing; best interest; caring. These all require particular 
consideration of how law actual operates to protect human being and their health. 
We have dev rich conceptualisation of dignity and autonomy; necessarily to lawyers 
and the courts but through the multi-disciplinary working we have come to 
appreciate far better what these concepts mean for human flourishing so I think 
these concepts sew medical law together rather than saying it is just aspect of 
contract; tort or any other areas of the law. 
 
According to McLean: 
… Medical law has now developed a lot of jurisprudence that makes it able to claim 
to exist as a discipline. In the early stages, there was much more overlap with other 
areas of law, such as family law. When I started it was difficult to decide on what 
topics to include, because it was not being taught in the UK. So it was difficult to 
decide on topics to include. But with advances in medicine like human 
reproduction, end of life care and genetics, I think there is a distinct jurisprudence 
which non-medical lawyers will not necessarily be familiar with, so it is a subject 
that can claim its own jurisprudence. 
 
A close reading of these five responses reveals a common thread running through them. All 
three respondents share the conviction that the central subject matter of HCL - human life - 
is too serious a matter for it not to be given special attention by law. Moreover, it is evident 
that although a broad appreciation of many branches of the law is a prerequisite for 
comprehending or performing analysis in HCL, there is a need for rules and doctrines from 
                                                          
810 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Andrew Grubb, 22/10/2013.’ 
811 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Graeme Laurie, 15/10/2013’.  
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these other fields of law to be tweaked or bent, as it were, to serve the purposes of HCL as 
was canvassed in Section1.7 of Chapter One. Also, it needs to be pointed out that Skegg and 
Montgomery did not speak directly to this issue but it can be inferred from their various 
responses that they are convinced that HCL is a distinct discipline.  
 
5.1.6. E. VIEWS ON THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF ENGLISH AND WELSH HCL TO OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS     
 
Last but not the least, the empirical research has revealed a varied subjective 
appreciation by the pioneer scholars of what aspects of HCL in England and Wales can be 
considered attractive for emulation by other jurisdictions, beginning with Montgomery, who 
stresses the need for any jurisdiction seeking to borrow aspects of English and Welsh HCL to 
ascertain whether its healthcare system is similar to the one in the country seeking to 
borrow such elements. Once that condition has been met, he suggests that: 
The statutory code which has a degree of internal coherence and great clarity can 
be taken over into other jurisdictions. You can take the Mental Capacity Act, the 
Human Tissue Act and translate. Whether they will be the ones to use, I think that is 
different. I think the common law tradition, if my argument over the years has been 
right, then whether it will make sense to take things like informed consent and our 
version of standard of care will depend upon how much confidence you have in the 
medical profession and its organization in the country you are talking about.812 
 
On the other hand McLean opines that: 
…the relative easy access to court is something that could be learnt by other 
jurisdictions who are struggling with these kind of issues. I think there are a number 
of mistakes perhaps that have been made in the past that English law is now trying 
to rectify in terms of the emphasis on patients’ rights as opposed to the emphasis 
on doctor's duties and if people can learn from that, not having to go through the 
process of making the mistake in the first place, I think that would be enormously 
helpful… I think one of the most important things from the patient’s point of view is 
the extent to which the courts have been willing to protect the notion of 
confidentiality and privacy; it is extremely important in the age of genetics... UK 
courts have been very cautious in allowing public arguments to overtake the 
                                                          




legitimate interests or rights of the individual, for example, in authorizing disclosure 
of otherwise private genetic information.813    
 
Grubb is also of the view that the regulation of assisted reproduction in England and Wales 
has worked very well in practice. He does not so much mean the precise wording, but the 
structure of decision-making, licensing and regulation through the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority, so other countries exploring how to regulate this aspect of medical 
practice can emulate this example.814 Brazier expresses a similar opinion: 
Things like laws on transplants can be adapted to suit your local circumstances. The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority is attractive, as many people from 
abroad look at it as an example. If a jurisdiction outside sees a problem it is useful 
to look critically at England and find out how good was it or bad was it and say we 
are going to take the good bit. [Questions such as] how they apply to my country 
resources and religion are all important factors.815 
 
5.2. CONCLUSION 
The exploration undertaken here has made it clear that although the claim in England 
and Wales that HCL having the status of a distinct body can, at first blush, be ascertained by 
ticking boxes against the indicia or defining characteristics of a field of law, an identification 
of the historical factors which have necessitated the attainment of these characteristics 
could be highly contentious since such factors are located in the realm of subjectivity. 
Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated in this chapter that it is rather a combination of 
factors which have operated in diverse ways to accelerate the emergence of a distinct body 
of HCL as a potential framework to facilitate patient empowerment and the external scrutiny 
of ethical dilemmas associated with medical advances. First, a renewed interest in liberalism 
which later found concrete expression in the European Convention on Human Rights, placed 
into domestic law in the UK via the Human Rights Act, 1998, has also made a huge impact on 
                                                          
813 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Sheila McLean, 22/10/2013’.  
814 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Andrew Grubb, 22/10/2013’.  




the maturation of a field of HCL. Secondly, the increasing intervention of non-medical 
professionals in deliberations on moral aspects of medical practice have wrestled medical 
ethics from the monopoly of the medical profession, culminating in a new field of inquiry: 
bioethics, which have influenced legal thinking about healthcare and advances in medical 
technology. Thirdly, the increasing vigilance of the British media over positive developments 
in medicine, as well as the scandals and malpractice in healthcare, have created public 
awareness and sustained the public’s interest in bioethical discourse. Finally, my empirical 
research has revealed how pioneering scholars recall the historical development of the field 
and has shown that the interest of academic lawyers in exploring issues relating to 
healthcare, bioethics and human rights has significantly accelerated the visibility of the field 





IS THERE A NEED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DISTINCT BODY OF HEALTH CARE LAW IN 
GHANA? 
6.0. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter draws upon the diagnostic exploration undertaken in Chapter Four 
regarding the relative absence of a field of HCL in Ghana. I present three key arguments in 
this chapter. First, I contend that the phenomenon of patient vulnerability recognised in the 
English and Welsh jurisdiction, which has a fully developed body of HCL, are abundantly 
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present in Ghana, in comparatively serious forms. The myriad of problems confronting 
healthcare in Ghana renders patients more vulnerable to the extent that they are largely 
disempowered in the healthcare enterprise. Second, I argue that the absence of regulatory 
framework for the advances in medicine, which have contributed towards the emergence of 
a discrete body of HCL in England and Wales, and are gradually entering medical practice or 
healthcare in Ghana, can provide many issues for potential HCL scholars and policy makers 
to speculate about. Finally, I explore lessons that Ghana can draw from English and Welsh 
experience. This lesson drawing also includes consideration of recommendations for Ghana 
elicited directly from Pioneering HCL Scholars in this jurisdiction. 
6.1. THE REALITY AND RAMIFICATIONS OF PATIENT VULNERABILITY IN GHANA 
A field of law does not emerge in a vacuum; it is usually driven by significant needs. 
Consequently, whether or not it is necessary to have a discrete body of HCL in Ghana is 
largely contingent upon the existence of a practical need which warrants such a field of law. 
I argue in this section that the incidence of exploitation of patient vulnerability and the 
regulatory vacuum in relation to medical advances being imported into Ghana suggest 
strongly that there is a need for a discrete body of HCL.  The thesis hastens to clarify here  
that a mere development of a distinct subject of HCL per se will not necessarily provide an 
instant solution to the conundrum of patient disempowerment but could assist in creating 
awareness about the issue among the public and policy makers. 
 In order to explore indicators of patient vulnerability in Ghana, it is apposite to offer a 
working understanding of the phrase ‘patient vulnerability’ in this thesis  
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 Patient vulnerability has been explained as ‘an inability of patients to retain control of their 
life situation or to protect themselves against risks/threats to their integrity.’816 Kennedy 
aptly explains patient vulnerability, noting: 
As between the doctor and the patient, there is an inevitable imbalance or 
disequilibrium of power. The doctor has information and skill which the patient, 
who lacks these, wishes to employ for his benefit. When it is remembered that 
among the powers possessed by the doctor is the privilege to touch and even 
invade the body of another and as a consequence exercise control to a greater or 
lesser extent over that person, it will be clear that with the best will in the world, 
and conceding the good faith of the doctors, such powers must be subject to 
control and scrutiny, from an abundance of caution.817  
 
Of course, every patient would like his or her doctor not only to be competent but more 
importantly, to put the patient’s interest over and above that of the doctor’s. The 
importance of this desire amongst patients cannot be overemphasised. As Mehlman 
helpfully notes, it is important to the patient for three good reasons: 
First, you have far less power than the doctor ... if you are sick you will need care 
urgently, you are not in a good position to insist upon seeing the most highly 
qualified and trustworthy physician. Second, the doctor often has to do things that 
you cannot monitor because you are untutored or oblivious. Third, your health and 
well-being are in peril, and most likely you are worried and afraid. Some experts say 
you can be so intensely affected by your circumstances that you are no longer the 
same person.818 
 
It is imperative to note that patient vulnerability is not an abstract construct or mere 
rhetoric in relation to the healthcare experiences of patients; it manifests itself in medical 
malpractice and gross violations of patients’ rights. I thus proceed to survey some of the 
reported incidence of medical malpractice and violation of patients’ rights that manifest 
                                                          
816 VF Irurita, ‘The problem of patient vulnerability’ (1999) 6 Collegian, 10, 11. 
817 I Kennedy, Treat Me Right - Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) ch 16, 
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explicit or tacit exploitation of patient vulnerability. The illustrations are largely drawn from 
judicial decisions, media archives and academic literature. 
   First, there are few judicial decisions that are relevant to the issue of the exploitation 
of patient vulnerability. Some of these decisions have already been discussed in Chapter 
Four. Thus, the purpose of citing some of these decisions here again is not necessarily to 
explain what was decided in those cases, or to suggest that the existence of just a few 
judicial decisions indicates that the exploitation of patient vulnerability only occurs 
infrequently, but to offer real case examples which graphically illuminate patient 
vulnerability. To begin with, in the afore-discussed Darko v Korle-bu Teaching Hospital,819  
instead of the right knee being operated on, the team of surgeons in the leading teaching 
hospital in Ghana operated on the left knee of a patient. The hospital refused to further 
attend the patient as a protest over a medical negligence suit the patient had initiated 
against them. Clearly, the decision of the hospital to refuse further treatment when the 
patient sued them can reasonably be attributed to the obvious imbalance of power in the 
doctor-patient relationship. Indeed, the posture of the hospital seems to suggest that, in so 
far as a patient had consented to the doctors treating him, he did not have any right 
whatsoever to challenge an act or omission by them, let alone drag them to court for 
redress.  
Moreover, in the previously discussed case of Elizabeth Vaah v Lister Hospital and 
Fertility Centre,820 it took court action before medical records were released. For our present 
purposes, it is evident from Vaah that a patient is helplessly vulnerable in their clinical 
experience unless the law intervenes to guarantee certain safeguards. A reasonable 
                                                          
819 Frank Darko (Minor) (Suing Per Next Friend Gladys Darko, Mother), Suit No. AHR 44/06, Judgment by Accra 
Fast Track High Court dated 24/06/2008. Unreported (copy available in my folder). 
820 Unreported but the suit number is HRCM 69/10 Fast Track Court, High Street, Accra, Ghana (copy available 
in my folder). 
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inference from the decision of the hospital not to disclose medical records to an aggrieved 
patient is ostensibly to conceal alleged malpractices perpetrated against the patient.  
Another illustration of the exploitation of patient vulnerability may be found in Somi v 
Tema General Hospital, where a 36-year pregnant woman was rushed to hospital with an 
ante partum haemorrhage. The doctor on night duty had finished earlier than expected at 
4.00 a.m. instead of 8.00 a.m. and the morning doctor on day duty did not report until 10.00 
a.m. The nurses tried to keep the patient alive but they could not hear the heartbeat of the 
unborn child. The patient was finally taken to the theatre after an inordinate delay. Neither 
the mother nor the baby survived the operation.821 Significantly, this case reveals a glaring 
lack of respect for a patient’s right to receive reasonably prompt care at a health institution 
in an emergency case. Indeed, if there was a vibrant culture of consciousness of patient 
rights among healthcare professionals, it would be more likely that the necessary 
accountability mechanism would have been put in place in the defendant hospital to check 
the lateness of the doctors, in order to avert a recurrence of this incident.  
Furthermore, in The State v Kweku Nkyi, a student nurse at the Kumasi Central 
Hospital was asked to treat a sick child. He injected the sick child twice with what he 
believed was mepacrine. The child‘s condition immediately deteriorated and he died within 
a few hours. A post-mortem examination revealed that the death of the sick child was 
caused by arsenic poisoning.822 It is reasonable to infer here that the case of allowing a 
student nurse to treat a child without supervision by a properly qualified healthcare 
professional is symptomatic of the vulnerability of patients in Ghana.  
As noted above, the paucity of judicial decisions does not necessarily imply that 
medical malpractice and scandals relating to patient vulnerability do not occur in the 
                                                          
821 Somi v Tema General Hospital (1994-2000) CHRAJ 196  
822 [1962] 1 G.L.R. 179-199  
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Ghanaian healthcare system in appreciable proportions. On the contrary, the reality is that 
only a few aggrieved patients are able to pursue redress in court, or even in a supposedly 
less cumbersome quasi-judicial forum like the CHRAJ. Abject poverty, coupled with 
ignorance and illiteracy confronting many patients in Ghana is another layer of complexity 
regarding patient vulnerability. In order to construct a fuller picture of the stark reality of 
patient vulnerability in Ghana, it is appropriate to survey some of the many stories in the 
media concerning medical malpractice and scandals. 
 The media in Ghana is replete with numerous stories of medical malpractice which 
ultimately result from either deliberate or unintended exploitation of patients’ vulnerability 
in the country.  Notable examples will be cited here to buttress the claim made earlier that 
Ghana’s healthcare is bedevilled with numerous incidences of medical malpractice which do 
not find their way into courts or other quasi-judicial fora (such as CHRAJ).  
 Recently, The Insight, a Ghanaian newspaper, reported that a patient had died from 
complications arising from gauze which a doctor had negligently left in the belly of the 
patient after surgery. 823 This was revealed by another doctor who desperately tried to save 
the life of the patient, but pleaded anonymity. The paper, which reported that it had 
compiled tens of such cases across the country to be published in the near future, revealed 
that ‘some members of the Ghana Medical Association (GMA) who spoke to “The Insight” on 
the case of medical negligence want action to stop the malpractices.’824 
                                                          
823 Insight Reporter, ‘Killed by a Doctor’ (The Insight, 2014) http://www.ghanamma.com/killed-by-a-doctor/ 
(accessed: 12/3/2014).  
824 Insight Reporter, ‘Killed by a Doctor’ (The Insight, 2014 edn) http://www.ghanamma.com/killed-by-a-
doctor/ (accessed: 12/3/2014).  
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Another shocking example is a report featured in The Mirror under the heading 
‘Doctors render woman barren ...after leaving towel in her abdomen.’825 The report runs as 
follows: 
A 26-year-old woman who went for a caesarean section at the Brong Ahafo regional 
hospital in Sunyani is furious at the medical team that took the operation for a 
tactless act that nearly cost her her life and has left her barren because the team 
left an operation towel in her abdomen. Ms. Ernestina Adade Konadu went through 
the ordeal two years ago when she went to the hospital to deliver. Consequently, 
the woman, whose first attempt at having a baby resulted in this disastrous 
manner, is demanding GHC150,000 as compensation from the hospital. The 
botched caesarean section, in the process of which Ms. Konadu lost her baby, after 
which she went home with another complication, took place on October 7, 2010. 
Ms. Konadu endured severe abdominal pains for over a year before diagnosis at a 
different health facility, revealed that the pains she had been experiencing were the 
result of an object lodged in her abdomen. A subsequent operation to remove the 
object revealed an operation towel which had been left in her abdomen after the 
caesarean section a year earlier. According to her medical report, the operation to 
remove the towel rendered the victim barren, meaning that she could no longer 
conceive and bear children. Moreover, her medical condition has so deteriorated 
that she can no longer engage in any hard work. After investigations into the 
matter, the authorities of the Brong Ahafo Regional Hospital confirmed and 
recognised the incidence of negligence on the part of the medical team but said the 
hospital was not in a position to pay compensation to Ms. Konadu.  Ms. Konadu has, 
therefore, appealed to the Minister of Health, all relevant statutory bodies and the 
coalition of non-governmental organisations on human rights issues to step in to 
ensure that the right thing is done to save other patients from suffering similar fate. 
According to her, the Brong Ahafo Regional Chief State Attorney, Madam Afia 
Serwaa, who is also counsel for the Brong Ahafo Regional Hospital, had warned her 
to back down on her demand or she (Madam Serwaa) would go public with Ms. 
Konadu's medical condition. 826 
 
The above media report raises pertinent issues that represent some of the layers of 
complexity concerning patient vulnerability in Ghana. First of all, the narrative suggests that 
the hospital medical team, who were guilty of serious medical negligence, had exploited the 
vulnerability of the patient. Another plausible inference is that either proper records of the 
surgical procedure were not completed, or the doctors failed to carry out a proper post-
                                                          
825 The Mirror Reporter, ‘Doctors render woman barren ...after leaving towel in her abdomen’ (GhanaWeb) 
http://mobile.ghanaweb.com/wap/article.php?ID=251108 (accessed: 1/9/2014).  
826 Emphasis added.  
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surgery review of the patient. As Edwin has aptly noted, ‘by not disclosing a medical error, 
the doctor conspicuously places his own interests above that of the patient to the detriment 
of the patient, thereby violating a patient-centred ethic.’827 Beyond the gross abuse of the 
rights of the patient by the doctors, the official government lawyer responsible for advising 
the hospital exacerbated the already pathetic situation of the vulnerable patient by 
threatening that if she did not abandon her grievance she would risk having her medical 
condition made public. It is submitted that regardless of the nature or degree of sensitivity 
of her medical condition, if the allegation by the patient is true, then it is telling evidence of 
patient abuse and the exploitation of her vulnerability in Ghana. 
 Another example of the numerous media reports of medical malpractice in Ghana is a 
story broadcast on a radio station concerning the death of twin babies during delivery.828 
Earlier scans taken during the patient’s antenatal days had indicated she needed a 
caesarean section delivery, but nurses at the hospital on that day forced her to deliver the 
normal way.829 Realising she could not stand the pain, she began crying, upon which a 
doctor advised she should have the caesarean section.830 However, there was no 
anaesthetist available during the surgery. The patient alleged that the death of both twins 
was due to the absence of an anaesthetist while she was being prepared for the 
operation.831   
           Related to the foregoing instances of malpractice is the manifestation of a culture 
where transparency is lacking in medical practice in Ghana, especially with respect to errors 
                                                          
827 AK Edwin, ‘Non-Disclosure of Medical Errors: an Egregious Violation of Ethical Principles (2009) 43(1) Ghana 
Medical Journal, 34.  
828 The Reporter, ‘Tema General Hospital accused of 'killing' twin babies’ (Joy Online, August 2010). 
http://lifestyle.myjoyonline.com/pages/health/201011/55697.php (accessed: 10/1/2014).  
829 Ibid. 
830 Ibid. 
831 The Reporter, ‘Tema General Hospital accused of 'killing' twin babies’ (Joy Online, August 2010). 
http://lifestyle.myjoyonline.com/pages/health/201011/55697.php (accessed: 10/1/2014).  
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and mishaps in medical operations. A significant example of this point is the reaction of the 
doctors at the Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital (KATH), the second leading tertiary hospital 
in Ghana, towards allegations of a number of patient deaths due to the breakdown of life 
support machines in the hospital’s Intensive Care Unit. Addressing a press conference in 
response to the death of six patients following the breakdown of the ventilators at KATH, Dr 
Awuah, the medical director stated: 
It is medically unethical to reveal the number of patients who have died as a result 
of the broken down ventilators. With or without ventilators, patients die at the 
hospital.832 
 
Two important points are worth noting from the foregoing quotation. In the first place, it is 
confirmation that some of the medical advances which prolong the lives of patients in some 
of Ghana’s health facilities are being utilised. Secondly, it indicates that even for the limited 
number of life support machines available in Ghanaian hospitals, there appears to be a lack 
of an adequate accountability framework to safeguard patients. Notably, for the first time 
since its establishment in 2010, the media reported that:   
Korle Bu Teaching Hospital (KBTH) has established information and complaints 
desks at the various out-patient departments (OPDs) to afford clients and patients 
the opportunity to seek redress for their grievances instead of going to the media. 
In addition, the hospital is to form a Clinical Ethics and Professional Committee to 
address the concerns and grievances of patients and clients. At a media briefing in 
Accra last Friday, the Chief Administrator of the hospital, Professor Nii Otu, said the 
committee would comprise experienced medical and para-medical professionals, 
religious leaders and individuals from other interest groups. He said such a 
committee would help the hospital to step up its drive to improve quality health 
care, adding that ‘the core duty of the committee would be to address grievances 
of patients and clients bordering on our services.’833 
 
                                                          
832 O Tawiah, ‘Undercover Journalist ‘Doctor’ Probes Deaths At Ghana Hospital’ 
http://fairreporters.net/2012/03/12/under-cover-journalist-doctor-stops-avoidable-death-at-ghanas-second-
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The above press statement from KATH raises further concerns over the absence of a 
properly conceptualised legal framework to promote and protect patients’ rights, while 
clearly clarifying the responsibilities of healthcare professionals. Indeed, the fact that it was 
only in 2010 that a major hospital like KATH initiated measures to address some of these 
concerns - at least according to the best available archival evidence - is quite suggestive of 
how bleak the situation is for the entire country, particularly with respect to non-tertiary 
health institutions there.  
The phenomenon of the exploitation of patient vulnerability as revealed in the 
plethora of examples given above has far ranging ramifications that impinge on the quality 
of healthcare and the degree of patients’ trust in the system. It is to these possible 
ramifications that I now turn. From the foregoing illustrations it can be discerned that 
healthcare providers tend to disregard request for information by patients or challenge from 
them. Such attitude of healthcare professionals could be symptomatic of a culture of 
excessive medical paternalism.  As noted in Chapter Four and further reiterated in the 
present chapter, there are certain statutes and some case law which deal with issues arising 
in the doctor-patient relationship and in some other contexts of healthcare delivery in 
Ghana. Although some of the existing legislation address healthcare in perfunctory manner, 
it is true that other factors like cultural and social attitudes relating to healthcare 
professionals are partly responsible for disempowerment of patients in Ghana. It was 
against this backdrop that the Ghana Health Service adopted the Patient’s Charter in 2002, a 
statement of patients’ rights.834 The main aim was to ‘promote an open and positive 
relationship between and amongst health workers and patients’.835 Despite the adoption of 
                                                          
834 Ghana Health Service, ‘The Patients Charter’ 
http://www.ghanahealthservice.org/aboutus.php?inf=Patients%20Charter (accessed: 20/01/2014).  
835 Ibid.  
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the Patient’s Charter, the phenomenon of patient disempowerment persists in Ghana as 
was noted in Chapter Four.836 This reinforces the position taken earlier that creation of a 
body of HCL per se is not immediate solution to the conundrum of patient 
disempowerment.  
 The apparent lack of awareness of the Patient Charter and the fact that it appears to 
be disregarded by healthcare professionals is further amplified by a serious debate that took 
place in 2011 (i.e. almost a decade after the adoption of the Patient Charter) on a popular 
radio station, Joy FM, between two leading members of the medical profession in Ghana 
over whether or not there exists a mandatory duty for a doctor to explain the side effects of 
a prescribed drug.837 Arguing against the existence of a duty of risk disclosure, Dr Serebour, 
the Vice President of the Ghana Medical Association (GMA) at the time, insisted that there 
were no written laws or regulations binding doctors to explain the side effects of drugs they 
administered to their patients. On the contrary, Dr Jehu Appiah said that it was ethically 
mandatory for doctors to ensure that patients were made aware of the implications of the 
drugs administered to them before they were allowed to use them.  This debate suggests 
that there is a certain culture or social attitude underlying how Ghanaian doctors view their 
duties in relationship to patients. Any progress towards patient empowerment would 
ultimately necessitates addressing these cultural or social factors. 
           It may be surmised that the doubtful legal status of the Patient Charter might partially 
account for the virtual lack of awareness and non-compliance with those rights and 
responsibilities. Although such an argument can only be pressed so far, it is notable that the 
situation may radically improve because, as noted in Chapter Four, the Charter has now 
                                                          
836 See: 4.1.3 of Chapter Four above.  
837 http://ghanamedicalassociation.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=90&catid=49&Itemi 
=53 (accessed: 9/9/2013).  
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been invested with full statutory status due to the recent passing of the Public Health Act, 
2012 (Act 851). It remains to be seen whether merely formally legalising the Charter will 
enhance awareness and compliance and possibly generate more enforcement action in the 
form of litigation. However, it is important to point out that the content of the Charter is not 
sufficiently empowering from the patient’s perspective, as the provisions are predominantly 
hortatory. This contrasts sharply with the framing of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the 1992 Constitution and other rights leading to enactments. Unlike the 
homiletic tenor of the Patient Charter, the usual legislative drafting tradition in Ghana 
regarding the enshrining of rights is to use an imperative modality of ‘shall.’838 In that way, 
the obligation of the relevant duty bearer vis-à-vis the particular right is made more 
emphatic and capable of biting via judicial enforcement action.  Moreover, the Charter does 
not provide any administrative body in the form of a Patients’ Ombudsman or equivalent 
agency for the monitoring or secure compliance with the Charter, in addition to any court 
enforcement actions available to those who may opt for the arduous route of litigation.  
 Related to this lack of awareness of the Patient’s Charter and other patients’ rights 
statutes among healthcare professionals and the general public is the apparent indifference 
of Ghana’s legal education towards HCL, as I noted earlier in Chapter Four. Such a gap in the 
training of future lawyers and judges could impact negatively on all the elaborate 
arrangements for securing patients’ rights, as noted above in Section 4.1.4 of Chapter Four.  
The academic appreciation of HCL by lawyers in Ghana is important not only for 
enhancing the protection and enforcement of patients’ rights, but also in providing the 
requisite expertise at the disposal of policy and lawmakers as the need arises for a legislative 
                                                          
838 For the legal significance of ‘shall’, see the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) section 42: ‘In an enactment 
the expression "may" shall be construed as permissive and empowering, and the expression "shall" as 
imperative and mandatory.’ 
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panacea to be explored in response to the novel challenges posed by advances in medicine 
being replicated in Ghana. It is to the exploration of potential questions arising from these 
medical advances being utilised, or about to be utilised in Ghana that I now turn. 
 
 
6.2. POTENTIAL LEGAL AND BIOETHICAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY MEDICAL ADVANCES IN 
GHANA 
 
The nature of medical practice in Ghana has undergone significant transformation in 
many respects as a result of advances made in medicine as a healing art. Indeed, as Kennedy 
aptly notes in relation to England and Wales: 
It is a trite observation that developments will always be taking place in medicine. 
In one sense there is nothing new in recent events, such as in vitro fertilization, the 
freezing of embryos, genetic engineering, or kidney transplantation and kidney 
dialysis. After all, there is a continuum of development and refinement of medical 
technology and medical skills, from the knife, the leech, and the potion, to surgery, 
antiseptics, and anaesthesia.839   
 
This observation by Kennedy may be taken for granted when dealing with medical practice 
or healthcare delivery in a developed country like England and Wales. However, in Ghana, 
some of these developments in medical technology are gradually trickling into our 
healthcare system. Major medical advances which have challenged the boundaries of the 
law in developed countries like England and Wales and which are now being deployed in 
some of Ghana’s health institutions include life support machines; in vitro fertilisation (IVF); 
heart surgery; organ transplantation, and the dialysis machine. At the moment there is no 
explicit regulatory framework that govern medical advances in Ghana.840 Evidence of the 
                                                          
839 I Kennedy, Treat Me Right- Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988) 3. 
840 Owusu-Dapaa, 'Ghana' in H Nys (ed), International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Medical Law (Alphen aan den 
Rijn, (NL: Kluwer Law International 2014) 131. 
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reception of these medical advances into healthcare in Ghana can be gleaned from media 
stories. In May 2012, it was reported that kidney transplants were going to be integrated 
into routine medical practice in Ghana’s leading teaching hospital.841 According to the media 
report: 
Doctors at the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital (KBTH) will begin undertaking kidney 
transplantation in the last quarter of this year. This will bring great relief to many 
kidney patients in the country who need a kidney transplant but cannot afford the 
high cost of travelling and transplantation abroad. Since 2008, the nation’s premier 
hospital has undertaken 12 kidney transplants with the assistance of a team of 
transplant surgeons from Birmingham in the United Kingdom and the Transplant 
Links Community. Three of those transplants were performed in April this year. 
 
In August 2012, a leading radio station carried a story that:  
Thirty-five year old Mavis Owusu Asamoah of Kumasi has been diagnosed with End-
Stage Renal Disease which requires a kidney transplant at the Korle-Bu Teaching 
Hospital to save her. A letter, signed by Dr Vincent Bioma, Nephrologist at the 
Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital puts the cost of treatment at fifty-five thousand Ghana 
cedis (Ghc55,000), about US$29,000. The transplant surgery alone costs thirty-
thousand Ghana cedis (Ghc30,000).842 
 
Apart from such media reports, the academic literature can still be another source of 
information when seeking to gauge the extent of the use of medical advances and the 
potential challenges they may raise for law and bioethics in Ghana. In this regard, 
Agbernoku et al’s empirical research is worth considering.843 The authors’ empirical 
evidence from Kumasi suggests that although there is a low level of awareness of face and 
organ transplantation among the public, some patients remain open to the possibility of 
donating their organs, whether in Ghana or abroad.844 This finding can be a premise for a 
deduction that organ transplantation is gradually becoming part of medical practice in 
                                                          
841 The Daily Graphic Reporter, ‘Korle-Bu to Begin Kidney Transplant In Last Quarter’ 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=238839 (accessed: 17/1/2014).  
842 O. Tawiah, ‘Multimedia Launches Appeal For Two Cancer and Kidney Failure Patients’ 
http://lifestyle.myjoyonline.com/pages/health/201208/93058.php (accessed: 17/1/2014). 
843 P Agbenorku, M Agbenorku and G Agamah, ‘Awareness and Attitudes Towards Face and Organ Transplant 




Ghana. Furthermore, in 2008, Andrew Ready, a kidney transplant surgeon from UK 
undertook the first ever kidney transplant in Ghana. In a subsequent interview with the 
British Medical Journal, when asked about his proudest moment as a surgeon, Ready 
replied:  
It was when I did the first ever organ transplantation in Ghana. When the kidney 
had been transplanted and re-perfused with the recipient’s blood, urine started to 
pour from the ureter. The operating theatre was full of observers, and as I 
demonstrated the urine production they burst into applause and did so every time 
a spurt of urine emerged from the ureter. I think they saw this as symbolic of a step 
forward in the level of healthcare available, and I felt some of the excitement that 
the first transplant surgeons must have felt. That was three years ago, and the 
recipient of that transplant is back at college and enjoying life.845 
 
Another medical advance which has been imported into Ghana is in vitro fertilisation (IVF). 
IVF was introduced into healthcare in Ghana by a Provita Specialist Hospital in 1995.846 The 
technology gradually spread to other health institutions in the country. Whilst news reports 
suggest that the general public is excited by the success of the few IVF centres in the 
country, there is no legal regulatory regime for the use of the technology.847 The increasing 
popularity of the various assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) in Ghana, such as IVF, 
have recently received attention from the media. In particular, there was worry expressed 
by some religious leaders on the sale of sperm and other scandals in the use of ARTs. 
According to a media report published on 8th September, 2013:  
The Catholic Bishops’ Conference has condemned the sale of sperm in Ghana. This 
follows reports that fertility treatment is increasingly becoming popular in Ghana by 
the day. Health experts have raised alarm about the phenomenon. They are 
worried the increasing commercialization of sperm and egg donation might cause 
people to contract viruses such as HIV. For instance, a gynaecologist at the Komfo 
                                                          
845 S Carter, ‘A kidney transplant surgeon’ (BMJ Careers, 2011) http://careers.bmj.com/careers/advice/view-
article.html?id=20002163 (accessed: 17/1/2014). 
846 BBC News Reporter, ‘Ask our fertility specialist’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3790803.stm 
(accessed: 17/01/2014); Provita Specialist Hospital, http://www.provitaspecialisthospital.com/?p=2&id=22 
(accessed: 17/01/2014).  
847 The Reporter, ‘First Ever IVF Twins Delivered in Kumasi’ http://www.ghananewsagency.org/health/first-
ever-ivf-twins-delivered-in-kumasi-62457 (accessed: 17/1/2014).  
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Anokye Hospital, Dr Ernest Kwarko, says the increasing commercialization of sperm 
and egg donation needs stringent measures to ensure recipients are not affected by 
the deadly virus. President of the Catholic Bishops Conference, Most Reverend 
Joseph Osei-Bonsu tells Joy News the sale of sperm is against God’s principles. He 
explained that procreation is something that has to take place between a man and 
a women; this, he said, means having children should take place in the context of 
marriage. ‘And so if people are going to sell sperm then it takes it out of the area of 
marriage, that is why the Catholic Church is concerned, that is not right, it is wrong 
and so that shouldn't be done at all.’ Most Reverend Joseph Osei-Bonsu rather 
advised childless couples to seek medical treatment. Meanwhile, the Ministry of 
Gender, Children and Social Protection says it has already begun consultations to 
begin a national dialogue on the phenomenon. Mercy Adjabeng, Public Relations 
Officer for the Ministry tells Joy News the dialogue will take place this year. ‘Our 
strategy is to have national gender dialogue on emerging trends that are quite 
worrying. One is … surrogacy – the situation where young girls are made to get 
pregnant for people - and then the sperm and egg donation.’848 
 
A number of inferences can be drawn from the above media report concerning ARTs. In the 
first place, the report is indicative of the fact that ARTs have increasingly been integrated 
into healthcare delivery in Ghana, even if the service is dominated by private providers. 
Secondly, there are genuine concerns from one of the significant moral constituencies in 
Ghanaian society that unregulated ARTs will be a recipe for ethical dilemmas. Thirdly, it 
appear from the above quote that ARTs are being offered in some hospitals in Ghana but 
there is no dedicated regulatory regime on the subject.  It has been demonstrated in this 
section that patients are disempowered against excessive medical paternalism. Also, the 
regulatory vacuum vis- a- vis medical advances in Ghana has been explored. These problems 
confront or have confronted England and Wales where a discrete body of HCL has evolved 
over the past three decades.  The next segment explores lessons that Ghana may draw from 
English and Welsh experience.   
6.3. EMPOWERING GHANAIAN PATIENTS THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DISCRETE 
BODY OF HEALTH CARE LAW – LESSONS FROM THE ENGLISH AND WELSH EXPERIENCE AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GHANA 
                                                          
848 The Reporter, ‘Catholic Bishops conference condemns sale of sperms in Ghana’ (Joy Online) 




The present section develops the hypothesis that the development of HCL as a 
discrete body in any jurisdiction per se is not an automatic solution  to the conundrum of 
patient disempowerment but it could rather facilitate the empowerment of patients. In this 
respect, I explore lessons that can be learnt from the development of HCL in England and 
Wales as a discrete body. 
The legal transplantation of HCL from England and Wales is an inappropriate means of 
developing a discrete body of HCL in Ghana due to the obvious disparity in socio-economic 
realities and cultural values. This does not necessarily bar one from drawing useful lessons 
from the experience in this jurisdiction. Indeed, a critical study of the historical development 
of a discrete body of HCL in England and Wales will yield many important lessons. First, the 
study found that English and Welsh courts have been very cautious in pronouncing upon 
novel cases with significant ethical questions and have also  used some of these 
opportunities to comment on aspects of medicine that need to be regulated by consensus 
mobilised by a legitimate democratic body like Parliament.849 Secondly, the adoption of any 
major statutory framework governing aspects of medical advances is usually preceded by 
broad public consultation, spearheaded by specially designated ad hoc commissions. Thirdly, 
the widespread integration of HCL into the curriculum of law schools has ensured that 
specialist competency can be developed or acquired in this relatively new, but important 
field of law. Fourthly, the interest of academic lawyers in researching and publishing 
extensively in HCL has ensured that a pool of requisite expertise has been created from 
which public policy dialogue can draw assistance. Also, the interaction of various factors in 
England and Wales as noted in Chapter has made autonomy emerged as an overarching 
                                                          
849 See generally: Chapters Three and Five.  
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principle or   crucial norm that serve as a popular evaluative criterion in assessing judicial 
decisions and statutory intervention in the field. 
 In addition, soft law (other than formal delegated legislation) has become an 
important source of legal and bioethical norms of HCL. Moreover, the use of departmental 
and governmental public inquiries into healthcare delivery has brought errors made in 
medical practice into the glaring view of the public. Last but not the least, the sustained 
interest of the media in reporting on health and HCL on almost a daily basis ensures 
corresponding public awareness. In the light of all the foregoing lessons from the historical 
and empirical study of a discrete body of HCL in England and Wales, what concrete 
recommendations can be made for Ghana?  
 
The evolving field of HCL in Ghana could benefit from the views of pioneer scholars 
who worked in this field of law during its maturation in England and Wales. I shall therefore 
consider some of the recommendations made by such scholars before I proceed to Chapter 
Seven and make my final recommendations on the way forward for empowering patients in 
Ghana through the development of HCL.  
During an empirical survey targeted at pioneering HCL scholars in England and Wales, 
respondents were invited to share thoughts on the question, ‘[w]hat advice will you give to 
a developing country with a common law tradition like Ghana, which is seeking to draw 
lessons from the experience of England and Wales in this field of law?.’ This generated 
diverse responses which I am now presenting for the purpose of considering what can be 
distilled from them as part of my recommendations for Ghana in Chapter Seven. 
           McLean, despite conceding that her lack of familiarity with the Ghanaian legal and 
healthcare systems rendered some generic views which she considered to be of potential 
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relevance to any jurisdiction seeking to develop its HCL. She expressed her thoughts as 
follows:   
…when you are developing jurisprudence or a body of law it is important to accept 
that there may be a need to balance the interests of the individual and the interests 
of the community. For example it is in the interest of the community that they have 
healthcare professionals who are not afraid to carry out their profession and that 
they are given the right to exercise their own clinical expertise and discretion. 
However, this should not imply overriding the rights of individual patients.  Indeed I 
expect that the quality of the co-operation between the patient and the profession 
will improve when both sets of interests and/or rights are mutually respected.  
Obviously the question of resources is also a very important one. . . However, it is 
also important to establish a system (reinforced by the law) which ensures not only 
that treatment is available but that patients are treated appropriately, both in 
personal and clinical terms. A satisfied patient is not always a patient who has been 
given everything which is or could be available; being respected in the healthcare 
enterprise can sometimes be sufficient for a ‘good’ medical experience.850  
 
A critical issue discernible from McLean’s suggestions is the need to strike a good balance 
between the delicate and competing interests of patients’ rights on the one hand and the 
freedom of healthcare professionals to exercise their professional judgment in the delivery 
of healthcare, on the other, alongside the interests of the state. As McLean aptly points out, 
such a balance can only be achieved when there is a genuine recognition by the state as a 
regulator and the two other stakeholders (i.e. patients and healthcare professionals) that 
none of these seemingly contrasting interests in healthcare ought to be sacrificed at the 
expense of the others unless constricting one may inevitably enhance all.  
 Another major issue that emerges from McLean’s view presented above is the need 
for a state to adequately channel resources into healthcare. Although resources are finite all 
over the world, it is indisputable that England and Wales has a far better resourced and 
superior healthcare system. Nevertheless, Ghana is bedevilled with gargantuan resource 
constraints, further worsened by the fact there is disproportionate resource allocation to 
                                                          
850 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Sheila McLean, 16/10/2013’.  
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the detriment of healthcare. At this juncture, a quick glance at vital economic data on Ghana 
will illuminate the analysis of the issue of adequate resources embodied in McLean’s 
suggestions. According to the World Bank, while Ghana’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 
worth US$40.71 billion as at 2012, it has a population of 25.37 million.851 Ghana’s annual 
health expenditure per capita852 projected for 2011-2013 by Bank is US$79, representing 
just 4.8% its GDP. This also falls woefully below the global average per capita spending on 
health, US$948.853 On the other hand, during the same period, the United Kingdom having a 
population of 63.23 million, had a GDP of US$2.472 trillion and annual health expenditure 
per capita of US$3,609. Clearly, these figures demonstrate that the resources invested in 
healthcare delivery in Ghana are woefully inadequate and this renders the question of 
whether patients are receiving all available care as rhetorical, rather than real in the context 
of Ghana. When McLean was asked whether she agreed with the proposition that HCL 
should not be developed in a country until its economy is adequately advanced, she was 
quite quick to debunk any such contention.854 
Thus, it is imperative to realise that even in a country with an inadequately resourced 
healthcare system, like Ghana, the state must demonstrate good faith to deliver on its 
assumed international obligations ‘to protect, promote and fulfil’ the right to health and 
healthcare, as well as the bundle of all relevant healthcare rights.855 This clarion call to the 
courts (or other external accountability entities) for rigorous scrutiny to ensure that 
                                                          
851 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/Ghana (accessed: 21/01/2014).  
852 ‘Total health expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditures as a ratio of total population. 
It covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family planning activities, nutrition 
activities, and emergency aid designated for health but does not include provision of water and sanitation.’ 
World Health Organization National Health Account database 
(see: World Health Organisation, http://www.who.int/health-accounts/en/ for the most recent updates) 
(accessed: 21/01/2014).  
853 World Health Organisation, http://www.who.int/health-accounts/en/ for the most recent updates).  
854 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Sheila McLean, 16/10/2013’.  
855 International Commission of Jurists, ‘The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Compilation of Essential Documents’ (International Commission of Jurists, Geneva 1997).  
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resources allocated to healthcare from a state’s budget reasonably evince a clear intention 
of good faith on the part of the state to meet its obligations. Moreover, it is pertinent to 
underscore the fact that not all the things needed to improve the clinical experience of a 
patient are contingent upon the availability of adequate resources. Indeed, as McLean’s856 
earlier comment suggests, it is possible for healthcare professionals to adopt good attitudes 
towards patients without the need to deploy any significant resources and yet their 
approach can still impact positively on patients’ clinical experience. For example, being 
polite to patients and patiently explaining their condition and the available therapeutic 
options to them do not require any huge financial outlay. 
 Mason and Montgomery underscored the necessity of not separating culture from 
HCL. 857  According to Montgomery social structures and cultural circumstances of a country 
are important factors that need to be considered in any endeavour to stimulate 
development of HCL including the doctrine of informed consent.858 Montgomery’s 
suggestion raises important issues concerning the relationship between the social structure 
in a jurisdiction and the formulation of a legal regime to govern its healthcare system. 
Drawing on the sociological origin of the doctrine of informed consent, for example, as 
narrated by Montgomery, the doctrine should not be transplanted hook, line, and 
sinker without the necessary modifications to suit the local exigencies of the borrowing 
jurisdiction. In this regard, the incorporation of the doctrine of informed consent in post-
2011 statutes in Ghana concerning healthcare was arguably performed without much 
thought about Ghana’s social and cultural context. At this juncture, in order to test the 
validity of Montgomery’s emphasis on the sociological dimension of fashioning HCL rules 
                                                          
856 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Sheila McLean, 16/10/2013’.  
857 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Ken Mason, 15/10/2013’ and Extract from ‘Transcript of 
Interview with Professor Jonathan Montgomery, 25/10/2013’.  
858 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Jonathan Montgomery, 25/10/2013’.  
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and norms, it is apposite to explore how this doctrine of informed consent has recently been 
incorporated into Ghanaian law. 
            The doctrine of informed consent has been incorporated into two new statutes. As 
earlier discussed in Chapter Four, the Mental Health Act, 2012 (Act 846) makes reference to 
informed consent in various aspects of mental healthcare.859 According to section 61(3) of 
Act 846, ‘a person with mental disorder shall not be used for teaching and research 
purposes without informed consent and where that person is incapable of giving informed 
consent, the consent shall be given by the personal representative of that person.’  
Secondly, the Public Health Act, 2012 (Act 851) introduces the doctrine of informed consent 
into mainstream healthcare. The Sixth Schedule to Act 851 reproduces the GHS Patient’s 
Charter. The relevant provisions mirroring the informed consent principle are as follows: 
2. The patient is entitled to full information on the patient’s condition and 
management and the possible risks involved except in emergency situations when 
the patient is unable to make a decision and the need for treatment is urgent. 
 
3. The patient is entitled to know of the alternative treatments and other health 
care providers within the Service if these may contribute to improved outcomes. 
4. The patient has the right to know the identity of the caregivers and any other 
persons who may handle the patient including students, trainees and ancillary 
workers. 
 
5. The patient has the right to consent or decide to participate in a proposed 
research study involving the patient after a full explanation has been given; and the 
patient may withdraw at any stage of the research project. 
 
It is worthy of note that the phrase ‘informed consent’ is not expressly used in the text of 
the Patient’s Charter quoted above. Nevertheless, the stipulations regarding the rights of 
the patient largely coincide with the definition of informed consent given in section 91 of 
Act 846. Beyond actual clinical practice, Act 851 also extends informed consent to clinical 
                                                          
859 See:  Section 4.1.2 of Chapter Four. 
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trials for new medical products and procedures and there it expressly uses the term 
‘informed consent’. Thus, Section 158 stipulates that:   
[w]here the Authority grants authorisation for the conduct of a clinical trial of a 
drug, herbal medicinal product, cosmetic or medical device or procedure the trial 
shall not take place until 
 
(a) in the case of the treatment of adult persons, the voluntary written informed 
consent of the person taking part in the clinical trial has been freely obtained by the 
person conducting the trial and for a person who cannot read and write in a 
language that the person understands; 
 
(b) in the case of the treatment of a child or persons under legal disability, the 
voluntary written informed consent of their parents or legal guardians has been 
freely obtained by the person conducting the trial;... 
 
Surprisingly, Act 851, which is one of the largest statutes to be enacted in Ghana in recent 
times, does not define what it means by informed consent in the provision quoted above or 
anywhere else. Nevertheless, the extent to which this informed consent principle embodied 
in the law reflects the true convictions and aspirations of Ghanaians is yet another matter 
for future empirical investigation.  
 In this connection, Grubb, in responding to the question regarding his advice on 
developing a discrete body of HCL, stressed the need to allow a large segment of HCL rules 
to be developed through the proper democratic consultation of stakeholders, rather than 
leaving almost everything to be worked out by the courts on ad hoc basis. He remarked that:  
Developing [HCL] through the courts is a haphazard exercise because it depends 
upon the case coming up and judges’ natural inclination is not to decide more than 
they need to decide so you may establish some principles and resolve a particular 
person's case but you don't get guidance as it may apply elsewhere because the 
judges are not interested in that... So developing through the courts can take a long 
time… public policy at a grand level can be done by legislature and consultation; 
[with] now what we  call stakeholders; there is a huge number of those in any 
particular area of medical law in which it is important to know who the 
stakeholders are. So development through the courts is only a small part of the 
development of medical law. The majority of it and all regular aspects will need to 
be done through the democratic process of legislation including consultation. Those 
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can be very painstakingly slow and difficult to ever find a consensus on because 
there are so many different views on many controversial issues, it is difficult to 
formulate public policy in that way, but there is no any other way to do it.860 
 
Against the backdrop of this quotation, aspects of new medical advances like IVF and organ 
transplantation may be considered examples of issues that may provoke different views due 
to cultural and religious diversity.  
 Brazier responded to the same question by considering by emphasising the need for 
educating future doctors to appreciate the issues and values that HCL seek to advance:  
...More generally the most important thing is to teach medical students properly. If 
we could produce in England and Ghana a generation of doctors who have good 
comprehension of the legal parameters in which they practice and train to reflect on 
the ethics of what they do, then there will be less need for medical lawyers.861 
 
The emphasis on teaching medical students, or future healthcare professionals, and the 
legal and bioethical norms that define the boundaries of proper medical practice are indeed 
laudable and crucially worthy of emulation in Ghana. To a large extent, if healthcare 
professionals do not assimilate good practices as embodied in the relevant laws during their 
medical education, then a fortiori they cannot be trusted to respect patients’ rights in their 
professional practice. The merit in pursuing Brazier’s suggestion is that it could help ensure 
that HCL in Ghana will not be perceived by healthcare professionals as confrontational, a 
perception that was regrettably held by some doctors in England and Wales.862 
 Last but not least, Laurie was concerned about placing too much emphasis on law in 
an attempt to safeguard patients’ interests in healthcare in Ghana. He remarked: 
... there is only so much that the law can do in developing a caring relationship. One 
piece of advice for Ghana is: don't ask too much of the law because the law is a 
crude tool to develop human relationships and core values. ..It is good to protect 
                                                          
860 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Andrew Grubb, 22/10/2013’. 
861 Emphasis added. ‘Extract from Transcript of Interview with Professor Margot Brazier 18/10/2013’. A copy is 
available on file. 
862 See: Chapter Three. 
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autonomy, dignity, but don't forget that at the end of the day, patients are in a 
vulnerable position and need to have a good relationship with their healthcare 
professional...the more we assert patients’ rights it means more responsibilities for 
doctors and that makes doctors more oppositional and it thereby draws patients 
and doctors apart...863 
 
It appears from Laurie’s suggestion that there is a certain fear that using a rights-based 
approach to regulate the doctor-patient relationship may entail putting the two 
stakeholders on a collision course, which could aggravate the already vulnerable position of 
the patient. To my mind, when medical training is infused with heavy doses of HCL and 
bioethical education, healthcare professionals are more likely to appreciate the need for 
them to know, respect and uphold the rights of patients in their clinical interaction. It needs 
to be stressed however that being able to appreciate rights of patients per se is not a 
guarantee that one will uphold them.   In the light of the foregoing, I shall now proceed to 
explore whether a case can be made for a rights-based approach to the development of HCL 
in Ghana. 
6.4. CONCLUSION 
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that there is a real need for patient 
empowerment in Ghana. This was established by interrogation of instances of exploitation 
of patient vulnerability drawn from available judicial and quasi-judicial decisions as well as a 
plethora of evidence from media reportage. Although, these sources could not provide 
exhaustive instances of patients abuse or disempowerment in Ghana, what these limited 
sources furnished give us reasonable insight into the predicament of disempowered patients 
against extremely powerful healthcare professionals that masquared under medical 
paternalism to either consciously or inadvertently to exploit patients.  
                                                          
863 Extract from ‘Transcript of Interview with Professor Graeme Laurie, 15/10/2013’. 
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Moreover, it has also been contended here that there medical advances that 
generated bioethical dilemmas in England and Wales are being imported into Ghanaian 
medical practice. It has been established that there is legal regulatory vacuum regarding 
these medical advances- such as organ transplantation and IVF. Concerns have been 
expressed by some moral constituencies about these new developments and potential 
abuse and scandals that may accompany them.  The Chapter has acknowledged that these 
challenges are not novel to Ghana as they have been experienced by other jurisdictions 
including England and Wales, albeit in a different context. While it was noted that the quest 
for patient empowerment and the concerns over medical advances stimulated emergence 
of a field of HCL, the Chapter expressed point that merely having a field of HCL will not be a 
immediate solution to the conundrum of patient disempowerment. On the contrary, it was 
acknowledged that such a distinct body of HCL could potentially facilitate empowerment of 
patients. In that respect the Chapter pointed out some of the lessons that Ghana could draw 
from English and Welsh experience in these matters. Particularly, views and 
recommendations of Pioneering HCL Scholars regarding what Ghana need to do to evolve a 
HCL regime that will safeguard patients’ rights and give voice to them in healthcare matters. 
An important thread that run through these recommendations by the experts is that Ghana 
is a unique country by reason of its socio-cultural and economic circumstances therefore it 
needs to careful adapt doctrines and practices from other jurisdictions in a manner that will 
be suitable to her. Having the benefit of these guidance from experience of England and 



















CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD FOR GHANA 
7.1. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AND RESPONSES TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
It is now apposite to determine whether the objectives of the thesis with particular 
reference to the research question and its hypotheses have been attained. To reiterate, the 
research questions were as follows: How and why a discrete body of HCL emerged in 
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England and Wales and what lessons may be drawn from this for Ghana. The objectives of 
the thesis were: a) to clarify the status of healthcare law as a legal field and academic 
discipline in England and Wales; b) to explore the historical context of the development of 
HCL in England and Wales; c) to survey Ghanaian law for the existence or absence of a 
distinct body of HCL through the prism of English and Welsh HCL, and d) to explore potential 
lessons that can be drawn by Ghana from the English and Welsh experience. All these were 
ultimately intended to help in proving the hypotheses that: one, the quest for patient 
empowerment and the legal academic interest in medical advances have accelerated the 
emergence of HCL as a distinct body of law in England and Wales, and two, the need to 
protect patients’ rights and enhance public awareness of the implications of medical 
advances should facilitate the development of a distinct body of HCL in Ghana. The 
justification for the choice of England and Wales as a comparator jurisdiction was elaborated 
upon in Chapter 1. Some preliminary matters, including my preference for the label HCL, 
were also clarified in the same chapter. 
Methodological choices informing the research were explicated and justified in 
Chapter Two. Functional Comparative Methodology (FCM) was found to be appropriate for 
the general framework of the research, notwithstanding the fact that Ghana and England 
and Wales are at different levels of economic development. It was demonstrated in 
Chapters Five and Six that to some extent, both countries face similar challenges with 
healthcare, such as patient safety and rights. The FCM approach was supplemented by legal 
history and empirical legal studies in order to obtain verifiable evidence to buttress the 
central argument of the thesis, that the quest for patient empowerment and the growing 
interest of legal academics in medical advances in Ghana and the expected public awareness 
in that country are important motivations for the emergence of a discrete body of HCL. 
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In Chapter Three, a survey of the literature regarding the conceptualisation of a field 
of law (and for that matter a discrete body of law) revealed that there is no universal 
consensus on the definition of a legal field. However, the various positions articulated by 
diverse commentators can be reduced into four key indicators, namely: a legal field must 
have sufficient case law evidencing factual peculiarities which require specialised analysis; it 
must have significant interventionist or dedicated legislation to regulate specific 
relationships; it must have core principles which give it commonality and at the same time 
distinctiveness, and a field of law must be sustainable by securing a place in legal education 
and through the existence of scholarly works dedicated to the field. The Chapter 
demonstrated that not only has there been a significant quantitative increase in healthcare 
litigation in England and Wales since the 1980s, but more crucially, there are novel cases 
which present unprecedented legal and bioethical questions. The increasing resort to the 
courts for answers to some of this unfolding novelty in healthcare litigation is partly 
attributable to the empowerment of patients by way of according them a greater say in 
their clinical experience and the concomitant desire of healthcare providers to avoid blame 
or future liabilities by taking precautions. This includes seeking declarations on the legality of 
proposed sensitive medical procedures. It was also argued in this Chapter that the 
emergence of HCL has witnessed the adoption of many statutes and quasi-legislation, such 
as professional guidelines and directives that are not only novel but unique in terms of the 
subject matter they address. New technologies in medicine have brought up completely new 
questions that have stirred up tensions in the various moral constituencies of society and 
have necessitated the adoption of such dedicated statutes and quasi-laws. 
In Chapter Four, I verified the absence of a discrete body of HCL in Ghana through the 
prism of the established characteristics of English and Welsh HCL. It was found that although 
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there has been some legislative intervention in macro-aspects of healthcare, many other 
indicia necessary for a discrete field of law to be constituted were lacking in Ghana. The 
drivers for the development of this field of law in England and Wales were explored in 
Chapter Five. It was found that a combination of factors operated in both independent and 
interconnected ways to facilitate the evolutionary trajectory of HCL. Thus, the general 
enthusiasm for the protection of human rights was anchored on individualism interrelated 
with the intervention of non-medical academics864 in their critiques on medical ethics. This 
was in the wake of biomedical scandals unearthed in the 1960s and 1970s, including the 
Nuremberg Trials and infamous questionable experiments on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Equally significant in the emergence of the discipline in England and Wales was specifically 
the vibrancy with which the media projected positive and negative happenings in medicine 
and healthcare into the spotlight. The prominence of healthcare issues during the period 
under consideration was noted in this Chapter to have whipped up public interest in 
debating some of the moral dilemmas generated by medical advances. Another notable 
contribution explored in Chapter Five was the role played by pioneering scholars in the field 
and their views concerning the development of the field. Particularly significant is the fact 
that their views reflected and validated my library-based explanation of the factors that led 
to the development of HCL. 
Chapter Six engaged the major issue of the thesis, namely whether a case can be made 
for the development of a discrete body of HCL in Ghana. Proceeding from one of the 
working hypothesis that - the need for protecting patients’ rights and enhanced public 
awareness of implications of medical advances should facilitate the development of a 
distinct body of HCL in Ghana - the Chapter first surveyed the manifestations and 
                                                          
864 J Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2007) 6.  
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exploitation of patient vulnerability in Ghana. This was done by examining the few cases 
presented to the courts and the stories reported in the Ghanaian media which have not yet 
necessarily been litigated. It was also found that there is a growing concern among the 
Ghanaian public concerning the spate of medical malpractice incidents and scandals in the 
country. Notably, it was pointed out that all the various forms of media, including the 
internet, are replete with discussions about the phenomena of medical errors, malpractice 
and scandals. It was also found that apart from the scandals, identifiable stakeholders, 
including the Ghana Catholic Bishop Conference,865 and the Association of Childless Couples 
of Ghana866 highlighted the regulatory vacuum that has been increasingly visible due to 
hitherto unknown medical advances, such as IVF, being imported into routine medical 
practice in the country.  
Lastly, Chapter Six, having demonstrated that there is an unmet need in Ghanaian law 
as regards the failure to empower patients in healthcare, due to the absence of a discrete 
body of HCL, moved on to explore the viability of a human rights-based (HRB) approach for 
the development of HCL in Ghana. This HRB approach being advocated for Ghana in this 
thesis differs from the situation in England and Wales, where HCL reflects human rights but 
is not necessarily organised around human rights as I envisage them for Ghana. I have 
argued that there are already important conditions extant in Ghana which are suitable for a 
HRB paradigm for HCL in that jurisdiction. First, the stable constitutional democracy in 
Ghana over the last two decades has facilitated a culture of rights consciousness. Second, 
cheaper access to a quasi-judicial body for redressing human rights violations has addressed 
the lack of access to courts for the ventilation of grievances. Third, professional codes and 
                                                          
865 The Reporter, ‘Catholic Bishops conference condemns sale of sperms in Ghana’ (Joy Online) 
http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201309/112759.php (accessed: 1/5/2014).  
866 Ibid.  
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guidelines can be drawn up or revised to incorporate human rights-based language which 
healthcare professionals, as members of Ghanaian society, have become conversant with 
during the past two decades. Finally, factions of the vibrant community of civil society in 
Ghana, such as the Legal Resources Centre, and the Alliance for African Women Initiative 
can extend their advocacy role to include healthcare-related rights within their focus, in 
order to boost patient empowerment by raising awareness of patients’ rights.  
 Without wishing to overstate the achievement of this thesis, a modest claim could be 
that it has succeeded in charting the historical trajectory along which a discrete body of HCL 
has developed in England and Wales. The rationales for the emergence of this field of law, 
which did not exist until the 1980s, have also been explored from different perspectives. 
Essentially, it was demonstrated that the development of this field of law in England and 
Wales was a product of the interaction of diverse factors. In relation to this outcome, the 
thesis also succeeded in empirically verifying the usually unexamined assumption in the 
literature that HCL has attained the status of a discrete field of law or discipline. The first 
hypothesis has been positively confirmed in Chapters Three and Five: that the critical 
motivation for the emergence of a discrete body of HCL in England and Wales during the 
period under consideration in this thesis was essentially the perceived need to increase 
patient empowerment, coupled with the interest of legal academics in exploring the 
interface between law and rapid medical advances. 
 Furthermore, this thesis has established that Ghana does not yet have a discrete body 
of HCL. The model of what constitutes a legal field or discrete body of law used to test the 
presence or absence of discrete HCL in England and Wales was utilised in the Ghanaian 
context. When the same criteria was applied to Ghana’s legal terrain and how it interrelates 
with healthcare or medical practice, it was found that most of the indicia of a discrete body 
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of HCL were lacking in Ghana. Additionally, the thesis establishes that the conundrum of 
patient disempowerment emanating from excessive medical paternalism, coupled with the 
exploitation of patient vulnerability and the ethical concerns associated with medical 
advances, which have predominantly motivated the emergence of HCL in England and 
Wales, are also extant in Ghana. In this regard, some useful lessons can be drawn by Ghana 
with the necessary adaptation to suit its domestic circumstances, including its socio-cultural 
milieu and its level of economic development. The next section addresses the practical 
implementation of some of these lessons. Thus, the absence of HCL in Ghana, as revealed in 
Chapter Four, together with the glaring spectacle of unchecked exploitation of patient 
vulnerability explored in Chapter Six, significantly proves the second hypothesis of this thesis 
that ‘the need for protecting patients’ rights and enhanced public awareness of implications 
of medical advances should facilitate the development of a distinct body of HCL in Ghana.’ 
7.2 FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FACILITATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEALTHCARE 
LAW TO EMPOWER PATIENTS IN GHANA 
 
Against the backdrop of the reality of patient vulnerability, coupled with the reception 
of some ethically sensitive medical advances into Ghanaian medical practice, and drawing 
upon an assessment of the views of pioneering HCL scholars and lessons from my 
observation of the historical development of a discrete body of HCL in England and Wales, I 
would propound the following specific recommendations for facilitating the development of 
HCL in Ghana as a way of empowering patients.  
7.2.1. A PLEA FOR COMMISSIONING THE FIRST EVER PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO PATIENTS’ 
EXPERIENCES AND THE ORGANISATION OF MAJOR HOSPITALS IN GHANA 
 
The development of a discrete field of HCL that better safeguards patients’ rights will 
be enhanced (and better rationalised) if an official account of the exploitation of patients’ 
vulnerabilities is generated. This may be achieved with the setting up of a public inquiry to 
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undertake detailed investigations into patients’ experiences and the operations of selected 
health institutions in Ghana. The findings and recommendations from such an inquiry could 
greatly assist in addressing fundamental issues affecting clinical safety and accountability, 
the professional culture in the healthcare system, and the rights of patients. This suggested 
initiative, if adopted in Ghana, would not be unprecedented. In England and Wales, for 
example, public inquiries867 into the healthcare system have played an influential role in 
setting aspects of the agenda for HCL and policy reforms.868 Having demonstrated the 
potential utility of a public inquiry to stimulate the development of HCL in Ghana, the next 
issue that must be considered is the practicality or viability of this proposal there.   
 The constitutional system in Ghana has already made provision for the use of public 
inquiries as a tool to probe matters of public interest.  According to Article 278 of the 1992 
Constitution of Ghana:  
the President shall, by constitutional instrument, appoint a commission of inquiry 
into any matter of public interest where -  
(a) the President is satisfied that a commission of inquiry should be appointed; or  
(b) the Council of State advises that it is in the public interest to do so; or  
(c) Parliament, by a resolution requests that a commission of inquiry be appointed 
to inquire into any matter, specified in the resolution as being a matter of public 
importance. 
 
Thus, there are three ways in which the power to set up a commission of inquiry may be 
deployed.  The critical test for invocation of the power in all three circumstances is the need 
                                                          
867 I Kennedy, ‘Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into Children’s Heart Surgery at Bristol 
Royal Infirmary 1984-1991’ (Cm 5207, 2001).  
868 For example, see: Department of Health, Great Britain, ‘Learning from Bristol: the Department of Health's 




1995/r/a11G00000017rtwIAA (accessed: 17/03/2014); Secretary of State for Health, Safeguarding Patients, the 
Government’s response to the recommendations of the Shipman Inquiry’s fifth report and to the 
recommendations of the Ayling, Neale and Kerr/Haslam Inquiries (Cm 7015, London: the Stationery Office 
2007)   
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to serve the public interest. The Constitution defines ‘public interest’ as including ‘any right 
or advantage which ensures or is intended to ensure to the benefit generally of the whole of 
the people of Ghana.’869 The broader definition of ‘public interest’ presents an enormous 
opportunity for formal investigation into any matter which affects the generality of the 
population. Undoubtedly, the issues of patient safety and patients’ rights can easily satisfy 
the test of public interest, since almost every person at one point in time may become a 
patient. It is therefore submitted that probing the operations of some of the selected 
healthcare institutions in Ghana and how they impact upon patients’ rights and safety are 
sufficient justification for the use of the constitutional power to set up a commission of 
inquiry. Notwithstanding the existence of this constitutional facility, no commission of 
inquiry has ever been established to investigate any matter relating to healthcare in Ghana. 
It is quite striking that since the commencement of the 1992 Constitution, at least ten 
commissions of inquiries have been set up to probe political matters.870 The issues 
investigated by these commissions of inquiry were often debated in the media in the same 
way that the many incidences of medical malpractices and scandals in healthcare are given 
media spotlight. The budgets of these commissions of inquiry are funded by the 
Government.871 Since the nuances of clinical operations of healthcare institutions in Ghana 
in relation to patients’ experiences have never been subjected to an evidence-based public 
discourse, the setting up of a commission of inquiry into that subject may help to create a 
nationwide awareness of the subject and the building of a national consensus on how to 
                                                          
869 Article 295 of the 1992 Constitution. 
870 For example, the  Constitutional Review Commission set up by the Constitution Review Commission of 
Inquiry Instrument 2010 (C.1 64); the Ghana @ 50 Commission of Inquiry set up by the Commission of Inquiry 
(Ghana @ 50) Instrument  2009 (C.I. 61); the  Judgment Debt Commission, etc. 
871 Article 295 of the 1992 Constitution. 
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address safety and patient rights in the country, within the constraints of available 
healthcare resources. 
7.2.2. THE CREATION OF A PATIENT RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN 
There is an urgent need for the creation of a functionary or institution along the lines 
of an ombudsman whose mandate would mainly focus on the healthcare system in Ghana in 
relation to the rights of patients. As noted in Chapter Six, there is a serious problem 
regarding a lack of awareness of patients’ rights in Ghanaian society. The upshot of this 
ignorance is that there may be a tendency for patients to relate to healthcare institutions 
with the erroneous assumption that the care they are receiving is a privilege or favour that 
the healthcare institution and professionals are extending to them, so they should never 
have the audacity to question their clinical experience. The suggestion being made for the 
creation of the office of Patients’ Rights Ombudsman (PRO) will assist in obviating or 
ameliorating the unchecked abuse of patients’ rights and the compromising of patient 
safety.  
 The aims of a PRO scheme may vary depending on the priorities within a country. For 
example: it may be either general healthcare services or specifically health sector-oriented; 
individual patient or group-oriented; ethically or legally-oriented; oriented towards legal 
safeguards or quality improvement, and so forth.872 Be that as it may, it is noteworthy that 
these aims are not necessarily mutually exclusive, so the PRO being recommended for 
Ghana in this thesis could be a blend of these varied aims. The most pertinent thing is that a 
unique model of PRO to be constructed for Ghana should ensure that awareness of patients’ 
rights becomes profoundly embedded in the ethos and culture of healthcare delivery in 
                                                          
872 E Segest, ‘The Ombudsman’s involvement in ensuring patient’s rights’ (1997) 16 Medicine and Law, 473-




Ghana. According to Fallberg and Mackenney, an ideal patient ombudsman scheme should 
include a certain minimum of features, namely:  it should be regulated by law; it should have 
a common standardised system for handling requests; it should have full-time personnel 
who possess basic skills; it should report to the public, and it should have the power to 
access documents and be subject to regular evaluations.873 Thus, in order to design an 
effective PRO for Ghana, it would be helpful to reflect the above features.  
The potential objection to this recommendation for PRO in Ghana is whether or not it 
is a duplication of a similar existing constitutional mechanism: the Commission on Human 
Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). Notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution of 
Ghana has created this permanent quasi-judicial body to be responsible for investigating 
human rights violations and administrative injustice, it is submitted that the call being made 
here for the establishment of a PRO is neither superfluous nor a recipe for undermining 
constitutional arrangements for the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. 
Patient rights are a reflection of general human rights and their implementation in specific 
situations related to healthcare, including submission to diagnosis and therapy.874 Thus, the 
suggestion for this new body to oversee patient rights should rather be seen as a call for the 
reinforcement of the constitutional goal of securing human rights for Ghanaians, particularly 
in relation to healthcare. As noted earlier in Chapter Four, CHRAJ was conducting annual 
surveys to gauge the extent of public awareness of the Patients Charter before it had been 
given a statutory footing. Nevertheless, the research undertaken in the CHRAJ archives 
confirms that no inspection has been carried out by CHRAJ on the actual functioning of 
health institutions in Ghana for the purpose of determining their compliance with human 
                                                          
873 L Fallberg and S McKenney, ‘Conclusion’ in L Fallberg and S Mackenney (eds), Protecting Patients’ Rights? A 
Comparative Study of the Ombudsman in health care (Abingdon: Radcliffe Medical Press 2004) 80.  
874 A Rabiega-Przylecka, ‘Patient’s rights in Poland against the background of new regulations’ (2012) 31 
Medicine and Law, 43, 44.  
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rights norms, particularly patients’ rights. This deficit in the work of CHRAJ can be 
understood since CHRAJ has many responsibilities, but is beset with resource constraints. 
Thus, it is necessary for complete attention to be given to the inspection and investigation of 
health institutions. CHRAJ’s present responsibility for handling corruption in public services, 
as well as fundamental freedoms and human rights in the entire country, strongly suggest 
that it cannot be expected to devote sufficient time and resources to the commitment which 
an effective PRO service requires. Indeed, whereas CHRAJ deals with human rights in 
general, a PRO would be required to focus exclusively on human rights in the healthcare 
context. 
Moreover, the present recommendation is timely, since during the last general 
elections in 2012, one leading political party included a proposal for the creation of a health 
ombudsman in its manifesto. In an important campaign speech, the Candidate for the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) stated: 
In our efforts to enhance the quality of care, the NPP will create an ombudsman 
with the power to investigate and support complaints from patients in both public 
and private hospitals.875 
 
This proposal has been criticised by Pratt, a media commentator, as being an unnecessary 
duplication, as supplanting the statutory duty of the existing Medical and Dental Council 
(MDC).876 It is submitted that Pratt’s criticism is founded upon a misconception of the true 
legal mandate of the MDC. As has been argued elsewhere, the MDC is mainly responsible for 
ensuring that medical practice complies with regulatory standards set out under the MDC 
                                                          
875 Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, ‘Saving Our Health Service, Keeping Our People Healthy’ (speech by Nano 
Addo Akufo-Addo, 2012 Presidential Candidate of the New Patriotic Party at the Sunyani Nurses Training 
College, Sunyani on 17 October 2012) http://elections.peacefmonline.com/pages/politics/201210/140911.php 
(accessed: 13/4/2014). 
876 F Agyei-Twum, ‘Pratt punches Akufo-Addo on Health Ombudsman proposal’ (Joy Online, 19 October, 2012) 
http://politics.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201210/95779.php (accessed: 13/4/2014).  
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Act.877 Thus, the role that my recommendation in this thesis is contemplating is far more 
extensive than the role of the MDC in relation to patients’ rights. The PRO will not only 
receive and investigate complaints, it will also be proactive by undertaking a routine audit of 
the functioning of healthcare institutions in the country to ascertain the degree of 
compliance with their obligation to respect and uphold patients’ rights. 
Having demonstrated the mutual reinforcement between the existing constitutional 
arrangements and the new body being advocated, it is necessary to explore how the new 
body should be conceptualised and established. There are two possible routes that may be 
adopted for the realisation of this recommendation. One way is to create the PRO as a 
special unit or department within the existing structure of the CHRAJ. The likely negative 
consequence of this approach is that the effectiveness of the role envisaged for the PRO 
may be emasculated by the budget squeeze within the already overburdened CHRAJ. This 
may be ameliorated if the official to occupy the position of the PRO is given a rank as deputy 
commissioner of the CHRAJ. Such an exalted position of the PRO within the hierarchy of the 
CHRAJ could assist in positioning the PRO on a strong footing in the inevitable struggle for 
operational resources with other units or departments within the CHRAJ. The alternative 
route is to design and create a completely new entity outside the CHRAJ to play the role of 
the PRO. This option, which is my preference, will ensure that the PRO is truly independent 
and unfettered by any complex institutional bottleneck so that it can effectively deliver on 
its mandate.  
7.2.3. INTRODUCING THE TEACHING OF HCL INTO THE CURRICULUM OF LAW, MEDICAL 
AND NURSING SCHOOLS878 
                                                          
877 E Owusu-Dapaa, 'Ghana' in Herman Nys (ed), International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Medical Law (Alphen aan 
den Rijn, NL: Kluwer Law International, 2014) para 70. 
878 As recommended by Professor Margot Brazier. See: Chapter 6, Section 6.3, ‘Transcript of Interview with 




The utility of incorporating the teaching of HCL into the curriculum of educational 
institutions responsible for training future lawyers and healthcare professionals is self-
evident and therefore does not warrant extensive elaboration. It is significant to note that as 
far back as 1988, the General Medical Council in the UK strongly recommended that medical 
ethics and law should constitute one of the core components of the medical curriculum.879 
Making a similar recommendation for medical education in Ghana is therefore not out of 
place. 
Consequently, the remit of this sub-section of the thesis will be to recommend what 
should go into the curriculum of HCL education in the various institutions in Ghana. 
Developing a curriculum for the teaching of HCL in various institutions will need to strike a 
fine balance between depth and coverage. In this regard, Gardener’s advice becomes 
crucially relevant: 
The greatest enemy of understanding is coverage... If you’re determined to cover a 
lot of things, you are guaranteeing that most kids will not understand, because they 
haven’t had time enough to go into things in depth, to figure out what the requisite 
understanding is, and to be able to perform that understanding in different 
situations.880 
 
With the benefit of Gardener’s admonition it is imperative to develop a different curriculum 
with a different emphasis for the three types of institutions which need to introduce the 
teaching of HCL. The curriculum for law schools will be relatively nuanced and deeper than 
the ones for medical and nursing schools, given the legal skills and knowledge that law 
students would already possess. Similarly, the curriculum for medical schools might 
emphasise aspects of the law that are relevant to the medical profession, whereas the HCL 
                                                          
879 General Medical Council, ‘Teaching medical ethics and law within medical education: a model for the UK 
core curriculum’ (1998) 24 Journal of Medical Ethics, 188-192.  
880 HW Gardner, ‘Educating for Understanding’ (1993) ‘The American School Board Journal’, 24, cited in RN 
Nwabueze, ‘Health care law curriculum and scholarship in Canada, USA and England: lessons for Nigeria’, 
(2010) 44 The Law Teacher, 32-41. 
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curriculum for nursing schools would highlight the interface between law and the nursing 
profession. In the Table below, an attempt is made to suggest a HCL curriculum for the 
various educational institutions in Ghana that need to offer a course in this emerging area of 
the law. 
TABLE 3: PROPOSED HEALTH CARE LAW CURRICULUM FOR HIGHER LEARNING INSTITUTIONS 
IN GHANA 
 
LAW FACULTIES/ SCHOOLS MEDICAL SCHOOLS NURSING 
SCHOOLS/COLLEGES 
1. The Role of Law and 
(Bio)ethics in the Regulation 
of Healthcare 
1. General Introduction to 
Ghanaian Law and its 
Relevance to Medicine 
1. General Introduction to 
Ghanaian Law and its 
Relevance to Nursing 
2. The Doctor-Patient 
Relationship 
2. The Relationship between 
Law, Medical Ethics and 
Bioethics  
2. Nurses and Medical 
Liability 
3. Autonomy, Informed 
Consent and Refusal of 
Treatment 
3. The Rights of Patients and 
Duties of Doctors in the 
Doctor-Patient Relationship 
3. Patients’ Rights 
4. Human Rights and Health 
Care 
4. Medical Liability - Civil and 
Criminal 
4. The Regulation of the 
Nursing Profession 
5. Clinical Negligence and 
Medical Products Liability 
5. The Regulation of the 
Medical and Dental 
Profession 
5. Legal Issues in Medical 
Advances - IVF, Surrogacy, 
Abortion, Organ 
Transplantation 
6. The Structure of Ghana’s 
Healthcare System and 
Patient Access to Resources 
6. Legal Issues in Medical 
Advances - IVF, Surrogacy, 
Abortion, Organ 
Transplantation 
6. Public Health Law 
7. Pharmaceuticals, 
Regulation and Research 
7. Public Health law 7. Mental Health Law 
8. Legal Issues at the End of 8. Mental Health Law  
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Life: Dying, Death, Assisted 
Dying 
9. Abortion and Assisted 
Reproduction 
  
10. Organ Donation, 
Transplantation and Human 
Tissue 
  
11. Mental Health    
12. Public Health   
 
A close scrutiny of the above table reveals that many of the topics to be treated in the 
various institutions are similar. Nevertheless, it bears emphasising that the depth of 
coverage will be deeper for law students than their counterparts in the medical and nursing 
schools. This is justifiably so, as future lawyers need to have a deeper appreciation of both 
the substantive and procedural components of HCL in order to be in a better position to 
address disputes or contentions that may arise from medical practice or healthcare. 
Conversely, although medical and nursing students will not have the legal knowledge that 
law students possess, the way in which the curriculum in medical schools in the UK covers 
law could be looked at in order to ensure that this is taught at an appropriate level to 
facilitate understanding. 
 7.2.4 THE CREATION OF A SIMPLE CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENTS FROM HEALTHCARE INSTITUTIONS 
 
In order to overcome the situation whereby contentious and ethically sensitive 
procedures are undertaken in Ghana’s hospitals, without clear certainty as to their 
lawfulness, it is recommended that a simple and straightforward procedure should be 
included in Ghanaian civil procedure for the sole purpose of enabling healthcare institutions 
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to seek declaratory judgments. Currently, declaratory judgments can be obtained just like 
any other remedy in civil suit. Thus, a healthcare institution which needs assurance of the 
lawfulness of a procedure, such as a surgical operation to separate conjoined twins which 
carries a high risk of one of the patients dying, would need to issue a writ of summons and 
go through the various stages of pleadings before the matter can be fixed for applications 
for directions (or pre-trial proceedings) so that the court can set the action down for trial on 
a definite date. All these processes can take more than two months before the matter 
comes up for a definite hearing.881 It is trite to mention that in medicine or healthcare, 
time882 is not merely a luxury, but is rather of the essence in many delicate procedures, since 
a few minutes’ delay can result in an otherwise avoidable death. 
A simplified procedure for obtaining declaratory judgments in relation to contentious 
medical procedures for adults who lack capacity may draw inspiration from the English and 
Welsh Practice Direction (Practice Direction E – Applications Relating To Serious Medical 
Treatment),883 adopted in the wake of Bland-type cases.884 It is pertinent to note that the 
use of the term ‘incapacitated patients’ here does not refer to mental health patients, who 
are subject to the elaborate framework of the Ghanaian Mental Health Act, 2012. On the 
contrary, the term ‘incapacitated patient’ is used to refer to patients who are not ordinarily 
mental health patients, but due to a particular health condition or circumstance, lose the 
ability to exercise their right to self-determination with respect to proposed medical 
procedures. The procedure being contemplated under my present recommendation will also 
encompass children who lack the capacity to participate in decision-making concerning 
                                                          
881 See generally: K Tetteh, Civil Procedure (Accra: Black Mask, 2011).  
882 J Harrington, ‘Time as a dimension of medical law’ (2012) 20 Medical Law Review, 491. 
883 Courts and Tribunals Judiciary,  ‘Practice Direction – How To Start Proceedings’ 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/9E-%E2%80%93-Applications-relating-to-serious-
medical-treatment.pdf (accessed: 2/7/2014).  
884 Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland [2002] 1 All ER 794 
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crucial treatment or medical procedures. In this regard, it is pertinent to point out that the 
enforcement procedure under the Ghanaian Children’s Act, 1998 (Act 560) is not 
appropriate for HCL cases involving children. The requirement for the establishing of a panel 
to sit as a Family Tribunal before a matter affecting a child can be investigated stands a high 
risk of delaying the disposition of time-sensitive HCL cases. The civil procedure rules should 
not only be simplified, but also expedited to deal with these special types of HCL cases.  
It is submitted that the existing jurisdiction of the High Court regarding the 
enforcement of fundamental freedoms and human rights under Article 33 of the 
Constitution should be adapted to deal with applications for declaratory judgments in time-
sensitive HCL cases. This procedure for human rights enforcement885 cannot achieve the 
urgency which the exigencies of contentious medical procedures usually call for. For 
example, the recent separation of conjoined twins which made headlines in Ghana required 
swift action in order to avoid further complications, since they were joined at the stomach 
and waist.886 Clearly, it was known to the doctors who undertook the operation that it was 
highly risky in terms of the survival of both twins involved, but they went ahead without 
seeking any declaration as to the lawfulness of a surgery which was known to be likely to 
result in fatality. This is in contrast to the approach taken by healthcare providers in the UK, 
who deemed it necessary to obtain a declaratory judgment before proceeding with a similar 
operation in Re A (Conjoined Twins).887 A plausible rationalisation for choosing not to involve 
the courts in the decision to carry out the surgical separation of conjoined twins in 
circumstances known to be likely to be fatal in the Ghanaian case is that there is a lack of 
                                                          
885 The nuanced procedure for Article 33 of the Constitution is contained in the High Court Civil Procedure 
Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47), Order 67. 
886 The Reporter, ‘Second separated Siamese twin also dies’ http://graphic.com.gh/archive/Health/second-
separated-siamese-twin-also-dies.html (accessed: 20/4/2014).  
887 [2000] EWCA Civ 254. 
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enforcement of criminal law against healthcare professionals in Ghana. This is due to 
complex factors, including a lack of awareness on the part of the Ghana Police Service that 
healthcare professionals are still subject to the criminal law of the land when they make 
their best endeavours to save lives. That being said, Brazier and Ost have noted that even in 
a jurisdiction like England and Wales, where there is a fully matured field of HCL, the 
criminal prosecution of doctors is not popular compared to civil suits.888  
 
7.2.5 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT BIOETHICS COMMISSION 
In order to avoid the ad hoc resolution of moral dilemmas generated by medical 
advances and even some routine medical practices in Ghana, it is recommended that a 
permanent body be set up by statute to continuously and systematically identify and 
promote policies and practices that ensure that healthcare delivery and biomedical research 
are conducted in a socially and ethically responsible manner. This is imperative for a country 
like Ghana which has plural moral constituencies, due to the cultural diversity among the 
different ethnic groups in the country. Such a commission should be broad-based in its 
membership and independent in the discharge of its mandate. The reports it will produce 
may serve as a useful source of advice to lawmakers and professional bodies. In 
conceptualising the composition and mandate of the permanent commission recommended 
by this thesis, inspiration may be drawn from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NBC) in the 
                                                          
888 M Brazier and S Ost, Bioethics, Medicine and the Criminal Law Volume III:  Medicine and Bioethics in the 
Theatre of the Criminal Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013).    
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UK889 and the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (PCB) in the USA.890 
For example, the terms of reference of the NBC may be particularly instructive:  
1. To identify and define ethical questions raised by recent advances in biological 
and medical research in order to respond to, and to anticipate, public concern; 
2. To make arrangements for examining and reporting on such questions with a 
view to promoting public understanding and discussion; this may lead, where 
needed, to the formulation of new guidelines by the appropriate regulatory or 
other body; 
3. In the light of the outcome of its work, to publish reports; and to make 
representations, as the Council may judge appropriate.891 
 
The composition of the recommended permanent ethics commission will partly determine 
its credibility and independence. In this regard, it will be necessary to allow a representative 
to be selected from major stakeholders in matters pertaining to morality, traditional culture, 
major religions and active researchers in medical sociology, theology, healthcare law, and 
health-related human rights. On the basis of these thematic stakeholders, representatives 
may be drawn from the Christian Council of Ghana, the National Catholic Secretariat, the 
Ghana Islamic Federation, and the National House of Chiefs. 
Admittedly, some aspects of the mandate envisaged for the recommended permanent 
bioethics commission are being taken by the Clinical Trials Technical Advisory Committee 
(CTTAC) of the Food and Drugs Authority (FDA), recently created by the Public Health Act, 
2012.892 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the CTTAC in its present design under the law 
cannot be considered adequate for the purposes of addressing the tensions between 
morality, law and medicine, particularly in relation to new technologies and procedures in 
                                                          
889 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Exploring Ethical Issues in Biology and Medicine’ 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/about (accessed: 17/4/2014).  
890 http://bioethics.gov/about  (accessed: 17/4/2014).  
891 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, n. 888 above.  
892 See: Public Health Act 2012 (Act 851), s. 150.  
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medicine. The object of the CTTAC is to provide the FDA ‘with on-going and timely medical 
and scientific advice on current and emerging issues related to clinical trials.’893  
Clearly, it is evident from the stated purpose of the CTTAC that it is not mainly 
concerned with the moral or ethical dilemmas associated with healthcare and medical 
advances; rather, it seeks to provide technical scientific data to be used as a basis for cross-
checking the scientific and medical claims of applicants for approval or licence from the FDA. 
Undoubtedly, furnishing the FDA with independent technical scientific data is important as it 
will ensure patient/consumer safety. Nevertheless, it is not every drug or medical device 
which ensures patient safety that may be accepted as appropriate by society. This is 
particularly so where there are contested moral ramifications regarding a drug or medical 
technology. Consequently, the obvious option apparently needed to address this gap is that 
CTTAC should either be allowed to continue intact as established by Act 851, or should be 
substantially reformed in terms of its mandate, composition and relationship with the FDA 
in order to ensure its independence and credibility. Even if the latter does occur, there are 
still ethically contentious areas in healthcare which do not necessarily relate to drugs, for 
example, the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment. To that extent, the 
recommendation for a new commission being made here is still relevant.  
7.2.6 CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION IN HCL FOR JUDGES, LAWYERS AND 
HEALTHCARE PRACTITIONERS 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, the legal aspects of healthcare have not been 
incorporated into the curriculum of universities offering law programmes in Ghana. In fact, 
the Chapter confirms that medical ethics and law have never been part of medical education 
in Ghana. The combined effect of these deficits in legal and medical education, at least from 
                                                          
893 Ibid 151. 
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the perspective of patient empowerment and safety, was equally explored in Chapter Six. 
Although a specific recommendation has been made above for the introduction of HCL and 
its variant modules in Ghanaian law faculties and medical schools, it is important to address 
the knowledge or awareness gap among the large number of already qualified lawyers 
(including judges) and doctors who have completed their formal education and are now 
practicing their vocations. To obviate this hurdle, it is recommended that a special short 
training course be designed around key themes in HCL, health and human rights for lawyers 
and medical practitioners. Since they are both well-organised professions, such a course 
could be included in the continuing professional educational programmes for the respective 
professions. This will encourage as many lawyers and doctors as possible to patronise such 
educational programmes, as they will be accumulating credit for the renewal of their 
licence. 
 
7.5. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
Despite the significance of this study as noted earlier in Chapter One, there are 
limitations which need to be acknowledged and used as premises for delineating issues that 
require further research. First, due to the lack of systematic documentation of decisions of 
the Mental and Dental Council (MDC) of Ghana, access could not be obtained to the full 
gamut of disciplinary cases handled by the MDC since 1980. Thus, a statistical pattern could 
not be generated from decisions of the MDC concerning the violation of patient rights.  In 
this regard, it would be useful for research to be conducted into all the cases that have been 
decided by the MDC since 1980. This will give a profound insight into the nature of 
grievances that patients bring against doctors and the attitude of the MDC towards such 
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cases. Such a work may benefit from similar research carried out by Smith in relation to the 
UK’s General Medical Council.894 Secondly, the views of healthcare professionals, especially 
doctors, could shed more light on the necessity to incorporate HCL and ethics-related 
modules in medical school curricula. The views of medical officers in charge of hospitals that 
have been involved in scandals reported in the media could also have been elicited through 
interviews, but the difficulty of access and resource constraints prevented me from including 
these aspects in my research. Thus, it may be necessary for further empirical research to be 
pursued in this area. Thirdly, the lawyers who have handled the few available decided cases 
on medical malpractice could have also been approached for views on matters being 
investigated in this thesis, but logistical constraints have impeded their inclusion in my 
study. This also provides another issue for further empirical legal research in the future. 
Finally, as noted in Chapter Six (Section 6.3), post-2012 statutes enacted in Ghana 
embody the informed consent doctrine. However, there is no evidence of public 
consultation preceding the passing of these statutes, so it is uncertain whether this foreign 
doctrine has been adapted to reflect the cultural ethos and true aspirations of Ghanaian 
patients. Consequently, an empirical investigation to ascertain the views of the public on 
their understanding and expectations regarding the incorporation of the informed consent 
doctrine in Ghanaian law will be quite a useful enterprise. Finally, the fact that the 
comparison in this thesis was made only between two jurisdictions is a limitation in itself 
since other approaches to dealing with the same problems studied in relation to England 
and Wales and Ghana were not explored.  
                                                          
894 RG Smith, ‘The Professional Conduct Jurisdiction of the General Medical Council, 1858-1990’ (Oxford Socio-




7.6. FURTHER EVALUATION OF STRENGHT AND WEAKNESSES OF METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
OF THE THESIS 
In Chapter Two it was indicated that the nature of the research problem the thesis is dealing 
with did not lend itself to one methodology. It was contended that adopting a single 
methodology run a high risk of not being able to achieve the set goals of the research. In the 
light of that precaution the thesis adopted a blend of three legal research approaches 
namely- Functional comparative law approach, non-doctrinal legal history and empirical 
legal studies. Having gone through the research and reached conclusion of the thesis it is 
apposite that a critical reflection is done the strength and weaknesses of this 
methodological approach.  
The earlier discussion in Chapter in critiquing each of the three disparate 
methodologies was largely theoretical as most of what was known about them was 
predominantly from the literature. Nevertheless, at this stage these approaches have been 
tested by the entire circumstances of the research experience so an informed critique can 
be done here. There are advantages of deploying the three research approaches together. 
To begin with, the thesis sought to understand how a distinct body of HCL emerged in 
England and Wales and in relation to that explore lessons for Ghana. The broader objective 
of such question was to establish whether the problem of patient disempowerment and 
bioethical dilemmas of medical advances had any significant relationship with a distinct 
discipline of HCL.   
The functional comparative approach assisted the research to compare and contrast 
what exist in the two jurisdiction studied without strictly superimposing what is in one over 
the other. This was made possible by supplementing the comparative aspect of the 
methodology with ‘lesson drawing.’ The lesson drawing disposition of my approach to the 
research meant that the great disparity between England and Wales, and Ghana did not 
invalidate the comparison as would have been the case with legal transplantation.  
Furthermore, the empirical legal studies enabled the thesis to satisfy some of aspects of 
originality. Indeed, the data collection through email survey and the semi structured 
interview of the Pioneering HCL Scholars generated data previously unable in the literature.  
The blending of three legal research approaches was fraught with its own problems 
and limitations and some of them were encountered in the course of the research. One, 
there was the danger of overlapping in terms of theoretical underpinnings and practical 
deployment of some of the approaches. For example, non-doctrinal legal history and 
functional comparative law both do not limit themselves to strict legal doctrine- in terms of 
case law, statutes and academic analysis of those laws- but also go further to engage 
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I am a PhD student at Lancaster University School of Law. I am exploring the historical 
development of medical law/health care law as a distinct body of law in England and Wales.  
As part of my PhD, I am seeking to determine the extent to which medical law/health care 
law has been incorporated into the curriculum of law schools in England and Wales.  To this 
end I am writing to enquire: 
(1) whether you offer an undergraduate module in medical law/health care law 
(2) if so, what year did the module commence? 
If you do offer such a module, I would be most grateful if I could have a copy of the module 
outline, syllabus, or handbook. I will only use this information for my PhD research as 
outlined above. If you have the time to respond to my request by 10th September,2012, this 
would be very much appreciated. 
Thank you for your help and please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any queries.   














APPENDIX 3  
Semi-structured interview guide: 
1. Law and Medicine’s relationship before the 1980s 
a. How did the law relate to issues arising in healthcare during the long period before the 
1980s? 
b. Why did the law relate to medicine in the way it did? 
c. As an academic, did you have a research interest in matters relating to law and 
healthcare before the 1980s? 
2. The surge in academic interest in law and medical ethics post-1980: 
a. How did you develop an interest in law and medical ethics? 
b. Did you encounter any challenges as you embarked upon the publication of your 
research into this new area of the law? 
c. Can you explain if there was a particular objective(s) which you wanted to pursue by 
focusing your academic interest on this area of the law? 
d. Do you consider that there was a surge in academic interest in law and medical ethics 
post-1980? If so, please can you explain why you think this happened? 
3. The courts, legal professions and the emergence of a distinct body of healthcare law:  
a. How would you describe the general stance of the courts and legal professions in 
relation to this field of law? 
b. Do you think that the courts and the legal professions could have contributed 
differently to the development of this area of the law? Please explain your answer. 
4. The potential of English and Welsh healthcare law to be exported; 
a. Are there aspects of the body of healthcare law in this England and Wales which you 
think could and should be emulated by other jurisdictions? 
b. Which direction do you think English and Welsh healthcare law is currently facing - 
towards the patient, or towards the medical profession? Or towards something or 
someone else? 
c. What advice would you give to a developing country with a common law tradition like 
Ghana, which is seeking to draw lessons from the experience of England and Wales in 
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  Student: Ernest Owusu-Dapaa 
Supervisors: Professor Suzanne Ost and Professor Sigrun Skogly 
Working Title:  
An Inquiry into the Emergence of Health Care Law in England and Wales as a Distinct Body of 
Law - What Lessons Can be Drawn From This in Relation to Ghana? 
Hypotheses:  
1. The quest for patient empowerment and the legal academic interest in medical 
advances accelerated the emergence of health care law as a distinct body of law in 
England and Wales.   
2. The need for protecting patients’ rights and enhanced public awareness of 
implications of medical advances should make health care law more visible in Ghana. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Semi-structured interview  
1. Name of Interviewee: PETER SKEGG KENNEDY 
Mode: Written Responses via Email 
 
1.   Law and Medicine’s relationship before 1980s– 
 
 




The law has related to issues arising in health care for centuries e.g. the licensing of various 
professionals, the law relating to asylums and lunatics, abortion, negligence/manslaughter. 
There have long been books about the law for medical practitioners, in addition to those on 
“medical jurisprudence” (which might now describe as forensic medicine). A search of the 
index volumes to Holdsworth’s multi-volume History of English Law would lead you to the 
statutory regulations relating to the UK medical professions etc. 
Your question “how did the law relate to . . .” does not admit of a simple answer, at least 
from me. 
b.   Why did the law relate to medicine in the way it did. 
Given my inability to answer your initial question (which would require several PhD theses 
to answer at all adequately); I am sorry to report that I can’t answer this one either. 
c.    As an academic did you have research interest in matters relating to law and health 
care before the 1980s 
Yes. I first started researching in this area in 1966, as a law student in New Zealand. In 1969 I 
published an article arguing for what came to be called Gillick competence (although by the 
time of the Gillick decisions what we now call Gillick competence was accepted in most Torts 
and Family Law textbooks, usually – if I remember correctly – which a reference to my 
Anglicised (Mod L Rev) version of my 1969 NZ article. 
I commenced doctoral research in this field at Oxford in October 1969, and continued with 
this full-time until I became a Fellow of New College Oxford in October 1971. English health 
care law (though we didn’t use that term then) remained my main research and publishing 
activity until 1984 when I returned to New Zealand to become a Professor of Law at the 
University of Otago (the post I still hold, almost 30 years later). 
In the 1970s Ian Kennedy and I were the two English academic lawyers whose main focus 
was on “the law and health care” (to use your expression). There were, however, other 
academic lawyers who wrote in that field in the later 1970s and the early1980s: from 
memory, Glanville Williams, John Finnis, Graham Zellick, Joseph Jacob, John Finch, Gerald 
Robertson, and before long John Keown. 
I self-identified above as being an “English” academic lawyer, not so much because England 
is the land on my birth (although not upbringing) but because throughout the 1970s I was 
working on English medical law and from 1971 I was employed at an English University, 
Having now used the term “medical law”, perhaps I should explain that I did not use that 
term in the 1960s or very early 1970s, as at that stage I thought in terms of the traditional 
categories of tort law, criminal law, contract law, etc. . . .  And I avoided using the term 
“medical jurisprudence”, as the textbooks on that subject seemed much more concerned 
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with medicine relating to law rather than with law relating to medicine. Their accounts of 
the law were usually brief and unimpressive. 
I first used the term “medical law” in my entry in the 1973 edition of the Directory of 
Members of the Society of Public Teachers of Law (now renamed the Society of Legal 
Scholars). I thought at the time, and for a great many years later, that I was coining the 
term, which I used in an article the following year and in the subtitle of a book a decade 
later. (I am not aware of any use of the term in the UK in a pre-1973 directory, a pre-1974 
article, or a pre-1984 full title of a book: please let me know if you find one.)  Ian Kennedy 
did not use the term in his entry in the 1974 SPTL directory, but adopted it in his 1975 entry. 
Glanville Williams was the major English (strictly speaking, Welsh) academic who preceded 
Ian and my entry into the medical law field. I do not think Glanville ever used the term 
medical law, but was he still writing he would be viewed as a medical lawyer (although very 
far from being exclusively one). For the ways in which Glanville’s, Ian’s and my contribution 
to the development of the subject have been viewed, see the oft-quoted assessment by the 
then editor of the Medical Law Review at [1998] Med L Rev 136 and the first paragraph of 
the third chapter in John Keown’s Law & Ethics of Medicine (OUP, 2013) 
My reason for first using the term “medical law” was twofold. One was that I came across a 
US book entitled Legal Medicine, and realized that my area of interest was the precise 
opposite: Medical Law. The other was that I was asked to lecture on Public Order as part of 
the Constitutional Law at Oxford. Back to the time of Dicey this topic has included Public 
Order Offences, and this helped me realise that merely because something could be taught 
as part of a criminal law course did not mean that it could not find a place in a differently 
named subject. Nowadays courses and books on eg Sports Law and Entertainment law are 
so commonplace that I wonder why it took me (and others) in England so long to talk of 
Medical Law or (more recently) Health Care Law. 
2.   The Surge in academic interest in Law and Medical Ethics post 1980 
a.   How did you develop an interest in law and medical ethics? 
My interest in the subject dates from 1966 (although I now realize that some of the 
groundwork had been laid by my criminal law teacher in 1964). 
1966 was the year when my teenage girlfriend (since late in 1963, and now wife for most of 
the 50 years following) started her nursing training.  Work on the wards came much earlier 
than it does nowadays. So one element (and the one that I usually provide when people ask 
how I became interested in the subject) was hearing about the issues she was faced with on 
the ward and seeking, as a law student, to work out their legal ramifications. 
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But there was more to it than that. I was puzzled by the attitude to abortion in the circles in 
which I moved, so made use of the opportunity, as part of the Auckland law course, to write 
a research paper on that topic. This contributed to my interest in this area of the law. 
My interest was also fostered by reading (initially, for the research paper) Glanville 
Williams’ Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (with, as I mentioned at the beginning of my 
contribution to the issue of the Med L Rev cited above, a mixture of fascination and 
frustration). Had I agreed with all of it, and an article on consent issues published the 
previous year in Med Sci Law, I doubt if I would have been stimulated to continue in the 
field.  I soon found other fascinating publications, most importantly the proceedings of a 
CIBA Foundation seminar edited by GEW Wolstenholme and M O’ConnorEthics in Medical 
Progress (1966), which I acquired and read closely. 
b.   Did you encounter any challenges as you embarked upon publication of your research 
in this new area of the law? 
None whatever.  
 
As I mentioned above, I became a Fellow of New College in October 1971. Within the next 
four or five years – before finishing my DPhil – I published articles in a fair range of journals, 
including all three of what I then regarded (before the days of the OJLS) as being without 
doubt the three leading UK law reviews: the LQR, CLJ, and MLR. 
 
Only once was an article turned down by the editor to whom I had first submitted it, and I 
was aiming high as it was a second submission to the LQR in a very short time. (It has been 
cited more than any other article I wrote in my 15 years at Oxford!) 
  
In the late 1980s the law editor for OUP canvassed members of the Oxford Law Faculty 
about possible monographs and then reported back to me that of all the possibilities 
discussed mine was the one that he was keenest to bring to fruition. (My one compromise, 
given that “Medical Law” was then a rarely heard term, was to use that expression in the 
subtitle rather than the main title.) 
So I see the 1970s and 1980s as a marvellous time to publish on English medical law. 
c.    Can you explain if there was particular objective (s) which you wanted to pursue by 
focusing your academic interest towards this area of the law? 
No, I chose to work in this area for my DPhil at Oxford because there were some 
issues/misunderstandings that were “bugging” me and I wanted to sort them out and then 
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return to NZ to focus on what I thought would be my main long-term interest: NZ 
constitutional history. But the subject then “took off” and I have been running to keep up 
with it ever since. 
d.   Do you consider that there was surge in academic interest in law and medical ethics 
post 1980? If you consider there was a surge, please can you explain why you think this 
happened? 
The interest was developing in the 1970s: eg Ian Kennedy’s BBC radio programmes and his 
being invited, though a mere Lecturer at that stage, to deliver the Reith Lectures. The 
invitation, and the lectures themselves, can be seen both as a symptom and as a cause. Ian’s 
Reith Lectures were very significant in the UK, but I suspect less so in the USA, where 
Bioethics was born in the 1970s (if I understand it aright). 
There are many reasons for the surge, but in terms of the law they include the growth of UK 
law schools and in numbers of academic lawyers and graduate study; the fashion for taking 
on subjects that were not already dominated by major academics; and the much greater 
recourse to the courts to deal with medico-ethical dilemmas, which was linked to the 
increased willingness of the courts to deal with matters prospectively. (The introduction of 
RAE/REF may also have added to the incentive to move into new fields.) 
Incidentally, one way of measuring the increased academic interest in medical / health care 
law would be to look at the “Special Interests” listed by UK members of the SPTL/SOLS in the 
Annual Directory at (say) 5 year intervals. 
  
3.   The courts, legal profession and the emergence of a distinct body of health care law. 
a.   How would you describe the posture of the courts and legal profession generally 
toward this field of law? 
Clearly it has become of much greater interest to them. Here too an examinations of 
lawyers’ directories etc might well reveal that in the 1970s there were relatively few eg 
barristers advertising (though we mustn’t call it that) their interest and expertise in the area, 
whereas by the 1990s there were more and nowadays many.   
The area is such a wide-ranging one that I am suspicious of generalisations. However, I think 
the courts are less inclined to leave difficult ethical issues to the medical profession to the 
extent they once did. (Whether this is beneficial, except to the lawyers’ bank accounts and 
academics’ publication records, is of course a different matter.) 
The academic study of the law sometimes focuses unduly on case law, especially that of 





b.   Do you think that the courts and the legal profession could have contributed towards 
the development of this area of the law differently? Please explain. 
  
Yes. For example, they could have left more of these matters to be decided by doctors. 
  
Are there better ways of resolving these issues, when the affected parties have not been 
able to reach agreement? 
  
  
Tomorrow I hope to be able to email a list of my 1970s publications. I will also try to copy 
and attach the relevant part of the 1976 survey, which indicates that UK law schools did not 
offer courses in the subject at that stage.   
 
 
From: Peter Skegg [peter.skegg@otago.ac.nz] 
Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2013 4:06 AM 
To: Owusu-Dapaa, Ernest 
Subject: Additional information (and a correction) 
Dear Ernest, 
 
Having now printed out the answers that I sent you, I have seen that there were quite a 
number of grammatical errors and omitted words. 
 
The one significant mistake was about the time when I received encouragement from the 
OUP law editor: I meant to write "late 1970s" rather than "late 1980s".  
 
My list of academics who showed an interest in medical law in the 1970s should have 
included Prof Gerald Dworkin, then of Southampton. By the early 80s Andrew Grubb, then 
of Cambridge, was a major player. 
 
I will attach a pdf of Graham Zellick's survey. (He went on to become VC of the University of 
London.) 
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2. NAME OF INTERVIEWEE:  SHEILA McLean [hereafter ‘SM’) 
DATE: 16/10/2013 TIME: 19:00 
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MODE: TELEPHONE CONFERENCE VIA SKYPE RECORDING  
Semi-structured interview Guide 
1. Law and Medicine’s relationship before 1980s 
a. How did the law relate to issues arising in health care during the long period before 
1980s? 
SM:  Probably in a very limited way. Most of the cases that arose before 1980 were more 
about criminal issues; for example about abortion and that sort of thing. Very  few issues 
that we now regard as mainstream medical law - for example cases on negligence arose -  so 
there wasn't a national jurisprudence as such except for a very limited body of law. Arguably 
the majority of activity before 1980 was at the international level, so there were a number 
of international declarations about using human beings in research and so on, particularly 
following the Nuremberg Trials; and some of the medical professional associations had a fair 
amount to say but basically what existed in the way of case law was relatively scarce.  
b. Why did the law relate to medicine in the way it did. 
SM: I think in part; patient in those days were much less likely to challenge clinical decisions 
and the culture of medical paternalism was still very powerful in those days; so patients, I 
think, in a sense colluded with that and simply didn't challenge when things went wrong; 
there wasn't a culture of openness among healthcare professionals. And so there was no 
obvious reason for the law to become engaged because there wasn't a big volume of people 
actually registering complaints about the way that they have been treated in the healthcare 
system. 
c. As an academic did you have research interest in matters relating to law and health 
care before the 1980s 
Yes I had interest before 1980. I set up the first honors Programme in medical law in the UK 
in 1976; so I was working in that area pretty much before anybody else was. In E & W, it 
started after 1980. Ian Kennedy was doing some teaching at Kings College London around 
the same time, but as a discipline it really took off nationally quite a long time after I had 
been teaching it.  I believe the 2nd full honors programme in medical law was actually in 
University Edinburgh and that started in 1980. 
2. The Surge in academic interest in Law and Medical Ethics post 1980 
a. How did you develop an interest in law and medical ethics? 
SM: It was some sort of accident. I was working at the time in the Forensic Medicine 
Department and my then professor, the department always did lit bit of teaching to law 
students, suggested that we should expand the amount of teaching that we did and basically 
told me to invent a course and so it was very much an accident that brought me into it.  
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b. Did you encounter any challenges as you embarked upon publication of your 
research in this new area of the law? 
SM: The first book that I edited was actually 1981- Legal Issues in Medicine. I didn't 
encounter any such challenges; I found publishers who were very keen to publish in that 
kind of area so it wasn't problematic at all at that stage. 
c. Can you explain if there was particular objective (s) which you wanted to pursue by 
focusing your academic interest towards this area of the law? 
SM: I suppose that I have always seen medical law as focusing on human rights issues and so 
I think I wanted to explore from that kind of angle. 
I think medical law has now developed a lot of jurisprudence that makes it able to claim to 
exist as a discipline. In the early stages, there was much more overlap with other areas of 
law, such as family law. When I started it was difficult to decide on what topics to include, 
because it was not being taught in the UK. So it was difficult to decide on topics to include. 
But with advances in medicine like human reproduction, end of life care and genetics, I think 
there is a distinct jurisprudence which non-medical lawyers will not necessarily be familiar 
with, so it is a subject that can claim its own jurisprudence. 
d. Do you consider that there was surge in academic interest in law and medical ethics 
post 1980? If you consider there was a surge, please can you explain why you think this 
happened? 
Yes, there was. It is difficult to work out why. I think in part it was probably because other 
academics knew it was happening, a couple of courses were running and students interest 
was enormous with over subscription by students, and there was increased coverage of 
medico-legal issues on the television and the news. I think there was perhaps also a bit of 
student pressure; once people were aware that the subject was being taught; it persuaded 
other academics that the subject was worth pursuing. I did not have problem m trying to get 
publishers but I had problem trying to convince colleague to embrace the discipline. It was 
not accepted very comfortably by lots of academics in the early days. 
3. The courts, legal profession and the emergence of a distinct body of health care law.  
a. How would you describe the posture of the courts and legal profession generally 
toward this field of law? 
SM:  I suspect it wasn’t regarded as being a special area of law initially so I think the courts 
were simply taking traditional principles and applying them to some somewhat unusual 
cases.  Initially, in the English courts, there was a deferential approach to the medical 
profession I think what you had was a kind of assumption that we shouldn't be challenging 
doctors and it was actually quite difficult for patients to succeed in litigation. Arguably, this 
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deferential attitude inhibited the development of the discipline to an extent, although this 
approach has now changed 
b. Do you think that the courts and the legal profession could have contributed towards 
the development of this area of the law differently? Please explain. 
SM: they could first of all by recognizing the human rights issuers that were at stake; it was 
assumed that people were just had a grievance and wanted to talk about it, but not 
necessarily that there was a human rights element to the claims that they were trying to 
pursue and I don’t think the courts took that as seriously as they might have in the  early 
stages. The legal profession also didn't really take medical law terribly seriously in the early 
stages, so there was no incentive coming from the legal profession itself to move in the 
direction of looking more closely at the discipline; that probably changed in part because of 
the increase in the number of people who were actually complaining or had grievances 
about healthcare and it then became an area in which lawyers could reasonably think about 
specializing  and still earn a salary ; so when my first groups of students graduated they 
would have been no jobs  in medical law; they would have gone off into another areas of the 
law because there was no niche for medical law but there is no longer the case. 
4. The potential of English and Welsh health care law to be exported 
a. Are there aspects of the body of health care law in this country which you think 
could and should be emulated by other jurisdictions? 
SM: The relatively easy access to court is very important because then obviously rights are 
addressed. I think it is something that could be learned by other jurisdictions who are 
struggling with these kind of issues; I think there are a number of mistakes perhaps that 
have been made in the past that English law is now trying to rectify in terms of the emphasis 
on patients’ rights as opposed to the emphasis on doctor's duties ; and if people can learn 
from that not have to go through the process of making the mistake in the first place , I think  
that would be enormously helpful. People can learn from mistakes that I think have been 
made as well from the good parts of the law.  
I think one of the most important things from the patient’s point of view is the extent to 
which the courts have been willing to protect the notion of confidentiality and privacy; this 
is extremely important, particularly in the age of genetics. The idea that there are situations 
in which the individual sometimes is as important as the community is significant.  UK courts 
have been very cautious in allowing public arguments to overtake the legitimate interests or 
rights of the individual, for example, in authorizing disclosure of otherwise private genetic 
information.  
b. Which direction do you think English and Welsh health care law is currently facing - 
towards the patient or medical profession? Or something or someone else? 
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SM: Probably, none of these things. the problem of law is that it has to establish tests to 
which judges adhere. In the past the test that was used was very doctor friendly; I think 
increasingly we are seeing some movement in cases such as Chester v Afshar in which there 
is no doubt the court did something radical, and arguably bent some of the traditional legal 
rules. But I think the difficulty is that the law almost cannot do one thing or the other 
because what it has to is to do is to stick to the test that has been developed.  So while there 
is a certain movement towards recognizing that patients have very real interests in 
participating directly in the decisions about their own healthcare, and I think there is a clear 
recognition that there are right issues involved in this, I think the law will always end up 
being cautiousThis is an inevitable consequence of being a rule based system.  
In the case of consent to treatment, some have argued that we have, in fact, gone too far in 
providing information and that this is equivalent to abandoning patients.  However, I think 
this misses the point because it is not that patients are swamped with information which is 
unintelligible to them rather that when a treatment is recommended a clear explanation of 
that recommendations should be given to the patient; there is nothing paternalistic or 
‘abandoning’ about advising a patient about what is the sensible or appropriate medical 
option, and nothing in the law of consent that prohibits or discourages such advice.  
However after that it is the patient’s decision to make  I think that this is not patient 
abandonment but rather treating the patient as an adult who has an interest in the 
treatment process. 
The engagement of law in this area is extremely important and I cannot think of another 
forum when you can obtain disinterested decisions I think the role of lawyers is important in 
this area; it is not always interested in the way I would like but at least it provides an 
independence forum for addressing these questions so I am in favor of the law continuing to 
be involved in resolving these disputes. 
c. What advice will you give to a developing country with a common law tradition like 
Ghana, which is seeking to draw lessons from the experience of England and Wales in this 
field of law? 
SM: I am not entirely sure that  I could that given I am not familiar with the  Ghanaian legal 
system, but one  thing I keep coming back to is that when you are developing jurisprudence 
or a body of law it is important to accept that there may be a need to balance the interests 
of the individual and the interests of the community. For e.g. it is in the interest of the 
community that they have health care professionals who are not afraid to carry out their 
profession and that they are given the right to exercise their own clinical expertise  and 
discretion. However, this should not imply overriding the rights of individual patients.  
Indeed I expect that the quality of the co-operation between the  patient and the profession  
will improve when both sets of interests and/or rights are mutually respected.   
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Obviously the question of resources is also a very important one.  States must try to e4nsure 
that any healthcare system is adequately and appropriately resourced, which requires 
financial investment as well as investment in training staff. However, it is also important to 
establish a system (reinforced by the law) which ensures not only that treatment is available 
but that patients are treated appropriately, both in personal and clinical terms. A satisfied 
patient is not always  a patient who has been given everything which is or could be available; 
being respected in the healthcare enterprise can sometimes be sufficient for a ‘good’ 
medical experience..  
So you don’t agree HCL should not be developed in a country until its economy is 
developed/? 
SM : I  think if we took that position then we will be authorizing states to fail to meet their 
international obligations because most states have actually signed up to all the initial 
declarations that talk about right to health or health care ; it is too easy a route to say yes 
we don’t have the resources to do that and used that as an explanation for not living up to 
international obligations that they have; I think government should think about where they 
are outing resources if it is becoming an issue. 
3. NAME OF INTERVIEWEE:  JONATHAN MONTGOMERY (JM) 
DATE: 22/10/2013 TIME: 16:00 
MODE: FACE TO FACE 
 Semi-structured interview Guide 
 Law and Medicine’s relationship before 1980s 
1. How did the law relate to issues arising in health care during the long period before 
1980s? 
JM: I didn't start as academic in 1984 so I am looking back at when I first started. I think the main 
thing is that the early writing covered quite a lot of things around. The early writing covered lot of 
things around clinical negligence. On my shelf I do have a 19th century book given by my father years 
ago. I will start with Nathan on Negligence in 1950s. I have work from 1970s by Skegg and Kennedy. 
The work in 1970s picked issues mainly around interface of criminal law and medicine. It is quite 
interesting that end of life and sanctity of life, consent were the only matters. There was also a bit of 
material in the 1970s around novel procedures like transplantation, such as whether transplantation 
will be legal  by Gerald Dworkin in Southampton who discussed whether transplant of organ is 
lawful. Kennedy also point to Glanville William’s Sanctity of Life; so sanctity of life issues, bit about 
consent, clinical negligence. There was very little around public health and modern healthcare. When 
I began to research, there was a bit of work done on liability of hospital in the 1980. I did discover 




2. Why did the law relate to medicine in the way it did. 
JM: I am not sure before 1980; it really felt like anything law relating to medicine. What 
Nathan's book was about taking negligence and applying it in a particular context not seen 
as being enormously different; so if you look at it does not cite or discuss the Bolam case 
although it had been decided so it does not look at application of tort law in an area. When I 
look at Skegg and Kennedy works it doesn't look a subject as it was a piecemeal lecture. I 
think what changed is in the 1980 because of Ian Kennedy’s Reith lectures. He argued that 
there was a common theme. I will say the Unmasking of medicine is the starting point. 
Around same time Mason and McCall Smith wrote their first edition (1981). Sheila became 
International Bar Association Professor of Medical law  in 1983.The unmasking of medicine 
is interesting because it was not particularly well  received by doctors or medical sociologists 
who didn’t think it will be helpful or it was something new, but had massive impact on legal 
scholarship so it suddenly became subject on its own right on that basis.  
  
3. As an academic did you have research interest in matters relating to law and health 
care before the 1980s. 
 
JM:  I worked closely with Joe Jacobs on Encyclopedia of Health Services and Medical law; 
when I reviewed his work in the Modern Law Review, medical law in the shadow of 
Hippocrates. Joe too was very critical of Kennedy's lectures and he said he did not have 
anything new to say but my understanding is that they were rivals. Kennedy's book is really 
important because it opened up the subject to lawyers. When I reviewed Kennedy and 
Grubb text and Materials, I did say that it did not really live up to the promise in the 
Unmasking of Medicine as it did not address public health issues which were largely 
scratched over. I was strongly influenced by the unmasking of medicine and what I did was a 
reaction to what I didn’t like about it so I will put that down as the lynch point. The 
Unmasking made it clear that the subject was neither for lawyers alone nor doctors alone. 
The lectures were public forum. When I wrote Law and Accountability and Professionalism 
was reflecting what I read from sociologist. It made me read around Illich and sociology and 
professionalism and I found slightly different from Kennedy had picked up so I found myself 
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4. How did you develop an interest in law and medical ethics? 
 
JM: The accident bit was that I was teaching Southampton and  Gerald Dworkin whom I 
mentioned earlier who had done work on transplantation got a job in London and he had 
been running a half option in the undergraduate curriculum on law and medicine and ethics. 
And it was a lot of students demand for it and I said I could do that because I am quite 
interested in it so I go into actually teaching it as accident. A lot of my career has been in at 
right place at right time. And the reasons why I am interested in it were a mixture. One was 
that by then my girlfriend now my wife was training as a nurse and while I was a student so I 
did my undergraduate course in 1980-83 I did one year LLM and I read some of the stuff 
they were given on law and ethics and I thought it was not very good so I got interested in 
we could do much better than that and that was about the time that the Unmasking of 
medicine was coming out as a book. So the Reith lectures I don't remember but I remember 
the book. then I also interested in the issues around ethics because at that stage I was 
expecting not to stay in legal academia for very long, I had a place in theological college to 
study theology in order to be ordained in the Church of England.so I had interest in life and 
death issue and these sort of big ethical questions about how we value life. So I started 
being interested in combination of the teaching needs and a little bit of personal need. My 
academic research interest at that stage were around children rights so other aspect of 
accident was the time of the Gillick litigation was going through and I was mainly teaching 
family law with interest in children's right so I started working on Gillick from the point of 
view of there is a case about children's rights and I realised that got issues about children 
rights and parental rights and how they merge together. And of  course I started teaching 
what was then medical law and ethics course I used that as sort of case study so it became a 
medical law case for med it started as family law case and it became a medical law case and 
how we regulate doctors.  
[JM: I think my views on that .my reasons for thinking that have changed a bit over the last 
couple of decade. When I started on it I was particularly responding to first of all my 
frustration with the fact that the Unmasking of the medicine had carved the more territory 
than medical law cases and materials book that Ian and Grubb produced then. The text and 
materials book (by Kennedy and Grubb) were pulled out of master course they did at Kent. 
But they felt to me much narrower than the scope issues that the Unmasking of Medicine 
had risen; so I was searching for something that explained how you could get some sense of 
limits of the subject but not are restricted to what doctors did in their clinics. I think the 
second dimension why I chose HCL was that because I was married to a nurse, I had a strong 
sense from her that what went on in the hospital certainly wasn't best understood as being 
about what doctors did; and you need to understand other professionals as well; that got 
me interested into professional rivalries and I tried to get perspective of what was going; 
which was automatically medically dominated. Doctor’s Handmaiden’s contribution- that 
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was very much prompted by that sort of perception but there is also a bit of that in the 1989 
Journal of Law and Society piece which was originally a paper on the Hart workshop at the 
Institute of Legal Studies; there is a bit in that about the fact that the narrow conception of 
medical professionalism didn't enable us to ask some questions about teams and how teams 
operated. I had already identified then when nurses and other professionals fitted in little 
bit of nurse bit of pharmacist and also a bit on liability of hospital wards needed to be taken 
into account more fully than in Kennedy and Grubb's work was doing; so I then looked to 
how  could you define a scope and that took me to the European social charter and also to a 
little bit about the WHO; so what I found was that a set of definition while looking at the 
internal law of human rights in the context of right to health and health care and that is 
where I sort decided that HEALTH CARE LAW was the label to use but you will see it is a bit 
loose because there is a whole chapter on public health law in my book; so it could have 
been health and health care law and as the current debate going on about whether actually 
we should call it healthcare law or whether it is better to call it health law . and if you are 
interested in exploring that then I think there is full explanation of that is in Jim and Tommy 
Hervey's book on European health and there is also a version of it in Legal Studies, where 
they sort of do version there first chapter which discusses those definitional problems so 
that was how I got into as I was trying to shape the textbook that I write. NOW, I think the 
picture is slightly different and now I think we need to stress on slightly differently some of 
those things and I still prefer to call it HEALTHCARE LAW but I particularly found out as I 
carried on working and the first point I really wrote this up was in in my Current Legal 
Problems Lecture in 2000 which is call Medical Law in Transition towards a new Paradigm' 
and I felt you could really scope what was going without saying sort of corporate activities 
that were happening so things like GMC Guide is not just for clinic, the things that NHS was 
doing about confidentiality and protecting confidentiality so that sort of strengthened my 
perception that we needed to talk about the institution that delivered health care so 
whereas when I started it , it was about saying medical law was too narrow ; what I found  
by the the time I got to that stage is I believe even in the narrow bits of medical law , you 
needed to understand better how the organisations and the institutions , the professional 
bodies operated to make sense of the territory. So it wasn't so much about the scope of it, it 
was also about the way in which you did it and the method to achieve it. I partly learn that 
when I was working on the Encyclopedia of Health Service and Medical law; because of the 
way the editorial process happened , it was not one of those accident ; I was reading every 
statute as soon as it came out to see what changes it made in the area and so I discussed 
that an awful lots of law was being created nothing of the statutes or the cases but 
subordinate legislation so I realised that to make sense of it all I needed to learn about lots 
of other things and the another accident I became involved in National Health Service Trust 
Board in the 1990 as a non-executive director and that meant I was able to see lots of health 
service circulars and I started realising that lot of the work around what the rules are was 
being disseminated through the health system in guidance from those kind of health 
circulars into the NHS. And so that became a new version of why it is health care law 
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because you had to have a whole set of materials that were only produced by the 
organization.  
[ Is that what you call the quasi law= JM: I call it quasi law initially mainly because I had a 
colleague in Southampton Professor David Kent who had done a little bit of  work on quasi 
legislation which I had read. Now the language around European law is more about a 
discussion of soft law; so possibly soft law is a better way of describing it now. But it is 
something that has normative force but isn't necessary binding in the way that a statute or 
legal decision has precedent. Example of soft law will be Mental Health Act code of practice, 
Mental Capacity Code of practice. They are things that you are not obliged to follow to the 
letter because they are not legally binding but they have legal relevance. But once you agree 
that you also then begin to realise that it doesn't have to be something under the an auspice 
of Act of parliament to have some legal relevance; so for example when the Tony Bland case 
was decided they used the guidance from the British Medical Association and the royal 
college in order to understand how to look after people in PVS state; so that type of 
guidance became legally relevant even though it had no particular statutory authorisation 
and then you get things like the code of practice on confidentiality which NHS produced for 
its staff and that becomes legally relevant because NHS is under obligation obey lawful and 
reasonable instruction. In the doctor's handmaiden piece I explored that a little bit and part 
of that got into the textbook chapter on different types of law. So that led me to think we do 
need to talk about health care law even in the areas which are very narrowly medical law, 
you need a rich understanding of the sources of it that goes beyond strictly legal things and I 
think that is partly captured by health care law. I also more doubtful now about whether or 
not HCL is a label that could translate abroad because my reflections and this is quite recent; 
this is the last 5 or 6 years. My reflections recently has been that what I am rally describing 
that is a structure which is peculiar to socialised medicine system like the NHS where almost 
all the healthcare in the UK is delivered by people who work as employees in the NHS or foe 
the health service as GPs and so if you went to a system that did not have that central 
organisation then  it might that the subject HCL would not quite work because you don't 
have the same common rules across the whole of the health delivery system. it is not true is 
all the way across the UK system but almost all the legal regulations we have are dominated 
by the fact that which work the same way  as the professionals all work within  the same 
structure. So I am wondering whether HCL is peculiarly English definition and then health 
law might be a better definition for the global discussion and the translations. it is not 
necessary that the way I have defined HCL could transplant because it could be peculiarly 
English or UK because of the socialised medicine system so that is what I am grappling with 
at the moment with definitional question. 
[Public health law-   JM; the types of activities that state do through their organized health 
services , responding to pandemic, a vaccination Programme; those are things that are done 
by professionals in an organised way ; more and more now through local givernment.it 
should not be excluded from healthcare law. But I also think there is whole lot of public 
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health around clean air, clean water etc.  I felt the need to include this in my book but I 
define the scope to include rights.  
 
Q Is mental health appropriate subject in Health Care Law 
JM: I tried to cover it in my textbook when I started because it is such a big area in its own 
right. Since it is delivered by health professionals you cannot exclude it.  I was involved in 
the Mental health Trust  Board and I was seeing patient and tried to work out what question 
which come up ; I tried to work on question which came up in that context. I felt it was a 
very specialist area and I struggled with. I look at when we can compulsory treat or not.  
 I also struggled with Medicines and the law chapter.  I largely defined what I put in the book 
by thinking on what I was asked to lecture about because I was often asked to talk to health 
professionals and how law related to their work. What went into the first edition of the book 
was very much shaped by that. Some of the topics were new with no cases so I had to 
reason from first principles. I was interested in addressing issues as health professionals 
would like to understand in relation to their work rather than for people in the court. 
 
5. Did you encounter any challenges as you embarked upon publication of your 
research in this new area of the law? 
JM: I think the quick answer is no. I did not feel like I did. I was lucky the first big article I 
worked on, it was in the are of children in modern law review and it was about the Gillick 
case; and I was analyzing different types of rights and there was actually quite lots of 
literature around that to work so coming from family law, I had family law colleagues who 
were there; it was very topical so there was lots of thing written in the papers; and so it 
wasn't that difficult to get into it. Because it was being driven out of teaching; I gradually 
built up some confidence in it by picking topics that were topical because it was only half 
option; I did not have the problem that I had with the book which was around definition; I 
just had to find 10 interesting topics to do a half option and it was a foundation subject we 
call it then so you did not have to cover everything. You could cover topics that were of 
interest; so I didn't find that difficult to place articles because I was working on in the phase 
between family law and healthcare law; there were family journals that you could put things 
then; and the other thing was that there was lot of edited collection beginning to emerge at 
that stage and so people would say we are working on this; are you interested in doing a 
paper and you say I am working on this at the moment and so that is quite interesting. For 
example, the doctors' handmaiden piece; there wasn't a big peer review hurdle at the time. I 
was interested in the relationship between the professions and health care law. There were 
lots of conferences which gave new scholars opportunity to try things out and publish. The 
whole Law and Bioethics by Freedman was good for new scholars as it made things easier 
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for them than mainstream journals. What I think was not necessarily such a good thing at 
that stage it becomes more difficult to know that people read your work. Because if it goes 
into the modern law review everyone sees it is there because not everybody buys the book 
of collection of essays. So I think there is strengths and weaknesses; but what I found was 
because the subject was not neatly defined by then; I was able to research things that I was 
interested in; I think what we have been doing now is different type of problem; is that such 
lots have been written about; it is a bit harder to find something new to say. I didn't find that 
as a problem partly because I wasn't so interested in things around death and dying that lots 
of people were writing about. Partly because I got interest in this sociological perspective on 
it and there even if I wrote about areas that people had written about; I wasn't duplicating 
what they were doing. I think that will be more difficult now because there is so much more 




6.  Can you explain if there was particular objective (s) which you wanted to pursue by 
focusing your academic interest towards this area of the law? 
 
JM:  I am not sure how my objective was at the time. But I am very aware of it now. I found 
myself because I was asked to go and talk to health professionals and my wife is health 
profession working in clinic ; and because in the early 1990s I became heavily involved in the 
health service locally ; I felt myself asking questions about how  the law could support 
improvements of health services so that brought together a bit of definitional question; is it 
health care or medical law because the area I was working were not necessarily medical but 
were about health professionals and more generally ; but a commitment to try and do things 
that would support other aspects of my public service career which were around improving 
patient safety to make things better for patients. Now with hindsight; I think that was quite 
different from the type of approach Ian Kennedy and his people; which got divorced from 
clinic and was more about public debate about what we expected in a more abstract terms 
of doctors and more in supporting an emerging interest from lawyers on how law might got 
involved ; and I wrote that up in the piece; Compleat Lawyer about Margot Brazier's Work 
last in 2011 in the Medical LAW  Review and when I wrote that it made some sense to me 
at6 what some of things because I picked back from her work  on how this work doctor in 
the clinic as opposed to how they work for lawyer in court. I don’t think I was really aware of 
doing that at the time.  Reflecting back I think that was implicit in the way in which I 
developed things. I think that took me away from being interested in the type of argument 
that will persuade a judge and got me more interested in how you could explain the law in 
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the way that health professionals would make sense of it and apply it and develop it on the 
assumption that mostly health professionals want to do the right thing and therefore they 
won’t try to avoid the law; they will try and understand the law. So that got me interested in 
things like codes of practice and guidance; so my first bit of work on professional guidance 
was around research involving children in the 1992 with the British Pediatric Association and 
I worked on a working party on guidance on testing children for disorders in 1994 and we 
revisited in 2010 to see how well the principles and thinks to soft law/ quasi law thing. I got 
myself realising that if you wanted to influence practice actually not my many cases go 
courts but lots of people read textbooks and guidance and lots of people relied on the 
colleges or the British Medical Association; so like many other people, I spend time on the 
BMA Medical Ethics Committee trying to help them get a sound guidance so I guess that is 
all part of being motivated by trying to not see the law in opposition to healthcare but as a 
way of supporting healthcare.   I did some work on rights which I wrote in early 1990s and I 
argue that rights were not necessarily in patients' interest because they encourage 
confrontational approach and I didn't think Ian used rights in a strong sense; I thought there 
were better ways of promoting patients interest so yes I think that to some extent I was 
influenced by working with J. Jacob and his book where he argue d for the Hippocratic 
tradition being one which is value laden and not value free. Ian's work sort assumed that 
there was competing value set and that we shouldn't trust doctors. That has not been my 
experience. I am not sure Ian will say that n; looking at what he learnt from the Bristol royal 
inquiry and his subsequent work, he has tried worked through the institutions much more.  
He also worked on guidelines inching xenotransplantation; he prompted the setting up of 
Nuffield Bioethics and went to chair subsequently so I don't want downplay his 
contributions at all because he has made a massive contribution. I perceive in the 1980s that 
he has set up a confrontation and that didn't attract me.  
  
7. Do you consider that there was surge in academic interest in law and medical ethics 
post 1980? If you consider there was a surge, please can you explain why you think this 
happened? 
 
JM: I think a second publication which is crucial is Mason and McCall Smith, 1980/81 
because what did was to make it possible to teach medical students because you had a 
textbook. I was not doing that because I only came in the mid-1980s and teaching. But I 
think you see an interest in medical schools in trying to work out how to respond to medical 
teaching so there was Pond Report towards the end of 1980s which consider what syllabus 
might be in teaching medical law in the medical schools. I think one of the key people was a 
priest from Edinburgh. So I think on the legal side Ian was actually crucial because he gave 
an identity. I think Mason and McCall Smith developed something which medical schools to 
develop a syllabus and so it will be wrong to say that the medical people did not respond; I 
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also think the BMA was really important so they had their hand book which began to grow in 
to something which would help people work out what to do. So at that stage you had the 
GNC which had its blue book which told you what will get you into trouble .These were all 
handy in the 1980s so people began to have interest and so they became literature in the 
1980 in way that wasn't previously. If you look at the journals you had medicine, science and 
the law-- a lot of it was about medical aspect of criminal law cases but it was not about legal 
aspect of medical practice and in the 1980s what you get is the legal aspect of medical 
practice and training. so  I will tract it through  the hand book of medical ethics and you will 
see how that expands and later on in the 1990s what the GMC did - emergence of good 
medical practice was quite significant. But I think in the 1980s it was led from the BMA and I 
think they had a key role to play in their medical ethics department did that. 
 
[Q relationship between medical law and medical ethics?   
JM : I think one question we have not adequately answered yet which is now increasingly 
vexed by is the law and moral problems - and I wrote a piece on Kens Mason's book- 
Legitimacy of Medical Law  in 2006- I began to  realise that the whole enterprise revolved 
around Ian Kennedy, he began from problem with sterilizing women who had consent . 
Someone had been to a seminary that he gave. The impression was we must first guess 
what should happen and then use the law to ensure that the doctors did that. So there was 
a debate about the right thing to do and separate from a debate about what doctors should 
do and no such links to the two. I described that as some kind of hierarchy  , the applied 
philosophy is the  right to pure bit as to the right thing to do and law is a tool is the tool you 
use to make sure that practice operate like that. And if you think a bit like that then the law 
and moral problem when can we enforce morality should be answered because we don't 
generally believe that you can straight move into taking a moral view and improve on people 
who think differently and so that is how I began to think if that is how I understand Ian's 
version of the subject , to make it work I need to solve this; so it was not quite the same as 
Demoralization of Medicine- which is mainly aimed to say actually law isn't really like that, 
so  when you look at how the law really operates it doesn't simply  translate our vie s on the 
right thing to do  , isn't to make doctors do it. And one of the reasons it does not do that is it 
assumes that doctors are already engaged in that enterprise of trying to do the right thing. I 
also felt alongside that there was never less things when we try take a societal view on 
issues that were controversial and so some have said, I have given a conference 
presentation on this label, if you want to do re-moralization you will need to solve that 
problem. so one of the problems you need to solve is when can we justify using the coercive 
power of  law in areas that in plural society that we don’t agree on. I don’t really have an 
answer to that yet, although my paper on legitimacy of medical law I just sketch some puzzle 
ones that didn’t work very well. what I have found myself doing is actually engaging much 
more in governance approach so sitting on committee to produce guideline.; involve in 
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chairing the Human Genetics Commission now Nuffield Council Bioethics. instead of doing it 
through legal regimes, I found myself doing it through involvement in some public 
engagement and at the very later on lecture on law and demoralistion of medicine , I 
noticed that people like Ian and Margot, Sheila had all done similar things . Sheila McLean 
had been involved in the post Diane Blood debate, Margot has been involved in Retained 
Organ commission after Hayze Scandal Commission; Ian had done Bioethics on 
Xenotransplantation. So I thought this is something academic lawyers have been doing and 
it is not the same as work what the law should be. It is not quite the same as telling doctors 
what to do; it is how engaging in deliberative process to try and work as a society in 
improving our understanding of things so that it connects law and ethics in different way. 
[Q. Is this unique to this area of the law because from jurisprudence , legal theory , there has 
been this unending question on the relation between law , legal positivism and natural law 
so isn't it the. JM: I know it is. I was trying to look out for you. I have the agenda of the first 
meeting of the society of pubic law teachers - law and medicine group- Ian and I were on the 
platform that, in my bit of that [ I still have the notes once I find it] We started , I think , it 
was late 1980s . We started the medical law group of that society and it had its inaugural 
meeting as a sort of conference. I was asked o sit on platform with Ian talking about a sort of 
agenda for medical law and I discovered one of the things I said then was medical law was 
the place where we should be working through and contribute to the debate on law and 
moral problems and then I discovered in 2006 that. But I think you are absolutely right, it is 
a, long standing theme in jurisprudence and you will expect to see more of it in medical law 
than actually we have in its absence. Harris told me a few months ago that he regarded Life's 
Dominion of Dworkin as the best book on bioethics ever written. [Dworkin was Harris 
doctoral supervisor so he is biased]. If you read the main stream work on law and medical 
ethics, it is surprisingly weak on justifying the use of the law in issues of moral controversy in 
society. it sort of assume that you are having  a debate  on what the right ethical position is 
and it is ok just to use the law as a s a tool for helping people do it. But I think that is 
problematic. If you look at how I start my book, I start with the political process which 
produces law, the scope from international conventions, the type of law that they produce. 
What parliament does and I am very interested in (Hidden Law Making- a paper submitted 
to journal) - tries to look at how judges get involved in making law. It is again the role of 
judges in adjudication that Dworkin wrote about. I am looking at what has been exposed in 
the Nitson litigation around whether or not the court should get involve in creating a mercy 
killing defence to murder. The orthodox position as per Lord Brown Wilkinson in Bland’s 
case, in this controversial areas judges should not do this it should be left to parliament and 
yet in lots of cases judges do it; so why is it sometimes they dent do it in others. so we argue 
that a proper account need to be given of this which I believe to be a an account based on 
what John Austin called tacit legislation, with implicit parliamentary oversight, it can change 
what judges do it, or is based upon human rights argument that there are legitimate thing 
that irrespective of what government or parliament think judges should protect because 
311 
 
they are issues of fundamental human rights. I think we have not asked enough question 
about the constitutional law structure of medical law; how it should be made and how it is 
legitimate to do so. And so over the last 5 years it has become more bothering to me and I 
think it is a big phase of what I expect to be doing next.  
[Q How relevant is the issue of judicial activism / passivism] JM all that literature is relevant. 
to testing out those of sort of questions  on the medical law context but I am surprised when 
I look at it. If you compare the piece that Penny Lewis wrote about Purdy case and Prey v 
DPP Guideline and the piece that I wrote about it. My piece was based upon a lecture I had 
given a year or so. Although the final version is able to reflect what Penny wrote, I crafted it 
before I knew it but when I looked that what I realised was that it rather reinforced the 
point that I was anxious about which is as well as asking what the law should be on the 
physician assisted decided prosecution, we also need to ask question about how it should be 
made. and I though it was outrageous how the law in Purdy case decided to force DPP to 
work out law on physician assisted suicide and the reason I though it was particularly 
outrageous, it was  before parliament earlier. If it had not been before parliament there is a 
legitimate argument that if parliament won’t act, the courts have to step in and try and 
refine the law. But you could not make that argument in the Purdy case so I thought the 
Purdy case was constitutionally illegitimate. Penny does not like the way in which the 
current law is restricted on assisted dying; so she knows the two dimension of the problem. 
This has led me in the last few years to realise there is a lot more to this than I though in 
2011.   
 
 The courts, legal profession and the emergence of a distinct body of health care law.  
8. How would you describe the posture of the courts and legal profession generally 
toward this field of law? 
JM: I think there is a historical perspective here and I think if you look at the period until 
2000, the best explanation of both what court and parliament have done was the 
explanation I argue in the 1989 in the Law and Medicine accountability which was shake by 
very friendly attitude towards doctors that believe in the fact that doctors were 
fundamentally trying to do the right thing .That is what I describe in the Law and 
Demoralisation as integration thesis'. And why I think lots of academic legal commentators 
and some of the legal practitioners were very anxious about that because they thought it 
didn't properly hold doctors to account., I think the law makers both in parliament and in 
the court held on to that till the late 1990s and then I think there begins to emerge an 
interest more in patient rights and I will point to two major features of that which is in my 
writings. One is the loss of confidence in medicine-m this is what Harry Wolf picked up in his 
lecture that was published in the medical law review-are the courts too deferential to 
medicine. I was already exploring that a lot bit when I did my Current Legal Problems 
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published in 2000 about in the wake of Bristol, Alderhays scandals, the idea that we could 
just trust doctors became more problematic.  The other I will attribute to James Munby's 
emerging interest in using rights and I wrote on that on Law and Demoralisation under the 
heading ' the new model judge'. I think if you look at what is happening since about 2000 
there is more and more judicial intervention and activism going on. If you go back that 
literature you alluded to that about passive and active judges think our judiciary is becoming 
more active. I don’t think it more widespread now but I do think since 2000 it has been 
much more mixed and now that James Munby is such a senior Judge I will be interested to 
see whether it moves even further in that direction because I think that he is a very brilliant 
lawyer and I will put him the same category as Lord Denning and in the same way that I 
think he is brilliant lawyer and I am not sure I like the way he is taking things. I will take that 
as a historical shift. In the late 1970s through the 80s up to the late 1990s the attitude or 
posturing being about reinforcing medical practice and not holding it to account. Then I 
think it has been more ambivalent and gradually becoming more interventionist and activist. 
I am not sure that will necessary make better for patient but I think the law is becoming a 
more assertive. 
[If you look at informed consent and the Bolam test, how the English courts] JM: if you trace 
that through I think. I wrote about Bolam in the late 1980s and thought that it dominated 
the whole area of HCL as opposed to what it was truly was. I then revisited it in 200 when I 
did CLP lecture asking whether Bolitho had changed Bolam and my conclusion was that it 
hadn’t. I thought most of the activities there on improving the law around consent. So if you 
looked at the guidance which the colleges had produced and the GMC had produced, it had 
moved away from Sidaway position to much nearer to informed consent much nearer Lord 
Scarman judgment. It still took a long time to come through. The most important piece on 
Cambridge Law Journal, she tries to explore whether or not Bolitho has really changed 
things. I think she is persuasive now that it has changed thing. But the most interesting thing 
is Chester v Ashfer; I think as a matter of strict law it is inconsistent with Sidaway and it 
should have followed Sidaway because you are not allowed not follow earlier HL decision. It 
is pretty impossible to tell what Chester v Ashfer seek to test as doing. And yet there has 
been sea change in the assumption, if you read Department of Health Guidance on Consent, 
it doesn’t cite Sidaway anymore. It just cites Chester vAsher.it is completely indefensible. I 
actually think that there has been driven by the courts; but I think that has been driven by 
the medical profession and the NHS; just deciding that Sidaway was not an acceptable 
position to take in the modern world. If you want see my take on Chester v Ashfer, check my 
article ‘law and moralisation of medicine.’  
 
9 Do you think that the courts and the legal profession could have contributed towards 




JM:  They could have become more interventionist earlier. I think there is a change in pattern now, 
they could have argued that standard of acre was to be fixed by courts and not doctors. A lot of legal 
professionals have worked with doctors to improve their approach to ethics and the like.  
The potential of English and Welsh health care law to be exported 
10. Are there aspects of the body of health care law in this country which you think 
could and should be emulated by other jurisdictions? 
JM: I think that is a question whi9ch is hard to ask in the abstract. You could study the law 
on transplant and see how it can be adapted to local systems. For example the Mental 
Health Act, you need adaptation but you can take the basic text not least because they were 
developed to respond to ECHR. There is a sense which is not on England specifically. You can 
take Mental Capacity Act, Human Tissue Act and translate. The statutory code which has a 
degree of internal coherence and great comprehension can be taken over into other 
jurisdictions. Whether they will be the ones to use, I think that is different. I think the 
common law tradition if my argument over the years has been right then whether it will 
make sense to take things like informed consent and our version standard care will depend 
upon how much confidence you had in the medical profession and its organization in the 
country you are talking about. If my argument in Law and Demoralization, described as the 
integrity thesis, our law is built on the assumption that you can rely in the profession having 
their own sense of values which we are only enforcing. If all depend upon how much 
confidence you have in Ghana in the professional regulation of doctors by themselves. if 
your assessment of the Ghanaian medical profession was that it it developed its standards 
and policed them carefully; it will then make sense to use our type of approach to regulate; 
if on the whether hand your impression of the Ghanaian medical profession was that 
actually it couldn't be trusted; I think we won’t be the best model to use to translate. If my 
thesis is right is right around the need to look at soft law and institutional structure, does 
Ghana had a socialised medicine system that can create these values and help people live by 
them and give guidance on how to do it. if you did then that thesis will translate quite well 
but if you what you have is lots of individual practitioner who are very autonomous and the 
payment systems are fragmented and lots cannot afford anything; then I am not sure that 
the English system  will work because it is too colored by the particular NHS context to easily 
transplant. So I will be nervous to transplant except places that had those sort of health 
system. 
 
11. Which direction do you think English and Welsh health care law is currently facing - 
towards the patient or medical profession? Or something or someone else? 
JM: Up until these latest things; might be facing different direction. On court basis. Most of 
the legislature structure, the working target of our law is to advise doctors on what is 
expected of them and shape what they are supposed to do so if you take the mental 
314 
 
capacity Act it could have said that if a patient doesn't have capacity you have to do XYZ but 
what actually does is to say that the doctor has a defence that he was without consent, if 
they reasonably believe that the patient doesn’t pass this test. Abortion legislation doesn't 
say it is  only lawful to carry pregnancy when there is risk of carrying is outweighed; it says if 
two doctors in good faith believe that; so all those things tell us in the way Sidaway 
demonstrate that what our law should ask itself how we should regulate professional 
practice and not what a patient entitled to. More recently what patient is entitled to be 
coming to the fore a little bit more so I think it is facing towards regulation of the profession. 
I don't necessarily mean that makes it worse for patient that is a separate debate about 
whether facing that way and reinforcing the value we in the end help the patients or not. 
Sometimes it does other times it doesn’t. I will say facing the medical profession it does that 
because it is believed by the lawmakers, judges and parliament that are in the interest of 
patient so it is not choosing medicine instead of patient it is choosing medicine because of 
patient; it doesn’t mean they are right to do that. The judges and legislature have thought 
health profession that it is good thing for them to be there as they do valuable things so 
legal regulation is to help them to do right things and then if you look at Shipman Inquiry 
and scandals in the NHS; that breaks down as a working assumption and therefore you will 
begin to think differently how you should regulate things.  
 
12. What advice will you give to a developing country with a common law tradition like 
Ghana, which is seeking to draw lessons from the experience of England and Wales in this 
field of law? 
JM: I wouldn't want to give advice because I will feel a bit colonialist! But if you want an opinion on 
recommendation about informed consent for Ghana, I think I will say you need to think hard about 
the culture and health system you are going into; sop informed consent is I think essentially an 
American doctrine based upon the idea that people have lots of access to information; well 
educated; they live relatively independent lives of each other so you have this kind of atomistic idea 
that it is only about them and their decision. That already breaks down in our context where they see 
decisions as family decisions and we know that in areas like genetic medicine where the idea is that 
people think it is just about me as opposed  to how I share it with my children or my partner that 
already is  problematic and we see it when look at things like doctrine e of undue influence who go 
and take advice from their faith leaders and their spouses we think that this might be undue 
pressure; that is where they get their advice from and that I s what they think is the right thing to do. 
So I will encourage you what are the social structure and how do they operate; so fi your culture is 
largely family based; your version of informed consent should not include say breach of 
confidentiality to tell family; it should when it is right or wrong to do that. in terms of access to 
information informed consent needs to reflect the type of educational level you are dealing with and 
of you have informed consent which stop people who are not literate being able to do to informed 
consent because you have to sign consent form it doesn’t give you what you are after; what you are 
after is about empowering people to having decision that they are comfortable with their own 
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bodies. Don't start with are the rule sin UK; start with how do we improve the lots of patients in our 
system and then work out which legal systems have solved similar problems.  
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Semi-structured interview Guide 
1. Law and Medicine’s relationship before 1980s 
a. How did the law relate to issues arising in health care during the long period before 
1980? 
Before the 1980, it won’t be easy to describe a development of law that systematically dealt 
with relationship between doctors and patients or healthcare generally. The law came out of 
criminal law and it was analysed like that. The initial scholars who dealt medical law were 
really criminal lawyers looking at issues like death and dying, transplantation. Probably the 
greatest legal academic of all times in England and Wales, Glanville Williams wrote about 
those kinds of issues; and he was actually criminal lawyer even though he was a legal 
polemic since he knew most of the law. He wrote on abortion, transplantation with focus for 
lawyers; there was nothing high level abstraction in medical negligence. There was 
smattering of cases like that. Actually, what is interesting is primarily, the criminal law was 
the how the academic analysed as far as there was any medical law. Practitioners in fact 
criminal law was rarely used to prosecute anybody in a medical case; there are some famous 
prosecutions of doctors for unlawful abortion ( The Bourne Case); and the famous case of 
the pediatrician in 1981 ( R v Arthur) and also the only thing you heard about them was the 
trial. Because very often the criminal trial of a doctor ended up in a verdict of acquittal and 
summing up of judge but never got to the appellate case. By contrast there were medical 
negligence cases, they were not many though, that went to the court regularly before the 
1980 and even before the 1970s it was just a handful of cases. 
There wasn’t' in fact no medical law going on in the court about the odd prosecution and a 
smattering of medical negligence cases; it was completely undeveloped in the courts. Kennedy once 
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said in an article he wrote about informed consent on Sidaway ; that at one time all you had to was 
few Victorian statutes and couple of criminal case ; there wasn’t much and after that you had to just 
make it up. But it has changed now. 
b. Why did the law relate to medicine in the way it did. 
 
AG: There was much less interest by the general public in how doctors behaved. Doctors 
were seen as central figuring in medicine with patients; much less public interest in 
questioning what they did; doctors were the kings of their castle; masters of their real; kings 
of the realm, therefore the courts and lawyers through litigation rarely became involved. If 
something wen t wrong it was rarely challenged in the legal way. Academics were slightly 
ahead of that. This is because academic work out what should happen in the court rather 
than what has really happening most of the time. Glanville Williams, Peter Skegg and 
Kennedy were the grandfathers of medical law in the UK. They were slightly ahead of the 
game in questioning how the law dealt with relationship between doctor and patient; and of 
course Kennedy was the Unmasking of the Medicine started to cause society and chartering 
classes to think about doctors and whether their decisions should be challenged and if so 
how should it be  questioned. 
 
c. As an academic did you have research interest in matters relating to law and health 
care before the 1980s 
 
AG: NO; because I was a student then. So I did not have any research interest since I was a 
student of law. Medical law was not something that I ever heard of as a student. I went to 
University of Cambridge and medical law was never a subject then; I had never heard of it. It 
was only when I started to teach that medical law came into my head as something to be 
looked at it. I was the first person to start a course in medical law for law students in 
Cambridge. 
2. The Surge in academic interest in Law and Medical Ethics post 1980 
a. How did you develop an interest in law and medical ethics? 
AG: When I first started teaching in the Cambridge in the early 1980s in the law school; 
there had been long time an elective course for medical students started by Glanville 
Williams' it was popular for medical students. Because it I had been started by Glanville; it 
was run by the law faculty so when I got there I was asked to take it on by running. Because I 
was teaching criminal law. I was criminal lawyer and a tort lawyer; administrative law lawyer 
because we have the NHS by the government. So I had three main interests that might have 
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worked. There was no medical lawyer so I took it on. Gradually I got interested in it. The 
courses consisted of few lectures from me and guest lecturers by people from medical 
background and lawyers including Ian Kennedy. On evening in a bar I said to him I was trying 
to write a book on medical law and he accepted that we should write to ether and first 
edition came out in 1989. The reality it the more I got into it the more I became a medical 
lawyer. Within 6 years I really got into it and did lots because the materials were 
accumulating so there were lots to grapple with. After 5 or 6 years I called myself medical 
lawyer because I wanted to do. I started a course with colleague in Family; which was 
becoming popular children's interest etc. We started an elective in 3rd year for law students 
in Cambridge in 1986 or 7 thereabout.  
 
b. Did you encounter any challenges as you embarked upon publication of your 
research in this new area of the law? 
 
AG: I don’t recall any difficulties for example in traditional law journal saying what is this all 
about. Most of the general journals would published papers on medical law; MLR for e.g. 
LQR. CLJ being generalist journals; if you wrote a good enough paper I did not matter it was 
medical law. The subject grew such that the generalist journal could potentially become 
overwhelmed by the materials so I and Kennedy started the Medical Law Review in 1993 
and subsequently Medical Law International also came up in Cardiff where I taught for a 
while. That was really the time that the generalist journals could not cope with increasing 
papers by many academics coming into the area. I didn’t have any difficulties with publishers 
or other academics coming into it. If it was good enough it went and vice versa 
 
c. Can you explain if there was particular objective (s) which you wanted to pursue by 
focusing your academic interest towards this area of the law? 
 
AG: I found it fascinating. I suppose all others young academics the best advice that older 
academic gave younger academic in terms of research is find your own niche. Medical law 
which I happen to come into because of the course I was asked to run so I got a kind of 
eclectic interest in law. I have never been intereste4d in just tort, criminal law etc. I like a 
mix match if I can. So medical law which was relatively untouched in terms of systematic 
analysis and I had to borrow from different areas of the law suited my academic personality.  
I read science in the secondary school. I was generally interested in scientific area. So I 
became quite interested to the extent that I could do it to master what was going in medical 
field as well especially reproduction genetics which was quite technical; so I like a kind of the 
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background factual areas which was coming up rather than being interested in bridge 
building or planning not really interested in that. I found doctoring interesting and 
developing the law from different areas just suited me at the time. 
d. Do you consider that there was surge in academic interest in law and medical ethics 
post 1980? If you consider there was a surge, please can you explain why you think this 
happened? 
AG: There was demystifying of the role of professionals in society and so challenging 
professional judgement was suddenly not a taboo; doctor and nurses making profound 
decisions which have profound effect on people. I think it was par to the demystifying 
professional in general. Academic interest in medial law grew slightly ahead of people 
litigating over it. It was just lawyers here. There was stream of academic interest by others 
medical ethics, philosophy. A very distinguished moral philosopher Jonathan Glover was 
interested ling before that. His book causing LIFE AND DEATH is a classic. It was equivalent of 
Skegg's book on Law and Medicine. Peter Skegg was a very distinguished academic and how 
work was both authoritative and settled. He contributed enormously to development of 
medical law in the common law world. He taught in in UK at Oxford substantial part of his 
career. 
My concern was simply that Skegg was fundamentally a criminal lawyer and used at, medical 
law from criminal law perspective and there was nothing wrong with that; but when I was 
starting I was trying to do that through the eyes of other areas in medical law. So peter's 
book is absolutely definitive on criminal law perspective. But I am interested in broadening 
our understanding of medical law from A to Z whereas Skegg’s work comes with much 
nuanced authoritative analysis from point of view of criminal law.  
 
 
3. The courts, legal profession and the emergence of a distinct body of health care 
law.  
a. How would you describe the posture of the courts and legal profession generally 
toward this field of law? 
 
AG: It was very gradual' the emergence of medical law issue in the courts to a level now that 
we have even a medical law report to some extent. The courts were and are moving 
cautiously forward in medical law and a lot of the cases take more steps without taking 
grand forward leap like academic. There is now body of lawyers who will describe 
themselves as medical lawyers. I practiced in a chambers where there was substantial 
portion of the lawyers who did medical law; once upon a time you did only medical or 
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clinical negligence but it means so many other things now a days life and death decision; 
judicial review ; challenging funding decisions resources allocation; and entire panoply of 
functions carry out at public law level regularly subject to challenge in the court and there 
are lawyers to provide the service to allow the challenges to be taken forward; so legal 
profession has embraced medical law and the court has done that too. Though the 
development of it is being or as it is a correct approach for a judge one step at a time as is 
necessary; that is not what academic s to take all the steps to see where it line discussion 
ultimately goes and they are not representing a particular client but seeking to explore 
issues that arise in particular area an d can go further than judges can. One area that judge 
has dutiful is area of moral issues for moral philosophers and this is purely coincidental; 
lawyers don't have any expertise in moral philosophy some do but it is not because they are 
lawyers because they were interested in it. That is equally if not more likely to be true , 
judges and so when issues are debated in the two professional; realm: law and philosophy ; 
the interaction between those is quite difficult  for judges and you can see that in cases like 
PVS case Tony Bland or Conjoined twins case; when they are presented with pure argument 
based upon philosophy it is difficult for judges to adjudicated because that is not what they 
do or where they came from; and perhaps it is not what the court is about but it is almost 
impossible to think about the problem of what you do in the conjoined twin case; one will 
die or one will survive in operation or withdraw ANH from a PVS patient it is difficult to see 
without looking at both sides so  you get some judges looking across from both disciplines to 
help them with their legal arguments.  
 
b. Do you think that the courts and the legal profession could have contributed 
towards the development of this area of the law differently? Please explain. 
 
AG: No I think that the courts and lawyers are concerned with things that people want to litigate 
over; unlike academics who can do whatever they consider interesting. It is possible in the medical 
law cases which Ian Kennedy called for; which are courts issuing declaratory judgments even though 
the point has not matured yet; for e.g. a criminal law point does the court need to wait to get 
prosecution address rather than asking civil court to resolve it. It is possible that in medical law 
context, Ian Kennedy called for it including the Gillick case and the case on Guide to Self-Deliverance, 
a hand book on means to commit suicide- whether it will be a crime. Judges don't like hypotheticals 
but they have tried their best to work with that. 
 
4. The potential of English and Welsh health care law to be exported 
a. Are there aspects of the body of health care law in this country which you think 
could and should be emulated by other jurisdictions? 
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AG: Our top judges in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are very able and lots of 
our judgments are given by those judges. Consideration and though inn any country which 
has similar issues arise just like the way our judges look at Australian and Canadian 
decisions; ; those judgments are reflection on other countries. I suppose one area we 
perhaps led, we weren’t the first to do it , but our scheme has worked very well in practice is 
the area of fertility treatment; not the precise wording but the way the structure of decision 
making and  licensing and the regulation through the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Fertility has worked in the UK (n I was a member of it for a period of years) is a reflection of 
it on countries of trying to regulate that aspect of medical practice because we seem to have 
done quite well.  
b. Which direction do you think English and Welsh health care law is currently facing - 
towards the patient or medical profession? Or something or someone else? 
AG: It is not easy to answer that. I don’t think our law can be said to point to one clear direction only. 
We are living in a society which has come to embrace rights; patients have rights more often that we 
think of doctors as having rights. But usually we start our analysis with the right of the individual so 
that extent it is facing towards patients than any other way but that doesn’t mean necessarily that 
[patient rights will necessary turn every case; that is just reflection of our society as a whole and not 
medical law as such; the emergence of rights based analysis as a result of incorporation of Human 
Rights Act permeate all areas. 
c. What advice will you give to a developing country with a common law tradition like 
Ghana, which is seeking to draw lessons from the experience of England and Wales in this 
field of law? 
Developing it through t6 the courts is a haphazard exercise because it depends upon the 
case coming upon and judges naturally inclination is not decide more than they need to 
decide so you may establish some principles and resolve a particular person's case but you 
don't get guidance as it may apply elsewhere because the judges are not interested in that. 
Some judges’ are more expansive than others. so developing through the courts can take 
long time. But some areas can be regulated through the courts because the court s =give 
right yes or no answer. And that is how it should be that is kind of public policy at grand level 
which can be done by legislature and consultation; which the courts don’t before they give 
decision. What we now call stakeholders; there is huge number of the rose in any particular 
areas of medical law in which it is important to know stake. So development through the 
courts is only a small part of development medical law. The majority of it and all regular 
aspects will need to be done through the democratic purpose of legislation including 
consultation. those can be very painstaking slow and difficult to ever find consensus on; 
because there are as many as different views on many controversial issues so it is difficult to 




Q. when we say medical law, where is the medical law because often we draw upon areas of 
the law 
AG: Like many subjects like Property law is probably not breakable down to an own 
constituents. It is a bit like fundamental Particles in Physics most particles are made up of 
the particles yet they look different. Proton ' neutrons are made up of quarts. Likewise there 
are quarts in law; and most law is neutron or protons bigger particle size. Medical Law is 
really a blend other things but it is own unique blend of other things and that is why it is 
medical law ; you have to know more about other things before you can know medical law. 
 
You might give some thought to interactions between philosophers and lawyers; how does that 
affect medical law. That is possible influence if you look at influence which made the law what it is. 
Part of its unique blend of quarks; there is an element of moral philosophy that may shape the 
principles in a way that they are not shaped in other areas.  
 
 
END. END. END. END. END. 
NAME OF INTERVIEWEE: MARGOT BRAZIER 
MODE: FACE TO FACE MEETING 
 
1. Law and Medicine’s relationship before 1980s 
a. How did the law relate to issues arising in health care during the long period before 
1980s? 
 
MB: [As a general background I don’t know if you have looked at the history of family law in 
this country since it also emerged in the post 1950s. It was only the later 1950s that family 
law emerged largely because first text book was published by Peter Bromley. There is 
interesting parallel between family law and medical law. If you can, do talk to Professor 
Cretney, who was a pioneer in family law. Many of the people in medical law came from 
family law, jurisprudence and tort backgrounds. Medical law draws together many strands 
of different legal disciplines. I tell students medical law is a good revision tool because to do 
well in medical law you have to be good with your tort, criminal law, human rights law, 
family law, property law. I challenge them that it is a rigorous discipline. It has so many 
strands that can take a while to bring them together. I think the true father of medical law in 
England and Wales is Skegg and he is the greatest influence on my career] 
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I think that we have neglected the fact that there is a long history of the law’s involvement in 
medicine, if you look back in 16 and 17th centuries, a number of cases went to court between 
patients and physicians and surgeons; there were also cases where college of surgeons fighting 
college of physicians. There was quite a lot of discussion in the media about what we call medical 
law, quite critical of quacks. Once the different medical professions came together in 1858 with 
Medical Act 1858. And even more as the state took over funding of medicine; there came period 
when litigation more or less disappeared and there was a period of extreme deference to medics. 
Although there were cases towards 1950s and beyond; it was the medical gentlemen who must be 
right. In England lots of people were hesitant to challenge medics with the inception of NHS: most 
people were so grateful to be able to get medical care free;  go to the doctor for free. That gratitude 
inhibited criticism for a very long time. It seems about 30 years so it took a generation to grow up 
who took NHS for granted. I think medical law went into abeyance for about 100 years and then 
began to rise in early 1980s. There is a physician called Thomas Percival but also wrote extensive 
tome on medical jurisprudence in the 1800’a; they have got it in John Ryland’s library in Deansgate.  
 
b. Why did the law relate to medicine in the way it did. 
There are several different reasons. People were much less likely to litigate generally; so we moved 
gradually towards much more litigious society. Social attitudes began to change; between 1950s in 
England, vast majority of people had very conservative values; vast majority attended some sort of 
church so views on things like sexual conduct; family life were very much uniform and the other 
factor was gradually development of medicine created all sorts of new dilemmas which did not exist 
before; so that if in the 1950s a baby was born 32 - 33 weeks into gestation ; it was very unlikely to 
survive; few babies did but no decision had to be made but as neonatal  care develop so that you 
could  resuscitate babies at younger age and younger age; so problems arose as there would  be 
disagreements between parents or between parents and doctors; as  social cohesion became less 
and people got different views on morals . Thus you begin to get case like Gillick- challenging 
contraceptives to unmarried young daughter- if the case had been heard in 1950s, it would have 
been laughed at;   the idea that unmarried 16 year old can get access to contraceptives in 1951 
would have been just too awful to go into newspapers. And development of different forms   likes 
transplantation. It is not one thing but different things happening almost at the same time- changes 
in social attitudes and changes in medicine. 
 
c. As an academic did you have research interest in matters relating to law and health 
care before the 1980s 
 
MB:  I got interested in late 1970s; my work was in professional negligence generally. So I 
wrote a paper on solicitors and surveyors; I got to doctors and I found that it is so much 
more  interesting and I started to read Canadian cases on informed consent and that 
gradually urged me into medical law. I think I wrote my first article on “Informed Consent to 
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Medical Care" I wrote it during my maternity leave in 1979 (but it might have been 
published in 1980). It was based largely in Canadian cases because there was very little 
English law so gradually I became interested in it. One thing about medical law is I met and 
worked with people who are not lawyers. So I met John Harris, Tony Dyson, and Dr Mary 
Lobjoit who was fantastic pioneer insisting that we should teach medical ethics to medical 
students. So combination of these things got me interested in medical law. 
 
2. The Surge in academic interest in Law and Medical Ethics post 1980 
a. How did you develop an interest in law and medical ethics? 
 
MB: [answer: same as above) 
b. Did you encounter any challenges as you embarked upon publication of your 
research in this new area of the law? 
 
MB: It was made easier by the fact that I was not taken seriously by the law school at the 
time as was expected to go part time after having a baby. I had people who supported me; 
Professor Bromley who had similar experience with family law. I did the first edition of my 
book in 1987. The hard aspect was incorporating teaching medical law in the LLB teaching. 
We set up a Masters degree aimed at medical profession and possibly lawyers. I wanted to 
teach medical law to undergraduates; there was debate in the faculty board which I won by 
1 vote. A number of people said it was not a proper subject; but now it is taken for granted 
and is a popular subject with students. I didn't have difficulties with publishers. 
c. Can you explain if there was particular objective (s) which you wanted to pursue by 
focusing your academic interest towards this area of the law? 
MB: Medicine is such important part of human life. Whatever we do all of us have contact 
with medical profession all our life. With medical care you can lose your life or your life can 
be made so valueless that you can do nothing for your life. I was interested in consent; 
information disclosure; new technologies coming. I had  much in mind to do work resulting 
in law and policy to be better. Managing and negotiating difficult balance between rights of 
patients. Recognising that doctors are not machines and that they do their work in 
circumstances quite different from other professionals. The way Bolam was interpreted that 
if a doctor said is ok that is ok was wrong. But if a trainee solicitor makes a mistake 
something is wrong in the firm; if he gets up in the night he can say I will fix it tomorrow. If a 
trainee surgeon  gets something wrong, the consequences are disastrous; medics don’t have 
the same control of their working conditions so you cannot say that you are really too tired I 
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am not going to that operation or anaesethetise  the patient; if there is nobody else to do 
that you have to do it. So in framing principles of medical law you have to think of patient as 
the Centre of what you  are doing and also the professional who works in unique 
circumstances from other professionals. 
 
 
d. Do you consider that there was surge in academic interest in law and medical 
ethics post 1980? If you consider there was a surge, please can you explain why you think 
this happened? 
 
MB: There is so much to do. All things you have talked about before changes. Changes in 
medicine, technology and society. So it needs lots of people to address all those questions. 
More and more academic lawyers and professional practitioners became much more 
socially aware much more interested in the kind of law not much more akin to property law, 
contract etc. The influx of women into academia made quite a lot of difference. Of the 
younger generation of medical lawyers I will say two thirds are women and I think they are 
the very successful ones. For what I am going to say I have to be cautious because of my 
feminist colleagues but I think just as in medicine you see women becoming pediatricians so 
in medical law lots of women came in; although there are women who are wonderful 
commercial lawyers and similarly male colleagues who are wonderful medical lawyers. The 
subject matter attracted women. One of the things medical law does for academics in way 
not all other areas of law does; it offers opportunity for you to do things outside the 
university system. You get opportunity with Department of Health, medical profession; 
Ministry of Justice. 
3. The courts, legal profession and the emergence of a distinct body of health care 
law.  
a. How would you describe the posture of the courts and legal profession generally 
toward this field of law? 
 
MB: Within the profession itself the evolution of medical law practitioners more or less 
parallel medical law academics. For instance, in the late 1980 there were relatively few 
people who were skilled medical law solicitors or barristers but now there are lot; and there 
is lot of interaction between academic and medical law practice too. In terms of judges it is 
trite changes in judicial attitude in 1950s that doctors could never been wrong to change in 
Chester v Afshar. we have seen the evolution of a cohort of judges who although they don’t 
exclusively do medical law because that is not how the judiciary works, predominantly do 
325 
 
medical law cases: eg Mr Justice Hedly, who has taken most of the surrogacy cases family 
and medical law, Lord Thorpe  Shaw in the court of appeal, Baroness Hale who was a 
distinguished mental health lawyer as academic and is now in the Supreme court. In  many 
of the earlier cases judges were dismissive of patient with the apparent reason that 
medicine is too complicated we cannot make judgement on that; but they did it on 
engineering and will quite happy to work through complicated engineering evidence; but 
that is all changed judges will now go through  medical evidence in equal measure. 
 
b. Do you think that the courts and the legal profession could have contributed 
towards the development of this area of the law differently? Please explain. 
 
MB: Well, I think we have seen on a couple of occasions, folks try to turn the clock back 
towards conservative approach, one example is MacFarlane case. There could be tension at 
the moment within judicial system, some people pulling back because of all the worry over 
compensation culture and worry over NHS; on the issue where medical law interact with 
social values or morals again there is tension; between very conservative judgement and 
hands off judgement like Mr Justice Munby  on the morning after pill saying that the law has 
no business here. The increasing difficulty in bringing claims; abolition of legal aid so 
ordinary medical negligence case is going to become very difficult. Government wants to 
make it much more difficult to bring claim to judicial review so cases in which people 
challenge allocation for health care resources are going to be much more difficult. 
 
4. The potential of English and Welsh health care law to be exported 
a. Are there aspects of the body of health care law in this country which you think 
could and should be emulated by other jurisdictions? 
MB: It is always useful to look at examples if your jurisdiction has not developed medical 
law.  It is better where the legal systems are the same. Problem with comparative medical 
law is that we tend to compare only common law systems because of language barrier and 
difference in legal tradition. Things like laws on transplant can be adapted to suit your local 
circumstances. The HFEA is attractive as many people from abroad look at it as example. if a 
jurisdiction outside sees a problem it is useful to look critically at England and find out how 
good was it or bad was it and say we are going to take the good bit ; how do they apply to 
my country resources; religion are all important factors. 
b. Which direction do you think English and Welsh health care law is currently facing - 
towards the patient or medical profession? Or something or someone else? 
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MB: In so far as the law is evolving by case law the courts generally think patients are centre 
of problem; I will say they are pro patients but not mindlessly. They are aware of what is 
being asked of doctors. So far law  on health care  has been developed through legislation, in 
that domain the medical profession still has pretty sound grip on what goes on in policy. 
 
c. What advice will you give to a developing country with a common law tradition like 
Ghana, which is seeking to draw lessons from the experience of England and Wales in this 
field of law? 
MB: in so far as the country is makingits own particular advance in medical technology 
careful decisions need to be  taken about allocation of resources. It worries me in this 
country we put enormous of money in reproductive technology and we still have one of the 
highest death rates in developed world. in my view if your country had extra  money you 
could either develop pre-genetic diagnosis in Ghana or could put money into care of 
premature vulnerable babies. If you decide technology there are useful precedents to look 
at: transplant law etc. More generally the most important thing is to teach medical students 
properly. If we could produce in England and Ghana a generation of doctors who have good 
comprehension of the legal parameters in which they practice and train to reflect on ethics 
of what they do, then there will be less need for medical lawyers. 
[Medical law cannot claim strictly any particular principles of law as exclusively its own but 
we have got foundational law which create the building blocks of the legal system; tort, 
contract, equity, land law. Then we have got next part of lawyers training which is to apply 
the law to a crucial area of human life which may be family law, medical law, employment 
law ; so we have got kind of the founding blocks and law and; so medical law is law and.  
[ One issue which is important is to think about is the breakdown of moral cohesion in this 
country. And there is a tension in relationship between religion and medical law ; that seems 
to me a fact that states have to account of religion.   
 











NAME OF INTERVIEWEE:  KEN MASON (KM) AND GRAEME LAURIE (GL) 
DATE: 15/10/2013 TIME: 19:00 
MODE: SKYPE VIDEO CONFERENCE 
 Semi-structured interview Guide 
1. Law and Medicine’s relationship before 1980s 
a. How did the law relate to issues arising in health care during the long period before 
1980s? 
b. Why did the law relate to medicine in the way it did. 
c. As an academic did you have research interest in matters relating to law and health 
care before the 1980s 
 
KEN MASON (KM):  
There has always been medical law in so far medicine has always been subject to the law. 
What you are referring to here is medical law as organized discipline subject of it. If you 
talking about medical law as a discipline then I have no doubt that it was the series of 
lectures given by Ian Kennedy which arouse peoples’ minds and marked the start of the 
subject.  The lectures arouse peoples’ minds as to different views of medical law rather than 
just as a matter of medical negligence. It made medical law to be viewed also as a matter of 
medical ethics If you like the lectures made people see medical law not just as negligence 
but  rather a matter of medical ethics. At the same time and quite fortuitously, the subject 
was being developed in Scotland by Sheila McLean in Glasgow. She had also started writing 
on medical law in the small text and articles but not monograph as Kennedy did. She edited 
chapters of very small books. Nonetheless if you look back those writings were important. 
Kennedy published the Unmasking of Medicine in 1981. Kennedy is still the one who started 
the discipline of medical law. 
It should be negligence .If people asked you what you mean about medical law, the answer 
would be the law of medical negligence. The way that medical law was being taught in the 
universities was by Department of forensic medicine. Forensic medicine was a matter of 
pathology; I chose to follow it as medical practice. We call medical law here by the title, 
medical jurisprudence. I started teaching it around 1980s. I taught it with Alexander McCall 
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Smith.  Before 1980, you expected your doctor to behave in correct proper way and the 
effect of Kennedy was to question our original belief in doctors. 
 
Graeme Laurie (GL): There are two books which Sheila McLean edited in the 1970s- Legal 
Issues in Medicine and Medicine Morals and the Law. Legal Issues in Medicine is interesting 
book because it is a collection of essays: a lot them talked about criminal law issues. Before 
1980s the law engaged with doctors either in criminal context or negligence law. Indeed, 
McCall Smith came into medical law as a criminal lawyer and not tort of law. What we have 
seen is that in the post 1980s we have had less of criminal law as other areas of the law have 
grown up in broadening their perspectives on the law and medicine relationship. Britain and 
other European countries were taking a lot of lead from America so lot of it was around 
litigation but because UK was no very litigious we didn’t have a body of law as such.it was 
something on the radar in UK until Kennedy and Mclean began to question authority of 
medical profession. I could not have had interested in medical law before 1980s as I was a 
child. I studied medical law from 1987 to 89. It was immediately after the Sidaway case; 
same time as the Gillick case; so I think it was very good time to study medical law because 
they landmark decision was laid down at the time I was interested in the subject; so lots of 
discussion we had in class was about deference of the court to the medical profession. My 
degree was in forensic medicine. 
 
2. The Surge in academic interest in Law and Medical Ethics post 1980 
a. How did you develop an interest in law and medical ethics? 
KM: I was interested in the legal aspect of forensic medicine. I read a book by David Myers. It was 
very powerful book. When I read that I felt that was where I wanted forensic medicine to go. The 
book dealt with wide range issues. It was a lawyer speaking and not a doctor speaking. Our first book 
was in 1983. The book is now in 9th edition (2013).It was first and only book intended as 
comprehensive. There has been explosion in parliamentary intervention and case law which did not 
happen in the 1980s.  
GL: A lot of it was either posed us negligence where we need significant deference of the 
courts to medical profession or it was a matter of criminal law; and we did not believe that 
there was place of law in the spaces between negligence and criminal law. 
GL: I couldn’t make a decision between becoming a lawyer and a becoming a doctor. I 
decided to take law and studied at Glasgow University which at the time speciaisled in 
medical law for two years. The degree was four years but two of which was used in studying 




b. Did you encounter any challenges as you embarked upon publication of your 
research in this new area of the law? 
 
KM: I was inspired after reading Kennedy and Myers book then I became interested. My 
original contribution was a book  
GL: Challenges was ore about lack of legal precedents. So for example the first thing I ever 
wrote on this area was legal liability for transmission of HIV Aids. That was an article 
commissioned by the Journal of law Society. My problem was there was no real legal 
authority so I had to rely on reasoning by legal analogy. From the existing law you had to 
reason by analogy; there was undeveloped case law except in the established areas of 
medical negligence. Throughout the 1980s there were very few statutes so you had to look 
at the existing areas of law whether they are tort law or criminal law. 
c. Can you explain if there was particular objective (s) which you wanted to pursue by 
focusing your academic interest towards this area of the law? 
GL: After my undergraduate degree I did my PhD and I was interested in privacy and 
confidentiality; that is an area of the law which does not cover only health context but 
banking etc.  I became interested in how the law reconginse privacy issues in health context 
so I did my PhD in privacy in genetics. The privacy of genetic information in family context 
was not addressed adequately by the law at the time. One thing about medical law is 
thinking about how law responds to confidential circumstances. So you take genetics, you 
can find something about a disease in a family it might affect many members of the family 
but who information is it ; does it belong to the family; should the doctors respect to respect 
confidentiality of the patient and not tell the brothers and sisters; does he owe duty towards 
other members of the family. 
At the time I did not have any objective in mind but looking back I think medical law is 
interesting because it makes us deep questions about how much law can be an effective 
social tool.  If you want to develop deep medical jurisprudence you need different discipline 
to work together; you need to ask when law should intervene in medicine and when is it 
appropriate to leave matters to medical discretion. So what I have been interested in is that 
question of limits of law in medicine. 
d. Do you consider that there was surge in academic interest in law and medical ethics 
post 1980? If you consider there was a surge, please can you explain why you think this 
happened? 
GL: In the 1980s there were not that many medical lawyers that you know about - Kennedy, 
Brazier, Grubb, McCall, Mason, Sheila. The real explosion was in the 1990s and after 2000. I 
think the passing of the HRA 1998 is an important date because that was the year in which 
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HL decided the Bolitho case- the first time that court began to say we need to control 
standard of care for medical profession. 
Historically, medical law has been a marginal aspect of family law; human rights etc. There 
are still few chambers that specialize in medical law but that is changing. If you look at the 
court particularly the HC in E & W; over the last 50 years they have taken interest I 
particularly in certain core concepts but I am not sure that in itself is a good thing; I think the 
courts are becoming more paternalistic particularly if you look at the Judge Munby, now 
Lord President; He has a particular view of medical law which has been influential in shaping 
medical law in England and Wales. His contribution is open to critique; I think he has a very 
particular view on dignity, autonomy. I f you expose those views to other disciplinary 
perspectives especially bioethicists and philosophers' they will have very much to say. I think 
he has very much driven the court's intervention in medical law. 
 
Media has been actively reporting on medical law; there has been number of parliamentary 
intervention. So the profile of medical law has been raised for bad reasons: so that medical 
law has to come in a very reactive way. There are also number of scandals - organs; tissues 
etc. In a positive sense I think law schools have come to realise that actually human health is 
such a fundamental part of the human condition that we have  got to engage with the role 
of law in protecting and promoting human health and wellbeing; and actually medical has 
been seen as a very marginal area but if you look at the discipline you have to involve almost 
all areas of the law- private law; judicial review; public law; international law- thus medical 
law is incredibly rich and multi-dimensional.so medical law has progressed from being 
marginal area at the edges to the centre of law's role in society and teaching. 
Q: Can we say medical law is not a discrete field? 
 
 
3. The courts, legal profession and the emergence of a distinct body of health care law.  
a. How would you describe the posture of the courts and legal profession generally 
toward this field of law? 
KM: How strong was the impact of criminal thinking in the 1980s; the impact of some of the 
cases and how did that replace when the civil courts began to reflect more critical lee about 
the medical profession. Although we have always had criminal law but civil law engagement 
of medicine has increased during the last 30 years. There are core concepts and values that 
hold the different aspects of medical law together: the notion of autonomy; human health' 
dignity ' wellbeing; best interest; caring. These all require particular consideration of how 
law actual operates to protect human being and their health. We have developed rich 
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conceptualisation of dignity and autonomy; necessarily to lawyers and the courts but 
through the multi-disciplinary working we have come to appreciate far better what these 
concepts mean for human flourishing so I think these concepts sew medical law together 
rather than saying it is just aspect of contract; tort or any other areas of the law. 
 
b. Do you think that the courts and the legal profession could have contributed 
towards the development of this area of the law differently? Please explain. 
GL: if you look at the court and legal judgment we are only getting part of the picture about patients' 
experience in health care and health care professionals. Obviously cases that come to court are cases 
where the relationship broke down; patients’ right was not respected. So they are the bad cases; we 
have to remember that the cases that we read are very small part of people’s experience of caring 
relationship or how they think that the law support or ought to support them. The fact that we see 
recognition of autonomy; dignity and values that is important but we have got a long way together. 
 
 
4. The potential of English and Welsh health care law to be exported 
a. Are there aspects of the body of health care law in this country which you think 
could and should be emulated by other jurisdictions? 
 
JM. Medical law in Great Britain is shaped by the culture of British society; so talking about 
Ghana in West Africa you need to know the culture of the society in which medical law is 
being developed. We cannot dissociate culture from medical law. 
GL: One area interesting to examine is the way in which the courts have dealt with best 
interest test; for example best interest test in future treatment when they have to draw 
balance sheet about question on value of l life and quality of life that comes close to what 
healthcare professionals have to deal with patients in terrible circumstances. There may be 
some assistance from legal analysis there to health the health professionals take very 
difficult decisions. That might be good area but I resist in being too dogmatic about the role 






b. Which direction do you think English and Welsh health care law is currently facing - 
towards the patient or medical profession? Or something or someone else? 
JM & JK: Political rhetoric or agenda has made medical law more of patients focused. 
However, this over emphasis of rights means that it does not promote caring relationship; 
the more we assert patients’ rights it means more responsibilities for doctors and that make 
doctors more oppositional and it thereby draws patients and doctor apart. The autonomy of 
patients cannot be sustained because of resources constraint. The notion of patient 
autonomy is a flawed concept since you cannot give every patient all the relevant 
information. [ This view is based upon a chapter  we just worked on together] 
 
GL: it has definitely moved towards the patient but the consequence of that is the law is 
beginning to support patients’ abandonment. For example patient is entitled to information; 
the doctors provide it but it does not promote a caring relationship. 
 
c. What advice will you give to a developing country with a common law tradition like 
Ghana, which is seeking to draw lessons from the experience of England and Wales in this 
field of law? 
JM: Part of the problem of provision of resources; what resources can you provide. There is 
no pint in making law for something you cannot do if you have the money; the 
infrastructure, you could do. But don’t start making law that you cannot implement. 
Allocation of scarce resources is an important chapter in the book.  
GL: In England and Wales, the law drives the discipline of medical law. In Edinburgh we call it 
Medical jurisprudence because we see it necessarily as multidisciplinary area. What we have 
done in EW is that we have over legalise it; too much driven by the courts and parliament; 
but there is only so much that the law can do in developing caring relationship. One advice is 
don't ask too much of the law because the law is a crude tool to develop human relationship 
and core values. The courts have embraced core values of autonomy and dignity but the 
way that they interpreted that is very impoverished and is not something which is in the 
interest of doctor-patient relationship. 
Considering my answer to previous questions; I think there are some concepts that you need 
to reflect in the law but be careful that the law does not have to drive you in the direction 
you need to go, the law has try to support care and necessary developing notion of patient 
rights which pulls the doctor and patient apart is not a good idea. It is good to protect 
autonomy; dignity but don't forget that at the end of the people are in vulnerable position 
and need to have good relationship with their healthcare professional. 
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JM: There is no point in keeping people alive, who will normally have died, if you cannot 
feed them. So the things I will day is that - what resources do you have and what do you 
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